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THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 
IN THE CIVIL WAR 



BY 

/ 

JOHN FISKE 



Bellum atroz, multiplex, immane, pertinax 
cui simile nulla usquam narrat antiquitas 

JoBNANDBS, De Rebus Geticis, xl. 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

1900 



Office of thi 



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APfi2ll900 



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64846 



COPYRIGHT, 1900, BY JOHN FISKE 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



f-- 



FIRST C«PY. 






v^'-'x-ic^ r»c»^ci 



TO 

MY OLD FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE 

MARSHALL SOLOMON SNOW 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE 

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY AT ST. LOUIS 

THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED 



PREFACE 

In the course of my annual visit to St. Louis, in. 
the spring of 1886, 1 gave four lectures in the great 
theatre of the Exposition Building, in aid of the 
fund for erecting a monument to General Grant. 
These lectures touched upon many of the points 
treated in chapters i.-viii. of the present work, end- 
ing with the battle of Chattanooga. It is pleasant 
to remember the warm interest shown in the lectures 
by General Sherman, who " presided " on each oc- 
casion, and enlivened the suppers which followed 
with his abounding good-fellowship and his flashes 
of quaint wit. Those were evenings not to be for- 
gotten. 

The lectures — illustrated with maps, diagrams, 
views of towns and fortresses, landscapes and por- 
traits, with the aid of the stereopticon — were given 
during two years in many cities north of Mason and 
Dixon's line, from Lewiston in Maine to Portland 
in Oregon. For illustrating battles a stereopticon 
is most useful, enabling a lecturer to throw upon 
the screen his diagrams and his landscapes by turns, 
so that each helps to elucidate the other. It is de- 
sirable, however, to keep a sharp lookout for acci- 



vi Preface 

dents ; as I was once rudely reminded in Buffalo, 
when my operator's hydrogen unexpectedly gave 
out, leaving me to expound the battle of Shiloh 
with nothing but a blackboard and piece of chalk ! 

After an interval of some years there was a re- 
newed call for these lectures, and in the autumn of 
1895 they were given in Sanders Theatre at Har- 
vard University. The interest thus freshly aroused 
led me to prepare the present volume. It contains 
a great deal of material that I never put into the 
lectures, some of it written before 1886, some of 
it after. The ninth chapter, on the "crowning 
mercy " of Nashville, has been added quite lately. 

The present volume does not belong to the series 
in which I have for several years been dealing with 
the history of the iJnited States. Should I ever, 
in the course of that work, arrive at the Civil War, 
it will of course be treated on a very different plan 
from that of this book, which is a purely military 
narrative, restricted in its scope, and detached 
from the multitude of incidents which in a general 
history would form its context. 

In preparing this narrative I have had due 
recourse to the abundant printed sources of infor- 
mation, and owe much besides to personal associa- 
tion with many of the actors. While the war was 
going on it was, to me as to others, a subject of 
most intense moment, and its incidents were burnt 



Preface vii 

into the tablets of memory. I kept large maps, 
and marked the movements of the Union and 
Confederate forces, as reported from day to day, 
with blue-headed and red-headed pins. Among 
the friends of my childhood who gave up their 
lives for their country, one in the army and another 
in the navy — General Mansfield and Commander 
Eenshaw — stand before me with especial vivid- 
ness. In later years I valued highly the friend- 
ship of Sherman, McDowell, and Ericsson ; and I 
had more or less acquaintance — sometimes slight, 
but unfailingly fruitful in suggestions — with Sheri- 
dan, Meade, McClellan, Rosecrans, Garfield, Gib- 
bon, Pope, Geary, Francis Walker, "Baldy" Smith, 
Hazen, Hancock, Beauregard, Preston Johnston, 
and one of the noblest Romans of all, Joseph 
Johnston, whose hand-grip at eighty years of age 
was like that of a college athlete, and whose shrewd 
and kindly talk was as delightful as his presence 
was imposing. 

Among those to whom specific thanks are due for 
valuable counsel must be mentioned Colonel Snead, 
chief of staff to Sterling Price and member of the 
Confederate congress, author of that excellent book, 
" The Fight for Missouri ; " Major Hutchinson, 
chief of staff to General Bowen, whose heroic 
resistance to Grant is mentioned on page 230 ; 
Colonel Samuel Simmons, first on Lyon's staff and 



viii Preface 

later on that of Rosecfans ; Colonel Henry Hitch- 
cock, of Sherman's staff ; Colonel Henry Stone, of 
Thomas's staff ; General FuUerton, chief of staff to 
Gordon Granger ; General Fry, chief of staff to 
Buell ; General CuUum, chief of staff to Halleck ; 
and especially my dear friends, now passed away, 
Dr. Eliot, chancellor of Washington University, 
and Colonel Gantt, sometime of McClellan's staff, 
whose hospitable house was for many years my 
home during my visits to St. Louis. 

To that profound student of military history, 
the late John Codman Ropes, my obligations are 
greater than I can express, not so much for any 
specific suggestions intended for this book, as for 
the liberal education which came from knowing 
him. During a peculiarly intimate friendship of 
thirty years, the cosy midnight hours that we spent 
in discussing his favourite themes were many and 
full of profit. 

It may be observed that this book sometimes 
alludes to the Confederates as " rebels." I have 
been surprised to find how generally people seem 
to think that some sort of stigma is implied by that 
word. For my own part, I have sympathized with 
so many of the great rebellions in history, from the 
revolt of the Ionian cities against Darius Hystaspes 
down to the uprising of Cuba against the Spaniards, 
that I am quite unable to conceive of " rebel " as a 



Preface, ix 

term of reproach. In the present case, it enables 
one to avoid the excessive iteration of the word 
" Confederate," while it simply gives expression to 
the undeniable fact that our Southern friends were 
trying to cast off an established governjnent. In 
England, to this day, Cromwell's admirers do not 
hesitate to speak with pride of the Great Rebellion. 
While my own sympathies have always been in- 
tensely Northern, as befits a Connecticut Yankee, I 
could still in all sincerity take off my hat to the 
statue of Lee when I passed it in New Orleans. 
His devotion to the self-government which seemed 
to him in mortal peril was no more reprehensible 
than the loyalty of Falkland to the prerogative of 
Charles I., though in both cases the sentiments 
were evoked under circumstances which made them 
dangerous to the nation's welfare. 

In treating such a subject as the present one, the 
difficulties in ensuring complete accuracy of state- 
ment and perfect soundness of judgment are man- 
ifold. If my opinions are sometimes strongly 
expressed, they are always held subject to revi- 
sion. 

Cambridge, February 24, 1900. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

FKOM ST. LOUIS TO BELMONT 

Scope of the present narrative ...... 1 

Importance of the border states in 1861 . . . . 2_^ 

Of Virginia 3, 4 

Of Maryland 4,5 

Of Kentucky and Missouri 5, 6 

Position of Missouri in the causal sequence of events . 6, 7 
Some account of Francis Preston Blair and his family . . 8, 9 
Claiborne Jackson and his schemes ..... 10 

Nathaniel Lyon, and Blair's " Home Guards " . . .10 
Plots and counter-plots ; " rebellion against Missouri " . 11 

President Lincoln, through General Scott, authorizes certain 

gentlemen to act as a Committee of Safety . . .12 

Lyon removes the arms from the arsenal and guards the 

neighbouring hills ....... 13 

The state troops select a camping - ground on Lindell's 

Meadow and enclose it 13 

Camp Jackson, its avenues and its denizens ... 14 

Why Blair and Lyon deemed prompt action necessary . . 14 

Arrival of arms from Baton Rouge 15 

Hospitalities at Camp Jackson ; a visitor in bombazine . 15, 16 

A lady with spurs 16 

Lyon summons the Committee of Safety . . . .17 

Replevin vs. capture 18 

Camp Jackson surrenders to Lyon 19 

A secessionist flag in Pine Street is hauled down . . 20 
Colloquy on a street-car 20 



xii Contents 

The governor appoints Sterling Price to command his seces- 
sionist militia 21 

Lyon and Blair have a conference with Jackson and Price 

at the Planters' Hotel 22 

Lyon takes possession of Jefferson City . . . .22 

And routs the secessionists at Booneville .... 23 

Sigel's fight at Carthage 24, 25 

Appointment of Fremont to command the Department of 

the West 25 

Battle of Wilson's Creek, and death of Lyon . . 26, 27 

His great qualities 28 

Causes of Fremont's popularity 28, 29 

His " emancipation proclamation " ..... 29 

His military incapacity ........ 30 

Fate of Mulligan's detachment at Lexington . . . 31, 32 

Fremont is superseded hy Hunter 33 

Who in turn is superseded by Halleck .... 34 

Halleck's incapacity 34 

Curtis defeats Van Dorn at Pea Ridge .... 35-37 

Importance of these early campaigns 38 

Affairs in Kentucky ; attempt to preserve an attitude of 

neutrality 39, 40 

Previous career of Leonidas Polk ; he enters Kentucky and 
fortifies the bluffs at Columbus . . . . . .41 

ZoUicoffer advances through Cumberland Gap ... 41 

Kentucky declares for the Union 42 

Previous career of Ulysses Simpson Grant ... 43 

He is made brigadier-general of volunteers . . . . 44 
He seizes Paducah ; importance of the movement . . 45 

Oglesby goes in pursuit of guerrillas 46 

Grant defeats Pillow on the flats of Belmont ... 47 
His troops disperse for pillage, but are with difficulty set in 

order 48 

The Confederates attempt imsuccessfully to cut o£E their 
retreat 48,49 



Contents xiii 

Comments on the Belmont affair 49-51 

Grant's own comment 51 

CHAPTER II 

FORT DONELSON AND SHILOH 

The first Confederate line of defence 52 

Albert Sidney Johnston 53 

George Henry Thomas 54 

He destroys ZoUieofFer's force at Mill Spring ... 55 
Grant captures Fort Henry ....... 56 

Position of Fort Donelson ....... 57 

Its commanders, — Floyd, PlQqw, and Buckner . . .58 
Grant moves upon Fort Donelson and invests it . . 58, 59 

Artillery battle between fort and gunboats . . . .60 

Sortie of the Confederate garrison 61 

Ferguson Smith storms the Confederate entrenchments . 62 

While Lew Wallace seizes the Charlotte road and cuts o£B 

their retreat 62, 63 

Escape of Floyd and Pillow 63 

Grant's only terms : " Unconditional surrender " . . .63 

Importance of the victory 64 

It completely shattered the first Confederate line of defence 65 
Halleck's injustice toward Grant ..... 66-69 
Strategic importance of Corinth ..... 69 

The assembling of forces at Corinth . . . . .70 

Arrival of Braxton Bragg 70, 71 

Importance of Pittsburg Landing .71 

Opinion of the Count of Paris 72 

The position at Pittsburg Landing .... 72-74 

Arrangement of the Federal forces at Sluloh ... 73 
The open front between Owl and Lick creeks . . .74 
The eve of battle ; difference of opinion between Johnston 

and Beauregard 75 

How far were the Federals surprised at Shiloh ? . . .76 



xiv Contents 

Grant was not expecting any attack on Sunday morning, nor 

was Sherman 77 

The Federals were surprised 78 

The opening- attack on Prentiss's division . . . 78, 79 

Grant hastens up from Savannah Landing and meets Lew 

Wallace at Crump's Landing 79 

How Wallace's march was delayed ..... 80 
Grant's order should have been more specific . . .81 

Johnston's plan of attack ....... 81 

The slow pushing back of Prentiss 82 

And of McClernand and Sherman 82, 83 

Glorious stand of Prentiss in the " Hornet's Nest," supported 

by Hurlbut and William Wallace 84 

Death of Johnston 84 

Victory was not within his grasp ; grave mistake in his 

tactics 85 

The long stoppage at the Hornet's Nest was fatal to the Con- 
federates 85, 86 

Prentiss is captured and William Wallace mortally wounded 86 
Failure of the Confederates to take Pittsburg Landing . 87 

Difference of opinion between Bragg and Beauregard . 88 

The fundamental facts in the case 89 

Arrival of Nelson and Lew Wallace ..... 90 
Buell's arrival at Savannah on Saturday evening . . .91 
Nelson's report of Grant's expectations on that evening . 91 
Grant's letter to Buell written Sunday noon . . . .92 
How Buell and Grant spent the remainder of the day . 92 

A cold bivouac in the rain 93 

Arrival of Crittenden and McCook 94 

The opposing forces on Monday 94, 95 

Conditions of Monday's battle ; defeat of the Confederates . 96 
Why was there no pursuit after Shiloh ? . . . . 97, 98 

Sherman's humorous explanation 99 

Terrible slaughter . o ..... . 99 

Significance of the battle 100 



Contents xv 

CHAPTER III 

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS 

The second Confederate line of defence .... 101 

Island Number Ten 101 

Pope captures New Madrid 102 

How the Federal army sawed out a channel through the sub- 
merged forest 103 

How the Carondelet ran past the batteries . . . 104, 105 
Surrender of the garrison ; results of the victory . . 106 
Importance of rivers and of the river fleets in the Civil 

War 107,108 

The Titanic work done by the navy .... 108-110 

Naval inferiority of the South 110, 111 

Military importance of New Orleans 112 

Need for prompt action 113 

Views of President Lincoln and Commander Porter . . 114 
Benjamin Franklin Butler, his military qualifications . . 115 
Previous career of David Farragut ; he is appointed to com- 
mand the fleet 115, 116 

Character of the fleet • . . 117 

Forts Jackson and St. Philip 118 

The chain of anchored schooners, and the Confederate rams 119 
A difficult task for wooden vessels ..... 120 

Porter bombards Fort Jackson 121 

Difference of opinion between Farragut and Porter . 121, 122 
The gunboat Itasca breaks the chain of schooners . 122, 123 
The fleet advances up the Mississippi river . . . 123, 124 

Farragut's flag-ship in danger 125 

Destruction of the Confederate fleet ; fate of the ram Manas- 
sas 126 

Farragut's arrival at New Orleans .... 127, 128 
Surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip . . . 128, 129, 
Arrival of Butler ; the selection of such a man to govern 
New Orleans was an insult to the people of the city . . 129 



XVI 



Contents 



Opinion of the Count of Paris as to the execution of Mum- 
ford 130 

The notorious " woman order ; " " Beast Butler " . 131, 132 
Value of prompt action in warfare 132 

CHAPTER IV 

FROM CORINTH TO STONE RIVER 

Halleck takes the armies of Pope, Grant, and Buell, and 

advances against Corinth 133 

Which Beauregard forthwith evacuates .... 134 

Much cry and little wool ....... 135 

Breaking of the second Confederate line of defence . . 136 

Naval battle at Memphis 137 

Van Dorn begins to fortify Vicksburg .... 138 

The Confederate ram Arkansas 139 

Destruction of the Arkansas ; Van Dorn fortifies Port Hud- 
son 140 

A melancholy tale of lost opportunities .... 141 

Military and political importance of Chattanooga . 142, 143 

Mitchel's brilliant raid in Alabama 143 

Why Buell was " slow ; " because he had an Old Man of the 

Sea, yclept Halleck, bestriding his shoulders . . 144 

Halleck's innocent hope that the enemy would do what he 
desired him to do ........ 145 

Beauregard is superseded by Braxton Bragg, who leaves 
Van Dorn to cover Vicksburg, while he himself seizes 

Chattanooga 145 

How Halleck frittered away a golden opportunity . . 146 

How the said Halleck was called to Washington as general- 
in-chief, because of Grant's victory at Fort Donelson, 
Grant's and Buell's at ShUoh, and other western successes 147 
How he forthwith proceeded to do as the enemy wished by 
removing McClellan's army from the James river, and thus 
exposing the northern states to invasion .... 148. 



Contents xvii 

Bragg- is emulous of Lee, and prepares the way by great 

cavalry raids 149 

Meanwhile Buell is " slow " because the government will give 
him no help in getting cavalry, but expects him to chase 

cavalry with infantry . • 149 

Kirby Smith defeats Nelson at Richmond, in Kentucky . 149 
Bragg invades Kentucky ....... 150 

Panic throughout the northern states .... 151 

Defect in the Confederate strategy ; Kirby Smith's move- 
ments should have been distinctly controlled by Bragg ; 
too many cooks ......... 152 

Battle of PerryviUe 153 

Battle of luka 154 

Rosecrans defeats Van Dorn at Corinth .... 155 
Van Dorn is unwisely superseded by Pemberton . . . 155 
Buell is made a scapegoat for Halleek . . . .156 
How Buell incurred the enmity of Oliver Morton and Andrew 

Johnson 157, 158 

Buell is superseded by Rosecrans .... 159, 160 

The battlefield of Stone river or Murfreesboro, and the 
arrangement of the Confederate troops .... 161 

The arrangement of the Union troops at Stone river . . 162 
Rosecrans's plan of attack ....... 163 

Bragg's plan of attack ....... 164 

Faulty position of the Union right wing . . . 165, 166 

McCook's want of vigilance ...... 167 

The Confederate attack, and rout of two Union divisions 167, 168 
The Union army thrown upon the defensive . . . 169 
Sheridan's magnificent fighting ...... 170 

Thomas stands invincible, while Rosecrans forms a new battle- 
front 171 

Failure of Bragg's original plan ...... 172 

Terrific but fruitless attacks upon Palmer, who holds the 

Round Forest 173 

The Confederates baffled 174 



xviii Contents 

Results of the day's fighting* . . o , . 175 

Renewal of the battle ; retreat of the Confederates . . 176 
Comments ......... 177, 178 

CHAPTER V 

THE VICKSBUBG PROBLEM 

Physical characteristics of the Mississippi river . . . 179 

The bayous 180 

The bluffs 181 

Mutual relations of Vicksburg and Port Hudson . 182, 183 
Unapproachableness of Vicksburg from the South . . 184 

And from the north ........ 185 

How Halleck lost the opportunity in 18C2 .... 186 

Grant's position and forces at Corinth .... 187 

Grant's first movement against Vicksburg by way of the 

Mississippi Central railroad 188, 189 

The outflanking strategy 189, 190 

The task of supplying an army ; difficulties and dangers 

attendant upon lengthening the line of communications 191, 192 
Rivers more secure than lines of railroad . . . 193, 194 
Insecurity of Grant's position at Oxford . . . 194, 195 
Sherman moves down the Mississippi river against Vicks- 
burg 196 

Mr. Davis's mistake in reinforcing Vicksburg from Tennessee, 
rather than from Arkansas ...... 197 

Forrest's raid upon the railroads and telegraph lines in Ten- 
nessee 198 

Van Dom captures Holly Springs, and Grant is thus com- 
pelled to retreat upon Grand Junction .... 199 
Sherman is defeated at Chickasaw bayou . . . 200-202 

McClernand's ambitious schemes 202-205 

Capture of Arkansas Post ....... 205 

MeClernaud and his " star "....... 206 

Evils of amateur generalship 207 



Contents xix 

Why Grant moved to the west bank of the Mississippi . . 208 
His first plan, thus abandoned, was the correct one, had he 

been properly supported by the government . . . 209 
The situation in front of Vicksburg ; various alternatives 210, 211 

" Grant's big ditch " 212 

The Lake Providence experiment 213, 214 

The Yazoo Pass experiment 214r-217 

Fort Pemberton proves an insuperable obstacle . . 217, 218 
The Big Sunflower experiment 218-220 

CHAPTER VI 

THE FALL OF VICKSBURG 

The armoured gunboats Queen of the West and Indianola 221, 222 
Moral effect of a dummy monitor ..... 222 
Farragut's fleet runs past the batteries of Port Hudson . . 224 
Complaints against Grant ; a gloomy outlook . . 224, 225 

Grant's dogged determination 225 

Fresh alternatives 226 

The great southward movement to Bruinsburg . . 227, 228 
Grant crosses to the east bank of the Mississippi . 228, 229 

First victory ; at Port Gibson 229, 230 

The Confederates evacuate Grand Gulf .... 230 
The critical moment in a great career ..... 231 
A situation bristling with difficulties .... 232 
Grant's sublime audacity ; he cuts loose from his communi- 
cations 233, 234 

Grierson's extensive cavalry raid . . . . . 234 

Grant moves eastward toward the city of Jackson . . . 235 

Second victory ; at Raymond 236 

Third victory ; at Jackson 236 

Pemberton completely hoodwinked ; Grant turns westward 237 
Fourth victory ; at Champion's Hill ; decisive . . . 238 

Fifth victory ; at Big Black river 239 

FaU of Haines BlufP 240 



XX Contents 

A marvellous campaign . * 241 

Vieksburg is invested ........ 242 

Two unsuccessful assaults ; why the second one was made 243 
Dismissal of McClernand for insubordination . . . 244 

The siege of Vieksburg ; mule meat in demand . . 245 

Surrender of Vieksburg 246 

The turning point of the Civil War 247 

CHAPTER VII 

CHICKAMAUGA 

Importance of Chattanooga ....... 248 

The loyal mountaineers of the AUeghanies . . . 249 
The upper Tennessee river not a good line of communica- 
tions 250 

How the opportunity was lost in 1862 .... 251 

The cavalry raids of 1863 252 

Their diligence in the destruction of railroads . . . 253 

Why Rosecraus was so long in starting 254 

How Halleck tried to hasten matters, and how Rosecrans 

snubbed him 254, 255 

Comparative " slowness " of Rosecrans and Buell . . . 255 

Rosecraus decides to move 256 

By skilfvd manoeuvres he drives Bragg back upon Chatta- 
nooga 256, 257 

Description of the difficult mountainous approaches to Chat- 
tanooga 258-260 

In moving over the mountains Rosecrans greatly extends 

his front 261 

Bragg evacuates Chattanooga and moves to Lafayette . 262 
Seeds of disaster in the extension of the Union lines . . 262 
Two alternatives presented to Rosecrans .... 263 

He chooses the wrong one ...... 263, 264 

An appalling situation ....... 264 

Bragg loses the golden opportunity 265 



Contents xxi 

Rosecrans slowly concentrates his forces ; McCook's delay, . 
and its evil results ........ 266 

Arrival of Longstreet with his corps 267 

The problem at Chickamauga ...... 268 

First day of the battle 269 

Morning of the second day ; the fatal order . . . 270 
The dire catastrophe ; rout of the Federal right wing . 271, 272 
An appalling crisis ........ 272 

Thomas, with the left wing, retreats to Horseshoe Ridge . 273 
Some of the most desperate fighting recorded in history . 274 

The " Rock of Chickamauga " 275 

Rosecrans and Garfield misinformed ..... 276 
A brave man stunned by sudden calamity .... 277 
The battle was lost, but Thomas saved the army . . 278 
Awful slaughter 279, 280 

CHAPTER VIII 

CHATTANOOGA 

Bragg seizes Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and 

lays siege to Rosecrans in Chattanooga . . .281, 282 
Joseph Wheeler attacks the supply trains, and the rain 

proves even a worse enemy ...... 283 

Hooker arrives upon the scene with two corps . . . 284 
Grant is placed in command of all the forces west of the 

Alleghanies, and supersedes Rosecrans by Thomas . 285 

Jefferson Davis utters a prophecy from Pulpit Rock . . 286 
Grant arrives at Chattanooga ...... 287 

A happy thought occurs to " Baldy " Smith .... 287 

The scheme for opening a new line of communications 

through Brown's Ferry . . . . . . 288, 289 

Its complete success ........ 290 

Hooker occupies Lookout valley and repels a midnight 

attack by Longstreet 291 

The siege of Chattanooga was thus raised . . . 292 



xxii Contents 

Bragg- sends Longstreet into eastern Tennessee to crush 

Burnside 293 

What could have induced him thus to weaken his army ? . 294 

A possible explanation 295 

Sherman starts from Vicksburg for Chattanooga, and shows 
that, while weighted with Halleck, he can move as slowly 

as Buell 296 

But a despatch from Grant frees him, and he arrives . 297 
Importance of Chickamauga station ..... 298 
Sherman's stealthy advance toward it . . . 298, 299 

Thomas captures Orchard Knob and the adjacent hills . 300 
Breaking of the bridge at Brown's Ferry .... 301 
Sherman reaches the north end of Missionary Ridge . 301, 302 

His disappointment 302, 303 

Effect of the broken bridge upon Hooker's movements 303, 304 
Geary leads the way up Lookout Mountain . . . 305 
Hooker follows ; storming of the mountain ; the " battle 

above the clouds " 306 

The stars and stripes hoisted over Pulpit Rock . . 307 

Absurdity of the notion that the battle of Chattanooga was 

fought as Grant originally planned it ... 307, 308 

Progress of Sherman's attack upon Bragg's right . . 308 
Hooker moves against Bragg's left by way of Rossville . 309 

Bragg weakens his centre to strengthen his right . . 310 
Grant decides to threaten Bragg's centre, in order to aid 

Sherman's attack \ 810 

The orders to the storming line ..... 311 

Magnificent bayonet charge of Thomas's four divisions .311 

Without orders they continue the charge up the slope of Mis- 
sionary Ridge ......... 312 

A moment of anxiety for Grant and Thomas . . .312 

The four divisions reach the crest of the ridge and crush 

Bragg's centre 313 

While Hooker routs his left wing ; total defeat of the Con- 
federates 313,314 



Contents xxiii 

Greatness of the Union victory 314 

Grand scenery of the battlefield ... ... 315 

The Mississippi valley recovered 316 



CHAPTER IX 

NASHVILLE 

At the beginning- of 1864 each of the four cardinal victories 

in the West had been won under the leadership of Grant . 317 
But Lee, in the East, still maintained as bold a front as ever 317 

Need for unity of operations 318 

Grant is made lieutenant-general and placed in command of 
all the armies of the United States .... 318, 319 

In his first Virginia campaign he was outgeneralled by Lee 320 
The popular notion that Grant was averse to manoeuvring . 321 
In fact his manoeuvres were frequent and skilful . 321,322 
After three months of alternate hammering and manoeu- 
vring, Grant's problem was reduced to detaining Lee at Pe- 
tersburg until the whole Confederacy should be knocked 
away from behind him ....... 323 

The latter part of the work was done by the army with 

which Sherman started from Chattanooga for Atlanta . 323 
Sherman, having succeeded Grant in the chief command 
of the West, unites its three armies under McPherson, 

Thomas, and Sehofield 324 

Bragg is superseded by Joseph Johnston . . . 324 

Sherman's object is secondarily to take Atlanta, but pri- 
marily to destroy Johnston's army ..... 325 
How the golden opportunity was lost at Resaca . 325, 326 

Johnston, having been slowly pushed back upon Atlanta, is 

superseded by Hood 327 

Hood's previous career ....... 328 

What the Union generals thought of his appointment . . 329 
Finding it impossible, after hard fighting, to save Atlanta, 



xxiv Contents 

Hood evacuates it, and thus creates a difficult situation for 

Sherman 330 

Hood assumes the offensive and strikes at Sherman's com- 
munications 331 

He makes up his mind to invade Tennessee . . . 332 
His dreams o£ glory, and his fatal delay at Tuscumbia . 333 

Sherman marches to the sea-coast, leaving Thomas to dispose 

of Hood 334 

Ought not Sherman to have left more men with Thomas ? . 335 
Thomas's forces, present and prospective . . . 336, 337 
Hood crosses the Tennessee river at Florence, and marches 

northward 337 

Schofield's retreat through Spring Hill' to Franklin . . 338 
Hood loses an opportunity ....... 339 

Position of the Federal army at Franklin .... 340 

Further retreat upon Nashville ordered by Thomas . . 341 
Furious charge of the Confederates upon the Federal lines at 

Franklin 341, 342 

They are defeated with terrible slaughter . . • 343, 344 
Wilson defeats the Confederate cavalry .... 343 

Schofield effects a junction with Thomas at Nashville • . 344 
Hood follows and entrenches himself close by . . 344, 345 
Why Thomas was not ready to attack Hood . . . 345, 346 
Grant's impatience ........ 347 

He sends Logan on a needless journey to Louisville, and 
going himself to Washington, is barely saved from com- 
mitting a gross act of injustice ...... 348 

Grant's unsatisfactory account of this affair in his " Memoirs " 349 
Position of Thomas's army at Nashville .... 350 

Position of Hood's army • .351 

Hood's imminent peril 352 

Splendid tactics of Thomas 353, 354 

Advance of the Federal right wing .... 354, 355 
Outposts taken ; Hood's left wing broken .... 355 
Hood's new position next day ; the salient at Shy Hill . 356 



Contents 



357 



The assault upon Overton Hill 

The assaults upon Shy Hill ; total rout o£ the Confederates 358 
A pursuit of ten days, and annihilation of Hood's army . 359 
Results of Thomas's great victory .... 359, 360 



MAPS 

{All from sketches by the author) 
The Campaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky Frontispiece 

The Strategic Position of Missouri . . . Facing page 24 
Fort Donelson, February 13-16, 1862 . . . . .56 

Shiloh, April 6, 1862, morning 74 

Shiloh, April 6, 1862, evening 86 

Shiloh, April 7, 1862, morning 94 

New Madrid and Island Number Ten, March 3-April 7, 1862 102 
Stone River, December 31, 1862, morning .... 162 
Stone River, December 31, 1862, evening .... 172 
Grant's First Movement against Vicksburg, November 24, 

1862-January 10, 1863 188 

The Lake Providence Experiment, February and March, 1863 214 
The Yazoo Pass and Big Sunflower Experiments, February 

and March, 1863 

Vicksburg and its Approaches, May, 1863 
Chattanooga and its Approaches, September, 
Chiekamauga, September 19, 1863 
Chickamauga, September 20, 1863, morning 
Chiekamauga, the fatal order .... 

Chickamauga, September 20, 1863, evening 
Environs of Chattanooga, October-November, 1863 
Campaigns of Sherman and Thomas in 1864 
Franklin, November 30, 1864 .... 

Nashville, December 15, 1864 . . . 
Nashville, December 16, 1864 .... 



1863 



216 
226 
260 
266 
268 
270 
274 
288 
326 
340 
350 
356 



THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 
IN THE CIVIL WAR 



CHAPTER I 
FROM ST. LOUIS TO BELMONT 

My object in the present narrative is to exhibit 
an outline of the military events which brought 
about the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy 
by turning its left flank. In this mighty work 
the successive conquests of Vicksburg and Chatta- 
nooga were cardinal events of no less importance 
than the final conquest of Richmond. We have 
here to follow, from their first small beginnings in 
the state of Missouri, the military trans- ^ ^ , 

^ -^ ^ Scope of the 

actions, growing ever vaster in dimen- present nar- 
sions, which culminated in the course ^^*^'^®- 
of the year 1863 in the capture of the two great 
strongholds that dominated the lower waters of 
the Mississippi and the upper reaches of the Ten- 
nessee. After the close of this continuous story, 
a crowning episode will claim our attention, in 
the decisive victory at Nashville, which left Sher- 
man's army free to advance upon the rear of Vir- 



2 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

ginia, thus sealing tlie*doom of the exhausted Con- 
federacy. Our story may best begin by calling 
attention to the circumstances which made Ken- 
tucky and Missouri supremely important in the 
spring of 1861. 

While all the Gulf states were prompt in follow- 
ing the lead of South Carolina and passing ordi- 
nances of secession, the action of their neighbours 
to the northward was slow and vacillating. The 
people of the border states did not in general wish 
to secede, but many of them believed in the con- 
stitutional right of secession, and held that if the 
Gulf states wished to leave the Union the Federal 
Importance government had no right to retain them 
of the border by force. Accordingly there was no 
decisive action until after the fall of 
Fort Sumter and President Lincoln's proclamation 
calling upon the loyal states for 75,000 men to 
aid in restoring the authority of the government. 
Then the southern zone of border states — North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas — at once se- 
ceded from the Union and joined the Confederacy. 
Enormous political consequences now depended 
upon the action of the four remaining border 
states, — Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Mis- 
souri. The most powerful of the four, — the state 
which had given birth to Washington and Jefferson 
and Marshall ; the state which had once been ar- 



From St. Louis to Belmont 3 

rayed in sympathy with Massachusetts and in op- 
position to South Carolina in its attitude toward 
negro slavery, — the great state of Virginia, was 
won over to the side of the Confederacy, yet not 
without a bitter struggle. So irreconcilable was the 
diversity of interests and sentiments that the state 
was torn in twain, the doctrine of secession received 
an unexpected and unwelcome illustration, and the 
sturdy Virginians west of the Alleghanies straight- 
way formed a new commonwealth pledged to the 
defence of the Union. But even as thus curtailed, 
the accession of Virginia to the southern cause was 
an event of the first importance. When once her 
hand had found this thing to do, she 
did it with all her might, and for i^&^"^^- 
lavish expenditure of blood and treasure Virginia 
was foremost in the War of Secession. It was not 
simply, however, in the physical strength which 
she added to the Confederacy that the accession of 
Virginia was so important. There was the moral 
prestige of the grand historic associations which 
clustered about the home of Washington ; there 
was the military advantage of a position which 
threatened the Federal capital and exposed the soil 
of the northern states to invasion ; there was the 
spell which these things cast upon the imagination 
of European statesmen, tempting them to interfere 
in the struggle ; and moreover, Virginia was still, 



4 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

as in the Revolutionary period, a country fertile 
in leaders of men. But for her secession it would 
doubtless have been Robert Lee, with Stonewall 
Jackson as his right arm, that would have led the 
Union soldiers to speedy victory. Take away from 
the history of the southern army these names with 
those of Joseph Johnston, Ambrose Hill, Ewell, 
Stuart, Early, and Pickett, and how different that 
history would have been ! It is not too much 
to say that, except for Virginia, the summer of 
1862 might have seen the rebellion completely 
suppressed. Was it not Virginia that, stubborn 
and defiant to the last, held even the indomitable 
conqueror of the southwest at bay imtil his great 
lieutenant, sweeping from the mountains to the sea 
and turning northward straight toward Richmond, 
had cut away from her all the rest of the Confed- 
eracy, leaving her to fall alone, vanquished but not 
humiliated ? 

The task of suppressing so great a rebellion 
was herculean. All the world except the Ameri- 
cans of the northern states — and some even of 
these — believed it to be impossible. If the re- 
maining border states had followed the lead of 
Virginia, it might have proved to be impossible. 

The attitude of Maryland in April- 
Maryland. *^ ^ 

1861, was very dangerous. Endless 

gratitude is due to the unwavering loyalty of Gov- 



From St. Louis to Belmont 5 

ernor Hicks, and to the promptness with which 
John Andrew hurried the forces of Massachusetts 
to the front. But for these men the first task of 
the Federal army might have been to win back the 
Federal capital. 

As the action of Maryland was thus important 
by virtue of her position, so the action of Ken- 
tucky and Missouri was important by virtue of 
their sheer magnitude. Not that the strategic 
position was not here, too, of vast importance. 
The panic along the right bank of the Ohio, upon 
General Bragg's approach in the summer of 1862, 
may serve to remind us how unpleasant it would 
have been for the North had the area and the 
forces of Kentucky been added to the Confeder- 
acy ; and the mischief that might have Kentucky 
been wrought by a seceding Missouri, ^^^ Missouri. 
controlling the Father of Waters as far as Bur- 
lington and taking the state of Illinois in flank, 
would perhaps have been still more serious. But 
the magnitude of these two states was alone 
enough to make their action of critical impor- 
tance. South Carolina, with her six attendant 
states upon the Gulf, contained a population of 
about 5,000,000 souls ; the secession of the south- 
ern zone of border states immediately added 2,500,- 
000 to this ; the secession of Virginia added an- 
other million. It was high time for this to stop. 



6 The, Jlississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Missouri and Kentucky, if tliey had left the 
Union, would have carried over yet another 2,500,- 
000 souls to the Confederacy, besides adding to it 
an area nearly as large as Italy. Once saved to 
the Union, the military aid rendered by Kentucky 
in putting down the rebellion w^as at least two 
thirds as great as that rendered by Michigan ; 
and gallant Missouri, with 25,000 fewer white men 
of military age than Massachusetts, had a death- 
roll in the Union army of 13,887, while that of 
Massachusetts was 13,942. 

It would be difficult, therefore, to overrate the 
services of the heroic men who at the first outbreak 
of rebellion succeeded in crushing out the nascent 
secessionist tendencies in those two powerful states. 
Especial praise is due to the men wdio acted thus 
decisively and promptly in Missouri. If they had 
failed, it would have fared ill with the Union cause 
in Kentucky also. Flanked on the right by so 
powerful a state as Missouri, the friends of the 
Federal government in Kentucky would have found 
it hard to put forth their full strength. But as 
the campaigns of McClellan and Rosecrans in 
West Virginia freed Kentucky from 

Missouri. 

lateral pressure on the east, so the 
prompt action of a few high-minded and resolute 
men in Missouri freed her from lateral pressure 
on the west, and made it possible for Grant to 



From St. Louis to Belmont 7 

strike that great blow at Fort Donelson whicli 
first carried the Union forces into the interior of 
the Confederacy. It was in Missouri that the 
long series of events was set in motion which ter- 
minated in the suppression of the rebellion. From 
the seizure of Camp Jackson in 1861 down to the 
appearance of Sherman's army in the rear of Vir- 
ginia in 1865, there may be traced an unbroken 
chain of causation. As we look along^ this line 
we can see something like a steady progression 
of events toward the final goal. In spite of occa- 
sional reverses here and there, we see the Union 
arms steadily gaining ground, and the forces of 
the Confederacy steadily weakening, from the be- 
ginning to the end of the struggle. A different 
impression is obtained if we confine our attention 
to Virginia. There we see the formidable Lee de- 
feating or baffling one Union general after another, 
remaining unconquered and apparently unconquer- 
able, until at last with his swift and sudden over- 
throw the rebellion seems all at once to collapse 
like a bubble. The obstinate resistance of Lee 
served for a long time to mask the desperate con- 
dition into which the fortunes of the Confederacy 
were sinking ; and the student of that history can- 
not obtain an adequate view without carefully fol- 
lowing the sequence of events in the Mississippi 
Valley. Bearing this in mind, we shall the better 



8 The Mississipiyi Vjxlley in the Civil War 

appreciate the significance of tlie stirring 'Scenes 
which the streets of St. Louis witnessed in the 
spring and summer of 1861, 

Among the staunch defenders of the Union at 
that most anxious and critical moment, the fore- 
most name was that of the younger Francis Preston 
Blair. He was of the family of that redoubtable 
Scottish parson, Dr. James Blair, first president 
of William and Mary College, in conflict with 
whom three royal governors of Virginia had one 
after another come to grief. ^ His father, the 
elder Francis Preston Blair, long time editor of 
the " Globe," was one of the ablest exponents of 
Jacksonian Democracy, and deserved high honour 
for the energy with which he fought against the 
doctrine of nullification. His courage and weight 
of sense gave him great influence with President 
Lincoln, of whose cabinet his eldest son, Montgom- 
ery Blair, was a member. The younger Francis 
Preston Blair had lived in St. Louis since 1842, 
and for several years had been recognized as one 
of the leaders of the Benton wing of the Demo- 
Francis Pres- cratic party. While he had approved 
ton Blair. ^f ^]^g annexation of Texas, and had 
served with credit in the ensuing war against Mex- 
ico, he was always consistently opposed to the exten- 
sion of slavery into the territories, and during the 

1 See my Old Virginia and Her Neighbours, ii. 118, 123, 389. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 9 

stormy administrations of Pierce and Buchanan 
lie set his face unflinchingly against every measure 
that hinted even remotely at secession. Few men 
of that day were so highly endowed with political 
sagacity, or realized, as he did, the tendency of 
public events and the tremendous nature of the 
struggle into which we were drifting. Along with 
this rare foresight he was endowed with a lofty 
and unselfish public spirit, a weight of character 
that impressed itself upon every one, and a cour- 
age that nothing could daunt. Such a man is a 
power in any state. I have heard thoughtful peo- 
ple in Missouri say that if Virginia, during the ten 
years which preceded the Civil War, had possessed 
one such citizen as Francis Blair maintaining such 
a political attitude as he maintained in Missouri, 
she might have been found in 1861 devoting all 
her mighty energies to the preservation of the 
Union. I have heard this said repeatedly by men 
accustomed to weigh their words, and — whatever 
may be thought of the implication as to Virginia 
— it serves to show the esteem in which Blair was 
held by those who knew him. 

The most interesting moment in the career of 
this man was the spring of 1861. It had been 
largely due to him and the able men whom he di- 
rectly influenced that the Union sentiment in Mis- 
souri was so strong at the beginning of the war. 



10 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

It needed all tlie strength it could summon, for 
tlie friends of secession were busy and shrewd. 
Among them was counted the governor, Claiborne 
Jackson, who sought to veil his purpose with fair 
professions of loyalty. The governor was secretly 
helped by a considerable party in the legislature. 
Secrecy was forced upon them b}^ the action of the 
state convention in February in declaring itself 
emphatically opposed to secession. The efforts of 
the conspirators were directed toward the gath- 
ering of a secessionist state militia and the seizure 
of the United States arsenal at St. Louis, which 
contained some 60,000 stand of arms with a great 
store of other munitions of war.^ 

But Blair was beforehand with them. He sent 
intellio'ence to Washins^ton which led General Scott 
to despatch a small force of regular troops for 
the protection of the arsenal under command of 
Nathaniel Lyon, of Connecticut, a captain of the 
Second United States Infantry, a man of bound- 
less energy and untiring vigilance. Lyon soon 
succeeded in getting together some 500 men ; and 
Nathaniel when in April the governor refused to 
Lyon. Q2^ fQj^. troops in answer to President 

Lincoln's proclamation, Blair took the matter in 
hand, and on his own responsibility raised several 
regiments of loyal militia, known as " Home 

1 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, p. 100. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 11 

Guards." Blair and Lyon were kindred spirits ; 
a warm friendship sprang up between them, and 
they worked zealously and efficiently together. 
Governor Jackson solicited a supply of arms and 
ammunition from the Confederate government, 
and began recruiting volunteers for the defence 
of the state. The enemy against whom such de- 
fence was deemed necessary was the United States. 
The governor's outward show of loyalty was such 
that it was difficult to offer any opposition to his 
proceedings at this early stage ; but to wait for an 
overt act which should publish to the world his 
true intentions would be the height of folly. It 
would be simply giving him the initiative, and 
Blair was not the man to commit such piots and 
a blunder. He could thwart a plot by counter- 

^ ^ plots ;" rebel- 

a counterplot, if necessary; and for lion against 
some time his actions wore the sem- -^^i^soun. 
blance of rebellion against the legally constituted 
government of Missouri. What he represented in 
that state was the authority of the United States, 
which the state government could not be trusted 
to support. Under such abnormal circumstances 
a certain amount of irregularity, distressing to the 
souls of those dear old parchment worthies, John 
Doe and Richard Roe, was unavoidable. 

On the last day of April the following remark- 
able order was addressed by the War Department 



12 The Mississippi Vjcdley in the Civil War 

at Washington to " Captain Nathaniel Lyon, com- 
manding Department of tlie West : " — 

" The President of the United States directs 
that you enroll in the military service of the 
United States loyal citizens of St. Louis and vi- 
cinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore en- 
listed, ten thousand in number, for the purpose 
of maintaining the authority of the United States 
and for the protection of the peaceable inhabit- 
ants of Missouri, and you will if deemed neces- 
sary for that purpose by yourself and Messrs. Oli- 
ver D. Filley, John How, James O. Broadhead, 
Samuel T. Glover, J. J. Witzig, and Francis P. 
Blair, Jr., proclaim martial law in the city of St. 
Louis." 

On the back of this document was written 
by General Scott, general-in-chief of the United 
States Army, " It is revolutionary times, and 
therefore I do not object to the irregularity of 
this. — W. S. ; " and the whole was confirmed by 
the terse endorsement : " Approved April 30, 1861. 
— A. Lincoln." ^ 

A few days before the arrival of this order — 
which virtually constituted Blair and Lyon and 
the other five gentlemen named into a revolution- 
ary Committee of Safety — Lyon had taken the 
precaution of moving the greater portion of the 
1 Snead, The Fight for Missouri, p. 165. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 13 

arms stored in the arsenal into the state of Illinois 
for safe-keeping. This sudden removal check- 
mated a neat little scheme of Governor _, , ^ 

Kemoval or 

Jackson. In accordance with a stat- arms from 
ute of 1858 it was the custom for the *^^ ^^"^"^^• 
commander of each militia district in Missouri to 
assemble his men on the 3d of May every year 
at some convenient place within his district, and 
there go into encampment for one week. It 
was Jackson's intention to have the camp for the 
First District assembled on the hills near the 
arsenal, in a position favourable for a coiip cle 
main upon that coveted place. But before April 
was over Lyon had not only removed the arms, 
but had occupied the hills with batteries guarded 
by infantry. The commander of the district, 
therefore, — Daniel Frost, a gentleman whose loy- 
alty to the state government could be counted on, 
— selected another place for his encampment. It 
was a charming spot known as LindelFs Meadow, 
just southeast of the intersection of Grand Avenue 
and Olive Street, which were then mere plank 
roads. This camping - ground was entirely en- 
closed by a strong fence. It was bap- Camp Jack- 
tized Camp Jackson, in honour of the ^°'^- 
governor ; and in spite of that gentleman's profes- 
sions of loyalty, its true proclivities were betrayed 
by the names " Beauregard " and " Jeff Davis " 



14 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

applied to its two chief avenues.^ In this pleasant 
field of May were gathered about 700 men, by 
no means all secessionists, but all bound to serve 
the legally constituted government of the state of 
Missouri. It would not do to let them stay there, 
and on May 7 Blair and Lyon made up their 
minds to capture Camp Jackson. 

But why was such a step necessary ? The legal 
existence of Camp Jackson would terminate within 
four days ; why, then, such haste ? Because Gen- 
eral William Selby Harney, who was expected to 
return from Washington within a few days, was 
commander of the Department of the West, and 
General Captain Lyon was only acting com- 

Harney. mandcr during his absence. Upon Har- 

ney's return the activity of Lyon would, for a while 
at least, be held in abeyance. Harney was a brave 
and loyal soldier, but did not comprehend the 
political situation. He was no match in chicanery 
for Jackson and his friends, who would be sure 
to find reasons for keeping Camp Jackson in ex- 
istence as long as suited their purposes. On the 
7th of May, therefore, it was high time for Lyon 

1 This was denied by General Frost in an open letter to me in 
The Bejmblican, St. Louis, April 22, 1886 ; at least tlie general 
remembered nothing of the sort. On the other hand, Colonel 
Samuel Simmons, in some personal reminiscences, declares that 
these names were marked upon sign-boards. See Globe Democrat, 
St. Louis, May 10, 1881. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 15 

and Blair to strike, and the next day furnished 
them with an excellent occasion. 

It will be remembered that Governor Jackson 
had solicited from the Confederate government at 
Montgomery a supply of warlike material. On 
the night of May 8 the siege guns and howitzers 
sent in response by Jefferson Davis arrived on a 
steamer from Baton Rouge, packed in j^^^^^ ^^^ 
boxes marked "Marble," shipped as Camp Jack- 
merchandise, and consigned to per- 
sons well known for their Union sentiments. De- 
spite these elaborate blinds, the boxes were met 
at the wharf by the persons for whom they were 
really intended, and no time was lost in hauling 
them out to Camp Jackson. 

A fine cordial hospitality was dispensed at the 
camp in those balmy days of early May. The 
surgeon of Blair's regiment had dined there on 
the 8th, and he could have told anybody, says 
General Frost, "that it was a very attractive 
place, because he saw it filled with the fairest of 
Missouri's daughters, who ' from morn to dewy 
eve ' threaded its mazes in company with their 
sons, brothers, and lovers. He could also have 
described the beautiful United States flag which 
waved its folds in the breeze from the flagstaff 
over my tent." ^ One of the visitors next day 

1 Open letter from General Frost to Professor Fiske, The Re- 
publican, St. Louis, April 22, 1886. 



16 The Mississippi Valley m the Civil War 

came in a light open carriage then known as a 
A visitor in "Jenny Lind," and was leisurely 
bombazine. driven by a coloured servant up and 
down the avenues " Jeff Davis," " Beauregard," 
and " Sumter," and the rest. This visitor, 
dressed in a black bombazine gown and closely 
veiled, was a familiar sight on the streets of St. 
Louis, as she took the air daily in her light car- 
riage. Everybody recognized her as Mrs. Alexan- 
der, the mother of Mrs. Blair, but nobody accosted 
her or expected recognition from her because she 
was known to be blind. What should have 
brought this elderly lady to Camp Jackson ? was 
it simply the negro coachman gratifying some 
curiosity of his own ? 

A couple of hours later, as Blair was sitting in 
the porch of the southern house of the arsenal, 
chatting with Colonel Simmons and a few other 
friends, the Jenny Lind carriage drove up, and the 
familiar figure, in its black gown and veil, alighted 
and came up the steps. It was natural enough 
that Blair should greet his wife's mother and escort 
her into the house. But as they stepped upon the 
threshold, a slight uplifting of the bombazine skirt 
A lady with disclosed a sturdy pair of cavalry boots 
spurs. ^Q ^Y\Q eyes of Colonel Simmons and 

another gentleman, who glanced at each other sig- 
nificantly but said never a word. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 17 

Had the close veil been lifted, it would have 
revealed the short red beard and piercing blue eyes 
of Nathaniel Lyon, the "little Connecticut aboli- 
tionist," as some called him.^ His Committee of 
Safety was promptly summoned to the arsenal, to 
hear him tell how he had " satisfied himself by per- 
sonal inspection that the men [at Camp Jackson] 
had in their possession arms and ammunition which 
had been taken from the United States Arsenal at 
Baton Rouge, and which, therefore, rightfully be- 
longed, in his opinion, to the Federal government." 
It was necessary, he said, to seize Camp Jackson 
and hold its men as prisoners of war. In this 
opinion Blair, Broadhead, Witzig, and Filley con- 

1 In my opening lecture at St. Louis, April 15, 1886, 1 mentioned 
the fact of Lyon's visiting- Camp Jackson disguised in woman's 
clothes. For this statement I was taken to task in some of the 
newspapers, which derided it as an " old woman's story," too ab- 
surd for belief. I was thereupon assured by several members of 
the Blair family, friends of mine, that the story, although an old 
woman's, was literally true. In proof thereof General Blair's son, 
Francis Preston Blair the third, took me to call upon his grand- 
mother, Mrs. Alexander, a fine old lady of eighty-three. From 
her lips I heard the story, just as I have above given it, and she 
showed me the bombazine gown and close veil which she had lent 
to Lyon. As to the Simmons incident, it was told me by Colonel 
Simmons himself, who was soon afterward on Lyon's staff, and at 
a later date on the staff of General Rosecrans at Stone river. 

Mrs. Alexander was Myra Madison, only daughter of George 
Madison, governor of Kentucky, and niece of James Madison, 
bishop of Virginia and president of William and Mary College. 



18 TJie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

curred, but Glover and How deprecated any rasli 
action. They urged that inasmuch as Camp Jack- 
son kept the stars and stripes flying and had not 
been concerned in any breach of the peace, it would 
be best to allow its brief term of existence to ex- 
l^ire quietly ; if it contained stolen property of the 
United States, the best way to get it was to send 
Replevin vs. *^^ United States marshal with a writ 
capture. of replevin, supi3orted if necessary by 

Lyon's troops. Lyon replied that the camp was a 
mere " nest of traitors," that the legislature, which 
had just been convened at Jefferson City, might 
indefinitely prolong its term of existence, and that 
as for Harney, there was no counting upon him. 
To these arguments How and Glover yielded, but 
were still disposed to insist upon the writ of re- 
plevin, which to Blair and Lyon seemed not only 
a subterfuge, but a lame one. 

Nevertheless, at a meeting of Glover with two 
or three confidential friends that night, a writ was 
duly prepared, in case it should be wanted ; and 
early next morning my dear old friend, Colonel 
Thomas Tasker Gantt, armed with the precious 
document, set out on horseback to find Blair. 
Surrend Gantt himself was far from convinced 

of Camp of the efficacy of the replevin method, 

but he was willing to submit the case 
once more to Blair's master mind. A few miles 



From St. Louis to Belmont 19 

below the city, on the bank of the Mississippi, the 
solitary horseman met his friend marching up 
with 1000 men from Jefferson Barracks. " Well, 
Frank," said Gantt, " I have the writ of replevin 
here in my pocket." Blair's reply was more forci- 
ble than elegant ; but like Cambronne's famous 
exclamation at Waterloo, it was forever final, and 
a sense of relief lightened Colonel Gantt's mind 
as he reined his horse about. The march ended 
in a rendezvous with Lyon's forces, and by two 
o'clock in the afternoon that vigorous commander 
had invested Camp Jackson, planted his batteries, 
and sent in to General Frost a summons to sur- 
render. No alternative was possible. The cap- 
ture was effected without firing a shot, but it was 
followed by an unfortunate affray between some of 
Lyon's troops and the street mob, in the course of 
which about thirty lives were lost. Next day all 
the prisoners but one were released on parole. 

This capture of Camp Jackson was the first 
really aggressive blow at secession that was struck 
anywhere within the United States. In the city 
of St. Louis the immediate effect seemed magical. 
Secessionists were cowed, and Union men jubilant. 
On Pine Street, near Fifth, there was a building 
in which enemies of the Union were wont to as- 
semble, and for some time it had flaunted from 
one of its windows some kind of a rebel flag. As 



20 The Mississijyj^i Valley in the Civil War 

the startling news from Camp Jackson came down 
Rebel flag Pine Street, an authoritative shout 
hauled down, ordered the emblem of secession to 
be taken down, and down it came, nevermore to be 
hoisted in St. Louis. The scene was witnessed 
by a quiet and modest-looking man, who forthwith 
stejDped upon a street-car headed toward the ar- 
senal, whither he was going to congratulate Lyon 
and Blair. A dapper youth, voluble with rage 
and scorn, and craving sympathy, came on board 
and addressed this quiet person : " Things have 
come to a d — d pretty pass when a free people 
CoUoquv-na can't choosc their own flag. Where 
street-car. I came from, if a man dares to say 
a word in favour of the Union, we hang him to a 
limb of the first tree we come to." The quiet man 
replied, " After all, we are not so intolerant in St. 
Louis as we might be ; I have not seen a single 
rebel hung yet, nor heard of one ; there are plenty 
of them who ought to be, however." At this un- 
expected retort the dapj)er young man collapsed. 
The modest person who uttered it was a middle- 
aged man quite unknown to fame, a leather-dealer 
named Ulysses Simpson Grant.^ On that same 
day, among the bystanders who witnessed some of 
its stirring scenes was William Tecumseh Sher- 
man, president of the Fifth Street railroad.^ The 

1 Grant's Memoirs, i. 236, 237. 

2 Sherman's Memoirs, i. 172-174. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 21 

next day Grant had crossed the river to muster in 
the 21st regiment of Illinois infantry, of which he 
was soon afterward appointed colonel ; and three 
days later Sherman was called to Washington to 
the colonelcy of the 13th Regular infantry. 

On the memorable afternoon when Camp Jack- 
son surrendered, the governor was sitting in the 
state-house at Jefferson City, plotting secession 
with his legislature. At the news of Lyon's 
stroke, flashed over the telegraph wires, many 
cheeks turned pale with chagrin. Fearing that he 
might even then be marching on the capital, the 
governor took the precaution to have a railroad 
bridge burned, while the legislature remained in 
session all night to consider what had best be done. 
Shortly afterward a military bill was passed, cloth- 
ing the governor with quasi-dictatorial powers, in 
virtue of which he went on diligently organizing a 
secessionist militia, and appointed to command it 
General Sterling Price, an active and sterling 
enterprising officer, born in Virginia, P^^^^®- 
who had served in the Mexican War, and had 
been governor of Missouri. For a fortnight Price 
seemed to be having everything as he wished. 
After Harney's return, on May 11, Price inveigled 
him into an arrangement by which he secured for 
himself the initiative in all the work of calling out 
the military force of the state, while Harney's at- 



22 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

titude was reduced to that of a bystander. Under 
these favourable circumstances Price worked vigor- 
ously in organizing rebellion, and secretly invited 
the government of Arkansas to send an armed 
force to assist him. But his scheme was fathomed 
by the ever watchful Blair, who sent such reports 
to Washington that on the 18th of May Presi- 
dent Lincoln privately authorized Blair to remove 
General Harney f^om the chief command of the 
department whenever he should deem such a step 
required by the public safety. In pursuance of 
this order Harney was removed on the 30th, and 
Lyon was appointed in his place, with the rank of 
brigadier-general. 

This act brought things to a crisis. Jackson 
and Price understood that they were now dealing 
with men who could not be hoodwinked, but before 
taking extreme measures they sought an interview 
with Lyon and Blair. A safe-conduct was granted 
them, and on the 11th of June the conference was 
held at the Planters' Hotel at St. Louis ; but it 
came to nothing. The governor insisted that the 
Home Guards should be disbanded and 

The crisis. n -i^ t i 

all Federal troops sent out of the state. 
Blair would not listen to this, but insisted that the 
governor should disband his own militia. So they 
parted. Jackson and Price returned the same 
night to Jefferson City, and next day, throwing off 



From St. Louis to Belmont 23 

the mask which could no longer be worn, the gov- 
ernor issued a proclamation calling for 50,000 men 
to protect the state against the Federal " invaders." 
But Lyon was ready to strike. He embarked his 
forces on three swift steamboats and ascended the 
Missouri river, landing at Jefferson City on the 
15th. Once more the stars and stripes were hoisted 
over the state-house.-^ The governor, carrying 

1 In my lecture for the Grant monument fund, April 15, 1886, 
I said that Governor Jackson, on his return to Jefferson City, 
hoisted a secession flag over the state-house, and that Lyon, on 
the 15th, hauled down this flag before raising the stars and 
stripes. As these statements were called in question, I inquired 
of Hon. P. T. Miller, of the state treasury, who lived in Jeffer- 
son City in 1861. After due verification of his recollections, his 
reply was, " No flag ever floated over the state capitol other than 
the stars and stripes." Accepting this as conclusive, and looking 
about for the source of my error, I found it in my too hasty read- 
ing of two despatches printed in the St. Louis Daily Democrat, 
June, 1861. The two are as follows : — 

" Our patriotic governor, with his no less patriotic commander- 
in-chief of that hand of traitors, the Missouri State Guard, has 
returned to the capital and issued a proclamation which casts aside 
all pretences of loyalty, and raises boldly the secession flag, under 
which he has been fraudulently organizing ever since the Harney 
indulgence." — Letter from Jefferson City, June 13, 1861, signed H. 

" [General Lyon and his troops] marched in good order through 
the city, cheered at several points, and finally occupied Capitol 
Hill amid tremendous applause. W. H. Lusk was the happy 
individual selected to raise again the stars and stripes over the 
cupola, which he did, while the Jefferson band played the ' Star- 
Spangled Banner.' . . . Old ladies wept, and every one seemed 
overjoyed at the sight once more of the old flag." — Despatch 
from Jefferson City, June 15, 1861. 



24 The MisBissii^'pi Valley in the Civil War 

with him the great seal of the state, fled fifty miles 
up the river to Booneville, while Price kept on 
still farther to Lexington. Both these towns were 
places of rendezvous for the secessionist militia, but 
Lyon understood the value of time and did not 
leave them to assemble unmolested. He left the 
capital on the 16th, arrived at Booneville next 
Skirmish at morning, and in a short, sharp action 
Booneville. routcd the Secessionists, taking their 
guns and many prisoners. Jackson fled toward 
the southwestern part of the state, with Lyon in 
hot pursuit, and Price, with the forces gathered at 
Lexington, set out by a converging route to join 
the governor. Meanwhile Blair had despatched 
Colonel Franz Sigel, a veteran of the German 
revolution of 1849, from St. Louis, with 1500 
men, to intercept Jackson and attack him before 
Price could come to the rescue. On the 5th of 
July Sigel met Jackson with 4000 men not far 
from Carthage. A fight ensued in which Sigel 

On reading these two paragraphs carefully, with especial refer- 
ence to the words which I have italicized, it appears that it is not 
the governor but the proclamation that raises the secession flag ; 
and that, therefore, the phrase is metaphorical. The sense would 
have been made clearer by omitting the superfluous comma after 
*' loyalty." I dare say it was this comma that turned my mind 
back to " governor " as the subject of " raises." 

According to Mr. Miller, the State Guard, when commanded by 
Sterling Price, carried the flag of Missouri, containing the state 
arms on a blue field with yellow fringe. 



From St, Louis to Belmont 25 

for some hours had the advantage, but Jackson's 
superiority in cavalry enabled him to sigei's fight 
threaten Sigei's baggage-train in his ^^ Carthage. 
rear and thus compel him to retreat. During the 
night Jackson was reinforced not onl}?- by Price, 
but also by several thousand troops from Arkan- 
sas, Texas, and Louisiana under the noted Texan 
ranger, McCulloch. Sigei's position thus became 
perilous, but he effected his escape in a skilful 
retreat which won him higher encomiums than 
his subsequent career ever justified ; henceforth to 
" fight mit Sigel " became a favourite war-cry of 
enthusiastic Germans throughout the country. 

On July 9 the incapable Fremont was appointed 
to command the Department of the West, with 
disastrous results, the first of which fell upon the 
devoted Lyon and his little army. When on the 
13th Lyon arrived at Springfield and joined his 
forces to those of Sigel, it was found that their 
united strength was unequal to maintaining that 
position. The enemy, in retreating into the south- 
western corner of the state, had retreated upon 
reinforcements, and was now growing stronger 
daily. Presently the news of Bull Kun embold- 
ened the secessionists all over Missouri, and the 
rebel army, commanded by Benjamin McCulloch, 
increased till it numbered 12,000 men. Lyon had 
barely 6000 to oppose to this force, and in face 



26 The Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

of such odds it was difficult either to attack or to 
retreat. After waiting in vain for reinforcements 
which ought to have been sent him by General 
Fremont, he made up his mind to strike such a 
blow as would cripple the enemy, and thus secure 
for himself an unmolested retreat upon Rolla, the 
terminus of the railroad from St. Louis.^ On the 
morning of the 10th of August he accordingly at- 
tacked McCulloch in his position at Wilson's Creek, 
near Springfield. Lyon's plan was bold, even to 
rashness. He sent Sigel, with 1200 men and a bat- 
tery of six pieces, to turn the enemy's right flank, 
while he himself, with 3700 men and 
Wilson's *®^ g^^iis, attacked in front. The nature 

Creek ; death of the oTound was sucli as to favour this 



audacious movement. Sigel's march 
was successfully accomplished, and his assault was 
admirably begun, but his force was inadequate to 

^ The night before the battle Lyon sent a letter to Fremont 
explaining his situation. I cannot forbear quoting Colonel Snead's 
remarks on this occasion, in his The Fight for Missouri, p. 266. 
Colonel Snead, a most gallant Confederate officer, thus writes 
of his noble foe : " Not one word about the desperate battle he 
was to fight on the morrow, not one fault-finding utterance, not 
a breath of complaint ! But, true to his convictions, true to his 
flag, true to the Union men of Missouri who confided in and fol- 
lowed him, true to himself, and true to duty, he went out to 
battle against a force twice as great as his own, with a calmness 
that was as pathetic as his courage was sublime." 

This is the best thing I have ever read about Lyon. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 27 

the task assigned it. He was soon overwhelmed 
by numbers, and repulsed with the loss of five of 
his guns. The fight in front was kept up for six 
hours with desperate gallantry, and neither side 
was able to prevail. After being twice wounded, 
the brave Lyon was slain while leading a charge. 
By noon both armies were tired out and ceased 
fighting, and while the Confederates busied them- 
selves in strengthening their defences, the Union 
forces retired in good order, and after five days of 
marching reached Rolla unmolested. The Con- 
federate loss in killed and wounded was 1095, or 
rather less than one tenth of the number engaged ; 
the Federal loss was 1236, or about one fifth of 
the number engaged. In its dimensions, there- 
fore, the battle of Wilson's Creek resembled the 
battles of the Revolutionary War. The dimen- 
sions were small, but the losses showed staunch 
fighting ; and the indecisiveness of the result was 
like that of many another and far bloodier conflict 
during the next four years, in which Americans, 
arrayed against one another, gave repeated proof 
of that wonderful staying power in which we have 
always resembled our British forefathers, and which 
seldom can be made to understand that it is beaten. 
The one thing really lamentable in the battle of 
Wilson's Creek was the death of the noble Lyon. 
Like the death of Joseph Warren at Bunker Hill, 



2S The Mississi2ipi Valley in the Civil War 

it was a loss that could not be made good. In his 
brief career Lyon had shown extraordinary quali- 
ties. He was sagacious and dauntless, quick and 
sure, and always ready to assume responsibility. 
If his plan of attack at Wilson's Creek is perhaps 
Lyon's great liable to the charge of rashness, it 
qualities. should be borne in mind that after all 

it achieved a drawn battle against overwhelming 
odds. All our best generals on either side — Grant 
and Lee as well as the rest — had something to 
learn from hard exj^erience ; and if Lyon had lived 
to see the end of the war, he would very likely 
have taken place in the front rank of our great 
commanders. With the vigour and skill which 
had characterized his movements down to the day 
of his death, it is instructive to contrast the in- 
capacity and sloth which ensued thereupon. 

On the 9th of July General Fremont had been, 
as we have seen, appointed to command the West- 
ern Department, which now comprised the states 
of Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Kansas, with 
the adjacent territories. Fremont's work in con- 
General Fre- nection with the exploration of the 
mont. Rocky Mountains and the conquest of 

California had made him a favourite with many of 
the western people ; and moreover, having so lately 
been the first candidate of the Republican party 
for the presidency, he was at that time an impor- 



From /St. Louis to Belmont 29 

tant personage whom it seemed quite natural to 
select for high positions. But neither from a mili- 
tary nor from a political point of view was his 
career in the Civil War such as to justify the ex- 
pectations which his admirers had fondly cher- 
ished. He gave no proof of military insight, or 
political acumen. His most memorable act at St. 
Louis was a proclamation on the 30th of August 
which declared all slaves belonging to parties in 
arms against the United States to be free, and 
threatened instant death to all persons bearing 
arms within a district which he arbitrarily assigned. 
By such a decree Fremont not only assumed dic- 
tatorial powers which did not belong to him, but 
he showed a lamentable incapacity for tj. u 

^ "^ His emanei- 

comprehending the political situation, pation procla- 
Important as the slavery question was, 
the question of national sovereignty was far more 
important, and at this critical moment with such 
slave states as Missouri and Kentucky, where there 
was such a struggle between conflicting motives, 
it was in the highest degree imprudent to hint at 
the forcible emancipation of negro slaves. Such a 
hint was calculated to alarm many a loyal slave- 
holder and array him, against his better judg- 
ment, on the side of the Confederates. President 
Lincoln's unfailing political sagacity was quick 
to disavow this rash act, and to remind General 



30 The Mississi2)pi Valley in the Civil War 

Fremont that his powers as military commander 
were strictly limited. 

Soon after Governor Jackson had taken the 
field in behalf of the Confederacy, the state con- 
vention of Missouri met at Jefferson City, de- 
clared all the state offices vacant, and inaugurated 
a new provisional government, with its headquar- 
ters at St. Louis. After the battle of Wilson's 
Creek, McCulloch withdrew his troops to Arkan- 
sas, but the indefatigable Price made his presence 
felt more keenly than ever in the western counties 
of Missouri. Fremont had forces enough to pre- 
vent his doing any serious mischief, if they had 
only been properly concentrated. He had in all 
56,000 men, but they were scattered in small 
detachments in thirteen different places. To a 
certain extent this scattering was unavoidable, as 
there was a vast area to be protected ; but Fre- 
mont showed himself singularly deficient in han- 
dling the elementary problem of moving troops 
from places where they were idle to places where 
they were needed. His failure to relieve Lyon 
was an instance in point, and a still more flagrant 
one was forthcoming. 

At Lexington, on the Missouri river, Fremont 
had stationed Colonel Mulligan, with 2800 men 
and eight field-pieces, and ordered him to stay 
there until relieved. Price made up his mind 



From St. Louis to Belmont 31 

to overwhelm this detacliment, and accordingly 
on the 11th of September he appeared before 
Lexington with a force of 14,000 men, which 
daily reinforcements soon swelled to more than 
20,000. On his approach Colonel Mulligan en- 
trenched himself on an elevated plateau some 
fifteen acres in surface, a little east of „ „ ,, , 

Fate of Mul- 
the city and close to the broad river, li^an's de- 
He had a good steamer at his dis- t^chment. 
posal, upon which he might have withdrawn his 
force to the opposite bank, but in the absence of 
further orders he deemed it his duty to remain. 
He sent word to Fremont that he should defend 
the place to the last extremity, and begged for 
speedy reinforcements. It would not have been 
difficult from the garrisons at St. Louis and Jef- 
ferson City, and from General Pope's detachment 
in the northwest, to assemble 20,000 men for the 
protection of Lexington. Some time was afforded 
for such a movement, inasmuch as the Confeder- 
ates, worn out with forced marches and short of 
ammunition, contented themselves for the moment 
with investing Mulligan's position, and allowed 
six days to elapse before making a general attack. 
But although not only the city of St. Louis but 
every town in the loyal states was alive with 
anxiety over Mulligan's situation, Fremont could 
not make up his mind what to do. He sent no 



32 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

instructions whatever and no reinforcements until 
too late, so that the gallant Mulligan was left to 
contend with a foe that outnumbered him seven- 
fold. On the 18th the Confederates seized the 
steamer, and carried by storm a large building 
used as a hospital, which overlooked Mulligan's 
works. A desperate struggle ensued about this 
building. The Federals recaptured it and drove 
out the enemy, but presently numbers prevailed ; 
the Confederates won it again and held it, cutting 
off Mulligan's approaches to the river. There 
was neither spring nor cistern on the plateau, the 
weather was intolerably hot, and the devoted gar- 
rison soon began to suffer the torments of thirst. 
Next day a scanty reinforcement, tardily sent, 
arrived on the opposite bank of the river, but was 
unable to cross. Nevertheless, all that day and 
night, and through the forenoon of the 20th, a 
stout resistance was kept up, while the besiegers 
steadily pounded away with artillery. At length 
a general assault was made, the Confederates roll- 
ing large bales of hemp in front of them as a 
movable entrenchment, under cover of which they 
pushed close to the works on every side. Mulli- 
gan then surrendered, to avoid useless bloodshed. 

The horse being thus stolen, Fremont at last 
set out to lock the stable door. A cry of indigna- 
tion went up throughout the northern states. In 



From St. Louis to Belmont 33 

Missouri the Union party was despondent, and 
loud complaints were visited upon the command- 
ing general. On the 27th he started for Lexing- 
ton with 20,000 men and 86 guns, but Price had 
no mind to await him in that neighbourhood. 
Having dealt his blow, he knew how to get out of 
the way. He crossed the great state by forced 
marches, and was soon in his southwest corner near 
the friendly borders of Arkansas. By the middle 
of October Fremont had increased his Fremont's 
army to nearly 40,000. With this movements, 
force he felt sure of overwhelming Price, and even 
talked of a triumphant progress of a thousand 
miles down the Mississippi valley to Nev/ Orleans. 
The absurdity of such a dream was not so appar- 
ent then as now, for few people at the North 
could realize how tremendous the task of crushing 
the Confederacy was going to be. On the 1st of 
November, having reached Springfield, Fremont 
made up his mind that Price must be close by 
Wilson's Creek, and he prepared to attack him 
there. In point of fact the Confederate general 
was at Cassville, about sixty miles distant; but 
before this had been ascertained, and while the 
preparations were going on, there came an order 
from the President removing Fremont and ap- 
pointing General Hunter in his place. 

With all his military incapacity, Fremont had 



34 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

engaging personal qualities which endeared him 
to his soldiers, and his departure was regretted by 
many. Hunter retained his command but a single 
week. On the 1st of November the aged Gen- 
eral Scott had retired from the position of gen- 
eral-in-chief of the Federal armies, and General 
McClellan had succeeded him. In remodelling 
the military arrangements, McClellan appointed 
General Halleck to command the new Department 
of the Missouri, including the part of Kentucky 
west of the Cumberland river, and Hunter was 
thus superseded. The good fortune of Halleck in 
General ^^^^ Western command — vouchsafed 

Halleck. \^[j^ }^y ^n inscrutable Providence — 

was soon to carry him to Washington and to the 
supreme position in the army, yet he was a worse 
than mediocre man. He had, or was supposed to 
have, a thorough knowledge of the art of war as it 
exists in books ; he was familiar with military 
law ; he could sit in his study and plan campaigns 
with amazing profundity and precision ; and he 
looked so owlishly wise that the soldiers commonly 
called him " Old Brains ; " but with all this he 
had little power of grappling with practical diffi- 
culties, he accomplished nothing in the field, and 
after he had become general-in-chief his incapacity 
was responsible for some of the most terrible dis- 
asters of the war. His beginnings in the West, 
however, were auspicious. 



From St. Louis to Belmont 35 

During the month of December Generals Pope 
and Prentiss, with vigorous marching and skir- 
mishing, but without any serious engagement, 
restored the Federal authority in all the northern 
and central portions of Missouri. Price main- 
tained himself for a while at Springfield, but late 
in January, 1862, General Samuel Curtis moved 
against him with 12,000 men and 50 pieces of 
artillery. On the approach of this force the Con- 
federate general retreated into Arkansas, where 
he was once more joined by McCuUoch, and 
both were placed under the command of the able 
and enterprising General Van Dorn. Curtis, an 
excellent officer, pursued cautiously until he 
reached an eminence known as Pea Ridge, in the 
Ozark Mountains. Here he waited Battle of 
in a strong position, contenting him- Pea Ridge. 
self with observing the enemy, for his line of com- 
munications was already very long, and he could 
not safely penetrate farther into a hostile coun- 
try. He had left small detachments en echelon 
to protect his communications along the main 
post-road from Missouri which led to Fayetteville 
in Arkansas, and which was his only available 
line of retreat. This left him just 10,250 men 
and 48 guns with which to meet the enemy. Van 
Dorn, having collected more than 20,000 men, 
besides 5000 civilized Choctaws and Cherokees 



36 The Mississii^pi , Valley in the Civil War 

from tlie Indian Territory under the lead of an 
adventurer from Massachusetts named Albert 
Pike, thought himself strong enough to destroy 
or capture the Union army. A bold and well- 
planned march brought him into Curtis's rear, so 
that by seizing and holding the post-road he could 
cut off that general's retreat and compel him to 
surrender. Such movements, however, are often 
fraught with danger to the attacking party. The 
nature of the ground was such that in executing 
the manoeuvre the two wings of the Confederate 
army became sej^arated, and on the first day of 
the battle, while Van Dorn with his left wing 
succeeded in defeating the Union right and estab- 
lishing himself upon the post-road, on the other 
hand his right wing was comj)letely crushed, and 
McCulloch, its commander, was slain. 

Curtis's situation at the close of that day, the 
7th of March, was critical. He had routed and 
scattered half of the rebel army, but the other 
Total defeat ^^^^^ still Outnumbered him and cut off 
of the Con- his retreat. It was an anxious night, 
but the next day, with great skill, Cur- 
tis so extended his line of battle as to envelop 
both of Van Dorn's flanks and subject him to a 
murderous cross-fire, which soon drove him in con- 
fusion from the field. The Confederate army had 
lost in killed, wounded, and missing, not less than 



From St. Louis to Belmont 37 

5000 men, and was completely shattered. The 
Union loss was 1351. Among the contests of the 
Civil War this well-fought battle, out on the dis- 
tant borders of western Arkansas, was peculiar 
by reason of the presence of Indian auxiliaries. 
These red men were of small use to the Confeder- 
ates. Amid the roar of artillery and the obstinate 
fighting of a stronger race, they quite lost their 
heads, and only added to the confusion of defeat. 
So far as the state of Missouri was concerned, 
the victory at Pea Ridge went far toward ending 
the serious business of the war. There was more 
or less cruel and vexatious guerrilla fighting after 
this, but the rebels never again succeeded in in- 
vading the state in force. Van Dorn was called 
away to Corinth, where the Confederacy was mass- 
ing its strength for the coming struggle of Titans 
at Shiloh ; and Curtis was thus enabled to march 
at leisure through Arkansas, until he came out 
at Helena on the bank of the Mississippi river in 
the midsummer following. 

The interest of these early campaigns is some- 
what meagre as compared with the j^^ ^tj^nce 
mighty struggles which were to come, of these early 
But their place in the line of causal ^^"^p^^^"^- 
sequence which ended in the overthrow of the 
rebellion is profoundly interesting. Already they 
begin to reveal the prodigious value of the initia- 



38 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

tive that was taken by Lyon and Blair. The scene 
of our story is now to shift to eastward of the Mis- 
sissippi river, into central regions, where it is no 
longer a question of saving a single state, but of 
aiming a blow at the heart of the rebellion. The 
events which now come crowding upon our atten- 
tion are conceived upon a grander scale, and their 
glory and terror are such as to absorb the atten- 
tion and make it easy to forget the significance 
of these earlier and more restricted movements. 
But without the work which we have just passed 
in review, the history of these grander operations 
would have been very different. Until the great 
state of Missouri had been secured, it would have 
been impossible for a Federal army, without dan- 
gerously exposing its right flank and its line of 
communications, to have advanced upon the first 
Confederate line of defence in Kentucky. That 
line of defence, as we shall see, ran through the 
southern portion of Kentucky, making at one place 
a slight bend into Tennessee. 

If Kentucky could have been persuaded to cast 
in her lot with the Confederacy, the first defen- 
sive line would have been formed by the Ohio 
river, and no pains were spared by Jefferson 
Davis to secure so desirable an object. But the 
Union sentiment in Kentucky was strong. Party 
feeling ran very high there, as it did in Missouri 



From St. Louis to Belmont 39 

and all along the border, and many a house was 
divided against itself. Of the sons of Affairs in 
the venerable Crittenden, who had l^entucky. 
lately sought to avert the irrepressible conflict by 
crying Peace ! when there was no peace, one rose 
to the rank of corps commander in the Union 
army, while his brother became almost equally 
conspicuous among Confederate generals ; and this 
instance was but typical of hundreds. The gov- 
ernor, Beriah Magoffin, was a secessionist, and 
refused to obey President Lincoln's requisition for 
troops. The legislature resolved " that this state 
and the citizens thereof should take no part in the 
Civil War now being waged, except as mediators 
and friends of the belligerent parties ; and that 
Kentucky should during the contest occupy the 
position of strict neutrality." 

For a few weeks a sincere attempt was made to 
preserve this attitude of neutrality, but Attempt at 
events made it daily more manifest neutrality, 
that this was impossible. The State Guard, num- 
bering some 15,000 men, and possessing nearly all 
the serviceable arms owned by the commonwealth, 
was largely commanded by secessionist officers ; its 
inspector-general, Simon Bolivar Buckner, we shall 
soon see in high command under the Confederacy. 
Humphrey Marshall began collecting and drilling 
a rebel force within thirty miles of the capital, 



40 The Mississijypi VciU^y in the Civil War 

while William Nelson showed equal zeal in form- 
ing a camp of Union men. Thousands of seces- 
sionists left their homes to enlist with the Confed- 
erates in Tennessee, while in like manner great 
numbers went north into Ohio and Indiana and 
enrolled themselves in the Union ranks. As it 
became evident that neutrality could not long be 
preserved, the aversion to secession increased. 
The leaders of the Confederacy assumed a bully- 
ing tone, hinting that Kentucky belonged to them 
and knew it, but was afraid to take the responsibil- 
ity of leaving the Union. This sort of talk gave 
great offence, and in the August election the seces- 
sionist party barely obtained a third of the mem- 
bers in either house. On the 3d of September the 
Confederates, laughing to scorn this attempted 
neutrality, invaded the soil of Kentucky and took 
up a strong position. 

It was General Leonidas Polk who thus opened 
the war in this part of the world. This very able 
Leonidas commander was one of the picturesque 

^^^' figures of that time. A nephew of 

President Polk, he had been educated at West 
Point, but had soon left the army and turned his 
attention to theology. He became a clergyman in 
the Episcopal Church, and had now for twenty 
years been Bishop of Louisiana. His martial 
spirit reviving at the outbreak of hostilities, he 



From St. Louis to Belmont 41 

exchanged his surplice for the uniform of a major- 
general, and was at once placed in command of the 
forces gathering on the eastern bank of the Missis- 
sippi. There was a curious flavour of medisevalism 
in the appearance of this bishop at the head of 
an army in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The latest instance of a fighting divine before the 
Right Reverend Dr. Polk would seem to have been 
the Bishop of Derry, who was slain at the battle 
of the Boyne in 1690. A characteristic touch of 
ecclesiasticism appeared in the first general order, 
which declared that " the invasion of the South by 
the Federal armies had brought with it a contempt 
for constitutional liberty and the withering influ- 
ences of the infidelity of New England and of Ger- 
many combined ! " With sound military instinct, 
Polk saw the importance of the town of Cairo, 
situated at the junction of the Ohio river with the 
Mississippi, and advancing toward this goal he 
entered Kentucky and fortified himself at Colum- 
bus, on a bold bluff completely commanding the 
Mississippi river, about twenty miles below Cairo. 
At the same time General ZoUicoffer, coming from 
eastern Tennessee, invaded Kentucky by way of 
Cumberland Gap, and threatened the eastern por- 
tion of the state. 

This simultaneous invasion at points three hun- 
dred miles apart revealed the deliberate purpose 



42 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

of the Confederates to seize the state by force, and 
at once all thought of neutrality was at an end. 
The stars and stripes were defiantly hoisted over 
the capitol at Frankfort, and the legislature re- 
solved that Governor Magoffin should "inform 
those concerned that Kentucky expects 
declares for the Confederate troops to be with- 
the Union. ^^^^^^ ^^,^^^ ^^^ g^jj unconditionally." 

The governor vetoed this resolution, and it was 
instantly passed over the veto. As soon as it was 
known that Polk had occupied Columbus, a Federal 
detachment crossed the Ohio and occupied Padu- 
cah. A motion in the legislature that the gov- 
ernor should request the removal of these troops 
also was defeated by a vote of more than two 
thirds. A few days later it was voted to raise an 
armed force and drive the Confederates from the 
state. Most of the State Guard now went over to 
the enemy, and with them went Buckner, John 
Morgan, afterward so famous as a guerrilla chief- 
tain, and John Breckinridge, who had lately been 
Vice-President of the United States. The loyalty 
of these men to the Confederacy thus seems to 
have outweighed their loyalty to their own state, 
which had now decisively and finally arrayed itself 
on the side of the Union. 

General Polk's designs upon Cairo had already 
been anticipated and foiled by Federal troops 



From St. Louis to Belmont 43 

assembled in Illinois. There had just entered 
upon the scene a thoughtful and silent man, of 
whom our story has already caught a glimpse upon 
a street-car in St. Louis, rebuking a flippant seces- 
sionist. Ulysses Simpson Grant was ^^ 

*^. ^ Ulysses 

then thirty-nine years of age. He was Simpson 
the eldest son of a leather-dealer, of ^^^^*- 
Scottish descent, and was born at Point Pleasant 
in Ohio on the 27th of April, 1822. He was edu- 
cated at West Point, and was present in every 
battle of the Mexican War except Buena Vista. 
In his humble rank of lieutenant he had been 
distinguished for personal gallantry so far as to 
attract the attention for a moment of General 
Scott, the commander-in-chief, and of his staff- 
officer, Robert Edward Lee. In 1854, having 
reached the grade of captain, he gave up his com- 
mission and engaged thereafter in business as wool- 
dealer, auctioneer, real-estate agent, achieving little 
success, until the outbreak of hostilities in 1861 
found him at Galena in Illinois, earning a scanty 
subsistence in the leather trade. At that time he 
was regarded as a broken and disappointed man, 
for whom no one would have dreamed of predicting 
a brilliant future. 

When the President's call for troops came in 
April, Grant assembled and drilled a company of 
volunteers at Galena, and presently led it to 



44 The Mississii^i^i Valley in the Civil War 

Springfield, the capital of Illinois. He then wrote 
a very modest letter to the War Department at 
Washington, saying that since he had been edu- 
cated at the expense of the Federal government, 
he now felt it his duty to offer his services, and he 
accordingly asked for a commission. No notice 
was taken of this letter. Disappointed here. Grant 
went to Cincinnati, where McClellan was in com- 
mand of the Ohio volunteers, hoj^ing that he might 
obtain a place on that general's staff. But after 
calling twice at headquarters and not finding the 
general, he returned baffled but not disheartened 
to Illinois. There his zeal and skill in organiza- 
tion soon became so conspicuous that the governor 
placed him in command of a regiment, with which 
he marched to northern Missouri and put himself 
under the orders of General Pope. The Federal 
army was now increasing its dimensions so rapidly 
and suddenly that there was a great demand for 
general officers, and men who had been trained at 
West Point and seen active service were sometimes 
promoted straightway from the grade of captain 
to that of brigadier-general, as had been the case 
with Lyon. Members of Congress from Illinois, 
who had observed Grant's zeal and efficiency, now 
recommended him to President Lincoln for promo- 
tion, and he was accordingly made brigadier-gen- 
eral while Fremont was holding the chief command 
in the West. 



Prom St. Louis to Belmont 45 

When the cardinal position at Cairo was threat- 
ened by Polk, Grant seized it and made it his 
headquarters on the same day that Polk occupied 
Columbus. Grant thus gained an initiative which 
he was not slow in using. Polk's position at 
Columbus blockaded the Mississippi river up to 
that point ; by next seizing Paducah, he would 
blockade the lower Ohio likewise, and command 
the mouths of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, 
two broad rivers which served as indispensable 
military highways leading for hundreds of miles 
through the central portion of the Confederacy. 
The bishop sent scouts to inspect Paducah, but 
Grant was again beforehand, and occu- q.^^^^ ggj^eg 
pied the town just at the moment when Paducah. 
the good state of Kentucky was throwing off the 
incubus of secession. His behaviour in this affair 
was characteristic. Comprehending the military 
situation at a glance, he telegraphed to Fremont 
that he should strike at Paducah unless withheld 
by positive orders. Then he went on and seized 
the position, and on returning to Cairo found Fre- 
mont's despatch authorizing him to make the at- 
tempt if he felt strong enough. We see here the 
same qualities which we had observed in Lyon, — 
the ardour and quickness to strike, combined with 
the sagacity which knows where to aim the blow. 
With Paducah in Union hands, it was no longer 



46 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

possible for tlie Confederates to gain a defensive 
line along the Ohio river without a desperate 
battle. Shortly afterwards the movement was 
completed by sending General C. F. Smith to hold 
the mouth of the Cumberland. Grant now asked 
permission to attack Columbus, but the request 
was unheeded. Several weeks were passed in 
organizing and drilling the troops, while Polk 
strengthened the bluff at Columbus with earth- 
works mounting 142 heavy guns. Strong fortifica- 
tions were also begun by the Confederates lower 
down the river at New Madrid and Island Number 
Ten, and still lower at Fort Pillow. 

On the 1st of November, while Fremont was 
advancing against Price as above mentioned, Grant 
was directed to make demonstrations on both 
banks of the Mississippi, in order to prevent Polk 
from sending troops into Missouri. At the same 
time he was ordered to detach a small force to aid 
in the pursuit of the guerrilla chieftain Thompson. 
For this duty Grant detailed 3000 men under 
Colonel Oglesby, while with about the same num- 
ber under his own command he sailed down the 
river under convoy of two gunboats, and landed 
soon after daybreak of November 7 on the Mis- 
souri shore some three miles above Columbus, at a 
point where he was screened by thick woods from 
the view of the enemy. Just opposite Columbus, 



From St, Louis to Belmont 47 

and completely commanded by its guns, were three 
wooden shanties built on a low flat, scarcely above 
the level of the water. The place was Battle of 
named Belmont, on the same principle ^el^^oJit- 
that will sometimes lead well-meaning parents to 
christen a little brunette daughter " Blanche." To 
this point Polk had just sent General Pillow with 
2500 men, intending to cut off the detachment 
under Oglesby. Perceiving the aim of this move- 
ment, Grant decided to frustrate it by an imme- 
diate attack. Few of the men on either side had 
ever been under fire, but they fought very well for 
nearly four hours, until Pillow retreated in dis- 
order and the Union troops took possession of his 
camp. 

It was now time for them, having struck their 
blow, to get away from Belmont at once, for under 
the hostile guns of Columbus the place was unten- 
able. But the undisciplined Union soldiers, elated 
with victory, dispersed to pillage the camp, shout- 
ing and cheering, while their officers, scarcely less 
raw than themselves, made speeches presaging the 
speedy overthrow of the rebellion and the summary 
hanging of Jeff Davis " on a sour apple tree." 
Finding the language of command insufficient to 
restore order. Grant set fire to the camp, while the 
batteries at Columbus, seeing it now occupied only 
by foes, opened a heavy plunging fire. These 



48 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

energetic warnings sufficed to bring the men to 
their senses, and falling into place again they 
started in good order for the boats. 

But meanwhile Pillow had rallied his defeated 
troops, and being joined by three fresh regiments 
from across the river, had succeeded in taking a 
position between the Union men and their boats, 
so as to cut off their retreat. For a moment there 
were symptoms of confusion in the Federal ranks, 
which Grant allayed by remarking that victorious 
soldiers who had cut their way in could cut their 
way out again. A sj^irited charge soon repulsed 
the enemy, who disappeared from sight as he had 
done before, — but this time only to await the 
arrival of the high-decked steamers which were 
crossing the river crowded with reinforcements 
and bringing General Polk himself upon the scene. 

These fresh troops arrived in time to assault the 
Federals in flank just as they were reaching the 
shore, but it was too late to cut them off. Their 
embarkation was effected, not without much con- 
fusion and the loss of some parties who had been 
sent to bring in the wounded, but they carried 
away two of the cannon which the}^ had captured, 
as well as a few prisoners. Grant was the last to 
leave the field, and narrowly escaped capture or 
death. As he sat on his horse, covered with a 
cloak which disguised his rank, Polk saw him and 




FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY 13-16, 1862 



From St. Louis to Belmont 49 

exclaimed, " There 's a Yankee, my boys, if you 
want to try your aim ! " The last Federal steamer 
was just unmooring, but Grant's horse slid down 
tlie bank on his haunches, a plank was thrown out, 
and the general trotted aboard amid a hail of 
musket-balls, which for the most part flew harm- 
lessly over the deck. As the men were all em- 
barked, the gunboats now poured grape and canis- 
ter into the Confederates on shore until they sought 
shelter in the woods. Late in the evening Grant 
reached Cairo, having accomplished his main pur- 
pose in occupying Polk's attention and diverting 
reinforcements from the Confederate army in Mis- 
souri. The wary bishop now kept his men to- 
gether at Columbus in anticipation of further 
attacks. 

Whether in the life of Grant or in the history 
of our Civil War, the fight at Belmont was but a 
slight incident ; yet at one time it provoked much 
discussion. Both sides claimed a victory. The 
Federals claimed it as having won the morning's 
fight, as having effected their object, and as having 
come away after inflicting a heavier loss upon the 
enemy than they had sustained themselves. The 
Confederates claimed it as having at Comments on 
last compelled the Federals to with- Belmont. 
draw in hurry and confusion. Public opinion at 
the North adopted the Confederate view of the 



50 The llisslssipjn- Valley in the Civil War 

case, and seeing nothing but the fact of an advance 
in the morning followed by retreat in the after- 
noon, hastened to the conclusion that this was 
another fiasco like Big Bethel and Ball's Bluff. 
Whenever an engagement occurred at that early- 
period of the war, the northern people looked for 
overwhelming victory followed by a long stride 
southward ; they cared little for demonstrations 
and diversions, and having met with a long series 
of slight reverses, the importance of which was 
much exaggerated, they were naturally in a cap- 
tious and fault-finding mood. The affair at Bel- 
mont was accordingly made the theme of angry 
sarcasm, and although this mood was soon dis- 
pelled by the great victory at Fort Donelson, the 
sarcasm was revived in later years with far less 
excuse, when Grant became a candidate for the 
presidency. Democratic newspapers in 1868 made 
much of Belmont, while indulging in criticisms 
that were as ill-considered as ill-natured. Grant's 
military object in the movement was sound, and, 
as we have seen, was accomplished. His conduct 
of the movement was excellent ; but for his cool- 
ness and steadiness it would not have escaped the 
disaster so nearly incurred through the insubor- 
dination of the troops. Had they obeyed orders 
instead of stopping to riot in the enemy's camp, 
they would have been withdrawn as promptly as 



From St. Louis to Belmont 51 

they had advanced, instead of waiting for the 
enemy to rally and gather reinforcements ; and the 
affair would have worn the aspect of a brilliant 
dash instead of a repulse. Such untoward inci- 
dents are characteristic of fights between perfectly 
raw troops. But the affair showed at the same 
time of what excellent fighting stuff these novices 
were made. It was hotly contested on both sides. 
The Federal loss was 485 in killed, wounded, and 
missing ; the Confederate loss was 641. Compared 
with the forces engaged, these figures show bold- 
ness and persistence ; in the Revolutionary War 
such an affair would have ranked as a very con- 
siderable battle. 

In defence of the battle of Belmont no more 
pithy and incisive comment has ever been made 
than the simple remark with which Grant himself, 
in his " Memoirs," dismisses the subject : " If it 
had not been fought. Colonel Oglesby would prob- 
ably have been captured or destroyed with his 
3000 men. Then I should have been culpable 
indeed." 



CHAPTER II 

FORT DOXELSON AND SHILOH 

Events were now crowding upon the scene 
which made Belmont and all that had gone before 
seem insignificant. Baffled in their hopes of gain- 
ing the Ohio river, the Confederates had estab- 
lished their defensive line in southern Kentucky, 
stretching from Columbus on the MississijDpi to 
Cumberland Gap in the AUeghanies. The weak 
spot in this line was the part where it was crossed 
The first Con- ^^ *^® Tennessee and Cumberland riv- 
federate line ers, whicli afforded access to the Fed- 
eral navy. It was thought that the 
ascent of these streams might be blocked by for- 
tresses, as Polk had blocked the descent of the Mis- 
sissippi ; and to this end Fort Henry was erected 
on the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson, about twelve 
miles distant, on the Cumberland. Both strong- 
holds were within the state of Tennessee, a little 
beyond the Kentucky border, just where the as- 
cending courses of the two parallel rivers begin to 
diverge. Ninety miles northeast of Fort Donelson, 
the post of Bowling Green, forming a salient in 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 53 

the long line, was held by General Buckner. At 
an equal distance to the east of Bowling Green, 
General ZoUicoffer, in an entrenched camp at Mill 
Spring, formed the right wing of the whole line, 
and guarded the approaches to the Cumberland 
Mountains. The chief command west of the Alle- 
ghanies had been given to Albert Sidney Johnston, 
who was then regarded in all parts of the country 
as one of the ablest of American soldiers. General 
Johnston was a native of Kentucky, of New Eng- 
land descent. A graduate of West Point, he had 
served with distinction in the Texan army in 1836, 
and afterward in the Mexican War, and in 1857 
had conducted the memorable expedition to Utah. 
At the beginning of the Civil War he Albert Sid- 
had been opposed to secession, and it ney Johnston. 
was intended to offer him one of the highest com- 
mands in the Federal army. But when the state 
of Texas, of which he had long been a citizen, 
seceded, he did as so many others did and " went 
with his state." He was then in his fifty-ninth 
year, handsome in person and winning in manner, 
of lofty character, heroic courage, and undoubted 
ability. On assuming command he had completed 
the defensive line just described by throwing Buck- 
ner forward into Bowling Green, and was now 
busily employed in collecting an army sufficient to 
hold so vast a territory. Opposed to his left was 



54 TJie Mississippi .Valley in the Civil War 

Grant, at Cairo, now acting under orders from 
Halleck, at St. Louis. Disposed to his centre and 
right was the army which had been assembled in 
northern Kentucky under Don Carlos Buell. Five 
divisions of this army, under Generals McCook, 
Crittenden, Nelson, AYood, and Mitchel, lay to the 
northward of Bowling Green. A sixth, watching 
the extreme rebel right, was commanded by George 
Henry Thomas, of Virginia, one of the greatest 
soldiers produced by the Civil AYar, as well as one 
of the most attractive characters in American his- 
tory since George Washington. General Thomas 
had been educated at West Point, and had served 
with distinction in the Mexican War. As a Yir- 
ffinian of Virg^inians he was confronted with the 
painful question of allegiance which beset Lee and 
George Henry ^^*^^ *^® Johustons and SO many other 
Thomas. high-minded men ; but in his case love 

for the Union prevailed over his intense attach- 
ment to his native state ; and he became such a 
power in the Federal army that Virginia, which 
fought so hard to dismember the Union, may now 
congratulate herself that in giving us Thomas she 
also did much to help save it. A man of rare and 
exquisite refinement, whole-souled devotion to duty, 
perfect sincerity and perfect modesty, he was every 
inch a soldier. His military judgment was unerr- 
ing, and when he struck it was with the blow of a 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 55 

trip-hammer. We shall see him growing in fame 
and in achievement until at Nashville, in the con- 
cluding period of the war, he annihilates a great 
Confederate army on the field of battle. His first 
victory was similar in completeness, though small 
in scale. On the 19tli of January, 1862, in a 
short, sharp fight near Mill Spring, in ^^^^^^ ^f Mm 
which Zollicoffer was killed, Thomas Spring. 
destroyed the Confederate force and cleared all 
that part of Kentucky at a single blow. By this 
victory the Federals gained Cumberland Gap and 
were brought within support of the loyal popula- 
tion of eastern Tennessee ; the eastern extremity 
of Johnston's line was demolished, and his salient 
at Bowling Green was threatened on its flank. 
But still graver ill fortune was preparing for him 
in the other direction, where Grant was about to 
take the initiative. 

As Colonel Preston Johnston tersely observes, 
in his biography of his father, " there has been 
much discussion as to who originated the move- 
ment up the Tennessee river. Grant made it, 
and it made Grant. It was obvious enough to 
all the leaders on both sides." Sherman, Buell, 
and Grant agreed in urging it upon Halleck, but 
McClellan, general-in-chief, thought it should be 
postponed for a while, until after eastern Ten- 
nessee should have been occupied. Halleck seems 



56 The Mississip'pi Y alley in the Civil War 

to have understood the vakie of the movement, but 
when Grant asked permission to make it, Plalleck 
silenced him so sharply as to make it appear that 
he deemed it a gross blunder. Halleck thought 
the enterprise should not be undertaken with less 
than 60,000 men ; but Grant persisted, and Com- 
modore Foote, commanding the gunboat flotilla, 
added his solicitations, until at last the requisite 
permission was obtained ; and on February 2 
Grant and Foote started up the Tennessee with 
17,000 men and seven gunboats. The success of 
the movement was due to its promptness, as is 
usual in warfare, in which more strikingly than in 
any other pursuit of life we see the truth of the 
Capture of adage that time is money. Fort Henry 
Fort Henry, ^^^g (Joomed by the mere quickness of 
the movement. General Tilghman, the command- 
ant, had but 3400 men, and saw at once that it 
was too late for reinforcements to reach him. Ac- 
cordingly he sent most of his force over to Fort 
Donelson, remaining himself with a small detach- 
ment to cover the retreat. This was sound policy 
and apparently the only course open to the com- 
mander of Fort Henry ; the struggle must be made 
at Fort Donelson. General Tilghman worked his 
few men and guns admirably, and after a brief 
bombardment by the fleet he surrendered Fort 
Henry with only 96 men. A convenient base was 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 57 

thus established against Fort Donelson, to which 
the Union forces now hastened. 

Fort Donelson was situated on a plateau near the 
great bend of the Cumberland river, elevated about 
one hundred feet above the shore-line. ^ .,. - 

Jrosition of 

It " consisted of two water-batteries on Fort Donel- 
the hillside, protected by a bastioned ^^^' 
earthwork of irregular outline on the summit, en- 
closing about one hundred acres." ^ To the north 
of it Hickman creek, flowing into the Cumberland 
and filled at this season with backwater, formed an 
impassable barrier. About half a mile to the south 
Indian creek emptied into the river, and just south 
of Indian creek stood the little town of Dover, 
whence ran the road to Nashville by way of Char- 
lotte, affording the only available line of retreat in 
case of an overwhelming land attack. To the west 
or rear of fortress and town the country is cut up 
by several small brooks flowing into Hickman and 
Indian creeks, and leaving a series of ridges from 
fifty to eighty feet in height and for the most part 
parallel to the river. Starting from Hickman 
creek on the north, at a point rather more than 
a mile from the river, a continuous line of ridges 
was fortified with rifle-pits and abattis difficult to 
penetrate. Broken only at one spot by the valley 
of Indian creek, this line of defences was carried 

^ Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government^ ii. 28. 



5S The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

southward and eastward as far as the river, enclos- 
ing the town of Dover and commanding the road 
to Charlotte. Nine batteries were placed at inter- 
vals along the line. 

This strong position was occupied by an army 
of 18,000 men, commanded by General Pillow, an 
Its command- officer whose vanity far exceeded his 
^^- merit. Second in command was Gen- 

eral Buckner, an excellent soldier, whose relations 
with Pillow were not altogether cordial. On the 
13th of February, the day after Grant arrived with 
his army, a third general, senior in rank to Pillow, 
came in and took command. This was John Floyd, 
lately secretary of war under President Buchanan. 
He was a person unfit for any such responsible 
position ; and Johnston clearly made a capital mis- 
take in sending him there at a critical moment. 

Fort Henry had fallen on the 6th, and Grant, 
realizing the need of striking quickly, had hoped 
to attack Fort Donelson on the 8th ; but the roads 
were flooded, supplies were slow in coming, and the 
fleet had a long distance to travel in descending 
one river and ascending the other. The sun was 
setting on the 12th when the divisions of McCler- 
nand and C. F. Smith, numbering about 15,000 
men, arrived before the works. A third division 
of 2500 men, under Lew Wallace,^ had been left at 

1 An able officer, since better known as the gifted author of 
Ben-Hur and The Fair God. 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 59 

Fort Henry, but this was brought up next day, as 
the forces were insufficient to surround the works. 
Durins: the 13th the investment was ^ ^ , . 

s Investment of 

completed. McClernand held the Char- Fort Donel- 
lotte road with his right and stretched 
his left nearly as far as Indian creek. On his left 
came the centre division under Lew Wallace, and 
beyond, stretching northward to Hickman's creek, 
was stationed C. F. Smith with the left wing. 
The line was still a slender one, and Grant's con- 
duct in coming np so qnickly had been marked 
by audacity. It is seldom in history that a force 
behind entrenchments has allowed itself to be 
quietly invested by a force no greater than itself. 
If the enemy had harassed him on the march from 
Fort Henry, or vigorously attacked him on the 
morning of the 13th, it might have interfered seri- 
ously with his plans ; but during those two days 
the Confederates behaved as if paralyzed. Grant's 
conduct indicates that he gauged the calibre of 
Pillow and Floyd, and took it into the account. 
When his lines were completed on the 13th, he 
ordered an attack by way of feeling the enemy's 
strength. None of the works were carried, but 
McClernand' s hold upon the Charlotte road became 
firmer. 

The night was a dismal one for the soldiers. 
Their supplies were delayed, and food was getting 



60 The Mississippi V^^^l^y if^ the Civil War 

scarce. The weather had been warm, and many of 
these inexperienced men had forgotten or thrown 
away their blankets. Now the temperature dropped 
to twenty degrees below the freezing-point, while 
the camps were swept by a furious storm of snow 
and sleet. Many were frost-bitten, some were 
frozen to death, in others were sown the seeds of 
fatal disease. The morning, however, brought the 
gallant fleet, convoying the transports with the 
provisions so sorely needed, and 5000 fresh troops, 
which were added to Wallace's division and essen- 
tially increased the strength of the besieging line. 
Commodore Foote, pushing up within 500 yards 
An artillery of the watcr-battcries, opened a furious 
duel. fjj,g^ which succeeded in silencing several 

guns; but at length their plunging fire disabled 
his two best gunboats and compelled him to with- 
draw out of range, leaving the river above the fort 
still open to the enemy. The works on the river- 
front were knocked out of shape, but the fort 
seemed as far as ever from surrender, and at night- 
fall of the 14th Grant began to think it might be 
necessary to have recourse to siege. 

But Floyd had held a council of war that morn- 
ing in which it was decided that the situation was 
alarming, and that the best thing for the Confed- 
erates to do was to cut their way out, retire upon 
Charlotte, and reopen land-communication with 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 61 

Nashville. The sortie was to have been made that 
day, but at Pillow's instance, it was g^rtie of the 
postponed till next morning. Early Confederate 
on the ISth Grant had gone on board s^^^^^^- 
one of the gunboats to consult with Foote, who 
was suffering from a wound received the day 
before, and could not come ashore. Soon after 
daybreak Pillow hurled 8000 men upon McCler- 
nand's right, and after an obstinate struggle not 
only pushed him off the Charlotte road, but threw 
his whole line into confusion and drove him in 
upon Wallace. The avenue of escape was thus 
opened, and if the Confederates had taken immedi- 
ate advantage of it, though they would have lost 
the fort, they could probably have saved their 
army. 

But Pillow, flushed with his success, now at- 
tempted altogether too much. He sent a despatch 
to Johnston, announcing a Confederate victory, 
and attacked Lew Wallace in the hope of rolling 
him up on Smith and turning the whole Federal 
position. In this he was aided by Buckner, but 
the Confederates were exhausted with their morn- 
ing's work and made little headway. Presently 
there came a lull in the battle, and just at this 
moment Grant rode upon the field. There was 
no thought of siege in his mind then. He saw 
the state of affairs and the error the Confederates 



62 The 3Iississip2n Valley in the Civil War 

had committed ; and he knew that at such critical 
moments success waits upon a bold initiative. He 
ordered Wallace to retake the positions, lost in the 
morning, while Smith was to charge upon the en- 
Fergusou trenchments on the left. The veteran 

Smith storms Charlcs Fcrgusou Smith, one of the 

the Confeder- 
ate entrench- truest men and finest officers in the 

ment, Federal service, led the assault in per- 

son, inspiring his raw troops with his own daunt- 
less courage. " I was nearly scared to death,'* 
said one of his soldiers afterwards, " but I saw the 
old man's white mustache over his shoulder, and 
went on." Under a witliering fire of rifles they 
swept up the ridge and encountered the tangled 
boughs of the abattis. "No flinching now," 
shouted the old hero, waving his cap aloft on the 
point of his sword, " here 's the way, come on ! " 
and in a few minutes they had scrambled through 
and driven the defenders from their rifle-pits. 
The ridge was carried, and the right of the Con- 
federate line was in our possession. 

This achievement at once relieved the pressure 
upon the Federal right. Buckner brought over a 
whole division to drive Smith from the ridge he 
while Wal- ^^^ taken, but all to no purpose ; he 
lace cuts off could uot stir him an inch. Mean- 
while Wallace, assaulting the enfee- 
bled forces on his right, pushed them back into 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 63 

their works, seized the Charlotte road, and occu- 
pied every yard of ground to the river's edge. 
The situation of the Confederates was far worse 
than in the morning. They had lost more than 
2000 men in the battle, their escape was cut off, 
and Smith's position commanded their works. 

In the night an extraordinary scene ensued. A 
council of war decided that nothing was left but 
to surrender. But Floyd, who was at that mo- 
ment under indictment at Washington for embez- 
zlement of public funds, declared he would rather 
die than surrender. " Yes," said Pillow, " there 
are no two men the Yankees want more than you 
and me, and they shall not have us." Floyd asked 
Buckner if they would be allowed to depart in 
case they should turn over the command to him. 
Buckner replied yes, if they should leave before 
terms of surrender were agreed on. So these un- 
worthy chiefs forsook their men and escaped up 
the river on a small steamboat, while Colonel For- 
rest pushed his cavalry across a half-frozen marsh 
formed by backwater and got away, leaving part 
of his force in the hands of the wakeful foe. At 
daybreak Buckner sent a messenger to learn what 
terms would be accepted. " No terms," "Uncondi- 
answered Grant, " but unconditional tional surren- 
surrender. 1 propose to move imme- 
diately upon your works." The Confederate com- 



64 The Mississi2)2^i Valley in the Civil War 

mander complained of such treatment as " unchiv- 
alrous," but was fain to submit. 

The surrender delivered up to Grant nearly 
15,000 prisoners, with 65 cannon and 17,000 
muskets. His loss in killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing, had exceeded 3000, and that of the enemy- 
had been not far from the same. For physical 
dimensions it was the greatest military achieve- 
ment that the American continent had yet wit- 
nessed ; but its strategic value was not to be 
measured by its physical dimensions. The two 
great rivers were laid open for hundreds of miles, 
Importance ^^ *^^^* Union gunboats sailed far into 
of the vie- Alabama. The victory of Thomas at 
Mill Spring had already led Johnston 
to evacuate Bowling Green and retire u])on Nash- 
ville. Now it was necessary to abandon Nashville 
also, for the great suspension bridge over the 
Cumberland was Johnston's only available line of 
retreat, and there was now nothing to hinder Foote 
from coming up to destroy it. If the army stayed 
in its jeopardized situation, he would be sure to 
come. There was a panic in Nashville. The 
state government fled, with the archives and all 
the money in the treasury, Johnston fell back to 
Murfreesboro, and just a week after Buckner's 
surrender a division of Buell's army occupied the 
capital of Tennessee. On the Mississippi river 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh QB 

the results were equally decisive. By staying in 
Columbus, Polk would only invite the fate which 
had overtaken Buckner, and he accordingly re- 
treated as far as Corinth, in Mississippi. 

Thus the first Confederate line of defence was 
shattered throughout its whole length, and the 
silent man who had dealt such a blow stepped at 
once from obscurity into a national fame. The 
American people had happily had but little expe- 
rience in military matters, and knew little of the 
dynamics of warfare ; and when they saw position 
after position thus surrendered, and a wide stretch 
of country abandoned, as the immediate result of 
Grant's victory, the feeling was one of amazement, 
and a hopeful mood was enkindled that was as yet 
premature, because none could yet comprehend 
the enormous difficulty of the task which had to 
be performed. Grant had now won a foothold in 
the confidence of the people which did him and 
the country good service in the trying time to 
come, when at Vicksburg he was confronted with 
a problem immeasurably more complicated and 
difficult than that which he had now solved at 
Fort Donelson. In the gloomy record of the anx- 
ious and impatient year which had just passed, 
this great victory was the one bright spot. The 
victor became a popular hero, and the phrase 
" Unconditional Surrender," humorously associated 



66 The Mississippi Galley in the Civil War 

with the initials of his name, became the watch- 
word of the northern people, and the index of the 
policy which was to be pursued until the spectre of 
secession should be exorcised and the work of 
the men who founded this nation guaranteed in 
safety forever. 

The correct and studious Halleck, who had been 
so slow to sanction Grant's forward movement, 
Halleck and ^^ow telegraphed to Washington, beg- 
Grant. ging to have his own command so 

enlarged as to cover all the armies west of the 
Alleghanies, and added, with droll inconsistency, 
that " hesitation and delay are losing us the 
golden opportunity." President Lincoln immedi- 
ately appointed Grant major-general of volunteers, 
and presently Buell, Pope, Smith, McClernand, 
and Wallace were raised to the same rank. On 
the 11th of March Halleck's command was en- 
larged according to his request, and divided into 
three departments. Pope in Missouri commanding 
the right, Grant on the Tennessee the centre, 
and Buell at Nashville the left. 

A fortnight before these arrangements were 
made, Grant found it necessary to go for one day 
to Nashville, to consult with Buell, and during his 
absence some of his undisciplined men indulged 
themselves in marauding. On his return they 
were promptly arrested, but the news of the inci- 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 67 

dent, magnified and highly coloured in an anony- 
mous letter, led Halleck to send the following de- 
spatch to McClellan at Washington : " I have had 
no communication with General Grant for more 
than a week. He left his command without my 
authority, and went to Nashville. His army seems 
to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort 
Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat \ 
of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful 
general immediately after a victory, but I think 
he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no 
reports, no information of any kind from him. 
Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys 
it, without any regard to the future. I am worn 
out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. 
C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the 
emergency." 

Halleck sent this extraordinary despatch before 
complaining to Grant or giving him a chance to 
justify himself. No wonder that on receiving it 
McClellan should have felt bound to reply : " The 
future success of our cause demands that proceed- 
inofs such as General Grant's should at once be 
checked. Generals must observe discipline as well 
as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him 
at once if the good of the service requires it, and 
place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty 
to regard this as a positive order, if it will smooth 
your way." 



68 The Mississippi 'Valley in the Civil War 

By Halleck's command the army had just been 
moved back from Fort Donelson to Fort Henry, 
preparatory to ascending the Tennessee river for 
the capture of Corinth. Halleck now availed him- 
self of McClellan's message so far as to place 
Smith in command of the expedition, while he 
charged Grant with disobedience and directed him 
to remain at Fort Henry. Sorely astonished and 
hurt, Grant asked to be relieved of his command. 
An interchange of telegrams followed for several 
days, in the course of which Grant completely justi- 
fied himself, and was replaced in charge of the ex- 
pedition, greatly to the relief of Smith, who had 
been one of Grant's teachers at West Point, and 
thoroughly believed in him. Smith was shocked 
and amazed at this readiness of Halleck to con- 
demn his subordinate unheard, and at the moment 
after a great victory ; but the explanation is not 
far to seek. In common with many of the older 
ofiicers, Halleck was strongly prejudiced against 
Grant, who had been somewhat under a cloud 
when he left the regular army. It is unquestion- 
able that Grant shared with Daniel Webster, and 
many other men of strong and massive natures, a 
somewhat overweening fondness for John Barley- 
corn. The fact was made much of by ill-disposed 
people, and was of course duly brought to the 
attention of President Lincoln, who estimated it 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 69 

with his customary humorous shrewdness. "I 
should like," said Lincoln, " to find out the kind 
of whiskey he drinks : I would send whiskey and 
a barrel of it to every one of my gen- '^^^• 
erals ! " There is nothing to show that Grant's 
usefulness as a commander was ever impaired by 
this personal trait, but it seems to have been what 
Halleck had in mind when he acted so precipi- 
tately upon the anonymous letter. 

The little town of Corinth, in northern Missis- 
sippi, which was now threatened by the approach 
of the Union army, was the meeting-point of two 
great railroads that connected the Mississippi river 
and the Gulf of Mexico with Virginia and the Car- 
olinas. By seizing this strategic point and driving 
the enemy from his positions on the river at New 
Madrid, Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow, and 
Memphis, the whole country would be strategic 
laid open as far as Vicksburg. The importance 
task of opening the great river from 
above was entrusted to General Pope, with whom 
the greater part of Commodore Foote's fleet was 
now to cooperate ; and an expedition was already 
fitting out for the capture of New Orleans and the 
conquest of the river from below. The task of 
taking Corinth was assigned to the united forces 
of Grant and Buell, which Halleck was to command 



70 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

in person. The Confederates were straining every 
nerve to secure this important position, and make 
it the base for an offensive campaign which should 
retrieve the disaster of Fort Donelson. General 
Beauregard, who had won such laurels at Bull Run, 
was sent to Mississippi, and had already occupied 
Corinth in force. Loud and bitter complaints were 
jDOured upon Johnston for losing Fort Donelson 
and Nashville, and the Confederate government 
was urged to remove him from his command ; but 
Mr. Davis, after listening patiently to an angry 
delegation from Tennessee who begged him to give 
them a general, replied with great earnestness, " If 
Sidney Johnston is not a general, the Confederacy 
has none to give you." A special committee was 
appointed to inquire into the causes of the late 
disasters, and Floyd and Pillow were removed from 
command ; but Johnston was retained in his high 
position, with Beauregard as his chief lieutenant, 
and by the end of March they had assembled at 
Corinth an army of nearly 50,000 men. Polk was 
brought thither on his retreat from Columbus, and 
Braxton Bragg came up with 10,000 men from 
Pensacola. This able general was a native of 
North Carolina. At the battle of Buena Vista, in 
Braxton ^^^^ Mexican War, he had by a timely 

Bragg. movement saved from destruction the 

regiment of Jefferson Davis, and this service was 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 71 

never forgotten by the President of the Confeder- 
acy, who always befriended Bragg through good 
and evil fortune. Bragg was a man of refinement 
in feature and expression, somewhat stern and re- 
served in demeanour, an excellent disciplinarian 
and organizer, but wanting in strategic power. To 
complete this gathering of the forces. General Van 
Dorn, scarcely recovered from his recent crushing 
defeat at Pea Ridge, was ordered to bring over 
his army from Arkansas; but although he moved 
with alacrity, he only succeeded in getting up one 
regiment in time for the coming battle. 

Just before the misunderstanding between Grant 
and Halleck, General Beauregard sent a couple of 
regiments with a field-battery to take possession 
of the bluff at Pittsburg Landing, about twenty 
miles northeast from Corinth, but this force was 
driven away by two of Foote's gunboats. A few 
days later General C. F. Smith, coming pittsburg 
up the river with his forces, selected Landing, 
this spot as the rendezvous for the two Union 
armies. Halleck had designated Savannah, on 
the eastern bank, nine miles below or northward 
from Pittsburg Landing, but Smith was authorized 
to make a different arrangement if he saw fit. 
When Grant arrived, he recognized the importance 
of the position and adopted it. Many persons 
found fault with him after the battle for taking 



72 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil \Var 

position on the west side of the river, but the ablest 
critics seem to agree with the Count of Paris that 
the position was "extremely well chosen." It was 
Grant's theory of the campaign that he was to 
attack and crush the enemy, and the east side of 
the river was not the place in which to do this. 
It would not do to give up the bluff at Pittsburg 
Landing to Johnston and Beauregard. The posi- 
tion was an exceedingly strong one, and while the 
gunboats commanded the river Grant might expect 
to have sufficient means of transport at hand in 
case of disaster. It was his plan to wait in this 
position until the arrival of Buell's army, after 
which the united forces were to advance upon the 
enemy at Corinth. Meanwhile, as Buell was ex- 
pected to arrive at Savannah, Grant kept his head- 
quarters there for the present, but spent a large 
part of each day with the army at Pittsburg Land- 
ing. 

The position was a quadrilateral nearly enclosed 
by natural obstacles, but open on the southwest, 
the side facing toward Corinth. The north was 
covered by Snake creek, emptying into the river 
a little below the landing. Owl creek, a tributary 
of Snake creek, enclosed the northwest side. To 
the southeast Lick creek flows into the river above 
the landing, and at that time its volume was greatly 
swelled by backwater. All three streams, indeed, 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 73 

were more or less flooded. The space included 
between them measured about three miles in either 
direction. The ground was uneven and thickly 
wooded. A number of small roads intersected it, 
and on one of these, running out toward Corinth 
near the right of the position, was a rude meeting- 
house built of logs and known as Shiloh church. 
The greater part of the army was arranged across 
the open front of the quadrilateral between Owl 
and Lick creeks which protected its two flanks. 
The right wing, near the crossing of 

, „ T-»' 1 Arrangement 

Owl creek by the road from Pittsburg of Federal 
Landins: to Purdy, was commanded by forces at 
a general who for profound knowledge 
of strategy, and versatility of resource, must be 
ranked among the masters of the military art. 
William Tecumseh Sherman had succeeded Grant 
in command at Cairo, and now in the gathering of 
the forces had come to take charge of a division in 
the advance upon Corinth. On Sherman's left, 
and somewhat overlapping him to the rear, was 
McClernand, and next to him Prentiss, while 
Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division held the 
extreme left, resting upon Lick creek.^ About a 

1 These positions as marked on the map indicate approxi- 
mately the relative positions of the Federal camps on Sunday 
morning, rather than the fluctuating lines of battle which were 
formed under fire. 



74 The Mississijopi Valley in the Civil War 

mile and a half to the rear, stretching from a point 
slightly above Pittsburg Landing across to Snake 
creek, the divisions of Hurlbut and C. F. Smith 
were stationed in reserve ; but the gallant Smith 
was never again to take the field. He had hurt 
his leg in jumping into a yawl, and this slight 
injury, joined with the effects of exposure at Fort 
Donelson, brought him in a few weeks to the grave. 
He was then lying ill at Savannah, and his divi- 
sion was commanded by William Wallace. Lew 
Wallace's division was five miles down the river 
at Crump's Landing, whence a road runs westward 
to the town of Purdy. Movements of the enemy 
were possible in this direction, and Wallace re- 
mained to watch the Purdy road. Another road 
parallel with the river connected Wallace directly 
with the right of the Union reserve by a bridge 
lately built over Snake creek. 

The only quarter in which the Union army was 
exj^osed to assault was the open front between Owl 
and Lick creeks. At a later period of the war 
this line would doubtless have been entrenched, 
and the whole position made invulnerable. But 
the need of entrenching was not then so keenly 
felt as it came to be afterward. It took just such 
terrible affairs as Shiloh to reveal the need of it. 
For it was even in this strong position that John- 
ston resolved to attack and crush Grant's army 




SHILOH, APRIL 6, 1862, MORNING 



Fort Donelson and Shlloh 75 

before Buell's should have joined it. Could this 
be done, it might repair the disaster of The eve of 
Fort Donelson and regain to the Con- l>attle. 
federacy the lost territory. At the very least, it 
would save Corinth and restore the prestige of the 
southern arms. Johnston waited as long as he 
dared for the arrival of Van Dorn from Arkansas, 
with 20,000 men, but swollen streams and miry 
roads made him wait in vain. On the other hand, 
Buell's march from Nashville was delayed by un- 
looked-for obstacles. There was a freshet in Duck 
river, and a bridge had to be rebuilt, which took 
several days. In the early spring American roads 
are at their worst, and marching was slow. Still 
Buell made progress, and on Saturday evening, the 
5th of April, the head of his foremost division, 
under Nelson, arrived at Savannah. At that 
moment the Confederate lines were already de- 
ployed and ready for battle in front of the Federal 
army, but hidden from view in the forest. The at- 
tack had been planned for Saturday morning, but 
some misunderstanding of orders had bred delay 
until it was too late to attack before the morrow. 
Beauregard now argued that the plan of surprising 
Grant's army had evidently failed, and he held the 
element of surprise to be so important that in its 
absence the attack had better not be made. It 
would be wiser, said Beauregard, to retire upon 



76 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Corinth ; but Johnston persisted, and ordered the 
attack for next morning at daybreak. 

Perhaps no other battle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury save Waterloo has been the occasion of so 
much difference of opinion as the battle of Shiloh. 
One of the points most hotly discussed has been 
the question how far the Federal army was taken 
by surprise on the morning of that bloody Sunday. 
_ ^ Rumour had it for a while that the 

How far were 

the Federals presence of an enemy was so far un- 
^^^rr?^^* suspected that in Prentiss's camp, 
where Johnston's first blow fell, men 
were captured by wholesale in their beds. It has 
also been contended that the end of the day found 
the Federal army so completely shattered that no- 
thing but Buell's timely arrival could have saved 
it from utter destruction or capture. A sober study 
of the documentary evidence seems hardly to jus- 
tify such extreme statements ; yet doubtless they 
come much nearer to the truth than Grant and 
Sherman, in their published Memoirs, are willing 
to admit. 

So long as Grant felt it necessary or desirable to 
keep his headquarters at Savannah, it was doubly 
incumbent on him to secure the position of his 
army by every practicable means. If he thought 
it better to employ his raw troops in drilling than 
in throwing up earthworks, it was an error in judg- 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 77 

ment excusable in view of his want of experience, 
but none the less an error. His inat- Grant was not 
tention to the exposed front between expecting the 

attack on 

Owl and Lick creeks is pretty clear Sunday morn- 
proof that he was not expecting an ^"^' 
attack in that quarter for the morning of Sun- 
day, April 6. Had he been on the lookout for 
such an event, would he not have spent Saturday 
night at Pittsburg Landing instead of Savannah ? 
and would he not have lodged some appropriate 
instructions with Lew Wallace, instead of waiting 
till Sunday morning ? 

These considerations have all the more weight 
since in Grant's absence from the field it was not 
at all clear who represented him there. Lew 
Wallace and McClernand were the only major- 
generals, so that the latter was ranking officer at 
the front. As Sherman's camp, however, was 
situated furthest forward, it would seem to have 
been especially incumbent on him to watch for in- 
dications of the enemy's presence in the neighbour- 
hood. Here a cavalry force would have been use- 
ful, but for want of such aid the army was virtually 
blindfold. Under such circumstances it would 
seem that Sherman should have taken more than 
ordinary pains to learn all that could nor was 
be elicited from the forest by pickets Sherman. 
and scouts. His failure to do so, his evident fail- 



78 The Mississipin Valley in the Civil War 

lire to realize the need for it, was simply a mark 
of inexperience. It is truly remarkable that an 
army of 40,000 Confederates should have ap- 
proached on Saturday afternoon within a distance 
of two or three miles, and not have sharply aroused 
the attention of the Federal camps. The point is 
one on which General Sherman in later years was 
unduly sensitive. I have often heard him repu- 
diate with scorn the charge of having been taken 
by surprise at Shiloh, and there can of course be 
no doubt as to his perfect sincerity of conviction, 
rri- 17 J 1 Nevertheless, the undeniable fact that 

The Federals ' 

were sur- when the Confederates attacked in full 
piise . force on Sunday morning, the Federals 

were in camp and not in line of battle, would seem 
to furnish absolute demonstration that the attack 
was not expected. 

The first Union officer to take the alarm was the 
West Virginian brigadier, Benjamin Prentiss, who 
on Saturday descried indications of the presence 
of cavalry in the neighbourhood and strengthened 
his pickets. Soon after five o'clock on Sunday 
mornins^ the battle was be^-un by the 

The opening ... . . 

attack upon skirmishing of the rebel pickets with 
Prentiss's thosc of Preutiss ; and scarcely had that 

division. 

general formed his division and thrown 
it a quarter of a mile forward, when it was struck 
by the mighty rush of the Confederates. On they 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 79 

came in three parallel lines, one following another 
at intervals of about half a mile. First came 
Hardee, with about 10,000 men, then Bragg, with 
10,000 more ; while the rear line comprised Polk's 
10,000 to leftward and Breckinridge's 6000 to 
the right. When the full line of battle was de- 
veloped, this arrangement brought forward Polk 
on the extreme left, by Owl creek, with Hardee 
as left centre, Bragg as right centre, and Breck- 
inridge on the extreme right, by Lick creek. 
Besides these 36,000 infantry there were 4000 
cavalry, scarcely effective in that tangle of forest. 
On the other hand, the Union army numbered 
about 40,000 men, but 7000 of these were with 
Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing, leaving 33,000 
to confront the enemy's attack. 

Grant was taking an early breakfast at Savannah 
when suddenly he heard the heavy firing, and forth- 
with started up the river, leaving a note for Buell. 
At Crump's Landino: he found Lew 

^ , , , ^ , Grant's in- 

Wallace awaiting him in a boat. Tell- structionsand 
ing Wallace to hold himself in readi- ,^^^, ^^^' 

^ ^ lace s march. 

ness for an immediate start. Grant has- 
tened to the battlefield. Arriving at eight o'clock, 
and finding that the enemy had evidently massed 
his whole strength in our front, he sent a verbal 
order to Wallace to march at once. The distance 
was only five muddy miles, but after five hours of 



80 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

obstinate fighting, in the course of which the 
Federal front was driven back more than a mile, 
nothing had yet been heard from Wallace, and 
two of Grant's staff — James McPherson ^ and 
John Rawlins — were sent to look for him. The 
cause of delay was a misunderstanding such as 
one is continually meeting with in every-day life. 
It had not occurred to Grant that Wallace would 
move by any other route than the direct road from 
the vicinity of Crump's Landing to the bridge 
over Snake creek. But it happened that some of 
Wallace's brigades had been thrown out for some 
distance along the Purdy road, and it seemed to 
him sufficiently direct to come by a route parallel 
to that which Grant had in mind, crossing Snake 
creek a couple of miles higher up. When Mc- 
Pherson and Rawlins found him, he had nearly 
reached the creek ; but now he learned from them 
that to pursue this route would be dangerous. It 
would lead him to the point where the road from 
Purdy to Pittsburg Landing crosses Owl creek, and 
now that the Federal line had been driven back, 
this would bring him on the field in an isolated 
position, where he w^ould be liable to be separately 
attacked. It thus became necessary for Wallace 
to retrace his steps for some three miles, and then 

^ Afterward commander of the Array of the Tennessee, and 
one of the ablest generals in the war. 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 81 

to take a cross road to the Snake creek bridge 
below. All this marchino^ and countermarchinof 
used up the day, so that Wallace did not arrive 
upon the scene of action till seven in the evening. 
His was, comparatively speaking, a division of 
veterans, and its absence was severely felt. This 
serious peril might have been prevented had Grant 
in the first place sent to Wallace a businesslike 
written order, specifying his line of march. It is 
in such minute attention to details that great gen- 
eralship largely consists. Napoleon in his best 
days left but little room open for contingencies 
and misunderstandings. 

Johnston's plan of battle was very simple. It 
was to push back the Federal army in such wise as 
to turn its left flank, and to interpose Bragg and 
Breckinridge between that flank and the river. 
Thus by cutting off the Federals from j^j^j^^g^ ^, 
Pittsburg Landing and driving them, plan of at- 
in more or less disorganized condition, 
into the pocket formed by Snake creek, he might 
even hope to force them to surrender. The desper- 
ate valour and dogged persistency with which his 
first charges were received, however, were such as 
to make it doubtful whether one long day would 
suffice for his programme. We have seen how the 
first fury of the assault fell upon Benjamin Pren- 
tiss about half past five in the morning. That 



82 Hie Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

general held his ground nobly, gaining time for 
the other divisions to form in line of battle ; but 
presently the enemy pushed in between Prentiss 
and Sherman, whose left regiment soon gave way 
Prentiss ^^ disorder. This obliged Prentiss to 

pushed back. i^\\ i^^ck to save his right flank ; and 
so he alternately stood firm and yielded a little, 
until he had been pushed back half a mile to a 
point where Hurlbut reinforced him.^ When this 
was accomplished, it was nine o'clock, or three 
hours and a half since this division had first been 
struck. 

Meanwhile the disaster to Sherman's left wing, 
with the retirement of Prentiss, exposed McCler- 
nand's left flank, and he endeavoured to make a 
partial change of front to meet the danger ; but 
McClernand ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ fierce onsct of the enemy, 
and Sherman his line was driven back with the loss 

pushed back. r • i -j. j. i i j. 

01 SIX guns, and it was not able to 
recover itself and make a fresh stand until it had 
yielded nearly a quarter of a mile. By this time 
Sherman's third brigade, commanded by Colonel 
Hildebrand, had completely lost its organization 
and melted away, leaving on the ground more than 

1 For many of these details I am indebted to General Buell's 
paper, "Shiloh Reviewed," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, i. 487-536 ; one of the most masterly pieces of military criti- 
cism that I have ever read in any language. 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 83 

300 killed and wounded. The rest of Sherman's 
division fought with great obstinacy, and inflicted 
frightful loss upon their assailants ; but the Con- 
federates were so much stronger at the point of 
contact that mere heroism was of no avail against 
them, and by noon Sherman's division had ceased 
to exist as an organized body. Fragments of its 
regiments and companies took shelter among their 
friends of McClernand's division, which through 
these irregular accretions became quite an amor- 
phous body, taking its orders indifferently from 
McClernand or from Sherman. After two hours 
more of desperate fighting, these generals retired 
their division across Tillman creek and took up 
a strong position along the road from Snake creek 
to Hamburg. 

In this position their left flank was, in a mea- 
sure, protected by the line of reserve which Hurl- 
but and William Wallace had maintained since an 
early hour of the day. Upon an advanced portion 
of this line Prentiss had retired, and toward the 
same point Stuart's brigade, on the extreme Union 
left, was driven, but not until thrice its own 
numbers had been massed against it. About the 
left centre of the Federal line was a wooded area 
with dense undergrowth, admirably adapted for 
defence ; and there the indomitable Prentiss, rein- 
forced by Stuart and by brigades from Wallace 



84 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

and Hurlbut, maintained his ground from nine in 
the morning till five in the afternoon. Again and 
again the Confederate assaults were repulsed with 
heavy slaughter. So savagely were they received 
that they bestowed upon the place the name of 
The Hornet's " Hornet's Nest." The long struggle 
^®^*- at this point proved fatal to Johnston's 

scheme for turning the Federal left, and if among 
the Federal generals there is any one who deserves 
especial commemoration as having " saved the day," 
it is Benjamin Prentiss for the glorious stand which 
he made in the Hornet's Nest. 

It was in an open field on the eastern margin 
of this fiercely contested area, shortly after a spir- 
ited charge at about 2.30 p. M., that General 
Johnston was struck by a rifle-ball which cut an 
Death of artery in the leg. The wound need not 

Johnston. have been fatal. Although no surgeon 
happened to be near at hand, the general or any 
of his comrades might easily have extemporized a 
tourniquet that would have put him out of danger. 
But Johnston was so absorbed in his work that he 
took no heed of the wound until suddenly he sank 
and died from loss of blood. The command of 
the army then devolved upon General Beauregard, 
who was at that moment in the rear, at Shiloh 
church. 

The death of Johnston was a bitter loss to the 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 85 

Confederacy. Jefferson Davis afterward declared 
his belief that " the fortunes of a country hung by 
the single thread of the life that was yielded on 
the field of Shiloh." ^ Johnston's death deprived 
us of the data requisite for testing the soundness of 
this opinion ; but of the theory that if he had lived 
he would certainly have crushed the Federal army 
that evening, something may be said. The often 
repeated statement that Beauregard threw away 
what Johnston had won seems unfair to the former 
and inconsistent with the history of the remainder 
of the day. In point of fact, the Confederates 
had not yet won the battle.^ The advanced divi- 
sion of Buell's army, under Nelson, was approach- 
ing on the further bank of the Tennessee river ; 
and in order to gain a victory, it was absolutely 
necessary for the Confederates to capture Pitts- 
burg Landing and cut off Grant's army from rein- 
forcements. The long stoppage at the Hornet's 

1 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, ii. 69. 

"^ Indeed, Johnston had not even gone to work in the way 
best fitted to carry out his plan of turning the Federal left flank. 
For that purpose his right wing ought to have been much more 
heavily massed, and his heaviest blow should have fallen upon 
Stuart rather than Prentiss. By following this line of action and 
pressing northward upon the Hamburg road, perhaps the Hor- 
net's Nest might have been turned and Pittsburg Landing cap- 
tured, which would have made the Confederate victory certain. 
It was a grave mistake to hammer for hours at the Hornet's Nest 
instead of pursuing the course thus outlined. 



86 The Mississippi Valley In the Civil War 

Nest had used up so much of the day as to leave 
scarcely time enough for this crowning achieve- 
ment. After Johnston's death, more than two 
hours elajDsed before the tremendous pressure upon 
Hurlbut's left flank compelled him to retire toward 
Pittsburg Landing, while a similar attack upon 
William Wallace's right wing pushed it back, dis- 
ordered and partially crumbled. These events 
left the remaining Federal force in that part of 
the field, consisting of the remnants of Wallace's 
and Prentiss's divisions, with both wings in the 
Capture of ^ir. Thus a little before six o'clock 
Prentiss. about six regiments, numbering over 

2200 men, were encompassed and captured by the 
enemy. Prentiss was taken prisoner, and Wal- 
lace received a mortal wound. 

This great success for the Confederates was far 
from being an unmixed success, for the sending of 
so many captives to the rear entailed further delay 
when every minute was precious. The position at 
Pittsburg Landing was covered by a ravine partly 
overflowed with backwater. On bluffs overlooking 
this ravine a battery of twenty pieces was planted 
just as three Confederate brigades were advancing 
to the attack. As the enemy, flushed with victory, 
came on, these batteries opened upon them, while 
at the same time the gunboats Tyler and Lexing- 
ton took part in the contest and enfiladed the 




SHILOH, APRIL 6, 1862, EVENING 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 87 

rebel lines with their giant balls. Moreover, Nel- 
son's division was crossing the river, Failure of the 

and Ammen's brio^ade, its first brig^ade, Confederates 
* * to take Pitts- 

arrived upon the scene to support the burg Land- 
Federal artillery. The Confederates ^^^• 
were driven back, and presently orders from Beau- 
regard were passed along their advanced lines 
directing them to desist from further attacks and 
to retire out of range of the gunboats. By some 
southern writers Beauregard has been severely 
censured for these orders ; it is maintained that if 
he had ordered one last grand charge, it would 
surely have routed or destroyed the Union army. 
This opinion is open to grave doubt. If Beaure- 
gard could at that moment have put 6000 or 8000 
fresh reserves into the fight against his weary an^ 
tagonist, he might in all probability have routed 
him. But here at nightfall, after more than twelve 
hours of desperate fighting, his own men were as 
weary as the enemy ; and it was now Grant, not 
Beauregard, who could bring fresh troops into ac- 
tion, for the big steamboats were delivering Nel- 
son's men by the thousand at Pittsburg Landing. 

Thus, in spite of their magnificent valour and 
dash, aided by the initial advantage of the sur- 
prise, the Confederates at the end of the day fell 
just short of victory. Their utmost efforts left the 
line of communication between Grant's army and 



88 The Mississip2^i Valley in the Civil War 

the reinforcing army unbroken. Had Buell's 
arrival been further delayed, they might perhaps 
have completed their victory on Monday, but now 
the conditions were entirely changed. It was in 
Bragg and an agony of rage and disappointment 
Beauregard, ^j^^^ Bv?igg at nightfall received Beau- 
regard's orders to suspend the fight till morning. 
It is a principle often illustrated in war that when 
two armies have fought until their strength is well- 
nigh spent, the one that can soonest summon its 
jaded energies to a final assault is almost sure 
to win. Upon this principle Bragg would have 
risked everything upon a grand attack on Sunday 
evening. When Beauregard's staff-officer brought 
him the order to desist, Bragg inquired if he had 
already promulgated the order to other generals. 
The officer replied that he had. Then quoth the 
disconsolate Bragg, " If you had not, I would not 
obey it. The buttle is lost.'' ^ It is upon this 
view of the case that some writers have built the 
inference that Beauregard threw away the advan- 
tage which Johnston had virtually won. Of course 
nobody can tell what would have ensued had Bragg 
made his attack, but the general history of the 

1 See Colonel William Preston Johnston's interesting paper in 
Battles and Leaders, i. 568. A more correct view (as it seems to 
me) of the situation is given by General Beauregard in the follow- 
ing paper, i. 590, 591. 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 89 

day supports Beauregard's view that it would have 
ended in a repulse. What was the fundamental 
fact in the case which prevented the Confederates 
from approaching Pittsburg Landing, the goal of 
their endeavours, until their commanding general 
judged the opportunity for seizing it to be gone? 
Doubtless that fundamental fact was Thefunda- 
the wonderful staying power of the mental facts 
Federal troops. Man for man, they 
were just as good fighters as the Confederates. 
The latter began with such an immense initial 
advantage, in the surprise, that it lasted them all 
day. From the outset the several Union divisions 
were placed at the dire disadvantage of forming 
under furious pressure, so that in many cases a line 
was swept from its ground while in process of for- 
mation. The rallying of such lines often brought 
fragments of one division into adherence to an- 
other, thus seriously disturbing the organization. 
During the entire day no opportunity was offered 
for making a firmly knit Federal line of battle. 
Gaps were made which allowed one division after 
another to be taken in flank and compelled to 
fall back. Had these things occurred upon open 
ground, a judicious use of the Confederate cavalry 
might have completed the disorganization of the 
Union army and routed it. Such a disaster was 
prevented by the broken and wooded country. 



90 The 3Iississip2n Valley in the Civil War 

With this one circumstance in their favour the 
Federals, in spite of the tremendous disadvantage 
with which they started, disputed every inch of 
ground so obstinately that the day was not long 
enough for the Confederates to reach their goal, but 
just as it seemed almost within their grasp, the con- 
ditions were radically changed by the arrival of 
Buell's army. Such were the fundamental facts in 
Sunday's battle. 

At seven in the evening the Federals preserved 
a sufficiently continuous line of battle from the 
vicinity of the Snake creek bridge to that of Pitts- 
Arrival of burg Landing. Its connections were 
Nelson and preserved with Nelson on the left, and 
with Lew Wallace, who had just ar- 
rived at Snake creek, on the right. These rein- 
forcements added to each wing about 7000 men, 
and Grant tells us that with his strength thus 
restored he should have assumed the aggressive on 
Monday morning, even without further aid. Prob- 
ably he would have done so. It was characteristic 
of him not to know when he was beaten, and we 
have his own. word that he never for a moment 
doubted of ultimate victory ; but it was fortunate 
that his disorganized divisions were not called 
upon to assume the aggressive next morning with- 
out fresh support. 

We may now turn our attention for a moment 



Fort Donelson and Shiloli 91 

to the eastern bank of the Tennessee river, and 
observe how the relieving army arrived upon the 
scene. When General Buell reached Savannah, 
early Saturday evening, he found that Nelson's 
division had arrived there and gone into camp. 
Grant had not yet come down from Pittsburg 
Landing for the night, and Buell soon went to 
Nelson's camp, so that the two generals did not 
meet that night. Grant had already visited Nel- 
son's camp and told that officer that Grant's ex- 
he would send steamboats down for pectations on 
him on " Monday or Tuesday, or some ^ ^^ ^^' 
time early in the week." Grant added, "There 
will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will 
[i. e., shall] have to go to Corinth, where the 
rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us we 
can whip them, as I have more than twice as many 
troops as I had at Fort Donelson." ^ These re- 
marks are in harmony with the other indications 
which show that Grant was taken by surprise on 
Sunday morning. 

At sunrise on that memorable day Buell and 
Nelson were at breakfast when the sound of heavy 
firing burst upon their ears. Nelson's men were 
at once put in marching order, and Buell, finding 
that Grant had already started up the river, pro- 
cured a small steamboat and followed him. Pi'e- 

1 Buell, " Shiloli Reviewed," in Battles and Leaders, i. 492. 



92 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

sently a descending steamer handed to Buell a 
letter from Grant, in substance as follows : " The 
attack on my forces has been very spirited since 
early this morning. The appearance 
the situation ^^ f rcsh troops on the field now would 
at Sunday have a powerful effect, both by in- 

noon. . . 1 T 1 .1 

spirmg our men and disheartenmg the 

enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all 
your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will 
be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the 
day to us. The rebel forces are estimated at over 
100,000 men." Soon Buell found Grant wpon a 
steamboat at Pittsburg Landing, and after a brief 
conference the two went ashore. Guides were sent 
to Nelson for his difficult march, and steamboats 
were collected at Savannah to bring up the di- 
visions of Crittenden and McCook, the former of 
which was just arriving at that point. For the 
rest of the day both Grant and Buell were busy 
on the battlefield. The latter found much work 
to be done in rallying and reorganizing stragglers, 
and in preparing for the rapid disembarkation of 
his troops. As for Grant, we catch glimpses of 
him during the day in various parts of the field, 
now with Sherman on the right wing, now in the 
Hornet's Nest with Prentiss, now on the right 
again. We do not hear of any notable movement 
or tactical manoeuvre performed by him, for the 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 93 

circumstances admitted nothing of tlie sort. The 
work for a commander consisted chiefly in myriads 
of readjustments here and there, sustaining the 
efforts of single brigades or regiments, or the frag- 
ments of such ; and in this we cannot doubt that 
on all parts of the field the stubborn bravery of 
the men gained fresh inspiration from the indom- 
itable spirit of their commander. ^ 

In order to avoid the fire from the Union gun- 
boats, which was kept up all night, the Confed- 
erates fell back about a mile and occupied the 
camps in which the Federals had slept the night 
before. The tents thus served to shelter them 
from the cold pelting rain which came down in 
torrents. The Federals lay in the a bivouac in 
mud, scantily protected by the leafless ^^^ ^^^"• 
trees. General Grant, whose ankle had been 
badly bruised by a fall of his horse, sought refuge 
from the storm in a log-house ; but the surgeons 
had taken possession of the place, and its sights 
and sounds were so doleful that the general soon 
retreated into the chilling rain. 

During the night the remainder of Nelson's 
division crossed the river, and Crittenden's came 

1 The last paragraph of General Buell's admirable paper (Bat- 
tles and Leaders, i. 536), though apparently somewhat severe, is 
thoroughly borne out by the judicious criticism of Mr. Ropes, 
Story of the Civil War, ii. 84. 



94 The 3fississippi Valley in the Civil War 

iij^ from Savannah on steamboats, followed after 
. . , . an interval by McCook's, which ar- 

Arrival oi '^ 

Crittenden rivecl early in the morning. The steam- 
and McCook. ^^^^^ ^j^^ brought Nelson's artillery. 

These reinforcements numbered 20,000 men, and 
in organization and discipline they were confess- 
edly superior to Grant's army ; for they had been 
trained for several months under the eyes of Buell 
himself, who was unsurpassed as an organizer. 
As they arrived in succession, these divisions were 
arranged for the morrow's line of battle ; Nelson 
on the left, next to the river, then Crittenden on 
his right, then McCook. Next came the remnants 
of Hurlbut's and McClernand's divisions, mended 
with fragments from those of William Wallace 
and Sherman ; while the extreme right, near Owl 
creek, was occupied by the fresh division of Lew 
Wallace. Besides BueU's 20,000 men and Wal- 
lace's 7000, we may estimate at 10,000 the num- 
The forces on t)6r of Grant's troops who had fought 
Monday. during the previous day and were now 

again brought into line. To oppose this force 
Beauregard had from 20,000 to 25,000 men, none 
of them fresh. Some reorganizing was necessary, 
and in the course of it there was some shifting of 
commands ; so that Hardee occupied the extreme 
right, with Breckinridge on his left, then Polk, 
and finally on the extreme left, Bragg. 




SHILOH, APRIL 7, 1862, MORNING 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 95 

Victory for the Confederates was no longer 
to be expected, save through some extraordmary 
blunder of their antagonists. The entire expe- 
rience of our Civil War shows that in fighting 
quality American soldiers from all parts of the 
country are so evenly matched that, under similar 
conditions, even a slight superiority in numbers 
ensures victory. A parity of conditions does not 
exist when the assailing party rushes against en- 
trenchments and is shot down faster than it can 
advance ; nor can it be said to exist when the com- 
manders are so unequally matched as, for example, 
at Chancellorsville, where Lee's 60,000 men de- 
feated Hooker's 120,000, because at every point of 
contact between the two armies during the battle, 
Lee's superior intelligence opposed superior num- 
bers to those of Hooker. On the second day of 
Shiloh, where the conditions were nearly equal, 
there was nothing to interfere with the rule that 
victory takes sides with the heaviest battalions. 
The Union soldiers were also less fatigued. Beau- 
regard was hardly entitled on Monday morning to 
expect victory, but a battle was preferable to an 
immediate retreat upon Corinth, harassed by an 
aggressive foe. 

The contest opened soon after daybreak with 
Nelson's advance against Hardee along the Ham- 
burg road. By seven o'clock Lew Wallace's divi- 



96 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

sion had forced its way across Tillman creek and 
occupied the heights to the south of it. By ten 
o'clock a fierce struggle was inaugurated about the 
road to Corinth, between the Purdy road and 
Shiloh church, and for six hours here the fighting 
Monday's ^^as as Severe as any that Sunday had 
battle. witnessed. To break down Bragg's 

division, and to gain a firm hold of the Corinth 
road southwest of Shiloh church, would cut the 
Confederate connections with Corinth. To pre- 
vent such a catastrophe Bragg put forth his utmost 
efforts, returning the offensive with magnificent 
pluck and resource. In this great fight the de- 
cisive part was played by McCook's division on 
the spot. But scarcely less decisive was the pres- 
sure of Nelson and Crittenden against the rebel 
right, which obliged Beauregard to reinforce it at 
the expense of his left. To prolong the fight 
under such conditions would have been to invite 
destruction, and presently Beauregard skilfully 
withdrew his army, keeping up a show of resist- 
ance as long as possible in order to cover his re- 
treat. By four o'clock he was making all haste 
toward Corinth. 

The Union army made no attempt to pursue the 
enemy and complete his discomfiture. Why this 
should not have been done has never been satis- 
factorily explained. It would seem that the con- 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 97 

dltlons were favourable for annihilating Beaure- 
gard's army. Bragg reported next morning that 
his troops were " utterly disorganized and demor- 
alized," while Breckinridge declared, " My troops 
are worn out, and I don't think can 
be relied on after the first volley." there no pur- 
Forage was short, and the horses were s^\* ^^ter 
so exhausted that artillery had to be 
abandoned on the road. Buell's men must surely 
have been fresh enough to pursue, and so must 
Wallace's ; and, moreover, Buell's fourth division, 
under Wood, had begun arriving upon the battle- 
field in the middle of the afternoon, and his fifth 
division, under Thomas, was coming up behind. 
Wood and Thomas brought 12,000 fresh men. It 
is difficult, therefore, to understand why Beaure- 
gard was not persistently followed up and har- 
assed by from 20,000 to 30,000 pursuers. The 
responsibility, of course, rests with Grant, who 
never offered any sound explanation. He only 
tells us that he had not the heart to demand more 
work from his own jaded men, and he felt some 
delicacy about giving orders to Buell, whose senior 
he had been but a short time.^ Such delicacy at 
such a moment shows, as Mr. Ropes says, an entire 
failure to rise to the height of the occasion. Fancy 
such an excuse from Frederick or Napoleon ! 

^ Grant's Memoirs, i. 354. 



98 Hie 3Iississippi Valley in the Civil War 

The failure, be it observed, is not a parallel case 
with the refusal of Meade to return the offensive 
after the repulse of Pickett's charge at Gettys- 
burg ; for in the latter case there were sound rea- 
sons for not putting in jeopardy the victory that 
was ours as things stood. A vigorous pursuit after 
Shiloh could not have imperilled the Union army 
in any way. 

I suspect that the true explanation, after all, 
may be that our peace-loving people had not yet 
come to realize what a terrible affair war is, when 
truly effective, and especially when waged against 
our own kin. Under the compulsion of stern 
necessity we could fight against our brethren, but 
we could not feel toward them the indifference 
which Napoleon at Austerlitz felt toward the Rus- 
sian fugitives upon the Satschan lake. We were 
satisfied with thwarting the hostile army, and did 
not appreciate the need for terminating its exist- 
ence. Some such state of mind, on the part of our 
troops at Shiloh, seems to be implied in General 
Buell's remarks when he says, " I make no attempt 
to excuse myself or blame others when I say that 
General Grant's troops, the lowest individual 
among them not more than the commander him- 
self, appear to have thought that the object of the 
battle was sufficiently accomplished when they 
were reinstated in their camps ; and that in some 



Fort Donelson and Shiloh 99 

way that idea obstructed the reorganization of my 
line until a further advance that day became im- 
practicable." ^ This is not inconsistent with Gen- 
eral Sherman's humorous reply when I once asked 
him why the retreating rebels were not pursued : 
" I assure you, my dear fellow, we had had quite 
enough of their society for two whole days, and 
were only too glad to be rid of them on any 
terms ! " 

The American people, unused to warfare upon 
a great scale, were astounded at the news of this 
terrible battle. For the first time in the history 
of the western continent we were called to witness 
such slaughter as had marked the cam- Terrible 
paigns of Marlborough or Napoleon, slaughter. 
On each side more than 10,000 men were killed 
or wounded, while on the first day the Union army 
lost some 3000 prisoners. In proportion to the 
total numbers engaged in the battle, these losses 
were enormous. Reckoning the Confederates (with- 
out their cavalry) at 30,000, Grant's army at 
40,000, and Buell's three divisions at 20,000, we 
have a total of 90,000, with a loss of more than 
20,000 ; more than two ninths, or approaching one 
fourth. "I saw an open field," says Grant, "in 
our possession the second day, over which the 

1 Battles and Leaders, i. 534. 



^•<^c, 



100 The Mississippi Valley m the Civil War 

Confederates had made repeated charges the day 
before, so covered with dead that it would have 
been possible to walk across the clearing, in any 
direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot 
touching the ground. . . . On one part bushes 
had grown up to the height of eight or ten feet. 
There was not one of these left standing unpierced 
by bullets. The smaller ones were all cut down." 
Considering the rawness of most of the troops 
engaged, the battle of Shiloh was peculiarly sig- 
Significance nificant. It tested American mettle, 
of the battle, j^ showed what formidable fighters an 
industrial people, hating warfare, could suddenly 
become under the spur of necessity. On either 
side, moreover, it awakened such a feeling of re- 
spect for the other as had until that day remained 
dormant. It also dispelled some illusions. It 
showed the northern people that a few victories 
like Fort Donelson would not suffice to overthrow 
the Confederacy, but that the whole southern 
country would have to be conquered inch by inch. 
It took this tremendous battle to determine whether 
the results of the capture of Fort Donelson were to 
be permanently secured. As to this point Shiloh 
was decisive. The Federals were not thrown back 
upon Kentucky, but advanced into Mississippi, 
and laid siege to Corinth, the centre of the second 
Confederate line of defence. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS 

The defeat of the Confederates at Shiloh put it 
out of their power to regain what they had lost at 
Fort Donelson. Giving up for the moment all 
hope of recovering Kentucky or holding any j^art 
of Tennessee west of the mountains, their task was 
limited to the maintenance of their second great 
defensive line, extending from Memphis through 
Corinth and Huntsville to Chattanooga. 

All but one of the positions taken in flank by 
Grant's advance up the Tennessee river had been 
abandoned. At one point, however, the Confeder- 
ates still maintained their foothold. This was at 
the great double loop of the Mississippi commanded 
by New Madrid and Island Number Ten, just at 
the corner of the four states of Missouri, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Arkansas. When Polk evacuated 
Columbus, he took with him 130 pieces of artillery 
and planted them in this position. Thus armed, 
Island Number Ten with its outposts island Num- 
hermetically sealed the river to ships ^erTen. 
descending from Cairo. Vast swamps on the east 



102 The Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

side of the river made it difficult to approach the 
island with an army. There was only one road by 
which an enemy could come, a very good road lead- 
ing from Tiptonville six miles below in a direct 
line and on the narrow peninsula between the river 
and Reelfoot lake. On the other hand, if the 
Confederates should lose control of the river below 
New Madrid, this Tiptonville road was their only 
possible line of escape. But in order to close this 
road, it was necessary for the Federals not only to 
capture New Madrid, but also to run their gun- 
boats and transports past the island itself, and this 
was thought to be impossible. 

The island was garrisoned by 7000 men. A 
position so far in advance of the Confederate line 
was necessarily liable to be overwhelmed, and 
doubtless it would have been evacuated but for the 
belief that Federal gunboats could not pass it. On 
the 3d of March General John Pope arrived with 
20,000 men on the western bank of the river, and 
erecting batteries at Point Pleasant, twelve miles 
below New Madrid, he cut off the supplies of the 
town and in ten days compelled it to surrender. 

The enemy's only line of escape was now the 
Tiptonville road, and Pope's problem was how to 
seize it, for his transports, under convoy of Foote's 
fleet, were all above the formidable island. The 
densely wooded peninsula opposite the island, made 




NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NUMBER TEN 
MARCH 3-APRIL 7, 1862 



The CaiJture of New Orleans 103 

by the great bend of tlie river, was at that time 
overflowed, and at some distance to the north was 
partially intersected by bayous. The whole penin- 
sula was under water, and it was resolved to cut a 
navigable channel through the forest Salving out a 
by sawing off the trees near the ground, el^annel. 
The army contained an engineer regiment, com- 
posed entirel}^ of skilled workmen, and this regi- 
ment with much labour accomplished the task. 
First the men, working in relays of three hundred, 
stood upon small rafts and cut off the trees about 
eight feet above the water. As fast as the trees 
fell, another set of men in small boats tackled 
them with roj^es and they were hauled away by 
steamboats. When room enough was cleared in 
this way, a large raft was fastened to a stump, and 
from this raft a huge saw, attached to a pivot, 
was set working below the water so as to cut away 
the stumps close to the ground. Now and then 
in shallow places stumps were dragged up roots 
and all, and in some cases excavation was neces- 
sary. It was cold, wet work, but no one flagged or 
fell sick, and in nineteen daj^s a channel six miles 
in length, fifty feet wide, and four and a half feet 
deep had been sawed through the submerged for- 
est. By this extraordinary passageway the trans- 
ports for Pope's army were taken safely across 
the peninsula and out again into the river at New 



104 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Madrid, without coming within a dozen miles of 
the heavy guns of Ishmd Number Ten. 

To crown this triumph of ingenuity a daring 
exploit now became necessary. The place where 
Pope intended to cross the river, below Point Plea- 
sant, was guarded by Confederate batteries, which 
must first be silenced. One or two gunboats were 
needed for this, but none of the gunboats drew less 
than six feet of water, and consequently none of 
them could pass through the forest canal. The 
gallant Foote considered the risk of running by the 
island so great that he did not like to ask officers 
or men to undertake it, but Commander Henry 
Exploit of the Walke, of the Carondelet, was found 
Carondelet. eager to try the experiment. The 
boilers and other vulnerable parts of the ship 
were protected in every possible way by planks and 
chains and coils of heavy rope. A barge laden 
with hay was lashed in front of the magazine. The 
great guns were run in under cover and the port- 
holes shut, the sailors, with pistol and cutlass, stood 
on guard in case of an attempt to board, and the 
boatswain was ordered to be ready to sink the ship 
sooner than let her fall into the enemy's hands. 
The escape-steam was led aft through the wheel- 
house instead of puffing and sputtering through 
the smokestacks. And thus at ten o'clock on the 
night of April 4, enshrouded in the thick dark- 



The Capture of New Orleans 105 

ness of a gathering storm, the gallant Carondelet 
cast off her moorings and glided down the broad 
river, unseen and unheard. It was not until she 
was close to the island that her presence was be- 
trayed. The soot in her smokestacks, no longer 
moistened by the escape-steam, took fire, and a 
tell-tale blaze sprang forth from their grimy tops. 
The enemy promptly took the alarm and began 
firing his heavy guns, the roar of which was soon 
drowned by louder peals of thunder, while glimpses 
of the passing ship were revealed from moment 
to moment in vivid flashes of lig-htnins:. But her 
bold and shrewd commander ran her so close to 
the island batteries that their ponderous balls flew 
harmlessly overhead, and before the gunners could 
lower their pieces and take accurate aim she had 
glided by, and the hour of midnight found her safe 
at New Madrid. 

On Sunday the 6th and Monday the 7th, while 
the battle was raging at distant Shiloh, the Caron- 
delet pounded to pieces the batteries on the eastern 
shore as far as Tiptonville, and was presently 
joined by the Pittsburg, which followed her ex- 
ample and ran the gauntlet of Island Number Ten 
at two o'clock on Monday morning. The Confed- 
erate garrison now made haste to evacuate their 
stronghold, but it was too late. During the even- 
ing Pope's army crossed the river and occupied the 



106 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Tiptonville road, whereupon the garrison surren- 
Surrenderof clerecl at discretion. Three generals 
the garrison, ^j^j^ r^QQQ j^^g^^ ^23 heavy guns, 35 field- 
pieces, 7000 stand of muskets, tents for 12,000 men, 
several hundred horses, and an immense quantity 
of ammunition, were captured in this brilliant 
operation, without the loss of a single man on the 
Federal side. The credit for the achievement was, 
as usual, given to the commanding of!icer,i and 
Pope for the moment acquired a reputation which 
seemed to rival Grant's, but which he was destined 
within six months to lose when confronted with a 
problem which abler men than he found insoluble, 
— the problem of outgeneralling Robert Lee and 
Stonewall Jackson. 

By the capture of Island Number Ten the Mis- 
sissippi river was thrown open down to Fort Pil- 
low, against which the army and fleets 
immediately proceeded. But Halleck 
now summoned Pope and his army to Pittsburg 
Landing, where all the Union forces were concen- 
trating for the advance upon Corinth. There was 
no use in operating separately upon Fort Pillow, 
for Corinth once taken, it would fall of itself. 

1 The idea of sawing a channel through the submerged forest, 
the operation vipon which everything else depended, originated 
with General Schuyler Hamilton, of New York, a grandson of 
Alexander Hamilton and great-grandson of Philip Schuyler. See 
Battles and Leaders, i. 462 



The Capture of New Orleans 107 

It will be observed that in the affair of Island 
Number Ten the decisive blow was struck by the 
Carondelet. Without the gunboats the operation 
could not have succeeded. The same was true, 
in the main, of Grant's movement against Forts 
Henry and Donelson, the whole significance of 
which, moreover, lay in the fact that it opened a 
vast stretch of country to an invasion in which 
the river fleet was an indispensable instrument. 
The sparse population of the states which were 
the theatre of war, their extensive area, and the 
poorness of their roads made it pecul- 

^ PI' Importance 

larly necessary lor the armies to con- ^^ rivers and 
trol the rivers and railways. To get t^^ ^i^er 
sufficient food from the country trav- 
ersed was usually impossible, and all the opera- 
tions of the war, especially in the West, derived 
their peculiar character from the necessity of 
maintaining long lines of communication, the cut- 
ting of which would entail speedy famine. The 
great rivers which flow in all directions through 
the heart of the continent, sustaining on their 
broad waters the movements of fleets, thus early 
impressed upon this American war a novel and 
interesting feature, to which there is no parallel in 
European history. The rivers afforded lines of 
operation in many respects more secure than the 
railways, since they could not be cut, and here the 



108 The Mississi2)2^i Valley in the Civil War 

immense superiority of the northern states in ships 
and machinery came early in the struggle to turn 
the scale slowly but surely against the Confeder- 
acy. These formidable gunboats, with their power- 
ful guns, were like floating fortresses which could 
be moved in two or tlu'ee hours to longer distances 
than an army could march in a day ; and while it 
was but seldom that they could capture fortified 
places without the aid of a land force, at the same 
time this combination of strength with speed made 
them an auxiliary without which the greater oper- 
ations of the war could hardly have been under- 
taken. 

In a still wider sense it is true that but for the 
navy and its gallant commanders it would have 
been impossible to put down the rebellion. The 
work done by the navy was truly Titanic. There 
was something romantic in the boldness with which 
President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, at the out- 
break of hostilities, quickly announced their inten- 
tion of blockading three thousand miles of coast, 
all the way from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. 
Europe lauohed at the idea ; such a 

The United ,-,.,-, 

States navy t^^g ^^d never been done by the 

in the Civil greatest maritime powers, and the 

United States had very few warships, 

most of them antiquated and all about to become so. 



Tlie Caiiture of New Orleans 109 

Yet within a few months this stupendous blockade 
was made effective. It isolated the Confederacy 
from all the rest of the world, and made its over- 
throw possible. In those daj^s we had a great and 
growing merchant marine, before our abominable 
tariff and navigation laws killed it. The American 
flag was seen in nearly all the ports of the world, 
our hardy sailors were to be found on every sea, 
and we had a small band of brave and intelligent 
naval officers trained in a school of peculiar excel- 
lence.^ With such resources, aided by our Yankee 
versatility and our mechanical appliances, a navy 
especially adapted to the needs of the occasion, 
and unlike anything ever seen before, was created 
as if by magic. The famous old ships-of-the-line 
and frigates, a few of which are still lying in our 
navy yards, were of no more use than the catapults 
and cross-bows of the Middle Ages ; and even such 
steam-frigates as the Roanoke and Minnesota, 
which only five years earlier had ranked among 
the finest warships afloat, were now at once ren- 
dered powerless by the invention of armoured rams 
and gunboats. Of its old materials the govern- 
ment made such use as it could, while it called 
upon inventors for new designs, and meanwhile 
bought up every craft floating in American waters 

1 The events of our war of 1898 with Spain show that there has 
been no falling off from the lofty standard of achievement fixed 
by Hull and Perry and Farragut. 



110 The Mississipj^i Valley in the Civil War 

that could in any wise be promptly adapted to 
fighting and pressed into the service. Large 
steamers of 2000 tons burthen, swift little river 
and harbour tugs, Fulton ferry-boats casemated 
in iron and armed with formidable guns, tall 
Mississippi steamboats, squat mortar-boats, turtle- 
shaped rams with powerful engines and deadly 
beaks, went to make up an immense fleet of such 
nondescript appearance as would have aroused the 
skeptical wonder of a Nelson, but well-fitted, in 
the hands of sagacious and daring men, for the 
varied and difficult work which it had to perform. 
With such vessels as these, usually aided by de- 
tachments from the army, the government went on 
seizing the enemy's seaports and strengthening its 
grip upon his coast-line, until by the end of the 
war every considerable maritime town in the Con- 
federacy had passed into northern hands. 

In this important warfare the South laboured 
from the outset under insurmountable disadvan- 
taaes. Of the naval officers who followed their 
states into rebellion, there were some, such as 
Semmes and Buchanan, of eminent ability. But 
^ 1 • f • the South had only two shipyards, the 
ority of the most important of which, at Norfolk, 
was soon lost. She had no merchant- 
shipping or sea-faring population, very few ma- 
chine-shops or skilled mechanics, and her supply 



The Ccifture of New Orleans 111 

of iron was soon cut off by the blockade. Under 
these circumstances, though the Confederates 
worked with the zeal and determination which 
characterized all their proceedings, they necessarily 
effected but little. With the aid of their agents 
in England, favoured by the culpable negligence 
of Lord Palmerston's government, they succeeded 
in launching a few formidable privateers and in- 
flicting upon our foreign trade an injury which, 
though serious enough, has been greatly exagger- 
ated, and was indeed a mere trifle compared to that 
which we have since inflicted upon ourselves by 
idiotic legislation concocted in the lobbies of Con- 
gress. Such privateering could have no military 
significance save in so far as it might cripple our 
resources for attack ; and this it did not do to any 
appreciable extent. In the defence of their riv- 
ers and harbours the Confederates showed their 
unfailing gallantry ; but their ships were few, their 
engines of inferior make and liable to accident, 
and their commanders on the whole unequal in 
training to the officers of the Federal navy. 

Early in the war the United States government 
became impressed with the necessity of capturing 
New Orleans. The place was of the first impor- 
tance, both in itself and in its strategic relations. 
With a population of 170,000 souls, it was by far 



112 The Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

the largest city of tlie Confederacy, and it con- 
j^.j. . tained, moreover, more machine-shops 
portance of and trained workmen than any other, 
ew r eans. j^ ^^^^ important to deprive the enemy 
of these resources. The city was comparatively 
near to Mexico, which was threatened with occupa- 
tion by the forces of France, a power whose atti- 
tude toward the American Union was distinctly 
hostile. Above all, New Orleans barred the ascent 
of the Mississippi river to Union fleets, and if 
the rebellion were ever to be suppressed, ev^ery 
inch of the Mississippi must be conquered and 
held. Beyond it lay the three revolted states of 
Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, which could not 
only put 100,000 men into the field, but could at 
the same time raise food enough to feed the whole 
Confederacy for countless ages. These states must 
be lopped off, and the rest of the southern country 
blockaded on its west side as well as on its coasts. 
Besides this, the Confederate hold upon the Mis- 
sissippi seriously crippled the commercial resources 
and thus indirectly the military strength of all the 
northwestern states. The Confederate leaders 
counted much upon this, and some of them, in 
their first sanguine dreams, hoped that the imper- 
ative need of using this pathway for trade would 
presently compel the northwestern people to join 
them. Thus reinforced they might control the 



The Capture of New Orleans 113 

continent, leaving tlie northeast, and especially 
tlirice-hated New England, out in the cold. 

However exaggerated such hopes may have been, 
there could be no doubt as to the necessity that 
the United States government should ^^^^ ^^^ 
seize New Orleans as soon as possible, prompt 
Every month of delay made the enter- 
prise more difficult. Early in the summer of 1861 
the city was virtually defenceless, and it has been 
said, on high authority, that any three warships 
could then have entered the river and ascended 
it to Cairo without serious opposition. That the 
government then made no attempt to seize and 
fortify the great defensible points on the river is 
one proof among many of the slowness with which 
the people came to realize that they were entering 
upon a desperate struggle for national existence. 
The action of the Confederates was also dilatory, 
for they found it hard to believe that the United 
States government was about to put forth all its 
energies to subdue them, and the first effect of 
their victory at Bull Run was to create a false 
sense of security. Nevertheless they worked faster 
than the Federals, and after Fort Donelson their 
efforts were redoubled. The works on the lower 
Mississippi grew daily in strength, and in a few 
months they might fairly hope to render their 
great city impregnable. 



114 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Among the persons who first discussed with the 
Federal government a definite plan for the capture 
of New Orleans was Commander David Dixon Por- 
ter, a man to whom eminent naval ability came 
by inheritance, for he was son of that famous Cap- 
tain Porter who had first carried the American 
David Dixon war-flag on the Pacific ocean, and after a 
Porter. glorious cruise had at length succumbed 

in an unequal struggle with two British frigates in 
the harbour of Valparaiso, in one of the fiercest 
sea-fights of the War of 1812. In the spring of 
1861, while watching the mouths of the Missis- 
sippi, Commander Porter studied the situation, 
and on arriving in Washington six months after- 
ward he spoke of the importance of capturing 
New Orleans to President Lincoln, who did not 
need to be reminded of the subject by Porter or 
anybody. His first remark was that, of course, 
such a piece of work could not be done too soon. 
"The Mississippi," said Lincoln, "is the backbone 
of the Rebellion; it is the key to the whole situa- 
tion. But we must have troops enough not only to 
hold New Orleans, but to proceed at once toward 
Vicksburg, which is the key to all that country 
watered by the Mississippi and its tributaries. If 
the Confederates once fortify the neighbouring 
hills, they will be able to hold that point for an 
indefinite time, and it will require a large force to 



The Capture of New Orleans 115 

dislodge them." With these prophetic words Mr. 
Lincoln urged on the preparations with all possible 
despatch. A fleet of warships mounting more 
than 150 guns was fitted out, and accompanied by 
a strong squadron of mortar-boats. A land force 
of 13,000 men was collected and placed under 
command of General Benjamin Franklin Butler, of 
Massachusetts, concerning whose military qualifica- 
tions one need only say that it was fortunate, so far 
as the capture of New Orleans was concerned, that 
the conditions of the case were such as to give all 
the serious work to the fleet. 

For the chief command of that fleet a hero 
was chosen who in the naval annals of the Eng- 
lish race will take rank second to none unless it 
be Nelson. In that terrible fight at Valparaiso, 
when the Essex was forced to strike her colours 
to the Phoebe and the Cherub, there was to be 
seen on the deck of the hard-pressed American 
vessel a boy of fourteen years, already distin- 
guished for coolness and daring, whose name was 
David Glasgow Farragut. A native David Glas- 
of Tennessee, descended from an Ara- &ow Farragut. 
gonese family once prominent in the island of Mi- 
norca, he had in early childhood been adopted 
into Captain Porter's family, and had entered the 
navy in 1810. During his half -century of service 
he had won the highest reputation among his bro- 



116 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

ther officers. In 1833, when South Carolina un- 
dertook to put her theory of nullification into 
practice, it was Farragut whom Andrew Jackson 
sent to Charleston harbour to enforce his famous 
decree that " the Union must be preserved." 
When the Civil War broke out, Farragut's south- 
ern friends tried their best to induce him to join 
them, but he quickly silenced them with the un- 
compromising reply : " Mind what I tell you ! 
You fellows are going to catch hell before you get 
through with this business ! " In spite of this 
determined attitude, the government is said to 
have hesitated about entrusting him with such 
an expedition as that against New Orleans. It 
was feared that, however loyal, he might perhaps 
show less zeal in such an enterjjrise than a man 
of northern birth and associations. But Gideon 
Welles, secretary of the navy, with his able assist- 
ant, Gustavus Fox, reinforced by Montgomery 
Blair and Porter, who knew him so well, over- 
came these doubts, and on the 20th of January, 
1862, Farragut was put in command of the great 
expedition. 

The capture of New Orleans is remarkable as 
the last victory won entirely by wooden vessels. 
It was the crowning exploit of the old-time navy. 
While the expedition was fitting out, there oc- 
curred that memorable battle in Hami3ton Roads 



The Capture of New Orleans 111 

in which the genius of Ericsson suddenly revolu- 
tionized the naval warfare of the world. None of 
Farragut's ships were armoured ; none could have 
stood against such a foe as the Merrimac. His 
flagship the Hartford, of 25 guns, belonged to a 
type already passing away, like the still more pic- 
turesque and imposing seventy-fours and frigates 
which had preceded it. To the same Farragut's 
class belonged the Brooklyn, Rich- A^^t. 
mond, and Pensacola, and these were followed by 
one side-wheel sloop, three screw corvettes, and nine 
screw gunboats, each carrying two guns on pivots. 
Attached as auxiliaries to this squadron were nine- 
teen bomb-vessels, each armed with one 13-inch 
mortar, and these were accompanied by six gun- 
boats, three of which were double-ended ferry-boats 
from New York. This auxiliary flotilla was placed 
in charge of Commander Porter, and a distinct and 
special part of the work was assigned to it. 

The city of New Orleans is situated on the east 
bank of the Mississippi, 110 miles from its mouth. 
To bar the approach of a hostile fleet, the Confed- 
erates had strengthened and equipped the two old 
government fortresses at the Plaquemine Bend, 
ninety miles below the city. The course of the 
winding river at that point is nearly east and west. 
On the left or north bank stood Fort St. Philip, 
and on the right bank, some 800 yards farther 



118 The Mississi'p'pi Yalley in the Civil War 

downstream, was Fort Jackson. The latter was 
Forts Jackson ^ casemated work, built in the form 
and St. Philip, of a star, and armed with 75 guns. 
Fort St. Philip was an open work, with strong 
brick walls covered with sod, and mounted 53 
guns. Both forts were well supplied with food and 
ammunition, and each held a garrison of 700 men. 
The guns were not so heavy as one might suppose, 
for while there were a few that threw missiles of 
80 pounds weight, nearly half the number were 
only 24-pounders. Even these, however, were 
dangerous to wooden ships, and such was the confi- 
dence of the rebels in the strength of these for- 
tresses that they did not believe a hostile fleet 
could get past them. They were much more afraid 
of possible attacks from above, and as the Confed- 
eracy was ill-supplied with heavy cannon, they pre- 
ferred to send as many as possible to points farther 
up the river. Between the two forts and the city of 
New Orleans other defensive works had been begun, 
but were inadequately armed, and could do little to 
check the progress of an enemy who had once run 
the gauntlet between Jackson and St. Philip. 

For further obstruction the Confederates 
stretched across the broad river between the forts 
a row of heavy schooners well anchored with sixty 
fathoms of cable and held together by stout iron 
chains. Their masts were unshipped and cast 



The Capture of New Orleans 119 

overboard without being entirely cut loose, so that 
drifting hither and thither with their tangled mass 
of rigging, they might foul the screws of any 
steamers that should come too near. Above the 
forts were a dozen Confederate warships, mostly 
wooden and of light armament. The The Confed- 
cigar-shaped ironclad ram Manassas, ®^^*^ '^^"^^• 
carrying one 32-pound carronade which fired 
straight ahead, might have been formidable but 
for the weakness of her engines, which prevented 
her acquiring much impetus. The most dangerous 
rebel vessel, had she been ready for action, was 
the Louisiana, an ironclad with sloping sides car- 
rying 16 very heavy guns ; but Farragut's move- 
ments were so prompt that the night of the battle 
found her still manned with diligent workmen 
and unfinished. This small fleet was nominally 
controlled by Commander John Mitchell, of the 
Confederate navy ; but six of the ships belonged 
to a force known as the river defence fleet, and 
were commanded by a merchant captain, whose 
behaviour was afterward deemed insubordinate. 
The land defences were in charge of General 
Duncan, and under him Lieutenant-Colonel Hig- 
gins commanded Fort Jackson. The department- 
commander was General Mansfield Lovell, whose 
headquarters were at New Orleans. All three 
were able officers, but ill-supported. Lovell's 



120 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

whole force in the city consisted of 3000 raw- 
troops without arms enough to go around, so thor- 
oughly had every corner been ransacked for forces 
with which to strike the heavy but unavailing 
blow at Pittsburg Landing. 

In spite of these disadvantages the Confeder- 
ates felt sure of victory, and indeed the task set 
for Farragut was so difficult that only the highest 
skill and daring could have performed it. His 
wooden vessels, carrying 177 guns, had to contend 
with 128 guns in strong fortresses and 39 guns 
carried by vessels j^artly armoured. According 
to Admiral Porter, who thus concisely states the 
case, "it is generally conceded by military men 
that one gun in a fort is about equal to five on 
board of a wooden ship, especially when . . . the 
forces afloat are obliged to contend against a three- 
and-a-half -knot current in a channel obstructed 
by chains and fire-rafts." ^ After making all due 
allowances, therefore, the Confederates might 
easily feel that the odds were in their favour. 
They worked night and day in strengthening their 
defences, and another fortnight might have made 
them impregnable. But Farragut pushed on his 
preparations with desperate energy. There was 
great difficulty at first in getting his larger vessels 
over the bar, but by the 16th of April these obsta- 

^ Battles and Leaders, ii. 33. 



The Capture of New Orleans 121 

cles were surmounted and all was in readiness for 
tlie bombardment. Commander Por- Boj^i^ard- 
ter anchored his bomb-vessels around ment of Fort 
the bend of the river, close to the right 
bank, from three to four thousand yards below 
Fort Jackson and behind a thick wood. The 
mastheads were dressed with bushes, and thus 
became indistinguishable from the treetops. In 
such wise the bombardment began on the morning 
of the 18th, and was kept up with great fury for 
five days and nights, during which the mortar fleet 
fired 16,800 shells, or more than one to every 
minute. The aim was excellent. Nearly every 
shell was lodged inside of the fort, which at the 
end of this time was riddled like a worm-eaten 
log. Huge masses of sand-bags still protected the 
magazine, however, and, although several guns 
were silenced. Fort Jackson as yet gave no sign of 
surrender. As for Fort St. Philip, it had suffered 
comparatively little damage. 

This preliminary bombardment was a pet scheme 
of Porter's, to which Farragut seems to have at- 
tached small importance, though he Difference 
was willing to give it a trial. Porter I'^tween 

1 IT 11 1 • 1 Farragut's 

was so keenly alive to the danger which view and 
the fleet would incur in running past l*orter's. 
the forts that he deemed it necessary to begin by 
forcing them to surrender, and this he hoped to do 



122 Tlie Mississii^i^i Valley in the Civil War 

with his bomb-shells. Moreover he disapproved of 
the policy of ascending the river while leaving hos- 
tile forts in the rear unreduced. On the other 
hand, Farragut was ready to take the risk of pass- 
ing the forts, and believed that as soon as the city 
of New Orleans should be in our possession, the 
forts, thus isolated, would have no alternative but 
to surrender. The progress of Porter's bombard- 
ment soon convinced Farragut that it was not 
worth while to w^ait for the forts to be disabled. 
But before he could ascend the river, the line of 
dismantled schooners which barred the passage 
must be broken. On the night of the 20th, while 
the bombardment was briskly going on, this impor- 
tant task was undertaken by Lieutenant Caldwell, 
with the small gunboats Itasca and Pinola. A 
The Itasca's torpedo Connected with an electric bat- 
exploit, tery was lodged under the bows of one 
of the swaying hulks, but the wires broke prema- 
turely and no explosion took place. The Itasca 
then tried to grapple the hulk and set it on fire, 
but manoeuvring in the strong swift current she 
became entangled for a moment, and losing control 
of herself turned inshore and ran aground in a 
very dangerous position. With much difficulty her 
consort dragged her off, and now the adventurous 
little craft, seizing victory from this untoward acci- 
dent, steamed cautiously upstream by the eastern 



The, Capture of New Orleans 123 

bank with just enough water to float in, till she 
passed outside and above the line of hulks. Then 
deftly turning, and crowding steam, aided by the 
full momentum of the current, she steered boldly 
down upon the chains that stretched between the 
third and fourth hulks and held them together. As 
she struck with prodigious force, her bows were 
lifted quite clear of the water, and when they came 
down again the stout chains snapped asunder, the 
current pushed the great hulks far apart to right 
and left, the gallant Itasca passed through un- 
scathed, and a gateway was opened for the whole 
fleet to pass up. 

At two o'clock in the morning of April 24 
Farragut hoisted his red-light signal, and the whole 
squadron steamed slowly up the river. The vital 
parts of the ships — their engines and magazines 
— were protected by chain cables and sand-bags, 
their light spars were sent down, and ,pj^^ advance 
every needless encumbrance removed, up the Missis- 
Captain Theodorus Bailey led the way ^^^^^ ^^^^^' 
in the gunboat Cayuga, closely followed by the 
sloops Pensacola and Mississippi, the corvettes 
Oneida and Yaruna, and the gunboats Katahdin, 
Kineo, and Wissahickon. As the Pensacola passed 
through the breach in the line of hulks, the batter- 
ies in both forts opened upon the fleet with a tre- 
mendous roar. Then Commander William Bain- 



124 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

bridge Renshaw, with the Westfield and four other 
gunboats, came up within two hundred yards of 
Fort Jackson, and with a hailstorm of grape and 
canister drove the Confederates from their guns ; 
while the heavy broadside of the Pensacola replied 
effectively to the fire of Fort St. Philip. The 
Manassas attempted to ram the Pensacola, but 
missing her, kej^t on and inflicted a slight wound 
upon the Mississippi. In such wise Bailey's fore- 
most vessels got past the forts with little injury 
and engaged the enemy's ships above, while the 
two swift corvettes followed and joined in the fight. 
One of them, the Varuna, delivered a shot which 
burst the boiler of a Confederate transport crowded 
with troops, and presently with her shells set three 
other ships on fire. She was then attacked by two 
rams, both of which she defeated and disabled, 
but not until the enemy's iron beak had crashed 
through her wooden side. Running into shallow 
water, her crew and gallant commander, Charles 
Stuart Boggs, were rescued by her consort the 
Oneida, while her two crippled opponents were set 
on fire and abandoned. Three ships were wrecked 
or sunk by the Cayuga, one or two ran aground in 
attempting to flee, and one escaped to New Orleans. 
Meanwhile Farragut in the Hartford, followed 
by the Brooklyn, poured his broadsides into Fort 
St. Philip, driving the gunners under cover while 



The Capture of New Orleans 125 

the great ships slowly passed by. More than two 
hundred gnns were now firing at once, with noise 
like an earthquake, and the dark sky was veiled 
in darker clouds of smoke, fitfully illumined here 
and there by spasmodic fiashes. Presently the 
whole scene was shown up in the lurid glare of a 
blazing raft which a brave little tugboat was push- 
ing straight down upon the Hartford, rpj^g jj^j.^. 
After passing the fort with thirty-two ford's danger, 
shots in her hull and rigging, the flagship was now 
exposed to her greatest danger. In turning her 
helm to avoid it, she grounded on a shoal, and 
there received the shock of the huge mass of burn- 
ing pine-knots. The crackling flames instantly 
caught her and danced half way to her mastheads, 
while shells from St. Philip's water-batteries still 
kept dropping and bursting on her deck. At this 
perilous moment the great captain to whom the 
battle had been entrusted showed all the qualities 
of which he had given promise fifty years before, 
when as midshipman he trod the blood-stained 
deck of the Essex. Walking calmly up and down, 
his hands behind him, the old man gave his orders 
with a cheery voice that made every one ashamed 
of fear. " Steady, boys, steady," he cried, with 
his pleasant smile, " there 's a hotter fire than this, 
you know, for those who flinch from duty ! " His 
coolness and the admirable discipline of the crew 



126 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

quelled all tlie dangers. The fires were put out, 
and the staunch ship, freed from the shoal, sailed 
on up the deep channel, with other good work 
still before her. 

The flagship's consort, the Brooklyn, following 
closely in her wake, was presently struck by the 
ram Manassas, and an ugly gash was made in her 
side six feet below the water-line. But nimble 
carpenters bolted heavy planks over the wound, 
and she kept on her way. The crisis of the battle 
was now safely passed. All but three of the gun- 
boats of the rear division, under Captain Henry 
Bell, made a good passage into the waters above 
St. Philip, whose gunners were by this time weary 
and disheartened. One of the three unfortunates 
was the Itasca, which had so nobly played the part 
of pioneer. Her boiler was pierced by a shot, and 
she drifted downstream, running ashore just below 
the mortar fleet, and landing most of her crew in 
safety. In less than an hour and a half from the 
commencement of the action, Farragut's squadron 
had run the gauntlet, the forts were turned, and 
the doom of the Confederacy's proudest city was 
sealed. As the ships glided up the river, the 
noise of battle hushed, the undaunted Manassas 
Fate of the ^^^ descried through the dull twilight 
Manassas. of the April morning, pushing after 
them like a grim, forlorn hope. The Mississippi, 



The Capture of New Orleans 127 

which she had rammed, was ready to clear off the 
score, and turned quickly upon her to run her 
down. But the agile ram sheered away from the 
blow and gained the shore, where her crew aban- 
doned her. The Mississippi then pounded her 
with shot till she drifted away with the current, 
wrapped in flames, which presently caught her 
magazine and blew her into atoms. 

All but three of the rebel ships now lay at the 
bottom of the river or floated in charred fragments 
on the tide. The Louisiana stayed moored to the 
shore above St. Philip, where she had been of little 
use. Two others crouched under what was left 
of Fort Jackson. The victorious fleet Arrival at 
kept on up the river, silenced the bat- -^^^ Orleans, 
teries at Chalmette, hard by the spot where An- 
drew Jackson had vanquished a British army in 
1815, and swept around the bend which brought 
them before the wharves of New Orleans, where 
all was clamour and confusion. General Lovell 
had retreated northward with his handful of troops, 
leaving the city in the hands of its mayor. Amid 
the clangour of church-bells the citizens had been 
busy since daybreak burning great bales of cotton, 
and destroying the munitions of war which they 
had heaped together and the half-built gunboats 
on which they had been working night and day. 
Innumerable fragments thickly strewed the sur- 



128 The Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

face of the river witli a seething scum. Mr. Cable, 
the novelist, then a young lad, stood by and wit- 
nessed the scene as the shijis drew near. "The 
crowds on the levee," he says, "howled and 
screamed with rage. The swarming decks an- 
swered never a word ; but one old tar on the Hart- 
ford, standing with lanyard in hand beside a great 
pivot-gun, so plain to view that you could see him 
smile, silently patted its big black breech and 
blandly grinned." 

A plank was thrown from the Cayuga, and Cap- 
tain Theodorus Bailey, with Lieutenant George 
Hamilton Perkins, regardless of the knives and 
pistols of the raging mob, walked through the 
streets to the City Hall and demanded surrender. 
The ma3^or sought to gain time by evasive answers. 
Until Butler's troops should arrive, Farragut could 
not occupy the city, though his guns could destroy 
it, and the mayor, taking advantage of his for- 
bearance, kept the state flag of Louisiana flying 
for five days more. Meanwhile Porter, who had 
stayed with his bomb-vessels below the forts, sum- 
moned them to surrender, and on General Dun- 
Surrender of can's refusal he renewed the bombard- 
the forts. ment. This was not relished by the 
garrisons, and on the night of the 27th they all, 
except one company of devoted planters, rose in 
mutiny and began spiking their own guns. Next 



The Capture of New Orleaiis 129 

morning General Duncan surrendered. While 
the terms were arranged in the cabin of the 
Harriet Lane, with flags of truce flying at her 
masthead and on both the forts, the Louisiana, 
by accident unmoored, came blundering down with 
the current, all aflame, her shotted guns dischar- 
ging to right and left, until she suddenly blew 
up, rolling the Harriet Lane over on her beam- 
ends, and shaking all the officers out of their seats. 
A moment later the explosion would have killed 
friend and foe alike. It was simple carelessness 
on the part of the men who were destroying the 
useless hulk. 

The surrender of the forts allowed the trans- 
ports with Butler's troops to ascend the river. 
On the 29th, while they were expected but before 
their arrival, a small detachment of marines from 
Farragut's fleet landed in the city and hoisted 
the stars and stripes over one of the public build- 
ings. Scarcely had they left the spot when a man 
named Mumford hauled down the flag for the popu- 
lace to trample under foot and drag through the 
mud. The marines returned and hoisted another, 
and guarded it till May 1, when Butler arrived 
and took possession of the city, which he ruled 
till the middle of the next December. The selec- 
tion of such a man for such a command was a 
needless though unintentional insult to the con- 



130 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

querecl city. Where a military rule, at once stern 
Bu lerand ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ required by circumstances, 
his adminis- it is far better to have a true soldier 
ra ion. than an unscrupulous politician, bent 

uj)on money-making and intrigue. In fairness to 
Butler it must be said that his administration was 
in some respects intelligent and able. Order was 
preserved, and the streets were so much cleaner 
than ever before that the demon of yellow fever 
was banished for some time. But there was an 
amount of confiscation unparalleled elsewhere dur- 
ing the war ; and a swarm of adventurers, with 
Butler's connivance, made their fortunes in specu- 
lating with the property thus seized. The hang- 
ing' of Mumford, for his insult to the Federal flasT 
before the city had been regularly occupied by our 
troops, was an act of extreme severity, although 
the victim appears to have been a creature on 
whom our sympathy would be wasted. As the 
Count of Paris says, " The death of Mumford is 
the only stain on the brightest page, perhaps, in the 
history of the United States, — the page on which 
it is written that neither after final victory nor dur- 
ins: the course of this terrible war, while the citi- 
zens were giving their lives by thousands in defence 
of the Union, has any political offence (save in this 
one instance) been expiated in blood." 

This military execution, the speculating in se- 



The Capture of New Orleans 131 

qiiestrated property, and the notorious " woman 
order " were the incidents in Butler's rule which 
attracted most attention. Relying on the forbear- 
ance which Americans habitually exercise toward 
even the meanest of the female sex, some foolish 
women in New Orleans, well-dressed and rating 
themselves as ladies, sought to vent their spite by 
making faces at Federal officers on the street, call- 
ing them names, and spitting at them. To stop 
such behaviour Butler issued an order " that here- 
after, when any female shall, by word. The "woman 
gesture, or movement, insult or show order." 
contempt for any officer or soldier of the United 
States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be 
treated as a woman of the town plying her avoca- 
tion." Never, perhaps, was a military order more 
successful in effecting its immediate purpose ; but 
the furious rage with which it was greeted through- 
out the South may easily be imagined. Had its 
wretched author, however, understood in the small- 
est degree the feelings of gentlemen, had there 
entered into his constitution so much as a single 
fibre o^ true manhood, he would have seen that 
this vile edict insulted no one else so grossly as 
the officers and soldiers under his command. Such 
an outrage ought to have led to his immediate 
recall. It was doubtless silly in Jefferson Davis, 
after Butler's departure from New Orleans, to 



132 Tlie Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

issue a proclamation denouncing his former politi- 
cal ally as a felon who might be hanged without 
ceremony ; but after making due allowance for the 
extravagant bitterness of war-time, it seems a not 
unnatural commentary on the behaviour which 
earned for the military governor of New Orleans 
the familiar sobriquet of " Beast." 

The value of prompt action in warfare has never 
been better illustrated than in Farragut's capture 
of New Orleans. The blow was dealt before the 
enemy had completed his preparations for defence, 
and while his energies were distracted by the con- 
centrated advance of the Federal army upon Cor- 
inth. Its political value was great ; it nipped in 
the bud one of the many schemes of Napoleon III. 
for recognizing the independence of the Confed- 
eracy. Its military value, in opening the lower 
Mississippi, was equally great, and would have 
been still greater if the army had cooperated with 
like skill and promptness. The capture of New 
Orleans, taken in connection with the capture of 
Corinth, ought to have entailed the immediate fall 
of Vicksburg and the complete conquest of the 
Mississippi river; and but for the flagrant imbe- 
cility which then directed the movements of our 
western armies, it would almost certainly have 
done so. But we have now to enter upon a melan- 
choly tale. 



CHAPTER IV 

FROM CORINTH TO STONE RIVER 

On the llth of April, 1862, four days after 
the hard-won victory of Shiloh, General Halleck 
arrived at Pittsburg Landing and took command 
in person of the forces there assembled. On the 
21st General Pope arrived with his army, fresh 
from its capture of Island Number Ten. With 
the three armies of Pope, Grant, and Buell thus 
united, l^alleck had an effective force of more 
than 100,000 men. This force was organized by 
Halleck into right wing, centre, left wing, and 
reserve. All of Grant's army, except Halleck's ad- 
the divisions of McClernand and Lew vance upon 
Wallace, which were taken out and 
replaced by Thomas's division from Buell's army, 
formed the right wing, and was commanded by 
General Thomas. The remainder of Buell's army, 
forming the centre, was still commanded by Gen- 
eral Buell. General Pope with his army formed 
the left wing. The reserve was made up of the 
two divisions of McClernand and Wallace, with 
McClernand in command. In this arrangement, it 



I 

134 The Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

will be observed, there was no place for Grant. 
His talents were got rid of for the moment by ap- 
pointing him second in command over the whole, 
a 230sition more honourable than useful, since no 
sj)ecific duties were assigned him. With this grand 
army Halleck started at the end of April, creeping 
slowly forward, entrenching at every step, and 
restraining the ardour of his generals, until after 
nearly a month he had safely accomplished the 
twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth ! 
His adversary Beauregard, soon gauging the cali- 
bre of the Federal commander, retired inch by 
inch, keeping his skirmishers well forward and 
presenting as bold a front as possible. His total 
effective force, including the troops of Van Dorn, 
who had joined him just after Shiloh, amounted 
to scarcely more than 60,000 men. He was out- 
numbered two to one, and ought to have been 
surrounded and captured. He understood that 
Corinth could not be held ; all hope of that had 
really been lost when he withdrew his beaten army 
Beauregard ^I'^m the field of Shiloh. The most he 
evacuates could do was to save that army from 
capture, while delaying the enemy as 
long as possible ; and this he did very well indeed. 
He had thrown up extensive works as if with the 
intention of withstanding a siege at Corinth; but 
before Halleck had fairly closed in upon him, he 



From Corinth to Stone River 135 

had evacuated that town and retreated upon Tu- 
pelo, a station sixty miles south on the railroad 
leading to Mobile. 

Pope's forces were sent in pursuit, while their 
commander was confined to his tent by illness, 
about five miles from Halleck's headquarters. 
Despatches came in to the effect that the woods 
were full of Confederate stragglers, and it was 
hoped that at least 10,000 would be captured within 
a day or two. This intelligence Pope forwarded 
to Halleck, and it quite turned his head. Trans- 
lating hope into reality, Halleck telegraphed to 
"Washington that " General Pope, with 40,000 men, 
is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy 
hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and 
deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 -^^^-^ g™ 
stand of arms captured." Great were and little 
the rejoicings throughout the North, 
but they gave place to indignation a few days later, 
when it appeared that this brave story was but a 
new version of the three black crows. No prisoners 
were taken worth mentioning, Beauregard's army 
was still intact, and Pope was generally blamed 
and ridiculed for a wild statement which he had 
in no way authorized. With praiseworthy desire 
not to embarrass his chief. Pope bore this popular 
censure in silence, and it was not until after the 
end of the war that he even asked Halleck for an 



136 The Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

explanation, which that general, with some frivolous 
excuses, declined to give. Pope's conduct in this 
affair shows true generosity, but what shall be said 
of the superior officer who thus allowed a subordi- 
nate to become his scaj^egoat and uttered never a 
word to clear him ? 

Chagrined and disgusted as the northern people 
were at Beauregard's easy escape, nevertheless the 
occupation of Corinth was an event of great im- 
portance. It broke through the second Confederate 
line of defence, and gave the Federals possession 
of the only railroad which directly connected the 
Mississippi river with the seaboard of Virginia 
and South Carolina. It also turned the positions 
of Fort Pillow and Memphis on the great river, 
just as the capture of Fort Donelson had turned 
the position of Columbus. On the 5th of June, 
just a week after the fall of Corinth, the Federal 
fleet found Fort Pillow abandoned. This river 
fleet, which had cooperated with Grant and Pojie, 
was now commanded by Commodore Charles Davis, 
as the wound received by Foote at Fort Donelson 
had grown worse and obliged him to retire. Foote 
was a commander worthy of a navy that boasted 
a Farragut and a Porter, and in Davis he had a 
worthy successor. The fleet had been strengthened 
by the addition of four powerful rams constructed 
by Colonel EUet of the army, a man of venture- 



From Corinth to Stone Miver 137 

some courage, under whose separate command they 
had been somewhat oddly placed. From Fort Pil- 
low this strong armada hastened downstream to 
Memphis, which the fall of Corinth had already 
made untenable, but which the Confederate Com- 
modore Montgomery had too chivalrously deter- 
mined not to abandon without fighting to the death. 
Against Davis's five gunboats and Ellet's four 
rams he could bring eight gunboats, some of them 
armed with beaks ; and on the 6th of Naval battle 
June, at six o'clock in the morning, of Memphis, 
under the high bluff crowded with anxious citizens 
gathered in the blazing sunshine to watch the scene, 
he advanced to the trial of arms, which was short, 
sharp, and final. At half past seven the specta- 
tors dispersed to their homes, the men muttering 
curses, the women in tears. Of their eight gun- 
boats three were captured, three were sunk, and 
one was blown up; only one had escaped. One 
of the Federal ships was seriously injured, and two 
or three men were wounded, but not a man on 
that side was killed. Memphis surrendered that 
day, and thus the Mississippi was opened as far 
down as Vicksburg. 

After his capture of New Orleans, Farragut had 
proceeded up the river, receiving the surrender of 
Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, and other 
towns ; but on the 18th of May his progress had 



138 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

been stopped at Vicksburg, 400 miles above New- 
Orleans by water and 400 below Memphis. The 
position of that town was such that it could not 
V D rn ^® taken without the cooperation of a 
fortifies larger land force than Butler was able 

^^^' to spare, and so it became necessary to 
wait for the fall of Corinth. But after that event, 
as before it, Halleck dawdled instead of striking. 
On the 28th of June Farragut's fleet ran past the 
guns of Vicksburg without serious damage and 
effected a junction with that of Commodore Davis 
just above the town. Nothing could be done with- 
out an army, and Farragut asked Halleck for 
troops, but could not get any. Precious time was 
thus slipping away, while the enemy w^as putting 
every minute to good use. General Van Dorn, 
detached from the army which Beauregard had 
withdrawn to Tupelo, made all haste to Vicksburg, 
taking Breckinridge and his division along with 
him, and worked day and night building fortifica- 
tions and collecting cannon. 

Moreover, so far from losing heart on account 
of their crushing naval defeats at New Orleans 
and Memphis, the undaunted Confederates were 
making ready to attack the victors upon their own 
element. Fifty miles up the Yazoo river, wliich 
empties into the Mississippi just above Vicksburg, 
they were building a formidable ironclad ram, 



From Corinth to Stone River 139 

which they hoped would do as much mischief as 
the Merrimac had done and threatened m, r. r j 

ihe Confed- 

at Hampton Roads, and Farragut erateram 
had no Monitor at his disposal. This ^^k^"«^^- 
famous ram, the Arkansas, was built like the Mer- 
rimac, though smaller in size, and if her engines 
had been sufficiently powerful, she might have 
wrought fearful havoc to the Federal fleet. At 
her first appearance, on the 15th of July, she 
attacked and put to flight the Tyler and Caron- 
delet, and, running under the friendly guns of 
Vicksburg, where Commander William Porter, 
with the Essex, tried in vain to destroy her, she 
became a perpetual menace to our ships. 

By the end of July, as no troops could be ob- 
tained, and the crews were suffering from fever, 
it was decided to abandon offensive operations, 
and Davis withdrew his ships 300 miles up the 
river to Helena, while Farragut returned to New 
Orleans. The energetic Van Dorn at once sent 
Breckinridge with 6000 men and the Arkansas to 
recover Baton Rouge and bring back the state 
government, besides securing the mouth of Red 
river. The capital was defended by a detachment 
of 4000 of Butler's troops, with the ram Essex 
and a couple of gunboats. In the fight which 
occurred on the 5th of August at one o'clock in the 
morning, the Confederate troops were repulsed 



140 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

with a loss of 500 men, the machinery of the Arkan- 
Destruction sas broke down, and when she was at- 
of theArkan- tacked by the Essex, her commander 
Dorn fortifies ^an her ashore, landed his crew, set her 
Port Hudson, q^ fire, and turned her adrift. Like 
so many other rebel vessels in these waters, her 
career came to an end in a deafening explosion. 
Nothing daunted, however, by this reverse. Van 
Dorn seized and fortified the village of Port Hud- 
son, a few miles above Baton Rouge but below the 
mouth of Red river. By thus holding Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson, the Confederates controlled the 
250 miles of river between them, and through the 
Red river obtained their supplies from the trans- 
Mississippi region as promptly and securely as ever. 
Until they could be ousted from these two strong- 
holds, in spite of the splendid naval victories above 
and below, the work of clearing the Mississippi river 
was but half accomplished ; the " backbone of the 
rebellion" was not yet broken. Many more lives 
were yet to be sacrificed, many more homes made 
desolate, before that great object could be attained. 
The lesson of the summer of 1862 is a mournful 
one. It shows us how far the self-devotion of a 
noble people and the valour of able commanders 
could be neutralized by incompetence at the head 
of affairs. Corinth had fallen on the 29th of May 
and Memphis on the 6th of June. Halleck had 



Fvom Corinth to Stone River 141 

100,000 men elated with success, while his adver- 
sary, Beauregard, had 50,000 dispirited by a long 
series of reverses. At any time between the first 
of June and the middle of July a force of 20,000 
men, cooperating with the fleets of Farragut and 
Davis, which were ready and waiting for them, 
might easily have taken Yicksburg and Lost oppor- 
saved a whole year of anxious and ar- t^n^t^es. 
duous work in this quarter. There was nothing to 
prevent Halleck from sending such a force by rail 
to Memphis and thence down the river, and their 
landing at Vicksburg would have met with no such 
resistance as Sherman encountered six months 
later. But Halleck's mind was not large enough 
to take in the whole theatre of war between the 
Mississippi and the Alleghanies. Thus far the 
advance of the Union armies from Fort Donelson 
up the Tennessee river to Corinth had operated 
directly to open the Mississippi river by taking 
its fortified places in flank ; and with New Orleans 
now in our possession, nothing but the occupation 
of Vicksburg was necessary to complete the con- 
quest. 

But in this vast theatre of war, there was 3,n- 
other region that needed to be looked after ; thei^e 
was another strategic point scarcely less important 
than Vicksburg. This was the mountain fastness 
of Chattanooga, commanding eastern Tennessee 



142 The Mississippi Vqlley in the Civil War 

and all the northward avenues by which an army- 
starting from the centre of the Confederacy might 
hope to recover some of the lost ground in Tennes- 
see and Kentucky. Halleck at Corinth was 300 
miles distant from Vicksburg on the one hand, 
and 200 miles from Chattanooga on the other. 
T ^ It was as important for him to oc- 

Importance "^ 

of Chatta- cupy the latter as the former, lest the 
nooga. enemy, despairing of direct success 

against overwhelming odds in Mississippi, should 
seek to retrieve the situation by boldly returning; 
the offensive and throwing his whole force north- 
ward into eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. For 
two other reasons it was desirable to possess Chat- 
tanooga as the key to eastern Tennessee. First, 
it would interpose a Union army between the 
rebel forces in Virginia and in the West, and thus 
prevent their easily reinforcing one another. Sec- 
ondly, the people of eastern Tennessee were de- 
voted to the Union, they were subjected to griev- 
ous persecution on that account, and ever since 
the first outbreak of hostilities. President Lincoln 
had been impatient to relieve them. Halleck, 
therefore, was imperatively called upon to reach 
out his left hand to Chattanooga while seizing 
Vicksburg with the right. It was indeed a long 
reach, but he possessed both the stronger force 
and the interior lines. With all the difficulties of 



From Corinth to Stone Biver 143 

the task, a Napoleon would have made light work 
of it. A moderately good general would have 
made sure of one prize, even at the risk of losing 
the other. But what shall be said of the general- 
ship which could throw away such advantages of 
strength and situation, and tamely allow the enemy, 
dividing his weaker force and moving upon exterior 
lines, to gain both the coveted positions ! Let us 
observe the manner in which this awful disaster 
was brought upon us. 

Besides the army of 50,000 under Beauregard, 
the enemy had 12,000 men under Kirby Smith at 
Knoxville in east Tennessee, watched by 9000 
Federals under George Morgan at Cumberland 
Gap. He had also a garrison of 2000 men at 
Chattanooga, and this was watched from Hunts- 
ville in Alabama by 7000 Federals under an able 
commander, the astronomer Ormsby Mitchel. This 
general had just accomplished one of the most 
brilliant raids that were made on Mitchel's 
either side during the war. At the ^^^^• 
beginning of June he held a hundred miles of the 
railroad between Corinth and Chattanooga, some 
portions of which were torn up, and on the 7th of 
that month one of his brigades even went so far as 
to erect batteries on the north bank of the Tennes- 
see, opposite Chattanooga, and begin bombarding 
the town. But with only 7000 men, Mitchel 



144 The JMlssissi2)pi Valley in the Civil War 

could not hope to retain such advantages. If 
Halleck had now promptly reinforced him with 
30,000 or 40,000 men under Buell, Chattanooga 
might have been seized at once and held against 
all comers. Halleck would still have retained 
70,000, or at least 60,000, with which to crush all 
opposition in Mississippi and proceed overland to 
Vicksburg, drawing his supplies either by boat or 
by rail from Memphis. 

Now Halleck did despatch Buell toward Chat- 
tanooga, but in such a fashion as to render the 
movement useless. The question arose by what 
line of railway should Buell obtain his supplies 
when once he should have occupied the mountain 
citadel. Should they come from Memphis through 
Corinth and Huntsville, or from Louisville by 
way of Nashville and Murfreesboro ? The former 
line was parallel to the enemy's front, the latter 
was perpendicular to it, and all sound military 
considerations required that the latter should be 
Why Buell chosen. So thought Buell, whose 
was "slow." judgment in such matters was most 
excellent, but Halleck overruled him, and insisted 
upon his taking the line from Memphis to Chatta- 
nooga and putting the railroad in thorough repair 
yard by yard as he went. Under these imperative 
orders Buell started from Corinth on the 10th of 
June with 40,000 men, and after six weeks of rail- 



From Corinth to Stone River 145 

road-building reached by the end of July a posi- 
tion from which he could threaten Chattanooga. 

Meanwhile Halleck lay idle at Corinth, as if 
on the defensive, with his army of 60,000 men 
still outnumbering the enemy, who retreated from 
before him. He gave most stringent orders to 
Pope not to press the Confederate army in such 
wise as to run risk of a battle, and summed up his 
theory of the situation in these memorable words : 
" I think the enemy will continue his Halleck's 
retreat, which is all I desire." The imbecility. 
enemy was indeed rapidly moving the bulk of his 
army southward to Mobile, but he could not be 
expected to show such an accommodating disposi- 
tion as to throw himself into the Gulf of Mexico ! 
It is usually safe to suppose in warfare that your 
enemy will not do as you desire. General Beaure- 
gard, who was not a favourite of Jefferson Davis, 
was now removed from command, and his place 
was taken by Braxton Bragg. As soon as Bragg 
saw the manner in which Buell had been started 
eastward, he boldly divided his own forces. Leav- 
ing 15,000 men under Van Dorn, as the nucleus 
of a force with which to cover Yicksburg, he 
retreated upon Mobile with 35,000, and thence 
sped by rail straight to Chattanooga, which he 
reached and occupied in advance of Buell on the 
29th of July. 



146 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

By this masterly move Bragg suddenly gained 
the initiative and threw the Union armies upon the 
defensive, along the whole line. Holding Chat- 
tanooga, he seriously threatened Buell, who with 
Mitchel's division now had 47,000 men, but was 
obliged to spare 20,000 in small detachments to 
guard the long railroad, leaving only 27,000 ready 
for the field. Against this force, by summoning 
Kirby Smith from Knoxville, Bragg could at any 
moment throw 47,000 men. To relieve Buell from 
this embarrassment, 20,000 more men were sent 
from Corinth to take the place of those who were 
guarding the railroad, leaving only 40,000 for the 
work in Mississippi. Against these, by bringing 
together Lovell and Price, with other troops from 
Arkansas, Van Dorn was presently able to oppose 
32,000. It was not long before Bragg's activity 
How his army awakened such alarm that the army 
wasscattered. ^t Corinth was still further depleted 
to send reinforcements to Buell, so that it became 
quite out of the question for it to undertake any 
offensive operations. Thus it was that Halleck 
frittered away his golden ojoportunity ; thus was 
his great army scattered to little purpose ; thus 
did he allow the enemy to seize both the strategic 
centres west of the Alleghanies, and to prolong 
the Civil War at least a twelvemonth. And to 
crown all, the ridiculous line of communication for 



From Corinth to Stone River 147 

the sake of which everything had been thus indis- 
criminately sacrificed was almost immediately 
rendered useless by the events which forced Buell 
northward into Kentucky 

On the 16th of July, before the nature or extent 
of the mischief had become apparent, Halleck 

started for Washins^ton. President ^^ „ , 

° ^ Halleck ap- 

Lincoln felt the need of a general-in- pointed gen- 
chief for all the armies of the United eral-in-ehief. 
States, in the hope of securing unity of operation. 
Comparatively little had been accomplished thus 
far in the East, whereas much had been accom- 
plished in the West ; and it seemed logical to 
choose the western commander-in-chief for the 
supreme control of the armies. The departure of 
Halleck left Grant in command at Corinth. Pope 
was now called eastward to take charge of the 
forces hitherto scattered about in northern Vir- 
ginia, and his place was filled by one of his divi- 
sion-commanders, William Stark Rosecrans, who 
after distinguishing himself in the early campaigns 
in West Virginia had taken part in the recent 
advance upon Corinth. On arriving at Washing- 
ton, Halleck's supreme capacity for doing the 
wrong thing was illustrated by a step which 
threatened the Union cause with speedy and 
irretrievable wreck. The Seven Days' battles 
near Richmond had seriously damaged McClellan's 



148 The Mississij^pi Yalley in the Civil War 

army, but still left it in a position which must com- 
pel Lee to remain about Richmond. Lee would 
gladly have fought for another week and given 
20,000 men to get McClellan's army away from 
the James river ; and what he so earnestly desired 
Halleck now did for him by removing it by sea to 
northern Virginia, in the hope of making Wash- 
ington more secure.^ While this clumsy move- 
ment was going on, Lee was at once let loose, with 
all his force, to overwhelm Pope, threaten the 
Federal capital, and invade the loyal states. 

The northern people did not generally at the 
time appreciate the relations of cause and effect in 
this tide of calamity which so suddenly rolled over 
the country and seemed for a moment to be un- 
doing all that had been done. But the Confederate 
generals appreciated it thoroughly, and the im- 
becility so manifest at the head of our armies made 
them very bold indeed. Now that Bragg had 

^ McClellan's plans were apt to be sound, although he was, to 
an astonishing' degree, inefficient in action. His intention, which 
Halleck overruled, was to seize Petersburg as a point from which 
to operate against Richmond, just as Grant tried to do, two years 
later. Had McClellan done so, it is safe to say that no invasion 
of Maryland by Lee would ever have been heard of. See Ropes's 
Civil War, ii. 235-243, where this point is very clearly set forth. 
The Count of Paris truly says that Halleck's order, withdrawing 
McClellan's army from the James river, was more disastrous to 
the Federal ca\ise than any of the defeats inflicted by the enemy. 
See his Civil War in America, ii. 249. 



From Corinth to Stone River 149 

saved Chattanooga and gained the initiative, he 
meditated the recon quest of Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky, and, emulous of Lee, he lost no time in start- 
ing. During July and August the cavalry raids 
of Morgan and Forrest sj)read terror Morgan and 
and confusion through those two states. Forrest. 
They cut railroads, seized telegraph offices and 
sent misleading despatches over the wires, car- 
ried off horses and mules by the thousand, and 
once in a dash upon Murfreesboro captured 1700 
troops and a battery of artillery. Buell sent Nel- 
son to look after them, but that enterprising com- 
mander was free to confess that chasing cavalry 
with infantry was not very inspiriting work. Buell 
had long since earnestly called the government's 
attention to his perilous deficiency in cavalry, but 
could get no assistance. 

At length in the last week of August, while Lee 
was crushing Pope in Virginia, the forward move- 
ment beo-an. Kirby Smith took his ^^. , ^ . , 

* -^ ^ Kirby Smith 

12,000 men over the mountains by a defeats 
pass which enabled him to turn Cum- N^ls^^- 
berland Gap and compel the Federal force to 
evacuate it and retreat upon the Ohio. He then 
struck across Kentucky to Richmond, where Nel- 
son with 7000 men undertook to check his ad- 
vance. In a sharp fight in which about 900 were 
killed and wounded on each side. Nelson was 



150 The Mississij^in Valley in the Civil War 

totally defeated and a third of liis force was cap- 
tured. Smith then advanced upon Cincinnati. 

While this was going on, Bragg had come out 
of Chattanooga and crossed the Tennessee river. 
The sagacious Thomas saw that a movement into 
Kentucky was intended, and advised Buell to check 
it by occupying Sj^arta. But instead of doing so, 
Buell, who feared an attack on his right, concen- 
trated his forces at Murfreesboro. Profiting by 
this error, Bragg slipped past Buell's left, crossed 
the Cumberland river at Gainesville, and marched 
straight toward Munfordville, a station on the 
Louisville and Nashville railroad through which 
g Buell obtained his supplies. Munford- 

invades viUe was garrisoned by 4000 men. 

Kentucky. ^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ 

miles on the arc of a circle through Nashville and 
Bowling Green, while Bragg had only to travel 68 
miles on a straight line forming the chord of this 
arc. Determined in no event to abandon Nash- 
ville, Buell left Thomas there with three divisions 
and hastened northward ; but Bragg's shorter 
route enabled him to reach Munfordville and cap- 
ture its garrison before Buell had passed Bowling 
Green. Bragg was now three marches nearer than 
Buell to Louisville, and everybody supposed he 
would instantly come up and capture that city, so 
important not only for its size and wealth, but 



From Corinth to Stone River 151 

also as the only base of supply from which Buell's 
40,000 men could be fed. 

In the states north of the Ohio the excitement 
was at fever heat, and everywhere the outlook 
seemed gloomy enough. Within a few weeks the 
President had called for 600,000 men, half of them 
to serve for three years and a half as nine months' 
militia ; in case of necessity conscription Panie at the 
was to be resorted to. People forgot North. 
Fort Donelson and New Orleans ; it seemed as if all 
the gains had been cancelled. Those who held that 
the South could never be conquered now regarded 
their opinion as borne out by facts ; and there were 
a few in whom party prejudice was so strong as to 
make them rejoice in this conclusion. While such 
short-sighted people wagged their heads, militia 
turned out in thousands to defend the threatened 
points, and the streets of Louisville and Cincinnati 
were the scene of busy military preparation. 

But the wave of rebel invasion had already spent 
its force. On the 17th of September, the day on 
which Munf ordville was captured, Lee was slightly 
defeated in the murderous battle of Antietam and 
compelled to turn his back upon Maryland. Per- 
haps the news of this reverse may have impressed 
upon Bragg the necessity of caution. His army 
had not been cordially received by the people of 
Kentucky. He found himself in a hostile country. 



152 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

• 

He was indeed on Buell's line of communications, 
in a position where defeat would be ruinous to 
Buell. But by the same token, defeat at the hands 
of an army lying south of him would be ruinous to 
himself, and his force did not outnumber Buell's. 
Louisville was not quite defenceless, and to attack 
it with the chance of being assailed in the rear 
would be to court destruction. Accordingly Bragg 
desisted and turned eastward to join Kirby Smith, 
who after threatening Cincinnati had retired upon 
Frankfort. Here was the weak point in the Con- 
^ ^ . , federate stratecry. If, after his victory 

Defect in the ^ tsJ » J 

Confederate at Richmond, Smith had moved toward 
strategy. Louisville, SO as to unite with Bragg 

upon Buell's line of communications, they might 
have hoped to crush him as thoroughly as Pope 
was crushed at Manassas.^ As it was, they met at 

1 In this connection Mr. Ropes very properly comments on 
"the folly, which both the Union and the Confederate govern- 
ments were so constantly committing-, of having more than one 
commanding officer in one theatre of war." Bragg might have 
sent for Kirby Smith to come from Lexington (about 100 miles) 
and join him in giving battle to Buell at Munfordville. Smith, 
" although an independent department-commander, had oflPered 
to serve under Bragg in this campaign. Still, the fact that Bragg 
was not the sole commander in this region unquestionably ham- 
pered his movements. . . . Smith was not summoned, and Bragg 
did not feel himself strong enough to attack Buell alone." 
Ropes's Civil War^ ii. 403. Thus the supreme opportunity for 
the Confederates in this invasion of Kentucky was lost by them. 



From Corinth to Stone River 153 

Frankfort, the state capital, and amused themselves 
with the inauguration of a rebel governor, while 
Buell, who had marched on to his base at Louis- 
ville and largely reinforced his army, was now 
ready to turn and rend them. On the 30th of 
September, just as he was starting, there came an 
order from Halleck, relieving him from command 
and appointing Thomas in his place. But mag- 
nanimous Thomas, who understood the situation 
much better than either Halleck or the newspapers, 
protested so seriously against this injustice that the 
order was revoked. 

Upon Buell's advance Bragg fell back. At 
Perry ville, on the 8th of October, por- Battle of 
tions of the two armies came into colli- Perryville. 
sion. There was a severe fight, in which nearly 
5000 men were killed and wounded on each side, 
but it decided nothing. Bragg retreated south- 
easterly and escaped into east Tennessee through 
Cumberland Gap, whence he made his way back 
to Chattanooga, and presently advanced upon 
Murfreesboro. Instead of fruitlessly chasing him 
through the Gap, the Federal commander, antici- 
pating his movements, proceeded to Nashville, 
whence a new campaign might best be begun. 

While on either side of' the Alleghanies the 
Union armies had thus been baulked of the coveted 
prizes of Richmond and Chattanooga, and the 



154 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

\0y2l states were for a moment invaded by the 
enemy, there was one point where the Union line 
did not fall back, but every inch of ground once 
conquered was firmly held. That point was 
Corinth, where Grant remained in command. 
Grant had so many miles of railroad to guard, and 
his force was so much weakened by sending troops 
to aid Buell, that it was impossible for him to 
undertake any extensive operations. His first 
active movement was to send Rosecrans with 9000 
men and Ord with 8000 to attack Sterling Price, 
who was isolated with 14,000 men at the village of 
Battle of luka, twenty miles southeast of Cor- 

luka. inth. They were to attack him on 

opposite sides and crush him between them, but as 
often happens with such schemes, there was a lack 
of coordination in the movements. The battle was 
prematurely fought between Price and Rosecrans, 
and although Price retired from the field with 
heavy loss, he made good his escape and succeeded 
in joining his forces to those of Van Dorn. It 
could hardly be called a victory for the Federals. 

With his army thus concentrated. Van Dorn 
now resolved to inflict such a blow upon Grant as 
would compel him to retire down the Tennessee 
river. His plan was bold but well-considered. 
Grant's forces were small for the extent of country 
he was directed to occupy. He had 7000 men at 



From Corinth to Stone River 155 

Memphis under Sherman, 12,000 at Bolivar under 
Ord, 23,000 at Corinth under Rosecrans, and a 
reserve of 6000 at Jackson, where — as the most 
convenient point for communicating with these 
different forces — he had his headquarters. Van 
Dorn's total force was 22,000 men, and with it he 
boldly undertook to defeat Rosecrans and capture 
the works at Corinth. This would Battle of 
oblige Grant to retreat, and it was Corinth, 
hoped it would throw him back as far as Fort 
Donelson. Accordingly, on the 3d of October Van 
Dorn attacked Rosecrans, and a very obstinate 
battle ensued, in which fortune seemed at first 
to favour the Confederates, but after two days of 
fighting they were defeated with a loss of 5000 in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners. The total Union 
loss was about 2500. After this serious defeat 
the Confederates could no longer hope to take the 
offensive against Grant. On the contrary, it left 
him free to assume the aggressive and begin upon 
his first movement agrainst Vicksburo^. For this 
ill-fortune Van Dorn was unreasonably blamed by 
Jefferson Davis, who at once superseded him by 
John Clifford Pemberton, a general in 
every way his inferior. On the other superseded 
hand, Rosecrans won great increase ^yPember- 
of fame, and three weeks after his vic- 
tory he was appointed to an independent command. 



156 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

It was inevitable that some of our generals 
should be made to serve as scapegoats for the dis- 
asters and panic of the summer. Popular indig- 
nation demanded victims, and at such times the 
blows are very apt to fall in the wrong places. If 
Halleck could only have been removed from the 
Buellmadea chief command and comfortably im- 
seapegoat. mured in some Old Woman's Home, 
what a relief it would have been to a long-suffer- 
ing people ! But the fates showed little discrimi- 
nation in their awards. One of the most shameful 
pages in American history is that which records 
the unrighteous condemnation of the able and 
faithful Fitz John Porter, a wrong which has been 
tardily and partially rectified. As for Pope, who 
had shown himself totally unfit to command an 
army, his removal came none too soon. Of 
McClellan's incapacity, both in strategy and in 
tactics, the Maryland campaign had furnished the 
crowning proof, and the only reason for regretting 
him was the amazing selection of Burnside as his 
successor. The case of Buell was entirely different. 
It is true that the public had in great measure lost 
confidence in him ; it was vaguely felt that some- 
how or other he ought to have prevented Bragg 
from invading Kentucky, or else that he ought not 
to have allowed him to get away from Kentucky 
without a crushing defeat. While a war is going 



From Corinth to Stone River 157 

on, it is difficult to see below the surface of events. 
We now know, however, that it was Halleck who 
was responsible for Buell's failure to anticipate 
the rebels in seizing Chattanooga. With the 
enemy in possession of this place and holding east- 
ern Tennessee, it is difficult to see how any gen- 
eral, without a decided superiority in numbers, 
without a suitable force of cavalry, and with a 
line of communications 300 miles long, could en- 
sure himself ag-ainst such mischief as that which 
for a moment overtook Buell. His retreat upon 
Louisville and his subsequent pursuit of the enemy 
were admirably managed, and the state of his army 
during the whole campaign bore testimony to his 
rare ability. 

Unfortunately for Buell, however, he had made 
two powerful enemies, in Oliver Morton, gov- 
ernor of Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, g^gU's e^e- 
whom President Lincoln had appointed mies, Morton 
military governor of Tennessee. Mor- 
ton's services to the Union cause were so great that 
he stood high (and deservedly so) in the favour of 
President Lincoln. At the same time he was a 
man of relentless and domineering temper, and 
could never be made to understand that the In- 
diana troops in Buell's army owed obedience pri- 
marily to their general and not to the governor at 
Indianapolis. He would send his staff-officers 



158 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

into tlie army to look after the interests of the 
Indiana men, exchange their arms without the 
knowledge of their commanders, and keep up a 
communication concerning various matters which 
were none of their business.^ Buell was not the 
man to endure such infringements of discipline, 
and when he suppressed them he incurred the 
deadly hostility of the passionate Morton. As for 
Andrew Johnson, he wished to have all the other 
objects of the war postponed or sacrificed to the 
occupation of eastern Tennessee, and he hated 
Buell for entertaining broader views. Moreover, 
Buell was a strict disciplinarian, and insisted that 
war should be conducted upon civilized principles, 
and not upon those of Vandals and Bashi-bazouks. 
So when one of Mitchel's brigades, in the summer 
of 1862, wantonly sacked the town of Athens, in 
Alabama, Buell visited the offence with wholesome 
severity ; by sentence of a court-martial the brig- 
ade was broken up and distributed, its command- 
ing colonel was dismissed, and other officers were 
variously punished. For these praiseworthy mea- 
sures Buell was loudly abused in public meetings 
and by many of the newspapers. He was accused 
of sympathizing with rebels, and foul imputa- 
tions upon his loyalty were caught up and used 
against him by Morton and Johnson. In Octo- 

1 See Fry, The Army under Buell, p. 86. 



From Corinth to Stone River 159 

ber the pressure in various ways brought to bear 
upon President Lincohi had come to be such 
that he yielded to it and consented to Buell's re- 
moval. 

So industriously had Buell been maligned that 
it was said that everybody had lost confidence in 
him except Thomas ! But Thomas's opinion on 
such a matter was probably worth more than that 
of any other man in the United States. He could 
feel keenly what a pity it was for the country to 
lose the services of such an accomplished and high- 
minded soldier.^ The immediate occa- ^ ,, 

Isuell super- 

sion of Buell's dismissal furnishes a sededby 
striking commentary upon the military o^ecrans. 
obtuseness which then reigned at Washington. 
When Bragg retreated through Cumberland Gap, 
Halleck insisted that Buell should follow and 

1 I am g-lad to be able, in support of my opinion of Buell, to 
cite the words of Mr. Ropes, one of the most acute and learned 
military critics of the nineteenth century : " It cannot be doubted 
that the cause of the Union was seriously injured by withdrawing 
Buell from the command of this army. Buell was as able a gen- 
eral as any in the service. Had he at the first — that is, on Nov. 
1, 1861 — been placed in chief command in the West, it is not 
too much to say that the Confederate army of the West would 
have ceased to exist before June 1, 1862, and that thereafter a 
regiment of Union troops could have marched without opposition 
from Nashville to Chattanooga and Knoxville," Civil War, ii. 
414. The reference to Nov. 1, 1861, is to the date of Halleck's 
appointment to the chief command in the West. 



160 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

cliase him around the circle, instead of moving to 
Nashville to head him off ; and because Buell 
refused to lend himself to such a silly scheme, 
he was removed, and Rosecrans, fresh from the 
victory at Corinth, was put in his place.^ 

When Rosecrans took command at Nashville, 
October 30, this pretext for Buell's removal was 
ignored, and the new general was allowed to con- 
tinue in the course begun by his predecessor. An 
immediate offensive was demanded by the circum- 
stances. People were angry because Bragg had 
got off so easily. On the other hand the southern 
people were abusing Bragg for failing to conquer 
Kentucky. It is so easy in war-time for people at 
their cosy firesides to blame sorely tried soldiers 
for not doing the impossible ! A battle was there- 
fore necessary both for Bragg and for Rosecrans. 
The long campaign begun in July must be brought 
to a decisive issue. After all their marches and 
countermarches the two armies were face to face 
in middle Tennessee, and it was now to be seen 
which could annihilate the other. 

1 There is little direct evidence to show why Rosecrans 
received the appointment instead of Thomas, who had been 
appointed a month before. But Thomas had declined that ap- 
pointment, and may have been supposed to be too much in 
sympathy with Buell. Moreover, since the important victory at 
Corinth, there was a visible disposition to look upon Rosecrans 
as " the comingr man." 



From Corinth to Stone River 161 

Rosecrans was at Nashville, where his first care 
was to repair the railway connecting him with his 
base of supplies at Louisville. Bragg had con- 
centrated his forces at Murfreesboro, whence he 
sent the indefatigable Morgan on flying excursions 
to tear up rails and break down bridges in Rose- 
crans's rear ; and for want of a sufficient cavalry, 
Kosecrans, like Buell, found it hard to check 
these performances. The longer he stayed quiet, 
the worse the nuisance was sure to become ; and 
after due preparation he marched out of Nash- 
ville, on the day after Christmas, to attack and 
overwhelm the enemy. 

The town of Murfreesboro is a station on the 
Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, thirty miles 
southeast from Nashville. A mile to westward 
of the town the road to Franklin crosses Stone 
river, a sluggish tributary of the Cumberland. 
The sinuous river, and the railroad and turnpike 
straight as arrows, all run northwesterly and near 
together, through dense cedar-brakes interspersed 
with occasional clearings. It was this rpj^^ battle- 
triple line of turnpike, railroad, and field «* Stone 

nv6r or 

stream that was now to be made the Murfrees- 
scene of some of the most obstinate I'o^o- 
fighting of modern times. Bragg's army was 
drawn up in line of battle at an acute angle with 
the river and mostly to the west of it. The left 



162 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

wino: under Hardee and the centre under Polk 
were west of the river, and on the further side, 
to ward off any flank movement upon the town 
of Murfreesboro, was the right wing, composed 
of Breckinridge's division of Hardee's corps sepa- 
rated from its fellows. The general direction of 
the line west of the river was nearly north and 
south, with the left wing advanced south westward. 
On the east side Breckinridge's division was con- 
siderably refused to the northeast. Such was the 
Confederate line of battle, — an arrangement ap- 
parently faultless and fully adequate to the work 
which Bragg had planned. 

The Union army was drawn up to westward of 

the river in a line somewhat zigzag, but for the 

most part parallel to the enemy's front. 

The arrange- rn, . , . ^ -\r r^ ^ 

ment of our J- he right wmg under McLook stretched 

troops at iTom. the Franklin road to the Wilkin- 

Stone river. • 1 i» 1 

son turnpike, it consisted oi three di- 
visions, — first Johnson's, resting on the Franklin 
road with its right refused in a crotchet, and then 
Davis's ; the third, which connected with the centre 
at the Wilkinson pike, was commanded by a young 
officer named Philip Sheridan, who had lately won 
his first laurels at Perryville. The centre, com- 
manded by Thomas, consisted of two divisions, 
Negley's and Rousseau's, but in the plan of battle 
Palmer's division of the left wing practically formed 



4^ ^- 




STONE RIVER, DECEMBER 31, 1862, MORNING 



From Corinth to Stone Hiver 163 

part of the centre. Negley and Palmer were drawn 
up in line between the Wilkinson and Nashville 
pikes, with Rousseau stationed in the rear as a 
reserve. The remainder of the left wing under 
Crittenden, consisting of Wood's and Van Cleve's 
divisions, reached from the Nashville pike across 
the railroad and rested its left on a bend in the 
river. Each line of battle, Union and Confederate, 
was about three miles in length, and each contained 
in infantry and artillery about 40,000 men. 

It was well said by Frederick of Prussia that 
more than half the secret of winning battles lies 
in knowing how to take position. Rosecrans's 
arrangement was well adapted to his purpose save 
in one quarter of the field, but the defect in that 
quarter was a o^rave one. His plan of ~r> , 

^ o ^ Kosecrans s 

attack was brilliant and bold. It was plan of 
to throw the two divisions of Wood 
and Van Cleve across the easily fordable river and 
crush the single division of Breckinridge. At that 
point is a commanding ridge upon which Union 
artillery, once posted, would enfilade the whole 
Confederate line. With the aid of this galling 
fire it seemed certain that Thomas, with his two 
divisions and Palmer's, would defeat the Confeder- 
ate centre ; while the Union left, continuing its 
turning movement, would pass through Murfrees- 
boro and occupy the Franklin road, thus cutting 



164 The Mississippi •Valley i7i the Civil War 

off the enemy's retreat. In other words, the Union 
army, pivotmg upon its right, was to be swung 
around in a semicircle, enveloping and destroying 
the enemy. It was for this purpose that Rosecrans 
massed his troops so heavily upon his left. In 
space the Wilkinson turnpike divided his line in 
the middle, but nearly two thirds of his weight 
was to the left of this. This was well, provided 
the right wing were strong enough and so advan- 
tageously placed as to be able to hold its ground. 
If the pivot were to be shaken out of place, the 
whole turning movement would be spoiled and 
the army thrown upon the defensive. 

It was all the more essential that the right wing 
should be made secure, since the arrangement of 
Bragg's plan Bragg's troops was such as to indicate 
of attack. ^\^^^ ^^^ attack would be made in that 
quarter. In fact, Bragg's plan of battle was almost 
precisely the same as that of Rosecrans. With his 
left somewhat heavily massed and thrown forward, 
he intended to overlap and crush the Federal right. 
Swinging around his whole force west of the river 
with Polk's right as its pivot, he would come in 
upon the Federal rear, fold the army back against 
the river, and, seizing the Nashville turnpike, cut 
off their retreat. The two plans being thus sub- 
stantially identical, each general having a heavy 
force opposed to the weaker wing of the other, it 



From Corinth to Stone River 165 

followed that he who could soonest deliver his blow 
would be likely to achieve success. In this respect 
the position favoured the Confederate general. 
Rosecrans, in delivering his blow, must throw two 
divisions across the river, which, though not a seri- 
ous obstacle, would still occasion some slight delay. 
In front of Bragg's left there was not only no 
obstacle, but the forest formed an impenetrable 
curtain, under cover of which his men could ap- 
proach the Federal right without being observed. 

Under these circumstances it was imperatively 
necessary for Rosecrans to use extraordinary dili- 
gence in placing his right wing. This 
he can hardly be said to have done, and ^j^^ ^f ^j^^ 
the error which he failed to rectify Union right 
spoiled his plan of battle and came 
within an ace of destroying the Union army. The 
error was that McCook's line was too long and thin 
and faced too much to the east, thus coming too 
near the enemy. If it had been refused half way- 
back to the Wilkinson road, so as to face nearly 
south, it might at the same time have been more 
heavily massed. The enemy would have had to 
move farther to reach it, and could not have struck 
it in flank without stretching out his own line so 
far as to weaken himself. It could also have been 
more easily reinforced, in case of necessity, by 
Rousseau's division in reserve. Rosecrans under- 



166 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

stood all this, and told McCook that he did not like 
his facing so much to the east. At the same time 
he did not press the matter, but left too much to 
the discretion of the corps-commander, who was 
over-confident, and assured him that in the event 
of an attack he could hold his ground just as 
he was for three hours. Herein was Rosecrans's 
one terrible mistake. Absorbed in preparing the 
offensive movement with his left, he did not give 
sufficient attention to his right. He ought to have 
visited the spot in person and insisted upon Mc- 
Cook's rectifying his position. One reason why- 
Napoleon almost invariably won his battles was 
that he did not leave such important matters to 
subordinates, but overlooked all manner of details 
with his own eyes and made sure they were right. 
If he seemed sometimes to take fearful risks, it was 
generally after he had very thoroughly verified his 
premises. If Rosecrans had been a really great 
general, he never would have staked so much upon 
another man's judgment. 

Other officers beside the commander-in-chief re- 
marked upon the faulty arrangement of the right 
wing. On the eve of the battle General Sheridan, 
accompanied by one of his brigade-commanders, 
General Sill, visited McCook's headquarters and 
earnestly assured him that the arrangement was 
liable to invite disaster. But McCook did not 



From Corinth to Stone River 167 

profit by the warning. His line was not only not 
withdrawn, but it was not even pro- McCook's 
perly guarded. When the storm of bat- want of 
tie burst upon it at daybreak next morn- 
ing, the 31st of December, it found Johnson, the 
first division-commander on the right, a mile and a 
half in the rear at his headquarters ; and with him 
was Willich, the commander of the right brigade of 
his division, so that there was literally nobody in 
front to give orders to the troops. Baldwin's re- 
serve brigade was too far in the rear to be of any 
use. The guns were ill-guarded, and some of their 
horses had been led to a distance to be watered. 

Upon this scene of gross negligence fell the 
sudden shock of two Confederate divisions, one 
of which was led by Patrick Cleburne, the ablest 
division-commander in all the Confederate army 
west of the AUeghanies. The Confederate attack 
was superb and irresistible. Their men rushed 
forward like an overwhelming torrent, and in a 
few minutes Johnson's whole division was swept 
from the field with the loss of eleven guns, and 
fled in wild disorder toward the Wilkinson road.^ 
This catastrophe uncovered the right Rout of two 
of Davis's division, and upon this the divisions, 
victorious Confederates charged in heavy masses, 

1 The crotchet upon which McCook placed so much reliance was 
of course too thin and frail to witlistand such an attack in mass. 



168 TJie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

strikiiijr it at once in front and flank. The resist- 
ance liere was much more effectual. The redoubt- 
able Cleburne was twice driven back by a murder- 
ous fire, but no bravery could compensate for the 
advantage of position which the rebels had gained, 
and after an obstinate struggle Davis's division 
was routed and driven across the Wilkinson turn- 
pike, leaving Sheridan uncovered to receive the 
next furious onset of the enemy. 

While the battle was begun thus inauspiciously 
on the right, Rosecrans had been carrying forward 
his plan of attack with the left. Part of Van 
Cleve's division had already crossed the river, and 
Wood with his men was preparing to follow, when 
the terrific roar of battle from the other end of the 
line made every one start with surprise, not un- 
mingled with dismay. It indicated a much more 
sudden and violent attack than they had reckoned 
on. Presently word came that McCook was hard 
pressed, but it did not reveal the extent of the 
calamity ; and Rosecrans, loath to admit the neces- 
sitv for chano:ino: his plans, sent word 

Union array J & » x ' 

thrown upon to McCook to disputc cvcry inch of 
the defensive. ^^^^^^^ ^n a few minutes his own 

attack would set everything right. But the enemy 
had secured the initiative, and held the game in 
his hands. The surging volume of sound moved 
steadily northward, and drew nearer and nearer 



From Corinth to Stone River 169 

with alarming rapidity. The first of McCook's 
three hours had hardly elapsed when a message 
came announcing the rout of two divisions and the 
loss of nearly all the field south of the Wilkinson 
road. The bold plan of attack must now be aban- 
doned, or the enemy would gain the Nashville 
turnpike before the morning's disaster could be 
remedied, and thus our line of retreat would be cut 
off. The Union army was thrown upon the defen- 
sive, and the question for the moment was how to 
ward off impending ruin. The army must change 
front, and a new line of battle must be formed 
facing southwest. Crittenden was accordingly 
ordered to withdraw Van Cleve from beyond the 
river and send him westward to the railroad, while 
Wood was to follow and take place on his right 
so as to defend the Nashville road. Rousseau's 
reserve division was moved southward to support 
Sheridan. 

It was a terrible moment. The cedar thickets 
in Sheridan's rear, between the Wilkinson and 
the Nashville roads, were swarming with fugitives, 
the shattered remnants of Johnson's and Davis's 
divisions. The Confederate centre, hitherto silent, 
opened a heavy fire upon Sheridan and Negley, 
while their victorious left was hurled upon Sheri- 
dan, whose defeat would now complete the de- 
struction of the Union right. But in young Philip 



170 Tlie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Sheridan the advancing rebels encountered an 
officer of very different mettle from those they had 
disposed of that morning. When he found his 
<.,.,, flank uncovered by Davis's retreat, he 

Sheridan's *' ' 

magnificent withdrew his right and ordered his left 
^ * to push back the enemy at jDoint of bay- 

onet ; and while this charge, superbly conducted 
by Colonel Roberts, drove off the enemy in dis- 
order, he used the precious moments in forming a 
new front at right angles to his old one and facing 
southward. In this new position he met the re- 
turning shock of the rebel infantry, and held them 
at bay for two hours. Then finding them again 
outflanking him, he faced his two right brigades to 
westward, so that his division and Negley's together 
formed something like a semicircle convex toward 
the south, and for another two hours the enemy's 
efforts to break this line were fruitless. The fight- 
ing was now terrific. Maddened by this obstinate 
resistance, Bragg massed the entire left and centre 
of his army against these two divisions, but was 
thrice driven back with frightful slaughter. At 
length, with his cartridge-boxes empty, his brigade- 
commanders all killed, and 1800 men laid low, the 
noble Sheridan saw that he must retreat. One 
more desperate charge with cold steel, and before 
the enemy had recovered he withdrew his men to 
the rolling plain west of the Nashville road where 



From Corinth to Stone River 171 

the new line of battle was forming. " Here we 
are," lie cried, as he met Rosecrans galloping up, 
— " here we are, all that are left of us." His 
magnificent resistance had saved the day. 

The crisis, however, was not yet passed. To 
form a whole army in new line of battle under 
the fire of an advancing enemy flushed with suc- 
cess is an operation calculated to tax the highest 
powers of a general. The enemy's repeated and 
determined assaults left no respite. The whole 
right wing was now gone, and the brunt of the 
fight was taken by the centre under Thomas. 
With Sheridan's retirement, Negley Thomas 
was next outflanked and obliged to stands invin- 
retreat. Rousseau's division, which 
had been sent to Sheridan's support, was also 
driven back. But Thomas was not to be con- 
quered. On rising ground just west of the Nash- 
ville turnpike and commanding the field, Rose- 
crans was already forming his new line facing 
southwestward. The divisions of Johnson, Davis, 
and Sheridan were again set in order, with those 
of Van Cleve and Wood, 12,000 fresh men, to 
sustain them ; and on the crest of the 

,,,--> - II' •n while Rose- 

knoll iiosecrans gathered his artillery ^.^^^^^ forms 

in heavy masses. To gain time for ^ new battle- 

-,.(,. -I . front. 

this lormation, and to preserve its 
continuity with Palmer's division, which was now 



172 The Mississi2jpi Valley in the Civil War 

the extreme left, between railroad and river, it 
was essential that Thomas should stand immov- 
able as a rock. He rallied the divisions of Negley 
and Rousseau, and called Van Cleve to bring up 
one brigade to his support. Van Cleve came on 
the double quick, just in time to meet the rebel 
onset. The fighting at this critical point was per- 
haps the hottest of the day. One of Rousseau's 
brigades lost 26 officers and 611 men out of a 
total of 1566. Four times the Confederates with 
marvellous gallantry returned to the assault, and 
four times their ranks were so woefully torn with 
grape and canister that they fell back baffled and 
at last somewhat disheartened. Their hopes of 
victory were beginning to be dashed. The stub- 
born resistance of Thomas, added to that of Sheri- 
dan, had gained so much time that the new line 
of battle was approaching completion, and occupy- 
ing so strong a defensive position that the work of 
Bragg' s army must virtually be begun over again. 
The division of Palmer, however, had become 
more and more enveloped in battle since the first 
withdrawal of Rousseau and Negley. By a con- 
centrated assault upon Palmer, tlie enemy, whose 
original plan was now manifestly failing, might 
break through the Union left and take the new 
line in flank. But Palmer handled his men very 
finely, and the fighting was here as stubborn as 




STONE RIVER, DECEMBER 31, 1862, EVENING 



From Corinth to Stone River 173 

anywhere in Thomas's part of the field. The 
most furious struggle was for the possession of a 
grove known as the Round Forest, Terrific 
which was regarded as the key to struggle; 

/-^ /. 1 Palmer holds 

the federal left, ihe Confederates, the Round 
urged on by their bishop-general, Polk, forest, 
performed prodigies of valour. One of their regi- 
ments returned to the charge till it had lost 207 
men out of 402 ; another, surpassing even this won- 
derful record of heroism, kept on till it had lost 
306 out of 425. But all in vain. Palmer's grip 
on the Round Forest could not be shaken, and at 
lensfth Polk sent across the river to Breckinrido^e 
for reinforcements. Up to this time Breckin- 
ridge's men had not been engaged. Crittenden 
had withdrawn his divisions cautiously, keeping 
up some show of menace, and Bragg had not 
yet deemed it prudent to weaken his right wing. 
Rosecrans's first movement, therefore, though 
nipped at the start, had played a useful secondary 
part in neutralizing a large force of the enemy. 

At two o'clock in the afternoon Breckinridge 
sent over four brigades to Polk's assistance, and 
the attack on the Round Forest was renewed. It 
was unsuccessful, and the Confederates were so 
roughly handled that they did little more here till 
four o'clock. Then summoning all their energies, 
they rushed forward in one last determined effort. 



174 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Here, as Kosecrans hurried to the spot, a cannon- 
ball grazed him and carried away the head of 
Colonel Garesche, his chief of staff, who was rid- 
ing at his side. Making his way to the front, the 
commander ordered a bayonet charge, which broke 
Th Confed- *^^® Confederate line and ended the 
erates battle in this quarter. During the 

progress of this series of deadly strug- 
gles at the Round Forest, the remainder of the 
Confederate army attempted to break down the 
new Federal line of battle by an attack in front. 
Unless this could be accomjDlished, all the successes 
of the morning went for nothing. But the new 
line was too strong to be carried. As the Con- 
federates approached, their ranks were beaten 
down by a hurricane of grape and shrapnel and 
musket-balls, against which nothing human could 
stand. So great was the destruction that the as- 
sault which was just beginning was never made, 
but the baffled foe sought shelter in the woods, 
and the noise of battle ceased. 

Thus ended the first day of the great fight at 
Stone river. It decided nothing except that both 
commanders had failed to carry out their plans. 
Rosecrans's plan had been foiled at the outset 
by the vigour and promptness with which Bragg 
struck the vulnerable point in his line. Bragg's 
plan had come very near succeeding, but was at 



From Corinth to Stone River 175 

length ruined by the stubbornness and resource of 
Sheridan, Thomas, and Pahiier, and the skill with 
which Rosecrans reconstructed his order of battle. 
The two armies were still on a par in strength, 
being about equally exhausted. If Results of the 
either was to be crushed, the work must ^'^* ^^y- 
be begun anew, and Rosecrans now held such a 
position that little could be hoped from a direct 
attack upon him. The enemy's superior cavalry, 
indeed, had already begun to operate against our 
line of communications, to which our army was 
now parallel ; and there was some fear lest he 
might follow up the movement in force and cut us 
off from our base. Rosecrans, however, rightly 
judged that the Confederate army was in no condi- 
tion to attempt this. During the cold, clear night 
a council of war was held, and some of the gener- 
als earnestly advised him to retreat to Nashville. 
But Rosecrans would not hear of such a thing. 

This determination proved very disconcerting to 
Bragg next morning. He had misinterpreted the 
bloody repulse of the afternoon, supposing it to be, 
like Sheridan's last bayonet charge, a device for 
facilitating retreat; and accordingly he imagined 
that he had won the battle. When he got up on 
New Year's Day and found the Union army still 
in position, it was a great disappointment. Little 
was done that day. Bragg spent it in reconnoi- 



176 The Mississip2^i Valley in the Civil War 

tring to ascertain if his adversary was still pre- 
sent in full force. Eosecrans prepared to resume 
the offensive, and accordingly sent Van Cleve's 
division with one of Palmer's brigades to seize the 
heights upon the east side of the river and plant 
batteries there, according to his original plan. This 
movement, which threatened the town of Mur- 
freesboro and Bragg's communications, was unop- 
posed and apparently not discovered until the next 
day. The batteries enfiladed the whole of Polk's 
Renewal of ^i^^^' ^^^ '^^ ^^^^ necessary for Bragg 
the battle. either to storm the position or take 
his army away. On the afternoon of January 2, 
Breckinridofe was sent back to the east side of the 
river and entrusted with the attack. At first 
Breckinridge was successful against Van Cleve ; 
but Negiey's division coming to the rescue, led 
by Colonel John Miller, its senior brigade-com- 
mander, the Confederates were presently over- 
powered. Their line was exposed to the raking 
fire of 58 guns from the Union batteries west of 
the river, and after half an hour Breckinridge 
retreated, leaving 1700 men of his division killed 
and wounded. During the night both armies 
R treat of hcgan massing forces east of the river. 
the Confeder- BraofSf sent over Cleburne's division, 
while Posecrans sent the whole of 
Crittenden's corps, together with Davis's division, 



From Corinth to Stone Itwei' 111 

and occupied the heights so firmly that it was idle 
to think of dislodging him. Nothing was done 
next day till toward midnight, when Bragg began 
his retreat to Shelbyville and TuUahoma. The 
retreat was mimolested. 

The losses at the battle of Stone river were 
nearly the same as at Shiloh, — about 10,000 men 
on each side, or one fourth of the total infantry 
and artillery force engaged. Such a proportion of 
loss ranks it among the most stubborn battles of 
modern times. In point of bravery it is impossi- 
ble to award the palm to one side more than to the 
other. It was simply Greek against Greek. As 
at Shiloh, the Confederates seemed at first to be 
bearing down all opposition ; and as at Shiloh, 
they were at last compelled to retire from the field. 
Of the two battles Stone river seems in some 
respects the more interesting, as it was much the 
less simple in its conditions. There 

Comments. 

was more opportunity for the display 
of something like grand tactics, and here, except 
for the great initial mistake, Rosecrans showed 
signal ability. Pity that the mistake should have 
been so grave as to cause all this fertility of re- 
source to be expended in the work of retrieving 
disaster ! But for that well-nigh fatal error, Rose- 
crans might probably have gone forthwith to Chat- 
tanooga. As it is, the battle of Stone river seems 



178 The 3Iississippi Valley in the Civil War 

less clearly a Federal victory than the battle of 
Shiloh. The latter decided the fall of Corinth; 
the former did not decide the fall of Chattanooga. 
Offensively it was a drawn battle, as looked at 
from either side. As a defensive battle, however, 
it was clearly a Union victory. It saved Nashville 
and tightened the Federal grasp upon Tennessee, 
and from this time forward, except for a brief 
period in the following autumn, the initiative in 
the great western theatre of war remained with 
the Union armies. 



CHAPTER V 

THE VICKSBUKG PROBLEM 

Of all the great rivers in the world, the Missis- 
sippi is perhaps the crookedest. A ship sailing 
over its waters will often travel a dis- physical 
tance of thirty miles to reach a point charactens- 

. tics of the 

eight or ten miles distant from its start- Mississippi 
ing-place. This crookedness is not like ^^^^^• 
that of the New England stream that flows in 
graceful curves through deep valleys worn down 
into the granite by long ages of rubbing and grind- 
ing under the pressure of glaciers. The Missis- 
sippi flows through a soft alluvial soil, in which it 
cuts fresh channels to right or left at the occurrence 
of the slightest obstacle to its direct progress. It 
is thus continually leaving its old bed for a new 
one, so that its long course is marked by countless 
swampy islands and peninsulas, while on either 
side may be seen stagnant crescent-shaped lakes, 
the remnants of its abandoned channels. The Mis- 
sissippi water is so crowded with fine particles of 
reddish-brown alluvial mud that when dipped up 
in a tumbler it looks like diluted chocolate, and 



180 The Mississip2n Vhlley in the Civil War 

when poured out again leaves a thick slimy sedi- 
ment in the tumbler. Of .this alluvium great quan- 
tities are caught on its loop-like banks, until they 
gradually grow higher than the country beyond 
them, forming frail natural dikes, through which 
the contained water frequently bursts in devastat- 
ing floods. Against such calamities the inhabitants 
of lowland towns on the banks of the Mississippi 
seek to protect themselves by erecting artificial 
dikes, known in the parlance of that once French 
region as "levees;" and when the imprisoned river 
sometimes asserts itself and washes away a part 
of the levee, the "crevasse" is as terrible to the 
dwellers on those flats as the avalanche or the 
landslide to people who live on the sides of steep 
mountains. 

As a result of such freshets, the land on either 
side of the Mississippi is intersected by a network 
of bayous or sluggish streams as crooked as the 
river itself, and sometimes so long and deep as to 
be navigable for miles by vessels of considerable 
size. The strip of country thus creased and chan- 
nelled in every direction, which forms 
The bayous. -, -, . c -, > ^ 

the basin oi the mighty stream, aver- 
ages some forty miles in width. It is filled with 
cypress sw^amps, interspersed wath dense forests of 
Cottonwood, sweet gum, magnolia, sycamore, and 
tulip, beneath which the ground is thickly covered 



The Vichshurg Prohlem 181 

with impenetrable masses of creeping vines. In 
such a country operations with an army are quite 
impracticable; at no season is it possible for a 
large body of men to secure a foothold. At the 
same time it is impossible to erect upon these low, 
flat shores fortifications fit to resist a naval force 
like that which captured New Orleans. Through 
the devious windings of the river the Federal 
gunboats could plough their way unmolested from 
point to point, controlling its navigation and pos- 
sessing it as a military highway. 

But to this peculiar state of things, which was 
general throughout the lower Mississippi basin, 
there were a few notable exceptions. On its eastern 
side, for hundreds of miles, the valley is bounded 
by the lofty plains of Tennessee and Mississippi, 
which terminate in precipitous bluffs ; and here and 
there, though at long intervals, the river sweeps up 
close to the bluffs and washes their base for several 
miles. Such is the case at Columbus, 
Fort Pillow, Memphis, Vicksburg, 
Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson. All these places 
stand on the summit of bluffs rising from 80 to 200 
feet sheer above the turbid water. They afford 
foothold for an army approaching from the rear, 
but on the other hand they are unassailable by 
fleets on the river. A ship's guns cannot be ele- 
vated sufficiently to inflict fatal damage on such 



182 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

places, which on their part can return such a plun- 
ging: fire as is difficult for the strongest ship to en- 
dure. Jt was therefore only by fortifying these 
places thai the Confederates could hope to retain 
their hold upon the Mississippi river. As soon as 
they lost one of them, they lost the river down 
to the next similar point, except in the single case 
of Island Number Ten, where the conditions were 
peculiar. When they lost Columbus and Island 
Number Ten, there was no other foothold for them 
above Fort Pillow ; and when this and Memphis 
were taken away from them, there was no place 
where they could make a stand against the fleet 
until Vicksburg was reached. 

But of all points on the great river this was the 
strongest to resist either fleet or army. To the 
fleet it was practically inaccessible, to the army 
it was nearly so. A little below the mouth of the 
Yazoo river the Mississippi makes one of its great 
bends, turning abruptly to the northeast, and after 
flowing five miles in that direction it turns with 
equal abruptness to the southwest, enclosing a pen- 
insula less than two miles in width. Opposite the 
northern portion of this low peninsula stands the 
Vicksbm<g ^^*y ^^ Vicksburg, crowning the bluff 
and Port at a height of 200 feet above the water. 

For eleven miles below Vicksburg the 
river washes the foot of the cliffs. Then it sweeps 



Hie Vichshurg Problem 183 

away from them westward, and after three gigantic 
double bends again strikes the line of bluffs at 
Grand Gulf, which is only twenty-five miles below 
Vicksburg as the crow flies, but sixty miles by the 
river. Immediately below Grand Gulf the river 
once more leaves the bluffs, not to touch them 
again till it reaches the village of Port Hudson, two 
hundred and fifty miles farther down. Grand 
Gulf and Port Hudson, both of which were strongly 
fortified, might be regarded as outworks of Vicks- 
burg, but of these Port Hudson was far the more 
important. For between it and Vicksburg the 
great Red river empties into the Mississippi, and 
the Red river was the highway by which the states 
of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas were connected 
with the central and eastern portions of the Con- 
federacy. As a recruiting-ground for the rebel 
armies, these three states were able to supply 
100,000 men ; but still more than this, they were 
an inexhaustible granary from which the Confed- 
eracy was furnished with food, and while all its 
coasts were rigorously blockaded, its only communi- 
cation with the outer world was through Texas and 
Mexico. To sever from the Confederacy its three 
trans-Mississippi states, and to blockade it on this 
side as closely as on its sea-coast, was an object of 
paramount importance. It would destroy nearly 
half its resisting power. To do this, it was not 



184 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

enough for Union fleets and armies to possess the 
mouth of the Mississippi and the whole of its course 
above Vicksburg. It was necessary to control 
every part of it, and especially this region about 
the mouth of the Red river. This stream was the 
great avenue between east and west, jealously 
guarded on either side by Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson, which were like two powerful bastions 
reciprocally flanking and protecting each other. 

Between these two points the Mississippi river 
was entirely in rebel hands. Farragut's fleet at 
Unapproach- Ncw Orleans could not pass above Port 
ablenessof Hudson, uor could Davis's fleet at 
from the" Helena pass below Vicksburg, without 
south incurring great danger in running by 

the batteries. Nor was there any use in taking 
such risk unless to cooperate with an army acting 
between the two places. But no Union army could 
land on the eastern bank of the river at any point 
between Port Hudson and Vicksburg without sev- 
ering itself from every source whence supplies 
could reach it. As lons^ as Port Hudson was in 
rebel hands, a Union army could not 02:)erate upon 
Vicksburg from below without risk of speedy star- 
vation ; for the guns of Port Hudson closed the 
way to all supplies coining up the river, and the 
guns of Vicksburg itself frowned off all supplies 
attempting to come down. 



TliQ Vickshurg Prohlem 185 

While thus quite inaccessible from the south, 
Yicksburg was, for other reasons, no less inacces- 
sible on the north to an army approaching from 
the river. Above the city the hilly and from the 
range on which it stands swerves north- no^tli- 
easterly and quite away from the Mississij)pi, but 
near to its tributary, the Yazoo. Twelve miles 
above Yicksburg the waves of the Yazoo break 
upon the base of Haines Bluff, which commands 
all the river approaches at long cannon-range. As 
long as the Confederates held Haines Bluff, no 
army could land north of Yicksburg without being 
torn to pieces by a fire to which it could not effec- 
tively reply. 

Thus the " Queen City of the Bluff," as southern 
people were fond of calling it, might indeed smile, 
in its royal sense of security, on all the difficult 
country around it. Unapproachable by its steep 
front on the Mississipj)i, by its left which Port 
Hudson covered, or by its right which was guarded 
by Haines Bluff, it could be assailed only in the 
rear ; and here too the country, extremely rugged 
and broken by deep ravines, presented formidable 
obstacles to an enemy. While thus from its situ- 
ation Yicksburg had come to be the mainstay of 
the Southern Confederacy, its strength was such 
that it was likened to Gibraltar. The task of tak- 
ing it was as arduous as had ever been set before 
a general. 



186 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

That the obstacles had been allowed to accumu- 
late to such an extent was due, as we have seen, 
to the imbecility with which the Union armies were 
managed in the summer of 1862. When Farragut 
Alostoppor- ^"^^ Davis were patrolling the river 
tunity. on either side of Vicksburg in June, a 

force of 20,000 men, coming down from Memphis 
and landing north of the city, could not have failed 
to take it, for the approaches were not yet fortified 
and the Confederates had but a handful of men 
there. But although Farragut persistently begged, 
he could get no help from Halleck, who was trifling 
away the precious moments at Corinth, and scatter- 
ing his 100,000 men in such wise as to accomplish 
nothing in any direction. On the other hand, if 
we had had a few more troops at New Orleans, it 
would have been easy to send a small force up the 
river and take Vicksburg from the south, for the 
Confederates did not seize Port Hudson till August. 
The energetic and quick-witted Van Dorn was not 
slow to catch the golden opportunities which we 
thus wantonly threw away. His men worked with 
exemplary vigour, and every da}^ that saw Vicks- 
burg and Port Hudson unmolested by Federal 
troops saw^also their fortifications and outworks 
grow more and more impregnable. 

It was toward the end of October, 1862, that 
General Grant began to feel his hands free for a 



The Vickshurg Problem 187 

clutch at Yieksburg. His headquarters were then 
at Jackson in Tennessee ; the centre of his army 
was a little south of Jackson at Boli- 

I . . , . ^ ;r 1 • Grant's posi- 

var, his riglit wnig was at Memphis, tionand 
his left wing at Corinth, and his base forces at Cor- 
of supplies far up the Mississippi river 
at Columbus. His army consisted of 7000 men 
at Memphis under General Sherman, 19,200 at 
Bolivar under General Hurlbut, 17,500 at Cor- 
inth under General Schuyler Hamilton, who had 
there succeeded Rosecrans, and 4800 at Columbus 
under General Dodge, — in all 48,500 men. Heavy 
reinforcement was soon to be expected from the 
new levies which were collecting in response to the 
President's call in July for 300,000 men. Since 
Halleck's departure for Washington in July had 
left Grant in command of this army, he had so 
many points to occupy, in pursuance of Halleck's 
orders, that it was impossible to undertake any of- 
fensive operation. Under these circumstances Van 
Dorn had aimed a bold and skilful blow at Grant's 
left wing at Corinth, hoping to destroy it and force 
him to retreat down the Tennessee river ; but the 
scheme, as we have seen, had ended in a bloody 
defeat at the hands of Rosecrans. But the losses 
of that battle had been more than made good by 
new levies and exchanged prisoners, so that Van 
Dorn now had 24,000 men. Besides these there 



188 Tlie Mississijjpi Valley in the Civil War 

were 6000 at Vicksburg, 5500 at Port Hudson, and 
about 2000 at Jackson in Mississippi, making for 
tlie total Confederate force about 37,500 men, 
under General Pemberton, by wbom Jefferson 
Davis, after the defeat at Corintb, had unwisely 
superseded Van Dorn. 

With his army properly concentrated. Grant 
felt ready to advance against this inferior force, 
and on the 26th of October he wrote to Halleck, 
proposing to abandon Corinth after destroying the 
railroads all around it, and then to concentrate his 
force at Grand Junction and move upon Vicks- 
burg by way of the Mississippi Central 

Grant's first .. , _,, , 

movement railroad, ibis was the correct thmg 
against ^q do, but the Suggestion did not find 

favour with Halleck, who was apt un- 
duly to exaggerate the value of places as such, and 
to forget that after all it is the destruction of the 
enemy's army that is the primary object in war- 
fare. Before the victory at Shiloh had decided that 
Corinth was to be ours, that little town was a point 
of intense strategic interest. But now that it had 
been definitely gained with all its fruits, including 
the fall of Memphis and the opening of the Missis- 
sippi down to Vicksburg, there was no good reason 
for continuing to occupy it in force. Strategic 
points can be held by covering them as well as by 
leaving men to defend them, and a movement of 




GRANT'S FIRST MOVEMENT AGAINST VICKSBURG 
NOVEMBER 24, 1862-JANUARY 10, 1863 



The Vkkshurg Prohlem 189 

Grant's whole army upon Pemberton, pressing him 
down through the state of Mississippi, would have 
effectually covered Corinth. Halleck seems never 
to have answered Grant's letter or taken any 
notice of his suggestion ; so that being left without 
instructions, and unauthorized to abandon Corinth 
or any other point held by his army. Grant tried 
to see what could be done under these embarrass- 
ing circumstances. By weakening his forces at 
Corinth and Bolivar, he got together about 30,000 
men near Grand Junction, and prepared to advance 
against Pemberton. But he was so puzzled and 
delayed by incomprehensible telegrams from Wash- 
ington that he did not get started until the 24th 
of November. By this time reinforcements had 
arrived at Memphis, and Sherman was ready to 
move thence toward Grant and join him on the 
Tallahatchie river. As the Union army advanced, 
the Confederates fell back, continually skirmish- 
ing, until they reached the town of Grenada, be- 
hind the Yallabusha river. Grant with his forces 
united advanced as far as Oxford, forty miles north 
of Grenada. 

This first movement of Grant was an attempt 
to approach Vicksburg in the rear, and either 
compel its evacuation, as had hap- Theoutflank- 
pened in the case of Columbus and ^"^ strategy. 
Memphis, or attack it in the quarter where it was 



190 The Jlississijypi Vftlley in the Civil War 

least invulnerable. Be it observed that this was 
a continuation of the • same strategy which he 
had employed with such success from the moment 
he set out to attack Fort Donelson. Without 
approaching the Mississippi river, but simply by 
a victorious advance along a line parallel to it, 
he had effectually conquered it all the way from 
Cairo to Vicksburg. One after another the great 
bluffs which the Confederates had been at such 
pains to fortify had fallen of themselves in conse- 
quence of blows dealt not on the Mississippi river, 
but on the banks of the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land. The victories at Forts Henry and Donelson 
necessitated the fall of Columbus. The victory at 
Shiloh, involving the fall of Corinth, necessitated 
also the fall of Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow, 
and Memphis. Island Number Ten, indeed, was 
taken with all its garrison by General Pope ; but 
had Pope never attacked it, the fall of Corinth 
made it untenable, and it would have been evacu- 
ated ; the fortress would have fallen, though the 
garrison would have escaped. This series of con- 
quests of fortified places, simply through victories 
at distant points which outflanked them, was a 
beautiful though perfectly obvious piece of strat- 
egy. Grant's further advance toward the capital 
of Mississippi, along a line parallel to the river, 
was in illustration of the same principle. The 



The Vichsburg Problem 191 

presence of his army at Jackson would seriously 
threaten the Confederate hold upon Vicksburg. 
But the conditions of the case were now very dif- 
ferent, and the progress of the army, which had 
heretofore been comparatively easy, was soon ren- 
dered extremely difficult by reason of the increas- 
ing length of its line of communications. In order 
fully to appreciate this point, let us consider for a 
moment how enormous was the task of supplying 
our armies in the Civil War, and how narrowly 
their movements were thereby restricted. 

In the densely populated countries of Europe 
an army can often subsist upon the country 
through which it marches, but this was seldom the 
case with our armies in the southern states. Their 
food and ammunition had to be brousrht mr. . ^ i- 

* The task of 

to them, and it was seldom possible for supplying an 
them to move more than a few miles ^^"^y- 
from the line by which these supplies were brought. 
As Wellington once said, every army moves, like 
a serpent, upon its belly ; and the clumsiness of 
such kind of movement, under the conditions which 
obtained in our Civil War, may best be illus- 
trated by a little arithmetic. The weight of food, 
ammunition, and other supplies required by each 
soldier averaged 4 pounds daily. A single wagon, 
therefore, carrying a load of 2000 pounds and 
dragged over bad roads by six mules or draught 



192 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

horses, would supply 500 men, provided it could 
make the trip both wa3^s between the army and its 
base on the same day. If the army were one day's 
march from its base, so that the wagon must come 
one day and return empty the next, it could only 
supply 500 men every alternate day, or 250 daily. 
If the army were two days' march from its base, 
the wagon could only furnish supplies at the rate 
of 125 men daily, or 4 wagons to 500 men. To 
supply an army of 50,000 men, therefore, at two 
days' march from its base, required 400 wagons. 
Such an army ordinarily had at least 8000 horses 
for its cavalry and artillery, and each of tliese ani- 
mals consumed 25 pounds of forage daily, which 
made a load for just another 400 wagons. These 
800 wagons were drawn by 4800 mules or draught 
horses, which in turn required 180 wagons to carry 
their forage. These 180 wagons were drawn by 
1080 animals, which were fed by 48 additional 
wagons, and so on. Adding the figures, we find 
that for such an army as Grant had in Mississippi 
in December, 1862, nearly 1100 wagons, drawn 
by 6600 animals, were needed to keep it sup- 
plied at two days' march from its base ; while at 
three days' march, nearly 1900 wagons, drawn by 
11,000 animals, were requisite. Such an army 
could not travel more than two or three days 
without shifting its base along the line of some 



The Vichshurg Problem 193 

railroad or river; and obviously this movable base 
must be securely connected by river or rail with 
some permanent base established in a region en- 
tirely under Federal control. We thus get a 
realizing sense of the prodigious importance of 
railroads in our Civil War. Had the rebellion 
occurred a few years earlier, before our long lines 
of railway had been built, its suppression by mili- 
tary means would have been physically impossible. 
Indispensable as railways were, however, in sup- 
plying our armies in their long expeditions, they 
were far inferior to rivers in respect of security. 
Aided by the formidable gunboats, the Federal 
armies could advance to any distance along the 
banks of a navi stable river, obtaininof t>. 

o ' fc) Kivers pre- 

their supplies with promptness and ferableto 
regularity from flat-bottomed trans- 
ports, which could almost anywhere be pushed up 
to the shore and quickly unloaded. Owing to the 
naval superiority of the Federals, these river lines 
of communication could not be cut by the enemy. 
On the other hand, the railroads afforded lines of 
communication, the insecurity of which rapidly 
increased with their length ; as it was easy for the 
enemy's cavalry, in which he was usually superior 
to the Federals, to make bold incursions in the 
rear of our armies and tear up the track for miles. 
The effect of such a sudden stoppage of supplies 



194 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

was enough to paralyze all military operations. 
Imagine the food supply cut off for several clays 
in time of peace from cities of the size of Hartford 
or Worcester, and you get an inadequate illustra- 
tion of the peril of a great army severed from its 
base and isolated in the midst of lonely and hostile 
forests. To guard against such dangers was one 
of the most difficult tasks allotted to the Federal 
commanders, especially in the western theatre of 
war, where such immense distances had to be trav- 
ersed. Accordingly we find that, while the Fed- 
eral advance was always sure and decisive when 
supported by a river, it was apt to be precarious 
when the sole reliance was a long line of railway. 

We can now fully understand why it was not easy 
for Grant in the state of Mississippi to continue 
the series of brilliant movements by which he had 
heretofore caused so many rebel river-fortresses to 
fall without taking the trouble to go and assault 
them. Hitherto his own forward progress had 
been secure, for it had rested upon the Tennessee 
^ ,, . river. Now it had become insecure, 

Grant s mse- ' 

cure position for it depended upon the integrity of 
at X or . every mile of a long line of railway. 
When Grant reached Oxford, on the 5th of De- 
cember, he had his immediate base of supplies at 
Holly Springs, and his permanent base at Colum- 
bus, 180 miles distant. It was impossible to 



T^ie Vickshurg Problem 195 

guard so long a line, and in order to advance 
upon Grenada and beyond, it was necessary to 
make some different arrangement. Memphis was 
admirably situated for a permanent base, and a 
railroad ran directly from that point to Grenada, 
where it joined the Mississippi Central. Unfor- 
tunately it had sustained serious damage, and 
Halleck had instructed Grant not to have it re- 
paired. His movement was evidently regarded 
with disfavour at Washington, and the telegrams 
sent by Halleck were so bewildering that at this 
stage of the proceedings Grant felt it necessary to 
ask the question, " How far south would you like 
me to go ? " After more or less discussion by 
telegraph, he at length received permission to 
plan his own campaign. 

Thus armed with discretionary power, Grant 
held a conference with Sherman, in which two 
plans were thoroughly discussed. The one alter- 
native was to keep on in full force to Jackson and 
threaten Vicksburg in the rear ; the other was to 
divide the army, sending Sherman back to Mem- 
phis, and thence down the river to effect a landing 
just north of Vicksburg, while Grant should so 
manoeuvre as to detain Pemberton upon the Yalla- 
busha. There were sound objections to such a 
division of force, inasmuch as the enemy would 
possess the interior line whereby to mass his 



196 Tlie Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

strength against either Grant or Sherman. In this 
instance, however, no serious risk was 
movement apprehended, since Grant felt able, 
ag-ainst even with his force diminished, to meet 

the enemy in battle ; while Sherman, 
on the other hand, in case of ill-fortune, could 
retreat u23on his ships. To move on in full force 
to Jackson would necessitate the adoption of 
Memphis as a base, and the thorough repair of 
the railroad between that city and Grenada ; and 
this would consume precious time, during which 
the Confederates might be reinforced and Vicks- 
burg was sure to grow stronger. For this reason 
mainly it was decided to adopt the other alterna- 
tive and divide the army. Sherman accordingly 
returned to Memphis, organized his expedition, 
and on the 20th of December started down the 
river under convoy of the gunboat fleet, in the 
command of which Davis had lately been suc- 
ceeded by Admiral Porter. 

The fear that the Confederates in Mississippi 
might soon be reinforced was well founded. On 
the 24th of November the Confederate President 
had appointed Joseph Johnston to the chief com- 
mand of all the forces between the Alleghanies and 
the Mississippi, with his headquarters at Chatta- 
nooga. A week later Mr. Davis himself visited 
Vicksburg and Jackson, and saw that reinforce- 



The Vicksburg Problem 197 

ments were sorely needed ; and here it is interest- 
ing to observe that the Confederate Mr. Davis's 
authorities could meddle and bungle "Mistake, 
as effectively as the government at Washington. 
They had not yet given up all hope of retrieving 
the disaster at Pea Ridge and invading the state 
of Missouri ; and to this end a considerable force 
had been assembled in northern Arkansas, which 
on the 7th of December was thoroughly defeated 
by the Union generals Blunt and Herron at Prairie 
Grove. Offensive movements in that quarter being 
thus decisively checked, Johnston thought that the 
reinforcements needed in Mississippi might best be 
taken from the Confederate army in Arkansas, 
thus sacrificing a comparatively small and remote 
interest in behalf of one that was great and im- 
mediate. But Davis was unwilling to do this for 
fear of political disaffection in Arkansas. He 
preferred to take the reinforcements from Bragg's 
army at Murfreesboro, and did so in spite of 
Johnston's solemn warnings. On the 20th of De- 
cember Bragg accordingly sent 10,000 men to 
reinforce Pemberton in Mississippi. The great 
battle at Stone river was fought eleven days later ; 
and when we consider how closely that battle was 
contested and how narrowly the Federal army was 
saved from destruction, it seems probable that if 
those 10,000 men had been at hand, Bragg would 



198 The Mississippi Vctlley in the Civil War 

have won a decisive victory, and the whole course 
of the war in the West would have been changed 
most disastrously for the Union cause. So much 
good was already achieved for the Federals in con- 
sequence of Grant's assuming the offensive, slow 
and hampered as his movements had been. 

But Bragg did more for Pemberton than merely 
to send him reinforcements. On the 11th of De- 
cember he sent the brilliant trooper, General 
Nathan Forrest, with 2500 cavalry, across the 
state of Tennessee to cut Grant's communications 
with Columbus. Grant was warned of this move- 
ment by a telegram from Rosecrans, but Forrest's 
Forrest's blows werc difficult to parry, and Grant 

raid. \^2idi then no cavalry commanders equal 

to such a task. In one of the most effective raids 
of the war, Forrest destroyed sixty miles of rail- 
road, besides cutting the telegraph lines so effec- 
tually that from the 19th to the 30th of December 
Grant was quite isolated from the rest of the 
world. 

At the same time Pemberton ordered a raid on 
his own account. Van Dorn, with all the cavalry 
in the army, some 3500 in number, rode around 
into Grant's rear and made a dash at Holly 
Springs, where a great mass of supplies, valued at 
•$1,500,000, had been accumulated for the use of 
the Union army. The place was commanded by a 



The Vickshurg Problem 199 

Colonel Murphy, whom Grant had duly warned of 
the danger and instructed to defend his post to the 
last extremity. But at daybreak of 
the 20th, the very day after receiving captures 
this order, Murphy allowed himself to J^^^^ 

^ ;; Springs. 

be taken by surprise, and surrendered 
the town, with his whole force of 1500 men, with 
scarcely a show of resistance. For this shameful 
conduct he was dismissed the service, but the dam- 
age was done. Van Dorn burned all the stores, 
and making a long detour returned safely to his 
army. 

Grant was now in a very uncomfortable situa- 
tion. That which he most dreaded had come to 
pass. Van Dorn had destroyed his accumulated 
stores, and Forrest had destroyed the only road by 
which other stores could come to replace them. 
There was nothing to be done but retreat, and the 
cutting of the telegraph made it impossible to 
notify Sherman of this movement. To support 
the army on its retreat, it was neces- ^ 

•^ ' Grant 

sary to try the experiment of living retreats to 
upon the country. When some women ^^^^^ 

, Junction. 

of the neighbourhood came to Grant's 
headquarters and tauntingly asked him where he 
expected to get food for his soldiers, he quietly 
reminded them that their barns and granaries 
seemed to be well stocked. " What ! " they ex- 



200 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

claimed, frightened and crestfallen, "you surely 
would not lay hands on private property ! " The 
general regretted the necessity, but assured them 
that they must not expect him to starve his army 
on their account. Fortunately, the mishap occurred 
while the army was in a region of abundance. It 
ate up everything animal or vegetable that could 
serve as food on its retreat of eighty miles to 
Grand Junction, stripping the country for fifteen 
miles to right and left. Before the 8th of January 
communication had been opened with Memphis, 
and on that day Grant received a despatch from 
Halleck, informing him that Sherman had been 
defeated before Vicksburg, and directing him to 
go at once to the rescue with all the available force 
at his command. Accordingly on the 10th Grant 
went to Memphis, and began his preparations for 
moving his army do\vn the river to Vicksburg. 

Meanwhile Sherman steadily pursued his course, 

in total ignorance of what was happening to his 

chief. He started from Memphis on the 20th of 

December, with 32,000 men and 60 

Sherman's i ii/r' • • • i 

defeat at g^i^s, stcamcd ciown the Mississippi to 

Chickasaw the mouth of the Yazoo and thirteen 
miles up the Yazoo, and landed his 
troops near Chickasaw bayou, on the low flats in 
front of the range of bluffs just north of Vicks- 
burg. This lowland, regularly submerged at cer- 



The Vicksburg Problem 201 

tain seasons, was intersected by a labyrinth of 
bayous and stagnant lakes in such wise that there 
were only five paths along which an army could 
advance toward the bluffs, and these paths were so 
completely commanded by the Confederate guns 
as to be impassable. The outlook was not promis- 
ing, but it was the only point north of Vicksburg 
where a landing could be made at all, and accord- 
ingly it must be tried. Sherman's theory of the 
campaign was based on the expectation of surpris- 
ing the enemy and securing a foothold upon the 
bluffs, where he might maintain himself until 
Grant could join him. There were no topogra- 
phical maps upon which he could rely, and he did 
not know how completely the Confederates had 
crowned the bluffs with batteries. The enemy, 
moreover, having watchful scouts all up and down 
the banks of the river, had observed him every 
moment since his departure from Memphis; and 
the bluffs were guarded by 12,000 men, who in 
that position were more than a match for 100,000 
assailants on the swampy ground below. The 
ground, indeed, was so bad that Sherman's 32,000 
men were twice as many as he could use to good 
effect. Under these circumstances he ordered an 
assault, and was right in doing so, inasmuch as 
the facts here stated were not fully known to him, 
and could not be ascertained save by trial. On 



202 The 3Iississippi Valley in the Civil War 

the 29th of December the assault was made. It 
was as ably and gallantly conducted as any oper- 
ation of the war, but was doomed to failure from 
the outset. Two brigades, one of which was com- 
manded by Francis Blair (our old friend of the 
Camp Jackson days), made their way up to the 
enemy's works, but recoiled for want of support ; 
and presently the attack was abandoned. It cost 
Sherman nearly 2000 men killed and wounded, 
while the Confederates lost 187. It was not safe 
to stay upon the lowland, for a very slight rise in 
the river might at any time flood it and drown the 
whole army. On the 2d of January, therefore, 
convinced that the enterprise was hopeless, Sher- 
man moved his troops down to the mouth of the 
Yazoo, where he met General McClernand, who 
had been sent to take command of the expedition 
in his stead. 

The mention of this general's name brings up 
a dismal story of political intrigue by which this 
whole series of military operations had been unfa- 
vourably affected. The part which he sustained 
toward Grant at this time reminds one of the 
part sustained by Gates toward Schuyler in the 
Kevolutionary War. But McClernand was an 
McClemand's abler man than Gates. Without any 
schemes. military training, he had nevertheless 

acquitted himself very creditably at Belmont, Fort 



The Vichshurg Problem 203 

Donelson, and Shiloh, showing marked personal 
gallantry and some skill in handling troops. But 
his vanity was prodigious, while he had a very 
inadequate idea of military subordination, and 
seems to have regarded a military career chiefly 
as a means of political advancement. He was 
tired, he said, of furnishing brains for Grant's 
army, and he thought the time had come when 
his services entitled him to an independent com- 
mand. In August preceding the operations above 
described he had obtained leave of absence and 
gone to Washington to give personal attention 
to his claims. As an Illinois politician he had 
long been known to Mr. Lincoln, whom he sought 
to persuade that the best method of capturing 
Vicksburg was by an independent expedition down 
the river. After much discussion he won over 
both Lincoln and Stanton to his views. Late in 
October Stanton gave to McClernand §i paper 
secretly authorizing him to raise a volunteer force 
in the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, and 
when properly equipped and organized, to proceed 
with it against Vicksburg ; and on the back of 
this paper, which McClernand was to show in 
confidence to the governors of the states in ques- 
tion, Mr. Lincoln endorsed his approval of the 
enterprise. The scheme, however, was not viewed 
with favour by Halleck. Though not endowed 



204 The Mississipj^^ Valley in the Civil War 

with great discernment, Halleck cherished a whole- 
some professional prejudice against amateur gen- 
eralship, and he understood the viciousness of a 
plan which contemplated an advance by two mutu- 
ally independent commanders against the same 
objective point. Such a plan was contrary to 
military principles, ruinous to discipline, and full 
of the seeds of disaster. With all his sagacity, 
Mr. Lincoln had not yet come to realize the force 
of such considerations. In the preceding spring 
much mischief had been wrought by thus carving 
out independent commands in Virginia ; and it 
was now proposed to repeat this unwise policy in 
the case of Vicksburg. To crown all, Grant was 
not informed of it ; and accordingly, not possess- 
ing the key to the brief enigmatical telegrams 
which kept coming from Washington during the 
month of November, he was so puzzled by them 
that his own movements were embarrassed. It 
was not until the 18th of December, two days 
before Sherman started from Memphis on the 
expedition against Vicksburg, that Grant was 
directed from Washington to put McClernand 
in charge of the expedition. It appears that Hal- 
leck' s well-founded objections had been to some 
extent heeded by the President, for there was no 
intimation that McClernand was to be made inde- 
pendent of Grant; on the contrary, he was ex- 



The Vichsburg Prohlem 205 

pressly placed under his direction. The order was 
at once sent by Grant to Sherman at Memphis and 
to McClernand, who was at Springfield in Illinois. 
Both telegrams had to go through Columbus, and 
as Forrest had just cut the wires, neither was ever 
received. Thus it was not until after the repulse 
at Yicksburg that Sherman learned that he was 
superseded, and that Grant had been obliged to 
abandon his advance through the interior of Mis- 
sissippi. 

On turning over his command to McClernand, 
Sherman proposed that, instead of lying idle until 
a new campaign could be planned, they should 
utilize their time by capturing a fortress known as 
Arkansas Post, which the Confederates capture of 
had established on the Arkansas river Arkansas 
about fifty miles from its mouth. 
This stronghold threatened the communications o£ 
a Union army operating against Vicksburg from 
the river, and it was highly desirable to get rid 
of it. The expedition was well-conducted and 
promptly successful, as might have been expected 
from the overwhelming force of the assailants, 
— 30,000 men, with 45 field-pieces, 7 gunboats 
mounting Q^Q heavy guns, and a powerful ram. 
The fort was defended by 3 heavy and 14 light 
guns, with a garrison of 5000 men. In spite of 
its strong position and the gallantry of its defend- 



206 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

ers, it could not hope to stand against such odds. 
On the 11th of January it was battered to pieces 
and its garrison captured, yet not until it had 
cost the Federals 1000 men killed and wounded, 
— a striking illustration of the difficulty of storm- 
ing fortifications even under the most favourable 
circumstances. Elated beyond measure with this 
success, McClernand began talking about his 
McClernand *' ^*^^ " ^^^^ich was ever " in the ascend- 
andhis ant," and announced to Sherman and 

Porter that he should now keep on to 
Little Rock and clear Arkansas, of rebel troops. 
But in a letter to Grant a day or two before, ex- 
plaining his reasons for moving against the Arkan- 
sas Post, he had mysteriously hinted at a campaign 
in the interior of the state ; and Grant, aghast at 
the thought of thus wantonly diverting 30,000 men 
from the all-important work at Vicksburg, promptly 
signified to McClernand his disapproval of the 
whole movement. At the same time he informed 
Halleck by telegraph that McClernand had " gone 
on a wild-ofoose chase to the Post of Arkansas." 
In reply, Halleck authorized him to relieve 
McClernand from the command of the Yicksburg 
expedition, and either give it to the next in rank, 
or take command in person. Grant did not im- 
mediately act upon this permission, but perempto- 
rily ordered McClernand back to the Mississippi. 



The Vickshurg Problem 207 

«> 

That ambitious general sullenly obeyed, but took 
the occasion to empty the vials of his wrath in a 
confidential letter to Mr. Lincoln. " My success 
here," said he, " is gall and wormwood to the 
clique of West Pointers who have been persecut- 
ing me for months." 

It was fortunate for the country that the " clique 
of West Pointers " were allowed to have their way. 
McClernand's case was only one among many 
which in the course of our Civil War illustrated 
the evils of amateur generalship. The Amateur 
old-fashioned American notion that a generals. 
man who succeeds in one kind of work can succeed 
in any other by dint of native ability and without 
special training is not so commonly entertained 
now as it once was. It was a notion which, on the 
whole, did us credit ; for it bore unconscious testi- 
mony to the quick wit and rare versatility of the 
American people. But the complicated conditions 
of modern life are beginning to show its fallacious- 
ness, and the Civil War taught us some lessons 
in this regard. Of all the occupations of life, 
there is none in which the imperative need of pro- 
fessional training is so forcibly demonstrated as 
in warfare, where errors of judgment are visited 
with such prompt and terrible penalties. Among 
the commanders in our Civil War on either side, 
nearly all who achieved success on a large scale 



208 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

were graduates of West Point, and most had served 
their apprenticeship in Mexico. On the other 
hand, our volunteer commanders who had had no 
special training seldom prospered in any higher 
position than that of general of division. There 
were one or two excej)tions, but this was the rule, 
and McClernand was a conspicuous instance of it. 
Fortunately his power for mischief was short-lived. 
In superseding him, Grant waited only to make up 
his mind as to the best way of doing it. He seems 
to have been governed purely by unselfish motives. 
He would have been glad to restore Sherman to 
the command, and thus give him a chance to re- 
trieve himself, for people at the North were clam- 
orous with indignation over the failure at the 
Chickasaw bayou. But on mature reflection he 
concluded that he could best harmonize the jarring 
elements by assuming the immediate command in 
person, and on the 30th of January he did so. 

He prepared to withdraw the forces 
Grant moves _ , ^^. . . . , 

to the west irom northern Mississippi and concen- 

bank of the tratc liis wholc army at Young's Point, 

opposite Vicksburg. The army was 

reorganized in four corps, respectively commanded 

by McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPher- 

son ; and thus McClernand' s dream of glory was 

abruptly ended. He protested bitterly, alleging 

that he had been the originator of the Vicksburg 



The Vichshurg Problem 209 

expedition, and had been entrusted with it by the 
President's express desire. Grant simply referred 
the protest to Lincoln and Halleck, and that was 
the last of it. 

By this movement to the west bank of the Mis- 
sissippi Grant's first plan for the capture of Vicks- 
burg was definitely abandoned. It had His first plan, 
resulted in complete failure, owing tli^saban- 

1 • T c ^ on doned, was 

partly to the misconduct of the officer the correct 
who surrendered Holly Springs, and °^®- 
partly to the unforeseen obstacles encountered by 
Sherman at the Chickasaw bayou. But behind 
these causes lay the McClernand affair, which 
diverted the attention of the authorities at Wash- 
ington from Grant's requirements in November. 
Had he then been properly supported by the gov- 
ernment, he might have established his base at 
Memphis, and, receiving his supplies by the rail- 
road running thence through Grenada, might have 
moved upon Yicksburg from the rear, pursuing 
the same strategy which he had employed with 
such brilliant success in former campaigns. The 
occasion for dividing his army would not have 
come up, and united it was far more than a match 
for any force that Pemberton could oppose to it. 
This first plan of Grant's was no doubt the correct 
one, and could he have managed it in his own way, 
Vicksburg would probably have fallen before New 



210 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Year's Day. The difficulties, though consider- 
able, were nothing to those which Grant finally 
surmounted. 

In order to understand the complicated opera- 
tions to which Grant now devoted two weary months 
Various alter- of fruitless and thankless labour, we 
natives. must remember that Vicksburg was 

assailable only in the rear. Grant's first j)lan, 
which was now given up, had contemplated an 
approach upon the rear through the interior of 
Mississippi. When he captured the city, some 
months later, it was because he at last succeeded 
in approaching it from the rear. Now, with his 
army concentrated on the western side of the river, 
the difficult problem before him was how to take 
it across, and get into the rear of the city without 
sacrificing his line of communications. He could 
not do so by crossing below the city, for his supply 
ships came down the river from Memphis and 
could not be depended upon to pass by the guns of 
Vicksburg; while Port Hudson equally blocked 
the ascent of the river 250 miles below, so that 
supplies could not be sent up from New Orleans. 
On the other hand, Sherman's unsuccessful experi- 
ment had proved that he could not cross above the 
city unless he could get so far away to the north as 
to turn the extremity of the works at Haines Bluff, 
and this was impossible from the nature of the 



The Vichshurg Problem 211 

ground. Grant's work during February and March 
consisted of a series of attempts to grasp first the 
one and then the other of the horns of this dilemma. 
His work may all be summed up under two plans, 
which we may call his second and third plans for 
capturing Yicksburg. The second plan was to 
find a passage, by canal or otherwise, whereby his 
supply ships might pass below Vicksburg without 
coming within range of its guns ; it was like the 
problem which Pope had solved at Island Number 
Ten by cutting a channel through the submerged 
forest. Could this be accomplished, the army 
might cross below Vicksburg, and good hard fight- 
ing would do the rest. The third plan was to find 
a passage available for gunboats through the laby- 
rinth of bayous to the north, so that with the aid 
of the fleet he might secure a foothold for the army 
beyond Haines Bluff, and thence come down upon 
the rear of the city. Both plans were Titan-like in 
their audacity; both contended with insuperable 
difficulties ; and both were foredoomed to failure. 

For the sake of convenience we may designate 
these plans as second and third, but they were 
prosecuted more or less simultaneously. Each of 
the plans comprised two experiments. The first 
was an attempt to dig a canal through the neck 
of the peninsula formed by the great bend of the 
river opposite Vicksburg. The distance was but 



212 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

little over a mile, but as the canal was designed to 
admit vessels of sixty feet beam and nine feet 
" Grant's big draught, the amount of excavation re- 
ditcli." quired was very considerable, and as 

much labour was necessary to keep the canal free 
from water while the digging was going on, the 
progress was very slow. A dam was built across 
the upper end, and dredging-machines were set to 
work, and at length, after six tedious weeks, success 
seemed near at hand, when all at once, on the 8th 
of March, a sudden rise in the river burst open 
the dam. If the torrent could have been confined 
between the levees of the canal, it might perhaps 
have helped the work by scouring the bottom, but 
its force was so great that it broke down these 
levees and submerged the surrounding country, 
sweeping away tents and tools, drowning horses, 
and driving off the men, who had to flee for their 
lives. The catastrophe was a godsend to the 
northern croakers, who all these weeks had been 
wa2:o:ino: their heads in scorn of *' Grant's bio^ 
ditch." The rebels saw in it the judgment of 
Heaven upon an impious attempt to disturb the 
order of nature. Many enthusiastic friends of the 
government, who had built great hopes upon the 
undertaking, were sadly disappointed. Not so 
Grant, who from the first had expected very little 
from it. He had observed that the lower end of 



The Vickshurg Problem 213 

the canal entered the river just opposite the bluffs 
at Warrenton, where the Confederates could easily 
plant batteries commanding it, and early in Febru- 
ary he informed Halleck that he had lost all faith 
in the scheme. Indeed, before the catastrophe 
occurred, the enemy had already erected batteries 
at Warrenton which enfiladed the mouth of the 
canal, so that even if finished it would have been 
useless. Nevertheless, in deference to the public 
sentiment, which was shared by the government at 
Washington, Grant had given the project a fair 
trial, while looking out for some more feasible plan. 
His other experiment for crossing below Vicks- 
burg was begun the next day after his arrival 
upon the scene, and was carried on simultaneously 
with the canal experiment. About rp, t , 
seventy miles above Vicksburg, on the Providence 
opposite side of the river, is the cres- experiment, 
cent-shaped Lake Providence, a remnant of the 
old deserted bed of the stream. A muddy chan- 
nel, more swamp than river, known as Bayou 
Baxter, imperfectly connected this lake with 
Bayou Macon, which flows into the Macon river, 
a tributary of the Tensas. The Tensas, in turn, 
flows into the Washita, which flows into the great 
Red river. This tortuous system of waters is 
navigable throughout its length, except in Bayou 
Baxter, which about midway between Lake Provi- 



214 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

dence and Bayou Macon spreads out into a huge 
cypress swamp, in which for some distance the 
stream is quite lost. To clear a passage through 
this labyrinth, it was necessary to cut a channel 
through the swamp, dig up the stumps, and then 
break down the levees east of Lake Providence 
and let in the Mississippi river. It would thus 
be possible for ships coming down from Memphis 
to sail through this long detour without ever get- 
ting within forty miles of the guns of Vicksburg, 
and thus at length reentering the Mississippi from 
the Red river, to ascend to the scene of operations. 
The supplies for the army would thus make a 
roundabout journey of 400 miles, but the route 
was quite safe from the enemy. McPherson's 
corps was at work upon Bayou Baxter through 
February and March, but the obstacles had not 
been all surmounted when Grant resolved upon 
the very different plan which finally proved suc- 
cessful. 

While these experiments were going on. Grant 
was also endeavouring, with much more hope of 
success, to find a method of crossing his army 
to the north of Haines Bluff, so as to turn the 
The Yazoo right flank of the rebel line of works. 
Passexperi- The Yazoo Pass Seemed to afford a 
promising opportunity for this. The 
line of steep bluffs which leaves the Mississippi 




THE LAKE PROVIDENCE EXPERIMENT 
FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1863 



The Vicksburg Problem 215 

at Memphis to meet it again at Vicksburg en- 
closes with the river an elliptical area 200 miles 
long as the crow flies by 60 miles wide at its widest. 
Along the eastern portion o£ this ellipse, and near 
the base of the bluffs, run a series of rivers drain- 
ing the elevated plains of the state of Mississippi. 
First the Coldwater at the north comes down to 
join the Tallahatchie, and presently their united 
volume, swelled by that of the Yallabusha, forms 
the Yazoo river, which empties into the Missis- 
sippi just above Vicksburg. All these streams 
were navigable for vessels of light draught. In 
the upper part of the ellipse, 150 miles due north 
from Vicksburg, the distance between the Cold- 
water and the Mississippi is only ten miles, and 
this is traversed by a winding bayou, some 80 
feet wide by 30 feet deep, known as the Yazoo 
Pass. In former times this route, through the 
Yazoo Pass and along the rivers that flow under 
the bluffs, had been commonly taken by vessels 
plying between Vicksburg and Memphis. But 
the waters of the Mississippi, pouring into these 
narrow channels, had overflowed so much land 
that in order to abate the nuisance a powerful 
levee had been built, 100 feet thick and 18 feet 
in height, shutting up the Yazoo Pass and sever- 
ing it from the great river. To break down this 
levee and restore the old state of things was easy ; 



216 The Mississijyj^i Valley in the Civil War 

and then it seemed as if the army might be con- 
veyed in steamers all around the ellipse, from 
Milliken's Bend up to the Yazoo Pass, and then 
down the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Yazoo 
rivers to a point where it could land in the rear 
of Haines Bluff. It was perhaps the most gigan- 
tic flanking movement ever attempted in military 
history. The distance to be traversed along these 
serpentine streams was full 700 miles, — as far 
as from New York to Cincinnati, or from London 
to Marseilles, and as striking an illustration as 
one could wish of the inaecessibleness of this 
wonderful stronghold of Vicksburg. 

This experiment, like the others, was begun 
immediately upon Grant's arrival. On the 2d of 
February a mine was exploded in the levee, and 
the waters rushing in completed its destruction. 
The Yazoo Pass was thus opened so that vessels 
could enter, but the enemy had been beforehand. 
Both the bayou and the system of rivers to which 
it gives access wind their way through dense for- 
ests of pecan-wood, sycamore, oak, and other hard 
woods, and it was easy by felling trees across the 
stream to make a formidable barricade. Several 
miles of the Yazoo Pass were thus obstructed. In 
one place eighty prostrate trees, reaching from 
bank to bank, and intertwining their huge branches 
with the dense and tangled growth on either side, 




Yazoo Pass 



/ 



m\ 



Ci'wV'"'^-' Member tor 



Rollingy 
Fork^ 



'Wff 


( C/\ Haines 


■-jy^^s^ 


%)Vicksbu/g 



I Yazoo City 




THE YAZOO PASS AND BIG SUNFLOWER EXPERIMENTS 
FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1863 



Tlie Vickshiirg Problem 217 

formed a barrier more than a mile in length. It 
was necessary to chop the boughs and haul the 
great trunks, often weighing from twenty to thirty 
tons, quite out of the stream. The men, in parties 
of 500, worked like beavers, and in two weeks had 
cleared the way to the Tallahatchie river. Success 
now seemed assured in this direction. General 
Koss, with 4500 men, embarked on 22 steamers, 
and convoyed by a couple of ironclads, made 
his way 250 miles through the wilderness without 
losing a man, for there was so much of a freshet 
that the rebel sharj)shooters could not reach the 
banks. By the 10th of March Eoss was sailing 
upon the lower waters of the Tallahatchie, Quim- 
by's division had been sent to support him, and 
General McPherson, with his whole corps, was 
preparing to follow as soon as steamers enough 
could be got together. But the Confederates had 
made good use of the time which their barricades 
had gained for them. Where the Tallahatchie 
and the Yallabusha unite to form the Yazoo river, 
there is a great looplike bend enclosing a penin- 
sula, upon the neck of which the Confederates had 
now extemporized an earthwork and planted heavy 
guns. This work, which they called FortPember- 
Fort Pemberton, completely barred *^"- 
the descent of the river, and as the peninsula was 
overflowed it could not be approached by infantry. 



218 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

It remained to be seen whether the gunboats could 
silence its batteries. On the 11th and 13th of 
March attacks were made from a distance of 800 
yards, but nothing was accomplished. The vessels 
suffered more damage than the fort. Another 
levee of the Mississippi, 300 miles distant, was by 
and by cut, in the hope that the increased volume 
of water flowing into the Tallahatchie might suf- 
fice to drown the fort ; but the rise turned out to 
be insufficient for this. The Yazoo Pass experi- 
ment, therefore, auspiciously as it had begun, was 
now totally defeated. There was nothing for Ross 
to do but make his way back to the Mississippi 
river, and Grant had already begun to feel anxious 
lest the enemy might in some way contrive to sur- 
round and cut him off. 

While reconnoitring to find some method of 
relieving Ross, another labyrinthine passage was 
discovered, through which it was hoped the army 
might cross far below Fort Pemberton to the rear 
of Haines Bluff. Through the middle of the long 
ellipse for nearly 200 miles flows a considerable 
stream known as the Big Sunflower river, empty- 
ing into the Yazoo 100 miles below Fort Pemberton 
and 20 miles above Haines Bluff. Were it only 
possible to get from the mouth of the Yazoo into 
the Big Sunflower without jDassing the batteries at 
Haines Bluff, such a route would be preferable to 



The Vickshurg Problem 219 

any as yet devised ; and it seemed as if a way had 
at length been discovered through a r^y^^ g- 
network of narrow streams known as Sunflower 
Steele's and Black bayous, Deer creek, ®^p®^^"^®" • 
and Rolling Fork. The chief obstacles here were 
the narrowness and sudden bends of the shallow 
streams, the cypress and willow trees growing in 
their very beds, and the dense mass of tangled 
branches and vines overhanging and blocking the 
way. On the 16th of March Sherman took one of 
his divisions up Steele's bayou in small steamers, 
preceded by Admiral Porter with five ironclads and 
four mortar-boats. The powerful ironclads slowly 
pushed their way through the bushes, and the 
transports followed still more slowly, while now 
and then a smokestack or a pilot-house was brushed 
away by the wild tangle overhead. Sharpshooters 
lurked in the thickets, and on the fifth day the 
admiral, having advanced thirty miles farther than 
Sherman and approached within a few hundred 
yards of the clear navigation of the Rolling Fork, 
found himself attacked by a considerable force. 
His position soon became perilous. The rebels 
brought squads of negroes, and compelled them 
at the point of the bayonet to fell great trees 
across the creek both in front and in rear of the 
ships. Presently Sherman, hearing of the danger, 
and finding a narrow path through the cane-brake, 



220 The Mississippi Vdtlley in the Civil War 

disembarked his troops by nigbt and marched at 
their head to the rescue, lighting the way with 
candles. The skirmishers were dispersed, but it 
was found that the enemy had blockaded the 
entrance to the Rolling Fork, and occupied it in 
such force that he could not be dislodged. It 
was therefore necessary to retreat. There was not 
room enough to turn the ironclads around, and 
so their rudders were unshipped and they slowly 
backed out, bumping from side to side of the 
wretched creek, till on the 27th of March, after 
eleven days of toil and peril, the whole expedition 
floated again on the broad bosom of the Missis- 
sippi. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE FALL OF VICKSBUEG 

While army and navy were using up the 
months of February and March in these combined 
experiments, the navy was also endeavouring to 
disturb the Confederate control over the river 
below Vicksburg. To this end, on the 2d of Feb- 
ruary before daybreak Porter sent the ram Queen 
of the West down past the dreaded batteries. She 
succeeded in running safely by, and Naval opera- 
immediately attacked and disabled the *^^^^- 
Confederate steamer Vicksburg, after which she 
cruised up and down the river for a fortnight, 
capturing and destroying Confederate vessels 
wherever found. At midnight of the 12th the 
powerful armoured gunboat Indianola ran swiftly 
past the batteries and escaped without a scratch, 
though under fire for twenty minutes. The ad- 
miral, in high spirits, now looked forward to the 
speedy conquest of the river between Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson, but events soon maliciously 
mocked him. On the 14th the Queen of the West, 
while running past a battery on the Red river, 



222 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

had her steam-pipe cut by a shot and became un- 
manageable. The crew escaped upon one of her 
prizes, but did not set fire to her, as there was a 
wounded officer on board whom it was impossi- 
ble to remove. Thus she passed almost unharmed 
into the hands of the Confederates, and presently 
was ready to attack the Indianola, so lately her 
consort. In company \At\\ another rebel ram and 
a couj^le of light steamers, she chased the Indian- 
ola nearly up to Yicksburg, and on the night of 
the 24th, after a sharj) fight, compelled her to 
surrender. The Indianola was much damaged, 
and while the Confederates a few days afterward 
were at work upon her, the astounding news was 
brought that a monitor was coming down upon 
them. Sure enough : there was the black and 
terrible little creature, already below the Vicks- 
burg batteries, out of harm's way and coming 
swiftly down with the current. The Confederate 
ships did not stay to fight, but fled in a panic, and 
never slackened speed until they had reached the 
Red river. The men upon the Indianola set her 
on fire and hastened away. Yet the guns of the 
dreaded monitor sent forth neither sound nor 
flame. She was a dummy, a malicious ruse, a 
grim joke of Admiral Porter's. On the deck of 
an old coal barge he had built a wooden turret 
and painted it black. For a smokestack he had 



The Fall of Vichshiirg 223 

piled up some pork barrels emitting clouds of 
smoke from a mud furnace underneath, and this 
truly formidable craft was let loose with the cur- 
rent to scatter the Confederate vessels by the mere 
terror of her coming, — an excellent instance of the 
moral power of Ericsson's memorable invention ! 

So far as concerned the control of the water, 
however, the Confederates still had the laugh on 
their side. Porter saw that it was useless to dis- 
pute the case without bringing a great part of his 
fleet down, which was out of the question so long 
as the army entertained the thought of crossing 
the river above Vicksburg. When the news of 
these events reached New Orleans, it seemed to 
Admiral Farragut that the time had come to take 
his fleet upstream and pass Port Hudson. Gen- 
eral Banks had reached New Orleans in December 
with a force intended to cooperate with the fleet 
in reducing this stronghold ; but he had found it 
necessary first to make a campaign in the interior 
of Louisiana against a troublesome Confederate 
force under Richard Taylor, and it was long be- 
fore he was ready to undertake his principal work. 
But Farragut felt that his ships were needed above 
Port Hudson, and on the night of March 14, with 
seven stout vessels, he set out to pass the batteries. 
This time it was a fierce fight for an hour and a 
half. Four ships retreated downstream disabled, 



224 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

and one was destroyed, but the gallant admiral 
in his flagship, the Hartford, with one consort, 
succeeded in passing. From this time forth the 
Federal ships were able to patrol the Mississippi 
below Yicksburg, and to close the mouth of the 
Ked river, which was a serious blow to the Con- 
federates. But so long as Port Hudson remained 
defiant, the problem of sending suj^plies by water 
to a Union army below Vicksburg remained un- 
solved. 

In these various enterprises two weary months 
had been consumed, and Grant seemed as far as 
ever from taking Vicksburg. He had not yet been 
able to secure a foothold on dry land whereby to 
A gloomy g®* near it. He had apj)arently tried 
outlook. every available method of approach, 

he had shown great boldness and ingenuity of 
conception and rare perseverance, yet now, at the 
end of March, he had accomplished absolutely no- 
thing. Loud complaints were heard at the North. 
People were getting impatient. It was long since 
a Federal army had tasted the sweets of a deci- 
sive victory. Burnside had been terribly defeated 
at Fredericksburg. Eosecrans's great struggle at 
Stone river had apparently been fruitless, and 
Grant seemed to be wasting the precious moments 
in digging ditches. There were but few who as 
yet cordially recognized his ability. His victory 



The Fall of Vickshurg 225 

at Fort Donelson was indeed the most brilliant 
success yet acliieved by a northern general, but it 
was thought that he might have blundered into 
one great success, and in proof of this theory, 
it was asked, had he not soon after been nearly 
defeated at Shiloh? People were clamorous for 
his removal. The President's office at the White 
House was beset with politicians urging Mr. Lin- 
coln to supersede him. As generals capable of 
doing what Grant could not, one frequently heard 
mentioned the names (Heaven save the mark ! ) 
of Fremont, or Hunter, or McClernand. The 
intrigues of the last-named general seemed at 
one time almost likely to succeed. But Lincoln 
showed himself wiser than those who were so 
ready with their advice. He said, " I rather like 
the man ; I think we '11 try him a little longer." 

Lincoln's patience was well rewarded. It was this 
" trying him a little longer " that saved the country. 
Grant seemed to have exhausted all Grant's de- 
possible schemes, but his lexicon con- termination, 
tained no such word as "fail," and he was getting 
ready to attempt the impossible, — to defy Fortune 
and subdue her. It was proved that he could not 
cross with his army to the north of Haines Bluff, 
nor could he preserve a secure line of communica- 
tions if he were to cross to the south of Vicksburg. 
To put such a fortress as Vicksburg between him- 



226 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

self and his base of snj^plies was not to be thought 
of ; it would be putting himself just where the 
enemy wanted him. Nevertheless, Grant did think 
of it. 

There were just three new alternatives before 
him. Firsts he might cross in front of Haines 
Fresh Bluff and try to carry it by storm ; 

alternatives. \^^^ that meant almost inevitable de- 
feat. Secondly^ he might take his whole army 
back to Memphis and resume his first plan of ap- 
proach through the interior of Mississippi. That 
was a perfectly sound course, and was earnestly 
recommended by General Sherman ; but it would 
look so much like retreat that the moral effect 
upon the country would be disheartening. Thirdly^ 
he might descend below Vicksburg, detach a force 
to cooperate with Banks at Port Hudson, and 
after the fall of that fortress move upon Vicks- 
burg, with a sure base of supplies at New Orleans. 

This was not yet defying Fortune, but Grant 
was rising to the occasion. Every one of his gen- 
erals thought it sheer madness to put the army 
south of the city. Grant, however, was not wont 
to hamper himself with councils of war. He used 
to listen in silence to the opinions of his generals, 
and then do as he thought best. He had now 
made up his mind what to do, and accordingly on 
the 29th of March, having concentrated his army 



Tlie Fall of Vichshurg 227 

at Milliken's Bend, McClernand's corps was or- 
dered to lead the way to New Carthage, twenty- 
seven miles below. To this point Grant still 
thought it possible to bring supplies by cutting 
little canals to connect a network of bayous, and 
work of this sort was still kept up until the 
advancing season, which dried the channels so 
as to make them useless, dried also the roads in 
that wilderness of swamps, and began to afford 
ground upon which corduroy roads could be built 
fit for men and wagons. As the movement to the 
north of Vicksburg had been finally abandoned, it 
was desirable to bring the greater part of Porter's 
fleet below the city ; and Grant seized the occasion 
to risk the passage of ten shiploads of rations 
and forage under cover of the gunboats. This 
enterprise was completely successful, rj^^ 



move- 



Eight gunboats were left at the mouth ment south- 
of the Yazoo, and on the night of April 
16 all the rest of the fleet passed down. The 
Confederates set a few houses on fire to light up 
the scene, and rained heavy shot upon the river, 
while Porter's ships in reply sent shell after shell 
into the streets of Vicksburg. Every ship was 
struck and many were damaged, but only two were 
disabled, and after three hours the whole fleet, in- 
cluding the supply ships, was safe below the city. 
Ten days later another squadron, consisting of 



228 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

transports and barges laden with rations, succeeded 
in running the gauntlet ; and now at last Grant 
was ready to cross the Mississippi. The labour of 
moving the army through the Louisiana swamps 
had been enormous, and it was only on the 29th 
of April, one month from the beginning of the 
movement, that the advance corps had reached the 
hamlet of Hard Times, opposite the fortress of 
Grand Gulf, the extreme left or southernmost of 
the defences of Vicksburg, on a bluff twenty-five 
miles south of the city and just below the mouth 
of Big Black river. 

The next thing in order was to cross the river 
and take Grand Gulf. On the 29th of April the 
works were briskly bombarded for more than five 
hours by Porter's fleet, but they were too high 
overhead to be seriously damaged. Not a single 
rebel gun was dismounted, and accordingly the 
army could not cross here. During the night 
the fleet ran down past the batteries, convoying 
the transports and supply ships, while the army 
marched still farther down upon the west bank. A 
negro brought word that there was a good road 
from Bruinsburg, six miles below Grand Gulf, to 
Grant crosses ^^^^^ Gibson on the high ground twelve 
the Missis- miles inland. Nothing better could 
^^^^^' be desired. Next morning McCler- 

nand's corps embarked, and before sunset they 



The Fall of Vicksburg 229 

had reached the summit of the bluffs on the 
east side of the river, while McPherson's corps 
pushed on behind them. During the whole of 
these two days Sherman, assisted by the eight 
gunboats which had been left above Vicksburg, 
completely absorbed the enemy's attention by 
moving his forces up the Yazoo and landing them 
as if to attack Haines Bluff. On the 1st of May 
he received orders from Grant to move down the 
west side of the Mississippi, cross to Bruinsburg, 
and follow McPherson as rapidly as possible. 
Grant had immediately sent McClernand forward 
to Port Gibson, as a place which it was important 
to seize at once. Port Gibson stands at the junc- 
tion of roads from Bruinsburg and Grand Gulf, 
with roads leading directly to Vicksburg and to 
Jackson, the state capital. By seizing it, Grant 
would compel the enemy to evacuate Grand Gulf. 
On the evening of April 30 General Bowen, the 
Confederate commander at Grand Gulf, discover- 
ing McClernand's presence on the road to Port 
Gibson, marched out to attack him ; ^j^^^ . . 
and early next morning the two forces at Port Gib- 
encountered each other about four 
miles from that town, and a battle began which 
lasted all day. The enemy, with his reinforce- 
ments arriving from Vicksburg, numbered 8500 
men. Grant came upon the scene early in the 



230 The Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

battle, and with a portion of McPherson's corps 
wMcli arrived at noon, he had over 20,000 men. 
The Confederates fought with their usual gallan- 
try, but by nightfall their right flank had been 
turned, and they were swept from the field with a 
loss of 1000 killed and wounded and 650 captured. 
The Union loss in killed and wounded was 850. 
Next morning our army entered Port Gibson in 
triumph, and spent the day pursuing the routed 
enemy for fifteen miles, as far as Hankinson's 
ferry, on the Big Black river, and capturing 1000 
Confederates P^soners. That evening the Confed- 
evacuate erates hastily evacuated Grand Gulf, 

and retreated across the Big Black ; 
so hurried were their movements that they left 
five heavy guns as spoils for the victors. Next 
day, the 3d of May, Grant occupied this strong- 
hold and established his base of supplies there, 
while the troops remained three days in bivouac 
at Willow Springs and Hankinson's ferry, await- 
ing the arrival of Sherman's corps and fresh 
ammunition and rations. 

The critical moment in Grant's career had now 
come. During the long weary weeks of struggle 
with creeks and swamps, his mind had been grad- 
ually rising to a great resolve, which the turn of 
events was now about to make perfectly definite 
and clear. He had at last secured a footing on 



The Fall of Vicksburg 231 

the high ground east of the river, and was in 
possession of one of the strongest of the rebel for- 
tresses. At this season supplies could be brought, 
though liable to tedious delays, over the rough 
roads on the west side. In case of emergency it 
had been shown that they could do such a thing as 
run down the river under the Vicksburg batteries. 
Yet his situation was not a desirable The critical 
one to remain in. It was precarious n^oment. 
at best, and delay would increase the danger. 
His first intention had been to establish himself 
here, and detach a corps to cooperate with Banks 
in reducing Port Hudson. After the removal of 
that formidable obstacle, supplies could be regu- 
larly and safely brought up from New Orleans. 
If it were not for this vexed question of supply, 
there was everything to tempt him to an immedi- 
ate movement upon Vicksburg. The enemy had 
been surprised, defeated, and somewhat demoral- 
ized; now was the time to follow up this initial 
success with blow after blow. At this crisis there 
came a letter from Banks in the interior of Louisi- 
ana, stating that he could not reach Port Hudson 
before the 10th of May. This was all that Grant 
needed to decide his movements. It was still a 
week to the 10th of May, and after that it might 
very well take a month to reduce Port Hudson. 
Meanwhile the enemy, realizing the danger of 



232 The Mississipj^i Valley m the Civil War 

Vicksburg, would send troops from every quarter 
to reinforce it. Delay would be ruinous, and 
Grant instantly made up his mind to move upon 
the rear of Vicksburg. 

To face the difficulties in the way of such a 
movement required the stoutest of hearts and the 
coolest of heads. Grant's force, consisting of the 
three corps of Sherman, McPherson, and McCler- 
nand, numbered 45,000 men. In Vicksburg and its 
neighbourhood Pemberton had an army of about 
50,000 ; but Grant, unlike many Union command- 
ers, was apt to underrate the enemy's strength, 
A difficult 3.nd he supposed it to be only 30,000. 
situation. Another Confederate army was gather- 
ing to the east and north of Jackson. Its strength 
was unknown, but likely to be considerable, for the 
rebels were weakening their garrisons at Charles- 
ton and Mobile and every point from which troops 
could be spared to reinforce it ; and Grant knew 
that Joseph Johnston was on his way from Chat- 
tanooga to take the command in person. It was 
necessary for Grant to interpose his forces be- 
tween these two armies and beat them in detail, 
first driving Johnston eastward, then turning upon 
Pemberton, crushing him in battle and pushing him 
back upon Vicksburg. In order to do this, it was 
necessary to keep his army together ; if he should 
detach forces to guard his line of communication 



The Fall of Vickshurg 233 

with Grand Gulf, he could not bring men enough 
into battle to ensure him the victory. But nothing 
could be more certain than that Pemberton would 
fall upon his line of communications the moment 
he should move eastward against Johnston. 
Grant therefore came to the startling decision to 
cut loose from his base altogether, to feed his 
troops on what they could carry in their haver- 
sacks and what they could pick up on the way, 
and moving with all possible speed, unencumbered 
by heavy wagons, to vanquish the enemy and gain 
a new base of supplies on the Mississippi north 
of Yicksburg before famine should have time to 
overtake him. This was defying Fortune out- 
right. No general ever conceived a more daring 
scheme. There was no precedent for it in the 
history of modern warfare. Napoleon and other 
European generals who had " lived upon the 
country " had done so through a regularly organ- 
ized system of requisitions. No one had ever 
undertaken an elaborate campaign in an enemy's 
country with no more provisions than could be 
carried in haversacks or got by foraging. Doubt- 
less all would go well if everything should turn 
out as Grant had planned, but cam- Grant's sub- 
paigns are seldom carried out pre- Hmeauda- 
cisely as they are conceived, and in 
the event of defeat the total destruction of the 



234 The Mississippi Valley hi the Civil War 

army could scarcely be averted. Accordingly 
none of Grant's generals approved of the move- 
ment ; even the daring Sherman had little faith 
in its success. As for Halleck, he was not in- 
formed of the scheme until too late to prevent it. 
As soon as the news of it reached Washington, 
on the 11th of May, Halleck ordered Grant to 
retrace his steps and move toward Port Hudson 
to cooperate with Banks. But by that time Grant 
was fortunately beyond the reach of the telegraph, 
and the order did not find him until victory had 
been achieved. With sublime self-reliance he 
took the destinies of the army and the nation 
upon his shoulders, and wrought out a triumph 
that could have been obtained in no other way. 

In making this bold decision, Grant knew that 
Johnston laboured under difficidties. He knew 
that a concentration of rebel troops near the state 
capital could not be speedily effected. Some 
weeks ago Van Dorn, with his great force of cav- 
alry, had been imprudently taken from Mississippi 
and sent to assist Bragg at Tullahoma ; and soon 
afterward Grant had despatched Colonel Grierson 
on a cavalry raid which turned out to be one of 
the most brilliant and useful of the war. From 
Grierson's the 17th of April to the 2d of May, 
cavalry raid, ^j^j^ ^ force of little morc than 1000 
men, Grierson had made a tour of 600 miles 



Tlie Fall of Vickshurg 235 

througli the state of Mississippi, effectually cutting 
three different lines of railroad, destroying 60 
miles of telegraph, and isolating the city of Jack- 
son on the north, south, and east, besides thor- 
oughly confusing the enemy and distracting his 
attention. Nothing, however, could so completely 
bewilder the enemy and throw him off upon a 
false scent as the unprecedented move which 
Grant was about to make. 

With these elements of success duly considered. 
Grant started on the 7th of May, as soon as Sher- 
man had crossed the river. The men were fur- 
nished with rations for five days, and foraging 
parties were sent out each night to scour the 
country and bring in everything eatable they 
could lay hands on. Grant's march was admira- 
bly adapted to mask his purpose. He sent small 
detachments west of the Big Black to threaten 
Vicksburg and keep Pemberton in the neighbour- 
hood of the city. The left wing under McCler- 
nand marched up the eastern bank of the Big 
Black toward Edwards's station on the Vicksburg 
and Jackson railroad, about midway between the 
two cities. The centre under Sherman was headed 
for Bolton station, a few miles farther east on the 
same road. The right wing under McPherson 
was directed toward Jackson by way of Raymond. 
On the 12th McPherson's advance encountered 



236 The Mississij)in Valley in the Civil War 

5000 Confederates in a strong position at Kay- 
Second vie- iiioi^d ^^^ routed them in a sharp 
tory; at fight of two hours, each side losing 

aymon . ^bout 400 in killed and wounded. The 
enemy also lost 400 in prisoners, and thus discom- 
fited withdrew to Jackson. 

Meanwhile Pemberton, supposing Grant's imme- 
diate goal to be Edwards's station, advanced in 
that direction, intending to offer battle ; but Grant 
was not quite ready to dispose of him. He rightly 
interpreted the affair at Raymond as indicating a 
concentration of rebel forces about Jackson, and 
his first business was to nip it in the bud. Ac- 
cordingly he turned McClernand and Sherman 
eastward upon Clinton to support McPherson in 
his advance upon Jackson. On the evening of 
the 13th General Johnston arrived at Jackson and 
took command, but could muster only 6000 men, 
mostly consisting of those who had been defeated 
Third vie- *^^ ^^^ before at Raymond. Rein- 
tory; at forccments were on the way, however, 

and in a few days Johnston would 
have had over 20,000 men ; but Grant's celerity 
spoiled all this. On the 14th, while the other two 
corps were within supporting distance, McPherson 
came up and overwhelmed Johnston, capturing 
800 prisoners and all his artillery. McPherson's 
loss was about 250. The stars and stripes were 



The Fall of ficTcshurg 237 

hoisted over the capitol, an^l Grant slept in the 
house where Johnston had slept the night before. 
The one useful thing that Pemberton might have 
done on this day would have been to come up to 
Clinton and attack Grant in the rear, and indeed 
Johnston had sent word to him to do so ; but 
Pemberton thought he knew better. Seeing Grant 
carelessly moving so far away from his base at 
Grand Gulf, Pemberton naturally thought that 
sound strategy required him to lay hold of Grant's 
line of communications ; and accordingly he wasted 
the day in marching down toward Raymond. Of 
course it never entered his head that Grant had 
divested himself of all such encumbrances as lines 
of communication ! 

Thus did Grant's very audacity, by fooling the 
enemy, contribute to its own success. Had Pem- 
berton pressed him in the rear, it might have 
detained him till Johnston could be reinforced. 
But that chance was lost, and Grant now took 
care that Johnston should not speedily gather his 
forces. Leaving Sherman to burn the bridges, 
factories, and arsenals at Jackson, and Grant turns 
tear up the railroads in every direction westwand. 
for twenty miles, he now faced his army to west- 
ward and started for Vicksburg. Johnston had 
retreated to Canton, thirty miles north of the capi- 
tal, and had now no means of getting back save 



238 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

by marching. Early on the morning of the 16th 
Pemberton received a peremptory order to march 
to Clinton, it being Johnston's intention to join 
him there, and with their united masses head Grant 
off and prevent his ever getting back to the Mis- 
sissippi. But when this despatch reached Pember- 
ton, two thirds of Grant's army were already pass- 
ing Bolton, ten miles west of Clinton, and out of 
Johnston's reach by quite two days' march. 

Hearing of Pemberton's approach, Grant has- 
tened to the front, sending word to Sherman to 
bring up his corps. Pemberton was found strongly 
posted a little south of the railroad about three 
miles west of Bolton. His left wing occupied the 
bald crest of a wooded hill some seventy feet in 
height, known as Champion's Hill, and this crest 
was well-crowned with artillery. His whole line, 
stretching a couple of miles south from the hill, 
consisted of about 18,000 men. It took eight 
hours of severe fighting to dislodge this force. On 
the Union side the work was almost 

Fourth vie- . , - , t» r -r»i » 

tory ; at entirely done by Mcl^herson s corps 

Champion's and Hovey's division of McClernand's, 
directed by Grant in person, and con- 
stituting the right wing. The Confederates were 
defeated, losing 1400 in killed and wounded, 2500 
prisoners, and all their artillery; while one divi- 
sion of 4000 men, cut asunder from the rest of the 



The Fall of Vichshurg 239 

army and unable to rejoin it, fled southeasterly 
many miles beyond Jackson. 

Half of Pemberton's force had thus crumbled 
away ; the rest retreated in disorder toward Vicks- 
burg. To deal this shattering blow cost Grant 
2500 men. It was the decisive stroke of the cam- 
paign. The Confederates were now scattered to 
all points of the compass ; there was no more chance 
of uniting under Johnston ; while the Federals, in 
solid column and elated with victory, were fast 
nearing the goal of all their labours. That even- 
ing Grant received Halleck's order, dated five 
days before, telling him on no account whatever to 
undertake such a campaign as this, but to go down 
and unite with Banks. He could read this order 
now with equanimity. He had staked everything, 
but he had won. Unless something extraordinary 
should happen, Vicksburg was doomed. 

The march thither next morning was attended 
by a brief but notable passage at arms. At eight 
o'clock McClernand's corps had reached the bridge 
over the Big Black river. Pemberton had placed 
6000 men there in a position precarious unless re- 
inforced, and yesterday's defeat had Fifth victory- 
prevented this. In less than an hour at Big Black 
one third of this force was captured, 
with 18 pieces of artillery and 1400 stand of arms ; 
the rest had fled in a panic, not forgetting, how 



240 TJie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

ever, to set fire to the bridge, which had been 
smeared with turpentiDe and was soon in a blaze. 
This delayed the Federals for a whole day while 
they were building a rude bridge, and it may per- 
ha]3S have prevented their entering Vicksburg with 
the fleeing enemy. During that day Johnston 
advanced fifteen miles from Canton in search of 
Pemberton, who now, twice beaten, was taking 
refuge behind the stout works of Vicksburg. Next 
day, the 18th, while McClernand and McPherson 
marched straight toward the city, Sherman moved 
northwesterly and occupied the Benton road about 
half way between Vicksburg and Haines Bluff, 
thus rendering the latter stronghold untenable. 
The garrison abandoned it in too much haste to 
destroy anything ; and so the great fortress, with 
all its guns and stores, and with its command of 
the Yazoo river and all the northern approaches 
to Vicksburg, fell into Union hands in good con- 
dition and ready to be used against the enemy. 
The right wing of the Union army now rested on 
the long-coveted bluffs above the city, and looked 
Fall of down upon the Mississippi with feelings 

Hames BliifB. Yi\iQ those which surged in the bosoms 
of the Ten Thousand Greeks when from a peak in 
Asia Minor tbey caught sight of the friendly sea. 
Grant was with Sherman this morning, and the two 
rode out together upon the very bluff which five 



The Fall of Vickshurg 241 

months before the latter had vainly tried to storm. 
" Until this moment," exclaimed Sherman, " I 
never thought your movement a success. But this 
is a campaign ! this is a success, if we never take 
the town." Grant took out a fresh cigar and 
lighted it, smiled, and said never a word. 

Vicksburg was no longer the unapproachable 
Gibraltar of America. This wonderful campaign 
had made her like any other fortress. Grant's 
lines were drawn about her, and the bluffs which 
so long had baffled him now guarded his new base 
of supplies. The soldiers had contrived to live 
fairly well off the country and had not suffered 
from hunger, though they had eaten so much poul- 
try with so little bread that the sight of a chicken 
disgusted them. Never, perhaps, was a campaign 
carried out so precisely in accordance with its 
plan. It was just eighteen days since Grant had 
crossed the Mississippi, eleven since he An amazing 
had cut loose from his base at Grand campaign. 
Gulf. In those eighteen days he had marched 200 
miles, and by the novelty of his movements dis- 
concerted and separated forces much larger than 
his own. With a loss of not more than 5000 men 
he had defeated two armies in five battles, taking 
nearly 100 cannon, and destroying or capturing 
more than 12,000 of the enemy. And to crown 
all, he had solved the apparently insoluble problem 



242 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

of investing Vicksburg. To find a parallel in 
military history to the deeds of those eighteen days, 
we must go back to the first Italian campaign of 
Napoleon in 1796. 

When Johnston, on the night of the 17th, heard 
of the decisive overthrow at Champion's Hill, he 
instantly sent word to Pemberton to abandon Vicks- 
burg if not too late, and march northeastward to 
join him at Vernon. He saw that Haines Bluff 
must fall, that Vicksburg would then become 
untenable, and that Pemberton's only remaining 
chance was to save his army. It was noon of the 
Vicksburg 18th when Pemberton received this mes- 
invested. sage, and it nearly drove him frantic. 

He had not realized the full significance of his 
defeat, and could not bring himself to admit that 
the case was as bad as the sagacious Johnston saw 
it to be. While he was discussing the matter with 
his generals, Sherman had occupied the road lead- 
ing northeast in such force that it was decided the 
order could not be carried out. So Pemberton 
waited his doom. The city was well provided with 
food, but in course of time it must succumb to 
starvation, unless relieved. 

Grant, however, did not at first contemplate 
a siege. The Confederates were so disheartened 
by their defeats that he doubted their ability to 
resist an assault. On the 19th an attempt was 



The Fall of Vichshurg 243 

made to storm tlieir works, but it was unsuccess- 
ful, tliouo^li it secured more advanced -r.^^,, 

' o iwo unsue- 

and sheltered positions for the Federal cessful as- 
troops. The failure was disappoint- 
ing, for time was precious. Reinforcements were 
on the way to Johnston, and it was feared that he 
might approach in sufficient strength to relieve the 
city. Accordingly on the 22d another and desper- 
ate assault was made. The Federals pressed up 
close to the works under a murderous fire. In 
several places brave men succeeded in climbing 
the parapets and planting their flags, where they 
waved several hours, while the rebels were shot 
down as fast as they stepped up to remove them ; 
but the works were not carried. Two of these 
cases occurred in McClernand's corps, just as Grant 
was about to give orders to stop the assault. In 
an altogether too sanguine and heated mood Mc- 
Clernand sent word that he was " partly in posses- 
sion of two forts " and with a vigorous push hoped 
to carry everything in front of him. This natu- 
rally led Grant to renew the fruitless assault. 
Similar incidents occurred in Sherman's and Mc- 
Pherson's commands, but their military eyes read 
the situation more correctly. If McClernand had 
sent word that his men had reached the ditch but 
could not get into the forts, he would have described 
just what he saw before him, and much useless 



244 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

bloodslied would have been avoided. In these two 
assaults of the 19th and 22d the Union army lost 
4000 men, and made up its mind to settle down to 
a regular siege. Shortly after this McClernand 
issued a congratulatory address to his corps, full 
of insinuations against the other troops and their 
commanders. The address was evidently intended 
McClernand for a political Constituency in Illinois, 
dismissed. j^ ^^^ published in the newspapers, 
but, in flat defiance of army regulations, no copy 
of it had been sent to headquarters. This was a 
plain act of insubordination. During all these 
months Grant had been extremely patient with 
McClernand, for, as he said, " he could not afford 
to quarrel with a man whom he had to command." 
Now, however, he sent him home to Illinois, and 
gave the command of his corps to a trained and 
well-tried soldier. General Edward Ord. This 
was virtually the end of McClernand's military 
career, though he afterward held some obscure 
position in Texas. 

As soon as a siege was decided on, provision 
had to be made against the contingency of John- 
ston's arrival. Grant's army was reinforced from 
various quarters till it numbered 70,000 men, so 
that he was enabled to detach a strong force under 
Sherman to hold the line of the Big Black river 
in his rear. Defensive works were raised along 



The Fall of Vickshurg 245 

this line and as far as Haines Bluff, so strong 
tliat when Johnston, after collecting vieksburg 
with much difBculty 30,000 men, ar- l^esieged. 
rived in the neighbourhood, he prudently refrained 
from making an attack. Under such circum- 
stances the fall of Vieksburg was only a question 
of time. There was no more fighting worthy of 
mention. Mining, countermining, and sapping 
went on as usual in sieges. Shells were thrown 
into the city as they had been for months, only 
now more constantly, the army's siege guns aiding 
the mortars of the fleet. To escape this perpetual 
storm of deadly missiles, the inhabitants had re- 
verted to the custom of earlier ages and learned to 
dwell in caves. The bluff on which the city stood 
was honeycombed with subterranean vaults and 
passages, like the Roman catacombs, and caves 
favourably situated brought high rents. Food 
grew scarcer and scarcer. Flour sold at ten dol- 
lars a pound and bacon at five dollars a pound. 
Mule meat ^ was in demand. " Mule tongue cold, 
a la Bray," it was jocosely said, was a favourite 
side dish. On the 28th of June Pemberton re- 
ceived a curious letter from an unknown number 
of soldiers, which said, among other things, " If 
you can't feed us you had better surrender us, hor- 

1 Which if well fatted is a great delicacy, as French cooks 
know ; but doubtless the mule meat of sieges is lean and tough. 



246 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

rible as the idea is. ... I tell you plainly, men 
are not going to lie here and perish ; if they do 
love their country, self-preservation is the first 
law of nature, and hunger will compel a man to 
do almost anything. You had better heed a warn- 
ing voice, though it is the voice of a private sol- 
dier. This army is now ripe for mutiny unless it 
can be fed." The newspapers — which are not 
given to looking facts in the face — tried to take 
a more hopeful view. On July 2 one of them 
said : " The great Ulysses has expressed his inten- 
tion of celebrating the Fourth of July in Vicks- 
burg by a grand dinner. . . . Ulysses must get 
into the city before he dines in it. The way to 
cook a rabbit is first catch the rabbit," etc. 

But Ulysses had caught his rabbit. On that 
same day Pemberton had abandoned all hope, and 
next morning he sent out a flag of truce. The 
day was spent in arranging terms. Grant did not 
give up his principle of " unconditional surrender," 
but allowed some merely formal privileges, such 
as marching out with colours flying to stack arms. 
Surrender of The prisoners were all paroled, thus 
Vicksburg. saving the time and expense of trans- 
porting and feeding so great a number of men. 
At ten o'clock in the morning of the Fourth of 
July the Union army occupied the city, and before 
evening Sherman had started with 50,000 men 



The Fall of Vickshurg 247 

in pursuit of Johnston, whom he chased beyond 
the state capital, and left too hopelessly demoral- 
ized to threaten any more mischief in that part 
of the world. 

The capture of Pemberton's army was the lar- 
gest that up to that time had been made in modern 
warfare. The nearest approach to it had been 
Napoleon's capture of the Austrian army at Ulm 
in 1805, when he took 30,000 men and 60 cannon. 
At Vicksburg Grant took 37,000 men and 172 
cannon. Sedan and Metz were still in the future. 
There was no longer any question as to Grant's 
military capacity. The northern people were wild 
with delight, while the first chills of rj^^ turning- 
despair began to creep over the South- point of the 
ern Confederacy. The capture of 
Vicksburg, with the victory just won at Gettys- 
burg, marked the turning-point of the Civil War. 
Five days later Port Hudson, which had withstood 
a six weeks' siege and two assaults, surrendered 
to General Banks on hearing of the fall of Vicks- 
burg. On the 16th of July the merchant steamer 
Imperial, which had started from St. Louis on 
the 8th, drew up to the wharf at New Orleans, and 
in President Lincoln's vigorous language, "the 
Father of Waters rolled unvexed to the sea." 



CHAPTER VII 

CHICKAMAUGA 

Next after Richmond and Vicksburg, the 
mountain fastness of Chattanooga was the most 
Importance important strategic point in the South- 
of Chatta- ern Confederacy. It was the centre of 
»ooga. great lines of railroad radiating in 

every direction to the Mississippi, the Ohio, the 
Atlantic Ocean, and the Gulf of Mexico. Situ- 
ated at the lower end of that huge mountain 
defile known as East Tennessee, in the heart of a 
region which some have called an American Swit- 
zerland, it guards the only avenue by which Vir- 
ginia can be approached directly from the south- 
western states. Its possession by a Federal army 
would practically isolate Virginia and North 
Carolina on the one hand, and lop off Mississippi 
and Alabama on the other ; and by opening the 
way into the interior of Georgia would throw what 
was left of the war entirely into the Atlantic 
region. Its possession by the Confederates gave 
them control of eastern Tennessee, enabled them 
easily to move reinforcements between Virginia 



Chickamauga 249 

and the West, and was a perpetual menace to 
middle Tennessee and Kentucky. 

Besides this great strategic importance, Chatta- 
nooga had its peculiar political value. It was sit- 
uated in the midst of a population which from the 
beginning of the war had suffered persecution for 
their enthusiastic and uncompromising love of the 
Union. Still nearer to the heart of the Confed- 
eracy, indeed, there was a considerable area where 
sentiments of loyalty to the Union were strong, but 
ineffective because of their isolation. The hardy 
mountaineers of western North Caro- ^, , 

The loyal 

lina and northern Georgia and Ala- mountaineers 
bama were not associated by any o^tl^f^lle- 

•^ *' gnames. 

bonds of interest with the slavehold- 
ers of the lowlands, and had no sympathy with 
their scheme of secession. When two of Foote's 
gunboats, after the fall of Fort Henry, ascended 
the Tennessee river into northern Alabama, they 
found, in some places, the shores crowded with 
people loudly cheering their arrival and throwing 
up their hats with glee at sight of the Union flag. 
Even in South Carolina, in the upland region 
which in the Revolutionary War had witnessed 
the victories of King's Mountain and the Cowpens, 
it is said that not one person in ten was a seces- 
sionist. This whole area of the Alleghanies was a 
loyal area, and to clear it of Confederate armies, 



250 The Mississippi Valley hi the Civil War 

as had already been done in West Virginia, was to 
set it free. 

Thus political and military reasons combined to 
make Chattanooga the great objective point of the 
Army of the Cumberland, as Vicksburg was the 
goal of the Army of the Tennessee, and as Rich- 
mond was the goal of the Army of the Potomac. 
But the progress of the Federals toward Chatta- 
nooga was slower and less steady than their pro- 
gress toward Vicksburg, and this was due mainly 
to their different relations to the great rivers. In 
advancing from Cairo toward Vicksburg, we have 
seen how the Federals were powerfully assisted 
m, as far as Corinth by their control of 

ine upper *' 

Tennessee the Tennessee river as a highway for 
goTdlineof supplies. Proceeding up the Tennes- 
eommunica- see, which in that part of its course 
runs parallel to the Mississippi, the 
Federals were at the same time conquering the 
latter river downward, simply by taking its great 
fortresses one after another in flank. When they 
left the Tennessee and had to support themselves 
by railroads, their progress became much more 
difficult, as was illustrated by the failure of Grant's 
first movement against Vicksburg. Now the Ten- 
nessee river is not navigable for ships of war above 
the Muscle Shoals near Florence in Alabama, 
some 400 miles from its mouth and more than 200 



Chickamauga 251 

miles below Chattanooga. Even if it were naviga- 
ble in tbat part of its course, its value as a line of 
communication was greatly diminished by the fact 
of its running parallel instead of perpendicular to 
the enemy's front. In approaching Chattanooga, 
therefore, the Federals were obliged to depend for 
their supplies on the long line of railway running 
from Louisville through Nashville ; and at least 
half their energies were consumed in watching this 
line. 

We have seen that there was a moment in the 
summer of 1862 when Chattanooga might have 
been seized and held. As the Federals a lost oppor- 
had that spring concentrated all their t'lnity. 
forces west of the AUeghanies for the great move- 
ment upon Corinth, so the Confederates had gath- 
ered together all their strength to oppose them, 
and Chattanooga was left well-nigh defenceless, so 
that a single Federal brigade was able to begin 
bombarding it. After the fall of Corinth, the 
prize of Chattanooga was for him that should move 
quickest. Buell might have taken it, had not 
Halleck insisted upon his employing the precious 
hours in mending a railroad that was of no use 
to any one but the rebels when mended. This 
lamentable delay allowed Bragg to get there first, 
and within six weeks he had illustrated its use as a 
sally-port from which to invade Kentucky, throw 



252 TJie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Cincinnati into a panic, and threaten the destruc- 
tion of Buell's fine army. 

The most that was accomplished by the tremen- 
dous battle at Stone river was to keep Bragg upon 
the defensive. Had Rosecrans's plan of attack 
succeeded that day, the total defeat of Bragg 
would have uncovered Chattanooga. As it was, 
Rosecrans just got off with a whole skin, and the 
two armies lay sullenly facing each other, their 
fronts about thirty miles apart, Rosecrans at Mur- 
freesboro, Bragg at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, 
for nearly six months. Things were not so quiet, 
however, as would seem from this immobility of 
the armies. It was a busy half year. Each gen- 
Cavaby ^ral was trying with his cavalry to 

raids. reach out a long arm behind the other 

and cut his communications. They had tried hard 
pounding at Stone river without much profit to 
either ; now it remained to be seen which could 
trip the other up. The cavalry expeditions on 
either side came almost to assume the proportions 
of campaigns. At the end of January Bragg sent 
a cavalry force to surprise and capture Fort Donel- 
son, but it was repulsed, and came back after losing 
1000 men. In April Rosecrans sent out a troop 
which penetrated far into Georgia, cutting rail- 
roads, defeating the brilliant raider Forrest, and 
burning the Round Mountain ironworks, one of 



Chickamauga 253 

the principal manufactories of war material in the 
South ; until at length Forrest attacked again and 
captured the whole troop, 1500 in number. 

In warfare of this kind the Confederates had the 
advantage, as their cavalry was more numerous 
and better trained ; and when Rosecrans at length 
began to rival them in this arm of the service, the 
inequality was restored by the arrival of Van Dorn 
from Mississippi. In May, 1863, Van Dorn was 
murdered in a private quarrel, and the loss was a 
grievous one to Bragg, as he had set his heart 
upon starving his antagonist into retreating. How 
diligently the Confederates worked may Diligence in 
be seen from the report of the superin- destruction, 
tendent of the Louisville and Nashville railroad 
for the year ending July 1, 1863. During that 
year there were but seven months and twelve days 
when trains could run over the whole length of the 
road. Every bridge and trestlework of any conse- 
quence, on the main road and all its branches, had 
been destroyed and rebuilt within the year ; many 
had been destroyed and rebuilt three or four times. 
Stations and cars were burned and engines demol- 
ished ; and in one place a tunnel had been choked 
with rubbish to a distance of 800 feet. Under 
such circumstances it was not strange that Rose- 
crans's army should often have had to subsist on 
half rations. The country was scoured for forage 



254 The Mississippi V(iUey in the Civil War 

till it was stripped bare. Vegetables could not be 
had in quantity sufficient to keep off scurvy. In 
early summer a regiment passing over a field newly 
planted with potatoes would pull them up and 
eagerly devour them raw without waiting to wipe 
off the dirt. 

In contending with such difficulties, and with 
the horrible spring roads, the months wore away, 
while people at home censured Rosecrans as they 
censured Grant, and wondered whether anything 
was ever going to be done, and what the govern- 
ment was spending three million dollars a day for. 
The government responded to these expressions of 
feeling, and early in the spring Halleck hit upon a 
curious device for hastening matters. He wrote 
letters to Rosecrans and Grant, offering the rank 
of major-general in the regular army to the gen- 
eral who should soonest win an important victory. 
Grant never took any notice of the letter, but 
„ Rosecrans treated it as an insult, and 

Kosecrans 

snubs Hal- replied to Halleck that he felt " de- 
^^ ' graded at such an auctioneering of 

honours," and that if we had a general who would 
fight for his own personal benefit when he would 
not for the sake of his country, he ought to be 
despised by all honourable men. The incident is 
interesting, and strongly characteristic of the men 
concerned. Rosecrans's feelings were those of a 



Chickamauga 255 

high-spirited gentleman, but it was impolitic thus 
to show his contempt for his superior officer; it 
set not only Halleck, but the despotic and passion- 
ate Stanton against him.^ Perhaps Grant's cold 
silence was not less eloquent, but he presently- 
won such a triumph at Yicksburg as made it of 
little account how Halleck felt. 

In May, when Johnston was straining every 
nerve to raise a force to relieve Yicksburg, the 
question arose whether Rosecrans ought not at 
once to move against Bragg, to keep him from 
sparing any of his men for such a purpose. Hal- 

1 If Stanton and Halleck had expected to find in Rosecrans a 
more docile and submissive general than Buell, they were greatly 
mistaken. Of course I am not here speaking of military subordi- 
nation, but of the abdication of individual judgment, which is a 
very different thing. Perhaps they may now have been able, by 
the comparative method, to get some light on the subject of 
Buell's alleged "slowness." During the first eight months under 
Rosecrans, from October, 1862, to June, 1863, the Army of the 
Cumberland marched about 32 miles and fought the battle of 
Stone river. In the preceding eight months under Buell the same 
army had marched 

from Louisville to Nashville 185 miles 

from NashviUe to Corinth 217 " 

from Corinth to Battle Creek 217 " 

thence via Nashville to Louisville 336 " 
thence circuitously in pursuit of 

Bragg, and back to Nashville 485 " 
In all, 1440 miles, besides fighting the battles of Sbiloh and Perry- 
ville. See Fry, The Army under Buell, p. 76. 



256 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

leek urged such a movement, and Grant took the 
same view, but Rosecrans ingeniously argued that 
if Bragg were to be defeated so as to lose Chatta- 
nooga, his troops would be all the more likely to be 
sent to Mississippi, just as after the fall of Corinth 
they had hastened from Mississippi to Chattanooga. 
However, as the siege of Vicksburg progressed 
Rosecrans de- toward its close, Rosecrans decided 
cidestomove. ^o move in full force, and on the 24th 
of June his army started from Murfreesboro. 
About the same time Burnside, who had been in 
command at Cincinnati, moved into eastern Ten- 
nessee with 25,000 men, to take Knoxville and put 
an end to the distresses there. 

Rosecrans's advance was well-planned and skil- 
fully executed. He hoped to manoeuvre Bragg 
back upon Chattanooga and out of it 

A prelimi- . . . i i • r. 

nary cam- Without a battle, and his nrst steps to- 
paignof ward this end were well taken. Mak- 

manoeuvres. . /. i . -r» » 

mg a raise movement upon ±>ragg s 
advanced position at Shelbyville, and thus absorb- 
ing the enemy's attention, he rapidly concentrated 
his forces at Manchester, threatening Bragg's line 
of retreat. The Confederate general then fell 
back behind his fortifications at TuUahoma. But 
now, by a second turning movement, Rosecrans 
obliged him to abandon this strong position and 
fall back across the mountains and the river into 



Chichamauga 257 

Chattanooga. This preliminary campaign ended 
on the 3d of July, the same day which witnessed 
Meade's victory at Gettysburg and the hoisting of 
the white flag by the rebel commander at Vicks- 
burg. In nine days Rosecrans had driven the 
enemy from middle Tennessee without a battle. 
He had one great advantage in a superiority of 
numbers which enabled him to extend his left wing 
toward the enemy's rear, while still retaining force 
enough on his right to make serious demonstrations 
there. He had now nearly 70,000 men, while 
Bragg had but 43,000. Accordingly on reaching 
Chattanooga, Bragg felt it necessary to call in 
Buckner's force from eastern Tennessee, thus giv- 
ing up Knoxville, which Burnside immediately 
occupied. Much good had thus been accomplished 
by Rosecrans at small cost. The people, elated 
with the recent victories as much as they had be- 
fore been depressed, looked on with eager expecta- 
tion. Grant, Rosecrans, and Meade were at that 
moment the three conspicuous figures whose every 
movement occupied the attention of the whole 
country. 

The second stage of the campaign so well begun 
was devoted to driving the enemy out of Chatta- 
nooga. The place was excessively difficult to ap- 
proach from the north side of the Tennessee river 
in any direction. The Union army lay in a north- 



258 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

east and southwest line from McMinnville to Win- 

rpj^ ^ Chester. The most direct approach to 

proaciiesto Chattanooga was by the left through 

anooga. 'j^j^g^^^g^jj ^^^ ^^^^ Waldron's Ridge, a 

spur of the Cumberland Mountains named after 
a hardy pioneer of a century ago. But Rosecrans 
had two good objections to that road. One was 
that it would carry him far from the railway, with 
a long wagon-haul over steep and dangerous roads ; 
the other was that Bragg fully expected him to 
come that way in spite of its difficulty. The alter- 
native route was by the right through Bridgeport 
and Stevenson and over the mountains of northern 
Alabama and Georgia. This would keep Rose- 
crans near to the railway and to his depot of sup- 
plies which he was just establishing at Stevenson, 
but it necessitated his moving through a country 
so difficult that Bragg did not believe he would 
dare to attempt it. A series of parallel mountain 
ranges, hard to climb and penetrable only through 
narrow defiles, stood in his way. 

The first of these steep ranges, parallel to the 
Tennessee river and very near its bank, was known 
as Raccoon Mountain. Next came Lookout Moun- 
tain, a name destined to be famous in song and 
story, and more descriptive than such names some- 
times are. The mountain, 100 miles in length, 
rears its bold crest at its northern end nearly 3000 



Chickamauga 259 

feet above sea level and more than 1400 over the 
great river whose strong swift current rushes along 
below on its journey of 600 miles to its junction 
with the Ohio. It is here crowned with steep pali- 
sades, from the summit of which parts of seven 
states may be seen, spread out in a a difficult 
magnificent panorama. Toward the country, 
lofty peaks of North Carolina — the highest this 
side of the Rocky Mountains — it bears a similar 
relation to that held by the Rigi-Kulm in presence 
of its neighbour Alps. Between Raccoon and 
Lookout lies the wild valley drained of its waters 
by Lookout creek. Eastward from Lookout comes 
Missionary Ridge, some forty miles in length and 
running also up to the river. It encloses with 
Lookout Mountain the Chattanooga valley, through 
which flows Chattanooga creek ; and near the 
mouth of the creek stands the town of Chatta- 
nooga, superbly situated in the midst of a great 
amphitheatre of hills. Its position may well sug- 
gest the name of " Hawk's Nest," which the Indian 
word has been supposed to mean : but, heartless 
as it seems to disturb so pretty a fancy, we have 
the testimony of the famous chief, John Ross, that 
in his native Cherokee the name " Chattanooga " 
means " a good fishing-place." 

Eastward again from Missionary Ridge we come 
upon Pigeon Mountain, a sickle-shaped range 



260 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

enclosing the Chickamauga valley, drained by 
West Chickamauga creek. In the lower part of 
Mountains *^^^ valley the wide space contained 
after within the curved blade of the sickle 

moiintains. .1 , i ji <• 

was presently to become the scene 01 
the most dreadful act of the tragic drama now 
unfolding. At their southern or upper ends the 
Chattanooga and Chickamauga valleys unite in a 
single valley known as McLemore's Cove. Still 
eastward of Pigeon Mountain we find Chick- 
amauga Hill and Taylor's Ridge, drained by the 
middle and eastern branches of Chickamauga 
creek. Crossing these ranges we come to Chatta- 
nooga Mountain, the last of the series, beyond 
which the streams all flow in the opposite direction 
toward the Gulf of Mexico. East of the whole 
series, and on the southern watershed, stand the 
towns of Dalton and Resaca, stations on the rail- 
road from Chattanooga to Atlanta, where Bragg 
had his base of supplies. 

Now, obviously by moving his army directly 
across these formidable mountain barriers and aim- 
ing straight at Dalton, Rosecrans would keep his 
own base at Stevenson well-covered, while he would 
threaten the enemy's line of communications and 
compel him to evacuate Chattanooga. In spite of 
its natural difficulties, therefore, Rosecrans chose 
this route, more especially as he perceived that 



Chickamauga 261 

Bragg's attention was absorbed in the opposite 
direction. Accordingly, as soon as the 
railroad to Stevenson was in thorough ^^gj, ^^^ 
repair, and a sufficiency of supplies ac- mouutains 
cumulated there, Rosecrans crossed the greatly ex- 
Cumberland Mountains and descended *e^<^ ^ 
into the valley of the Tennessee river. 
The more effectually to hoodwink Bragg, he kept 
his left wing thrown out so as to menace Chatta- 
nooga from the north ; and on the 20th of August 
he began shelling the town from across the river. 
His front extended from opposite Harrison, ten 
miles above Chattanooga, to Bellefonte, fifty miles 
below, too great a distance for his numbers to 
cover. Between the 29th of August and the 4th 
of September, still keeping up his demonstrations 
on the left, Rosecrans moved the great bulk of his 
army across the river and began his march over 
Raccoon Mountain. The left wing, under Critten- 
den, took position at Wauhatchie, a railway station 
in Lookout valley; the centre, under Thomas, 
crossed to Trenton ; the right wing, under McCook, 
crossed from Stevenson and Bellefonte to Valley 
Head, whence cavalry demonstrations were made 
as far as Alpine. These movements were com- 
pleted by the 8th of September. When Bragg first 
began to hear of them he was incredulous, but at 
length, on the 7th and 8th of September, taking 



262 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

in the situation and seeing his communications 
g threatened, he evacuated Chattanooga 

evacuates and moved twenty-five miles south 
Chattanooga. ^^ Lafayette, where he covered the 
railroad and hoped to fall heavily upon the Fed- 
eral columns as they debouched from the mountain 
passes. On the 9th Crittenden's corps marched 
from Wauhatchie into Chattanooga and took pos- 
session of that long-coveted town. 

This capture (as it seemed) of the prize by sheer 
mancBuvring, without a battle, was hailed by the 
northern people with an outburst of joy. It 
seemed as if everything were going right at last. 
But dire disaster was soon to follow on the heels 
of this premature rejoicing. The seeds of calam- 
Seeds of i^y were sown in the enormous exten- 

disaster. ^\q^ ^f ^\^q Federal lines. Two alter- 

natives were open to Rosecrans. On the one hand 
he might draw the forces of Thomas and McCook 
down Lookout valley behind the friendly shelter 
of the great mountain, and, passing around its 
northern point in Crittenden's footsteps, conce'' 
trate his army upon Chattanooga. The r x th- 
em crests of Lookout Mountain and Missionary 
Ridge, which command the amphitheatre in which 
the town is situated, would require to be held in 
force. Then Chattanooga could be held against 
all comers and made the starting-point for a new 



Chichamauga 263 

movement for the overthrow of Bragg and his 
army. This would have been practi- Twoalter- 
cable and prudent, whereas in that dif- natives. 
ficult and dangerous country, any other course 
was needlessly venturesome. In one of those 
wild glens it was not always easy to learn what 
mischief might be brewing in another, and in issu- 
ing from the steep and narrow passes one might 
come upon ruin unawares. But Rosecrans in an 
evil hour chose the alternative of pushing through 
the mountains, in the hope of cutting off Bragg's 
southward retreat and annihilating his army on 
the spot. 

In adopting this hazardous course Rosecrans was 
duped by appearances and by treacherous infor- 
mation. Bragg in evacuating Chattanooga had not 
the slightest intention of retreating. He had come 
out full of the spirit of fight, to cover his commu- 
nications and to find his antagonist. But he sent 
scores of pretended deserters through the moun- 
tains and into Chattanooga, telling sad j^ogecrans 
stories of the headlong flight and utter chooses the 
demoralization of the Confederate ^^^^^^"®- 
army. This notion was even, in some unknown 
way, disseminated in Washington, and Rosecrans 
received telegrams from that city which confirmed 
him in his false impressions. Accordingly he 
ordered Crittenden to leave one brigade in Chat- 



264 The Mississiiyxn Valley in the Civil War 

tanooga, and with all the rest of his corps pursue 
the enemy along the railroad to Ringgold and 
Dalton. He sent Thomas's corps through two 
rugged gaps in Lookout Mountain into McLe- 
more's Cove ; and he pushed forward McCook 
from Valley Head to Alpine and Summerville. 
Such movements were hardly justifiable except 
against a beaten and demoralized enemy. The 
orders were issued on the 9th of September, and it 
was not until the 12th that Rosecrans discovered 
his frightful mistake. No wonder if the suddenness 
of the discovery somewhat shook his nerves. The 
situation was appalling. The Union army was 
separated into three parts over a distance of fifty- 
seven miles from Ringgold to Alpine, for McCook 
had luckily taken the alarm and gone no farther. 
These three corps numbered each scarcely 20,000 
men ; and between them at Lafayette, close in 
front of the Union centre, was Bragg's whole army 
in excellent condition and reinforced by troops 
from Mississippi, so that it numbered full 55,000 ! 
It looked as if Rosecrans were going to end his 
brilliant campaign by seeing his army annihilated 
corps by corps, for he could not possibly draw it 
together in less than three or four days. 

Things, however, did not come to such a pass 
as that. If Lee or Stonewall Jackson had been 
in Bragg's place, the worst might have happened, 



Chickamauga 2Q5 

but Bragg was too slow in making up Lis mind.^ 
Crittenden moved from Ringgold into Chicka- 
mauga valley, near Lee and Gordon's Bpaeg loses 
Mill, and Thomas, skilfully withdraw- the golden 
ing from the enemy's front and moving ^^^°^ ^^^ 
along the west side of Missionary Ridge, passed 
through Cooper's Gap and joined him. But there 
was woeful delay in making this junction, and the 
delay was due to the necessity which Thomas was 
under of waiting for McCook. The latter general 
was ordered by Rosecrans to march from Alpine 
through Dougherty's Gap, straight into McLe- 
more's Cove, but being assured by people in the 
neighbourhood that there was no practicable road 
that way, he retraced his steps over Lookout 
Mountain to Valley Head, and marched through 
Johnson's Crook and Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps 

1 A few days before, in a conversation with General Daniel 
Hill, Bragg had petulantly exclaimed : " It is said to be easy to 
defend a mountainous country, but mountains hide your foe from 
you, while they are full of gaps through which he can pounce 
upon you at any time. A mountain is like the wall of a house 
full of rat-holes. The rat lies hidden in his hole, ready to pop 
out when no one is watching. Who can tell what lies behind 
yonder wall ? " The truth is, says General Hill, that Bragg " was 
bewildered by the popj)ing out of the rats from so many holes. 
The wide dispersion of the Federal forces, and their confrontal of 
him at so many points, perplexed him, instead of being a source 
of congratulation that such grand opportunities were offered for 
crushing them one by one." Battles and Leaders, iii. 641, 644. 



266 Tlie Mississippi Valley iii the Civil War 

into Chickamauga valley. This roundabout route 
took him five days to traverse, and it was not 
until the night of the 18th that his corps was 
entirely closed up on Thomas's right. 

Meanwhile the anxiety of Rosecrans had scarcely 
allowed him to sleep, — and with good reason. 
Even as it was, wdth all the enemy's slowTiess 
in seizing his advantage, this delay in McCook's 
movements came near destroying the army. But 
for this delay no battle need have been fought 
in Chickamauga valley. If McCook could have 

Evil results ^^°^® "P *^^ ^^^^ sooncr, the army 
of McCook's would probably have been concentrated 
^^^* at Chattanooga, holding the crests of 

Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Then 
Rosecrans's mistake would have been retrieved, 
and Bragg could not have attacked him save at 
great disadvantage. The delay worked mischief 
to Rosecrans in two ways. It detained him in 
Chickamauga valley at least two days longer than 
there would otherwise have been any need for, and 
it also allowed time for Bragg to receive a heavy 
reinforcement from Virginia. Rosecrans was thus 
not only obliged to fight in the wrong place, but he 
was obliged to fight against heavy odds. No sooner 
had the news of the evacuation of Chattanooga 
reached Richmond than the Confederate govern- 
ment put forth its utmost energies in support of 




"^Lee and 
iordon's iriill 




CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 19, 1863 



Chichamauga 267 

Jefferson Davis's favourite commander. General 
James Lougstreet — a host in himself — was de- 
tached from Lee's army, with the two fine divisions 
of Hood and McLaws, and sent in all possible 
haste to reinforce General Bragg. Under ordi- 
nary circumstances this reinforcement would have 
come directly by rail through eastern Tennessee, 
but the free use of that road was a privilege 
which the rebels were never again to enjoy. The 
Federal occupation of Knoxville and Chattanooga 
already blocked the way, so that Longstreet was 
obliged to go around by rail through the Carolinas 
and Georgia, and come up from At- Arrival of 
lanta to Bragg's assistance. This delay Longstreet. 
was probably our salvation. If Longstreet had 
been present two or three days earlier, it is not 
likely that Rosecrans would have been allowed to 
concentrate his forces without preliminary fight- 
ing. Three brigades of Longstreet's corps under 
General Hood arrived on the 18th, — the same 
day on which the Federal concentration was com- 
pleted, — and Bragg, knowing that the rest would 
soon arrive, made his arrangements for an attack 
on the following day. 

The details of the battle of Chickamauga are 
somewhat complicated, but its salient points are 
easy to understand. Both armies were in Chicka- 
mauga valley, Rosecrans on the west side of the 



268 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

creek, Bragg on the east side. It would have been 
rp, ,1 desirable for Rosecrans, if he could 

Ine problem ' 

atChicka- have done so, to reach Chattanooga 
"^^^^' without a battle, and then choose his 

own time and place for fighting. His roads 
thither lay through McFarland and Rossville Gaps 
in Missionary Ridge. If attacked now, he must 
hold these roads at whatever cost, and accordingly 
he placed Thomas on the left, opposite Reed's and 
Alexander's bridges, with McCook on the right 
and Crittenden in reserve. He told Thomas that 
he should be properly reinforced if it took all the 
rest of the army to do it. On the other hand, 
Bragg's object was to attack the Federal left in 
flank, drive it back in confusion on the centre, and 
seize the roads through Rossville and McFarland 
Gaps, thus interposing his victorious army between 
Chattanooga and the defeated Federals. His plan 
of battle was much the same as at Stone river, 
except that now he was to pivot on his left wing 
and press forward with his right. But its issue 
was very different from what it had been at Stone 
river. The attack which he had planned was a 
failure from the outset, but a sudden catastrophe 
in a different part of the field — an accident which 
was not down on anybody's programme — threw 
victory into his hands. He did not open the battle 
clearly and vigorously, as at Stone river. Before 




CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 20, 1863, MORNING 



CMchamauga 269 

his preparations were completed, he discovered 
that the Federal lines extended much farther to 
the north than he had supposed, so that he was 
himself oblio:ed to draw northward. While he 
was accomplishing this movement, on the morning 
of the 19th, one of his brigades got entangled with 
one of Thomas's brigades, and rein- First day of 
forcements coming up first from one tl^e battle, 
side and then from the other, the skirmish quickly 
gTew into a battle, which raged till nightfall. It 
was a series of desperate charges and counter- 
charges, the prelude to a still more deadly fight 
on the morrow. At the close of the day Thomas's 
grasp upon the Eossville road was even firmer than 
at the beginning, so that the advantage was, on 
the whole, with the Federals. 

During the night Longstreet arrived with the 
remainder of his corps, and Bragg somewhat im- 
proved the arrangement of his troops, bringing all 
his infantry across the creek, and placing Polk in 
command on his right and Longstreet on his left. 
His plan was the same as the day before — to 
wheel on his left as a pivot and turn the Federal 
left. Polk attacked vigorously between nine and 
ten o'clock. Thomas held his own as sturdily as 
before, but was obliged to call for reinforcements, 
and Kosecrans began weakening his right in order 
to support him. While this was going on, the 



270 The Mississippi VaUey in the Civil War 

catastrophe occurred which gave away the battle 
to the enemy. Near the centre of the Federal 
The fatal \iiiQ<) where the shock of battle had 
order. j^q^ jq^ arrived, three divisions were 

posted in zigzag fashion. The first of these was 
Eeynolds's division ; next on the right was Bran- 
nan's, considerably refused to the right and hidden 
among trees ; next was Wood's division, nearly 
at right angles to Brannan's. About noon an 
aide of General Thomas, riding along the line 
and not seeing Brannan's men in their screened 
position, too hastily translated his first crude 
impression into a fact and, on reaching Thomas, 
informed him that there was an empty space 
between Reynolds and Wood. Thomas instantly 
transmitted the false information to Rosecrans. 
Now Rosecrans would have known better, had it 
not been for one thing. Some time before, the 
place now occupied by Wood had been occupied 
by Negley ; but Negley had been sent to the left 
to reinforce Thomas, and Rosecrans had ordered 
Wood to take his place. This had all been done, 
and the line was all as it should be. But when 
Rosecrans heard that there was a gap in the line, 
he naturally supposed that Wood had not yet quite 
got into position, and he sent an aide to hasten his 
movements. The aide thus gave the order in 
writing : " The General Commanding directs that 



" The General com- 
manding directs that 
you close up on Rey- 
nolds as fast as possi- 
ble and support him " 



^\ 



\ 



•\ 



\ 



I 






/' 



1° 

a 



o 



/ 



Reynolds 
Bran nan 
Wood 






if'' 



NVC- 



CHICKAMAUGA: THE FATAL ORDER TO WOOD 



Chickamauga 271 

you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible, and 
support him." He should have said " close up on 
Brannan." General Wood was naturally bewil- 
dered by such a mysterious order. How could he 
close up on Reynolds, when there was Brannan's 
whole division in line between them? He could 
not close up on him, but he might support him by 
passing around Brannan's rear. This, thought 
Wood, must be what Rosecrans meant, and so 
with all promptness he moved his division accord- 
ingly, leaving a great empty space in the very 
middle of the battle-front. Thus in the endeavour 
to fill up an imaginary gap there was created a 
real gap. It was just such a sort of misunder- 
standing as is perpetually happening in the little 
ordinary affairs of life. How often do we witness 
innocent but awkward blunders arising from hasty 
observation and lack of precision in the use of lan- 
guage ! But war has no pity for innocent blun- 
ders. General Longs treet would have willingly 
sacrificed ten thousand men to make such a hole 
in the Federal line as General Wood had just left 
there. For some little time the battle had been 
surging along down the line toward The dire 
the centre, and just at this moment catastrophe. 
Longstreet received Bragg's order to attack. Into 
the dreadful opening which Wood's movement had 
left, Longstreet poured eight brigades, one after 



272 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

another, in an overwhelming mass. The Federal 
divisions on either side were slammed out of place 
" like doors swung back on their hinges and shat- 
tered by the blow." The whole right wing was 
taken on its left flank, completely torn away from 
the rest of the army, and swept off the field in 
utter and hopeless rout. The heroic exertions of 
division and brigade commanders were all in vain. 
Nothing human could stand when struck in such a 
fashion. Rallying was out of the question ; there 
was nothing to be done but get out of the way. 
Rosecrans was caught in the throng and whirled 
off the field, and so were McCook and Crittenden. 
The cannon were all in the enemy's hands. The 
road to McFarland Gap was crowded with fugi- 
tives. More than half the Federal army was in 
full flight. Not an officer above a division-com- 
mander was left on this part of the field. 

Happily, however, it was not the Federal right 
wing that held the key of the position. That key 
was the Rossville road, which Thomas had been 
holding like a vise ever since yesterday morning. 
If the enemy were to gain that road and interpose 
between Thomas and Missionary Ridge, they could 
force him to surrender on the spot. The Army 
A critical ^^ ^^^^ Cumberland would be annihi- 
moment. lated. Chattanooga would be lost, 

and the rebel army, flushed with a victory far 



Chickamauga 273 

greater than any they had yet won, a victory com- 
pared to which even Chancellorsville was nothing, 
would in a few weeks plant their batteries before 
Nashville, perhaps before Cincinnati. Such mighty 
issues rested that afternoon upon the shoidders of 
one great man. It was a crisis scarcely less ter- 
rible than that of Gettysburg. But the occasion 
was never found to which Thomas proved unequal. 
The more disasters thickened about him, the more 
grandly did that noble Virginian defy them. Calm 
and imperturbable at all times, his clear head was 
never at a loss for resources. The extent of the 
disaster upon the right was first revealed to him 
by the appalling sight of huge masses of the 
enemy coming toward his flank instead of the 
reinforcements for which he was so earnestly look- 
ing, — a sight fit to shake the stoutest nerves ! 
Eetreat was inevitable, but nothing was allowed 
to loosen his hold upon the position he had under- 
taken to defend. Less than a mile in his rear 
there was a curved ridge known as the Horseshoe, 
convex toward the enemy's front, and over this 
horseshoe ran the Rossville road, that goal of the 
enemy's efforts. To this ridge Thomas retreated, 
and on its most favourable points skilfully planted 
his artillery ; and gathering there some 25,000 
men, stood like a rock, which the angry waves of 
war might buffet in vain. Long afterward men 



274 The Mississippi »Valley in the Civil War 

spoke of him as the " Rock o£ Chickamauga." 
For six weary hours those 25,000 men — their 
Terrific numbers lessening moment by moment 

fighting. till nearly 10,000 were stretched upon 

the groimd — stood at bay and hurled back again 
and again the furious onset of 60,000 rebels mad 
with desire to clutch the prize they had so nearly 
won. Riding to and fro among his men as quietly 
as if on parade, infusing them all with his own 
great spirit, quick to see each emergency as it 
came and to meet it with some fresh device, the 
hero held his ground. At one moment early in 
the afternoon, the rebel lines were extended so 
far beyond our left as to threaten the Rossville 
road, when their advance was suddenly checked 
by the arrival of that superb soldier, the rough 
and ready Gordon Granger, with 4000 men. He 
had marched without orders to the sound of the 
cannon, and the tremendous energy with which he 
supported Thomas is shown by the fact that nearly 
half his men were killed or wounded before dusk. 
As evening approached it was discovered that the 
last cartridge had been fired. In the wild turmoil 
which attended the rout of the right wing some- 
body had ordered the removal of all the ammuni- 
tion trains, and powder and ball were no more to 
be had save by searching among the dead bodies 
of friend and foe. Then with grim determination 




CHICKAMAUGA, SEPTEMBER 20, 1S63, EVENING 



Chichamauga 275 

bayonets were fixed. Longstreet, loath to own him- 
self baffled, had sent to Bragg for reinforcements, 
but none were forthcoming. " He told me," says 
Longstreet, " that the men had been beaten back 
so badly that they could be of no service to me." 
With such portions of his corps as still retained 
some freshness, Longstreet attempted a last as- 
sault, but his men were driven down the hillside 
with cold steel and with muskets used rpj^^ -RoQ^i of 
as clubs. Their strength was ex- Chicka- 
hausted ; they were baulked of their 
prey ; and night found Thomas still master of the 
Kossville road, and the Union army saved from 
destruction. The annals of warfare may be 
searched in vain for a grander spectacle; and in 
the years to come, so long as American children 
are born to love and serve their country, rescued 
at such dreadful cost from anarchy and dishonour, 
may they be taught to revere the glorious name 
of Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga ! 

When Rosecrans was swept away in the tide 
of fugitives, he at first made every effort to turn 
down a road which led through the valley straight 
to Thomas's position. But learning that this road 
was occupied by the enemy, he kept on through 
McFarland Gap, attended by General Garfield, his 
chief of staff, hoping to return by the Rossville 
road and thus make his way to Thomas. They 



276 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

found Kossville Gap choked with stragglers and 
teamsters fleeing toward Chattanooga, and were 
Rosecrans ^o\d that Thomas was killed, and the 
and Garfield, ^jjole army knocked to pieces. Some 
soldiers from Negley's division told Rosecrans 
that their comrades were all coming close upon 
their heels in disorderly flight. Now as Negley's 
was one of the last fresh divisions he had sent to 
the left in support of Thomas, Rosecrans was con- 
vinced that the worst must be true. While they 
were talking there came one of those lulls which 
every now and then interrupt the din of battle. 
Leaping from their horses, Rosecrans and Gar- 
field laid their ears to the ground to detect, if 
possible, the meaning of the distant murmur. 
There was no boom of cannon, only a faint and 
fitful craclde of musketry from different quarters 
of the field. It was one of the moments when 
Thomas had hurled back the rebel masses in dis- 
order, and they were waiting to reform their lines 
for a fresh onset. But to the anxious listeners 
the scattered sounds seemed only to confirm the 
stories, but too probable, which had just been told 
them. If these stories were true, the fragments 
of the army — all save such as must have sur- 
rendered — would soon be pouring through the 
passes to Chattanooga, and the best thing to be 
done was to get there as soon as possible and 



Chickamauga 277 

begin preparations for withstanding a siege. So 
Garfield advised, and so Kosecrans did, while Gar- 
field rode to tlie front to learn how things were 
faring. 

About four o'clock Rosecrans rode up to the 
door of the adjutant-general's office in Chatta- 
nooga, faint and ill. During this week that he 
had been drawing together his scattered forces, 
he had slept but little ; and on this second day 
of battle he had been in the saddle since early- 
dawn, with nothing to eat. The officers who 
helped him into the house did not soon forget the 
terrible look of the brave man stunned by sudden 
calamity.^ Presently McCook and Crittenden 
came in, and not long after a despatch from Gar- 
field telling how he had found Thomas. Rose- 
crans read it aloud, and waving it in the air 
shouted, " Thank God ! the day is not lost ; gen- 
tlemen, go at once to the front." But it was too 

^ In later years I used occasionally to meet Rosecrans, and al- 
ways felt that I could see the shadow of Chickamauga upon his 
noble face. The first time that I was introduced to him I was 
reminded of the strange look that haunted the face of the mother 
of Barnaby Rudge ; a look that remained amid all changes of 
expression, the dim but abiding shadow of a look to which an 
instant of terrible and overwhelming experience only could have 
given birth. Afterward I always noticed this look, and am sure 
that it was not merely in my fancy. (See Barnaby Budge, 
chap. V.) 



278 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

late now to turn defeat into victory. It was Gar- 
The battle fi^ld that should have gone to Chatta- 
was lost. nooga, and liosecrans that should have 

gone to the front. On the roads about Missionary 
Ridge there were brigades and divisions moving 
aimlessly for want of a chief, and Thomas had so 
drawn upon himself the whole fury of the rebel 
attack that these scattered fragments of the army 
were but feebly molested. Could Rosecrans have 
stayed on the field and exerted himself, as he had 
done so gallantly at Stone river, in forming a 
new line of battle, perhaps the issue might have 
been similar to the issue of that memorable con- 
test. For there was a moment when the three 
divisions of Negley, Sheridan, and Davis, thrown 
against the left of the enemy assailing Thomas, 
might perhaps have restored the battle ; but each 
general, following his own judgment, chose a dif- 
ferent route, and neither arrived at a position 
But Thomas where he could effect the result. The 
saved the Only commander who succeeded in ren- 
army. dcring valuable assistance to Thomas 

was Gordon Granger, as we have seen, who was 
guided simply by the din of battle and his com- 
mon sense. At night, in pursuance of an order 
from Rosecrans, Thomas moved quietly away 
from Horseshoe Ridge, and the whole army was 
drawn up at Rossville Gap and on the heights 



Chickamauga 279 

adjoining, where it remained all the next day 
unmolested. On the morning of the 22d it had 
all been retired to Chattanooga. 

The name " Chickamauga " has been said to 
mean "Valley of Death," in allusion, perhaps, 
to some wholesale Indian slaughter of long ago. 
However that may have been, the place had now 
fairly earned such a sombre epithet. In its di- 
mensions and in its murderousness the battle of 
Chickamauga was the greatest battle fought by 
our western armies, and one of the greatest of 
modern times. In our Civil War it was exceeded 
only by Gettysburg and the Wilderness ; in Euro- 
pean history one may compare with it such battles 
as Neerwinden, or Malplaquet, or Waterloo. At 
Shiloh and Stone river there were about 80,000 
men engaged, and in each the total losses in killed 
and wounded were about 20,000, the opposing 
armies and their losses being in each Awful 
case nearly equal. At Chickamauga slaughter, 
there were not less than 130,000 men engaged, 
and the total losses in killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing amounted to nearly 37,000 ; but the figures 
on the two sides were not evenly matched. Rose- 
crans had begun the campaign with about 70,000 
men, but had to leave detachments to guard his 
stores at Stevenson and to occupy other impor- 
tant points, so that he brought about 62,000 men 



280 The Mississipjn Valley in the Civil War 

into the field. Bragg, after his reinforcements 
from Virginia arrived, must have had about 70,000 
men. The Union loss was nearly 17,000, while 
that of the Confederates was not far from 20,000, 
a large proportion of which was incurred in the 
furious and futile assaults at Horseshoe Kidge. 



O^ af^'^V^r -a 



CHAPTi fl VIII 

CHATTANOOGA 

In retiring into Chattanooga, Rosecrans felt 
obliged to take a step which r.oon threatened to im- 
peril the army even more thin the ordeal through 
which it had passed. He withdrew a small force 
which had been stationed on th3 point of Lookout 
Mountain. With the forces tl en at his disposal 
this step was doubtless necessa y, but its conse- 
quences were lamentable. The iiilroad from Ste- 
venson, crossing the Tennessee riv^r at 

Ty . -, T . . Rosecrans in 

Bridgeport, passes over a depressic i m Chattanooga 
Eaccoon Mountain into Lookout \'al- is besieged 

1 T ,T by Bragg. 

ley and runs thence over a narrow 
ledge, with the river on one hand and the pre- 
cipitous end of Lookout Mountain on the other, 
into Chattanooga. This was the only line of rail- 
road by which supplies could be brought to the 
beleaguered army, and the only way to hold it was 
to hold Lookout Mountain. But Rosecrans did 
not think it practicable to keep up communication 
between his army in and about the town and the 
detachment on the mountain, and accordingly he 



282 fht M^^sLi^yrpV ^J>Mfyi in the Civil War 

withdrew the latter. In doino this, of course, he 
did not abandon his only mfjchod of getting sup- 
plies. He retained one avcjnue for that purpose, 
but it was a very poor one, and the immediate 
consequences of loosenii g his hold upon the rail- 
road were alarming. B ragg instantly occupied the 
mountain, and placed ^atteries there commanding 
railroad and river. On the east his forces occu- 
pied the crest of Miss ionary Ridge, about 400 feet 
above the level of the town, and patrolled the bank 
of the river for somo miles. From water to water 
he held the Union army invested in a semicircle. 
The only route b^: which food could come was a 
narrow and crool:ed wagon-road over Waldron's 
Ridge from Bridgeport through Jasper, a distance 
of sixty miles. .Such a line of supply was a sorry 
dependence for 40,000 men with their animals, 
added to the ^ copulation of the little town ; and 
Bragg, well knowing how precarious it was, sat 
down to compass the starvation of the Federal 
army. 

Longstreet advocated a bolder method. He 
recommended crossing the river in full force 
above Chattanooga and threatening the Nashville 
railroad so as to cut off Rosecrans's retreat and 
compel him to come out and fight at a disadvan- 
tage ; after which the Confederates might move 
up through eastern Tennessee, crush Burnside, 



Chattanooga 283 

and invade Kentucky. But Bragg' s mood was 
not sufficiently sanguine for such an ^m, i 
enterprise, and he felt that he made tacks the 
much surer of his prey by simply wait- ^"^^ ^ vajm. 
ing. For some days the wagons, wearily jolting 
over the rough mountain road, brought food and 
blankets and ammunition with some degree of 
promptness. Then came General Joseph Wheeler, 
on the 1st of October, with four or five brigades of 
rebel cavalry, and burned 300 well-stocked wagons 
and slew their 1800 mules. To stop this danger- 
ous work a strong force of Union cavalry from 
Bridgeport spent a week in fighting Wheeler and 
driving him back across the river. 

Then heavy rains came on, and proved a worse 
foe than the rebel troopers. The poor mules could 
scarcely tug their wagons through the deep mud, 
and as the delay shortened their forage, they grew 
weak from hunger and dropped by the way till all 
passing was blocked. The trips to Bridgeport took 
longer and longer, each new trip brought back 
fewer wagons, and every day the rations for man 
and beast grew smaller. The artillery The peril 
horses, being least needed at the mo- ^^^^ -raiDs. 
ment, fared worse in the scanty allotment of forage, 
and died by hundreds. On the road and within 
the Union lines more than 10,000 mules and horses 
perished. Thus the army, unable to haul its artil- 



284 The Mississ.i'pin Vhlley in the Civil War 

lery, soon became practically immovable. It could 
not retreat without inviting destruction, and re- 
maining where it was, gaunt famine stared it in 
the face. Bragg might well believe that all he 
had to do was to wait. 

But the United States government was awaken- 
ing to the needs of the occasion. If Lee's army 
could be temporarily weakened in behalf of Bragg, 
it was safe to take from Meade in order to give to 
Kosecrans. It had not at first been thought neces- 
sary to do this, because Burnside was in eastern 
Tennessee with 25,000 men, only 100 miles from 
Chattanooga, and almost daily since the 11th of 
September Lincoln and Halleck had been telegraph- 
ing him to go to Eosecrans without a moment's 
delay. If he had moved when first notified, his 
corps would have been present at Chickamauga, 
and the story of that battle might have been differ- 
ent. But there were difficulties in the way which 
to a man of Burnside's make-up seemed insuper- 
able ; and he never got quite ready to start. As 
the dangers thickened, the Eleventh and Twelfth 
corps, numbering 23,000 men, were detached from 
Arri 1 f *^^® Army of the Potomac, and sent, 
Hooker with under command of General Hooker, to 
wo corps. ^^g rescue. They went by rail around 
through Ohio and thence southward, with all their 
baggage and artillery, making the circuit of 1200 



Chattanooga 285 

miles from tlie Rapidan to Stevenson in about 
a week. On October 3 Hooker established his 
headquarters at Stevenson. Once arrived on the 
scene, his first business was to assist in opening 
communications with the beleaguered army. 

On the 19th of October, before this work had 
begun, Rosecrans was removed from command. 
President Lincoln had made up his mind that at 
this critical juncture of affairs the presence of the 
conqueror of Vicksburg was needed. Grant was 
called north from Mississippi, and met the Secre- 
tary of War at Indianapolis. He then learned 
that he was placed in command of all the forces 
between the Mississippi and the AUeghanies, and 
two orders were shown him, the one retaining 
Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cum- 
berland, the other removing Rosecrans and put- 
ting Thomas in his place. It was left for Grant 
to choose which he would have, and without a 
moment's hesitation he selected Thomas. Sher- 
man succeeded Grant in command of ^ 

Kosecrans 

the Army of the Tennessee. Rosecrans superseded 
was sent to command the department ^ ^^^^' 
of Missouri. McCook and Crittenden went home 
to await an investigation of the disaster at Chick- 
amauga ; ^ and their two depleted corps, consoli- 
dated into one, were given to Gordon Granger. 
1 " McCook . . . seemed at Perryville, Stone river, and Chick- 



286 The, Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Grant's first telegram to Thomas was, " Hold 
Chattanooga at all hazards; I will be there as 
soon as possible." Thomas replied, "We will 
hold the town till we starve." To some that time 
seemed not far off. There were officers who had 
nothing to eat but rancid pork and mouldy bread, 
and kernels of parched corn had come to be reck- 
oned a luxury. A week ago Jejfferson Davis had 
visited Bragg at his headquarters. Ascending 
Lookout Mountain and climbing to the top of a 
jagged rock on its summit, known as Pulpit Eock, 
the President of the Confederacy surveyed the 

amauga, pursued by a strange fatality. He assumed a kind of 
boastful over-confidence that in war always presages failure, be- 
cause it takes the place of the careful preparation that secures 
success. . . . He possessed a peculiar open frankness of manner 
and bonhomie that made him many friends, and he had many ad- 
mirable traits of character. . . . Crittenden was greatly beloved 
by his men. He was always genial, kind, just, and brave to a 
fault ; and as he came to my brigade, which was drawn up to bid 
him farewell, mounted on his beautiful gray horse, . . . and 
made us an admirable, almost electrical, little speech, if it had 
been in my power I would have made him commander-in-chief 
of the armies. . . . Now came the new regime. But already, 
before their arrival, and with the assumption of command by 
Thomas, our hopes went up with a great bound. . . . Grant and 
Sherman were different from the commanders we had known be- 
fore. They wore vests and coats unbuttoned ; and as to military 
bearing, old Frederick would not have had them in his camp. 
. . . But they had from the stai-t, and always retained, the per- 
fect confidence of the army ; and that faith was not misplaced." 
Hazen's Narrative of Military Service, pp. 152, 153, 164. 



Chattanooga 287 

scene before him with exultation, and prophesied 
the speedy surrender of the Federal army. But 
the tables were soon and most unexpectedly to 
be turned. When Grant arrived at ^ , 

ijrrant arrives 

Chattanooga, on the evening of the atChatta- 
23d, he found that Thomas had al- ^°^^^' 
ready ordered Hooker to concentrate his forces at 
Bridgeport with a view to opening a new line of 
communications. 

An admirable plan had been conceived by Gen- 
eral William Farrar Smith, — familiarly known to 
the soldiers as "Baldy" Smith, — chief engineer 
of the Army of the Cumberland. On the 19th of 
October, the day on which Rosecrans was super- 
seded. General Smith was reconnoi- ^ 

General 

tring the banks of the Tennessee river "Baldy" 
in the neighbourhood of Brown's Ferry, °^* * 
when this beautiful scheme occurred to him. Next 
day, on his return to Chattanooga, finding General 
Thomas in command of the army, Smith imparted 
to him his plan. On the 22d Thomas issued the 
needful orders for putting it into operation ; and 
when Grant arrived, a day later, he gave it his 
hearty approval. It was an indispensable prelim- 
inary to the brilliant operations which followed, 
and some writers have shown a disposition to 
claim the credit of it for Grant. It was certainly 
creditable to Grant's military judgment that he 



288 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

instantly recognized the merit of the plan, as 
Thomas had already done. But there can be no 
doubt that the plan originated with Smith, and 
would have been carried out exactly as it was, 
even if Grant had remained in Mississippi. Let 
us now observe the features of this famous scheme. 
Opposite the point of Lookout Mountain the 
river makes a great bend, enclosing a peninsula 
some three miles in length by less than a mile in 
width, known as Moccasin Point. OjDposite the 
lower side of this peninsula a narrow range of 
hills runs along close by the water's edge, with a 
Th n ' &^P ^* Brown's Ferry. A road from 
Ferry Opposite Chattauooga runs across the 

scheme. ^^^^ ^£ ^^^ peninsula to Brown's Ferry, 

and thence continues nearly southward along a 
deep gorge between the narrow range of hills and 
the base of Kaccoon Mountain until, as it enters 
Lookout valley, it curves westward and passes 
over a depression in Raccoon Mountain to Kelly's 
Ferry. Over this same depression runs the wa- 
gon-road from Bridgeport to Wauhatchie in Look- 
out valley, and also the railroad from BridgejDort 
to Chattanooga. Now the railroad, passing close 
under the point of Lookout Mountain and through 
the rebel lines, could not of course be wrested 
from the enemy without storming the mountain. 
But the banks of the river below Kelly's Ferry to 




,silJ/, 



^^ 



Chattanooga 289 

Bridgeport were entirely free from rebels, and 
obviously, if the wagon-road through the gorge 
could be secured, it would make an excellent line 
of communications. Supplies to any amount could 
be brought up the river in steamboats to Kelly's 
Ferry, and from that point hauled in wagons 
through the gorge to Brown's Ferry, and thence 
across the neck of the peninsula to Chattanooga, 
twice crossing the river by pontoon bridges. By 
this route the distance to be traversed by wagons 
was only eight miles. In order to get possession 
of this route it was necessary to secure the narrow 
range of hills and place a strong force in Lookout 
valley. Such a scheme needed such an auxiliary 
force as Hooker's to carry it into operation. Now 
under General Smith's personal supervision it 
was executed with complete success. Although a 
staff-officer, he was entrusted with the requisite 
command over troops to make the enterprise com- 
pletely his own ; a point in which Thomas and 
Grant showed true wisdom. 

In order to secure the narrow range of hills 
profound secrecy was required, for if the Confed- 
erates were to divine the scheme and occupy the 
hills in force, they could not be dislodged without 
a desperate and doubtful fight. The north end of 
Lookout valley was occupied by a Confederate 
brigade, which could be reinforced to any extent 



290 The, Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

by the short road around the point of Lookout 
Mountain. The problem was to seize the narrow 
range of hills by stealth, lodge Hooker with a 
strong force in Lookout valley, and establish a 
route by which he could be reinforced at pleasure 
from Chattanooga. At the end of three days the 
pontoon bridges were ready, the ground had been 
duly reconnoitred, and everybody had his instruc- 
tions. At three o'clock on the foggy morning of 
the 27th fifty-two pontoon boats, each containing 
twenty-five picked men, 1300 in all, commanded 
by General William Hazen,^ were started from 
Chattanooga and glided noiselessly down with the 
Its complete swif t Current, with no tell-tale plash 
success. Qf oars. In two hours' time they had 

landed at Brown's Ferry, driven away a rebel 
picket force, and taken possession of the narrow 
range of hills. While this was going on. General 
Smith, with a force of 2700 men, and three bat- 
teries, marched across the neck of Moccasin Point 
to Brown's Ferry, where they crossed in the pon- 
toon boats and ascended the hills. The range was 
thus held throughout its whole length by 4000 
men, who speedily felled trees and made a formid- 
able abattis, while they planted their three batter- 
ies on the end toward Lookout valley in such wise 
as to sweep the narrow road around the point of 

1 For the numbers, see Hazen's Narrative, pp. 154, 161. 



Chattanooga 291 

Lookout Mountain, by whicli alone the Confed- 
erates could send troops into the valley without 
climbing over the mountain. These 4000 men 
could defend such a position against three or four 
times their own number. As soon as they had 
crossed the river the work on the pontoon bridge 
was vigorously begun, so that by ten o'clock in the 
forenoon an excellent and secure road was in 
Grant's possession, direct from Chattanooga to the 
mouth of Lookout valley, and over this road he 
could send troops into the valley much faster than 
the Confederates could send them around the point 
of the mountain. 

The next morning Hooker started from Bridge- 
port, with part of the Eleventh corps, under 
Howard, and one division of the Twelfth, under 
Geary, something over 10,000 men in all, and 
marched along the railroad to Wauhatchie, where 
he arrived late in the afternoon and took posses- 
sion of all the roads in the valley. The single 
Confederate brigade there could do nothing but get 
out of his way, and a few shells from the batteries 
at the top of Lookout Mountain did jjoo^er occu- 
little harm. But by midnight Long- pies Lookout 
street had brought the greater part of ^^ ^^' 
his corps into the valley and assaulted Hooker in 
force. It was a wild scene under the uncertain 
light of the moon, with the cannon reverberating 



292 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

among the mountains. By four in the morning 
Hooker was master of the field, and Longstreet had 
retreated into his camp in Chattanooga valley. To 
complete the whole scheme, Palmer's division had 
been sent some days before around by the road 
over Waldron's Kidge and through Jasper, to hold 
the road by which Hooker had advanced, and this 
movement was duly executed. 

The enemy made no further attempt to dislodge 
Hooker, and by the bridge at Brown's Ferry Grant 
could quickly reinforce him to any extent required. 
The new line of communications, through Brown's 
and Kelly's ferries, was now completely secured. 
The sieee of wagons loaded with rations came rum- 
Chattanooga bling into Chattanooga every few 
hours, and all danger of famine was at 
an end. Still more, by Hooker's new position the 
Army of the Cumberland was joined to its rein- 
forcements from the Army of the Potomac, and 
its effective strength thus became equal to the 
enemy's. The siege of Chattanooga was virtually 
raised, and the situation in Lookout valley boded 
no good to Braxton Bragg. It is such beautiful 
operations as this that make military history a 
fascinating study. In all its details we perceive 
the touch of a master hand. Grant showed his 
appreciation by recommending Smith for promo- 
tion to the rank of major-general, saying, "No 



Chattanooga 293 

man in the service is better qualified than he for 
our largest commands." ^ 

Bragg was sorely chagrined at this collapse of 
his hopes of starving the Union army, but he did 
not begin to imagine what his adversary had in 
store for him. He did not see what the Brown's 
Ferry affair foreboded. So little did he dream 
that the Federals would soon be ready to resume 
the offensive, that on the 3d of Novem- ^ 

Bragg- sends 

ber he sent Longstreet with 20,000 away Long- 
men and 80 guns to annihilate Burn- ^*^®®*' 
side, or chase him out of eastern Tennessee. 
After having accomplished this task, Longstreet 
was to return. 

Bragg has been severely criticised for thus 
weakening his army at such a crisis. It was a 
grave mistake and hardly excusable. Bragg must 
have known that the fate of Chattanooga would 
have to be settled by a battle ; and it ought to 
have been clear to him that if he won that battle, 
Knoxville would be at his mercy, while if he lost 
it, Knoxville would be relieved. To risk the loss 
of the battle at Chattanooga, in order to pick from 

1 It was also appreciated by the enemy, as witness the follow- 
ing', from the Richmond Press : " The admirably conceived and 
perfectly executed coup at Brown's Ferry . . . has robbed the 
Confederacy of all its dearly earned advantages gained at Chioka- 
mauga." Hazen's Narrative, p. 164. 



294 The Mississippi J^alley in the Civil War 

the bough an apple that was sure to drop into his 
lap if he won it, would seem the height of imbecil- 
ity. Yet Bragg was no fool. Though he had 
Why did he i^^t the divine spark of genius, he was 
do so? an adversary whom it was creditable 

to beat. It was reported and believed by some 
people that Jefferson Davis, on his visit to Bragg, 
devised the Knoxville expedition for Longstreet 
because he and Bragg did not get on well together. 
General Grant, while mentioning this report, hu- 
morously suggests an alternative explanation : " It 
may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville 
for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had 
an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and 
thought he saw a chance of ' killing two birds 
with one stone.' On several occasions during the 
war he came to the relief of the Union army by 
means of his superior inilitary genius.''^ ^ 

But supposing that Bragg himself originated or 
approved the sending away of Longstreet, although 
the blunder does not admit of excuse, we can nev- 
ertheless perhaps understand how it may have 
happened. Bragg knew that the Federal army 
was at that moment in no fit condition to attack 
him in his strong positions. The best illustration 
of this was what happened immediately upon 
Longstreet's departure. No sooner had Grant 
1 Grant's Memoirs, ii. 87. The italicizing is Grant's. 



Chattanooga 295 

observed this weakening of the enemy's force than 
he proposed to Thomas an assault a possible 
upon Missionary Ridge, in the hope explanation. 
of recalling Longstreet and relieving Burnside, in 
accordance with the frantic telegrams which kept 
coming from Washington. From the tone of 
some of the despatches one would gather that 
neither Lincoln, Stanton, nor Halleck had a par- 
ticle of confidence in Burnside's ability to take 
care of himself, and the question is forcibly sug- 
gested, why was he kept so persistently in impor- 
tant commands? To return to Grant, when he 
proposed the assault upon Missionary Ridge, 
Thomas reminded him that the artillery horses 
were all dead, and so long as cannon could not be 
hauled, the mobility of the army was like that of 
a man with his legs cut off. 

Bragg knew, indeed, that the Union army was 
expecting further reinforcements. He knew that 
Sherman was coming from Mississippi with part of 
the army which had captured Vicksburg. Halleck 
had ordered this movement soon after the defeat at 
Chickamauga. Sherman had started from Vicks- 
burg on September 27, and in steamboats accom- 
plished the 400 miles to Memphis by October 2. 
He had then before him 400 miles of marching 
in order to get within reach of Chattanooga ; 
and Halleck, true to his snail-like traditions, had 



296 The Mississip2^i Valley in the Civil War 
ordered him to repair the railroad yard by yard 
Halleck's ^^ ^® advanced ; that same blessed old 
railroad railroad, for the sake of which Hal- 

again. ^^^^^ ^^^ once sacrificed Buell's hopes 

of success, and God knows how many thousand 
lives ! Thus hampered, Sherman plodded along 
at such a rate that the 27th of October — a 
whole month from the time of his leaving Vicks- 
burg — found him only at luka, still 200 miles 
distant from Chattanooga. Thus Sherman, when 
weighted with Halleck, could move as slowly 
as Buell, under like circumstances. At this rate 
Bragg might well reckon that Longstreet could 
proceed 100 miles to Knoxville, crush the feeble 
Burnside, and get back in time to counteract any 
movements that might be awaiting the arrival of 
Sherman. At all events, he knew that a mere 
demonstration against Burnside would throw Mr. 
Lincoln and the northern states into a wild panic, 
and be likely to divert to Knoxville any Union 
reinforcements that might otherwise be sent to 
Chattanooga. From this point of view there may 
have been a grain of sense in Bragg's plan. What 
ruined it was the unforeseen appointment of Grant 
to the command of all the western armies. It in- 
stantly wrought a combination of energies quite 
new to Bragg's experience. Since the fall of 
Vicksburg, Halleck no longer overruled and ham- 



Chattanooga 297 

pered Grant, but deferred to his judgment. Ac- 
cordingly the movements in the western theatre 
of war began to keep time to Grant's ideas and 
not to Halleck's, and there was an end of that 
slowness upon which Bragg had counted. On the 
24th of October, the morning after his Arrival of 
♦ arrival at Chattanooga, Grant sent Sherman at 

1 , oi *j_ LL -x Chattanooga. 

word to oner man to " drop every- 
thing" and hurry to Stevenson with his entire 
force. The result was that, in spite of broken 
bridges and long detours thereby necessitated, 
Sherman got his army up to Stevenson and Bridge- 
port by the 14th of November, and next day re- 
ported in person to Grant at Chattanooga. At 
this moment Longs treet, who had encountered 
unforeseen obstacles to a rapid progress, had got 
scarcely half way on his march to Knoxville. 
Throughout the northern states, the anxiety for 
Burnside was intense, but Sherman's arrival at 
Chattanooga put a new face upon things, and 
enabled Grant to strike a blow so tremendous that 
among its far-reaching consequences the rescue 
of Burnside and the relief of eastern Tennessee 
appear but as minor incidents. 

The wagon-road from Bridgeport through Look- 
out valley and the narrow gorge to Brown's 
Ferry was now to become a channel for reinforce- 
ments as well as supplies. Sherman's whole army 



298 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

was to be moved through it to the north of the 
river, with a view to crossing again far above, and 
seizing the extremity of Missionary Ridge. Less 
than a mile behind Missionary Ridge, at the junc- 
tion of the railroads to Cleveland in eastern Ten- 
Chiekamauga nesscc and to Dalton in Georgia, was 
station. Chickamauga station, where Bragg had 

his depot of supplies. To get possession of this 
station, and of the road between Cleveland and 
Dalton, would by a happy coincidence cut off all 
supplies not only for Bragg, but also for Long- 
street. A point of such vital importance could 
not be gained without a battle, and it was possi- 
ble to plan the battle so that in the effort to save 
this position the enemy should incur shattering 
defeat. While Hooker was to divert the attention 
of the Confederates by a vigorous demonstration 
against Lookout Mountain, Sherman was to attack 
their right wing near the north end of Missionary 
Ridge and cut them off from Chickamauga station. 
But the task of getting Sherman's force into the 
neighbourhood of the Confederate right wing was 
one that called for very delicate management. It 
Sherman's was beautifully done. The enemy, 
stealthy ad- looking down from his lofty eminences 

vance toward r» i -i ^ 

Chickamauga upon the whole vast held, and seemg 
station. f\^Q Union army gathered for so long 

a time before his left and centre, in Lookout 



Chattanooga 299 

valley and the plain before Chattanooga, felt little 
fear for his right, and so the northern end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge was inadequately guarded. It was 
of the first importance that Sherman's movement 
to this point should be hidden. One of his divi- 
sions was therefore first moved from Bridgeport 
into Lookout valley near Trenton, to draw Bragg's 
attention thither. The remaining divisions were 
taken along the wagon-road to Brown's Ferry, 
where they crossed on the pontoon bridge, and then 
diverged into a road leading due northward quite 
away from Chattanooga, and losing itself to sight 
among densely wooded hills. Here, a couple of 
miles north of the river, Sherman had a concealed 
camp. The enemy, seeing the troops cross at 
Brown's Ferry, but observing no further indica- 
tions of their presence north of the river, very 
naturally concluded that they were going to Knox- 
ville to relieve Burnside. So completely was Bragg 
hoodwinked that on the very eve of battle he 
sent away two divisions to reinforce Longstreet, 
and was able to get only one of them back again in 
time to be of service. At the same time he seems 
to have thought it possible to scare Grant by de- 
claring his intention of attacking him, and thus 
prevent his sending any more forces in the same 
direction. This was perhaps the weakest thing 
Bragg ever did. He sent Grant a letter, saying, 



300 The Mlssissijypi Valley in the Civil War 

"As there may still be some non-combatants in 
Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that 
prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." 

Grant was not the bird to be caught with such 
chaff. He was inclined to regard the letter as 
designed to cover an intention of retreat, and was 
confirmed in this impression by the story of a de- 
serter. He did not wish Bragg to get away un- 
punished, and accordingly on the 23d of November 
Thomas was ordered to make a demonstration in 
force. Thomas's line was in front of Chattanooga, 
facing Missionary Ridge. It consisted of the three 
corps of Granger, Palmer, and Howard, the latter 
having been detached from Hooker. In all Thomas 
had about 30,000 men. At two in the afternoon 
Capture of ^^^^y advanced with such deliberate 
Orchard precision that for a while the rebels 

Knob and 

adjacent line Supposed them to be on parade, but 
of hills. presently they made a sudden rush 

forward and captured a mound known as Orchard 
Knob and a low range of hills forming the enemy's 
front line of entrenchments. This demonstration 
showed the Confederates in full force on Mission- 
ary Eidge, but it accomplished much more. Dur- 
ing the night this advanced line was fortified and 
crowned with artillery, for dragging which horses 
were borrowed from Sherman. Two days later, in 
the closing scene of the battle, this artillery played 



Chattanooga 301 

an important part in protecting the assault upon 
the Confederate centre. Still another effect was 
produced. This preliminary attack in front caused 
Bragg that night to weaken his left wing on Look- 
out Mountain by withdrawing one strong division 
in order to transfer it to his extreme right. The 
observed presence of Howard's corps on Thomas's 
left, near Citico creek, made him think it wise to 
guard that all-important quarter somewhat more 
strongly. 

This strengthening of the Confederate right was 
destined to work an important change in Grant's 
plan of battle. Sherman's march on the 24th was 
delayed by many obstacles, and at last he was 
separated from his rear division by a sudden rise 
of the river, which broke down the Breaking of 
pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry. To ^ bridge, 
replace this loss, Thomas sent him Davis's division, 
and thus he went on in full strength. Following 
the route through his concealed camp, Sherman 
threw a pontoon bridge across the river, a little 
below the mouth of the South Chickamauga creek, 
and above the extreme right of the Confederate 
army. Having completed his crossing about noon, 
he moved on three divisions en echelon^ his left 
leading up the left bank of the creek, until all 
arrived at the terminal slopes of Missionary Kidge, 
where the Dalton railroad runs along their base. 



302 Tlie Mississippi Vcdley in the Civil War 

By four o'clock Sherman had secured the adjacent 
summits, and began massing the three divisions 
there, while Davis's division was left to guard the 
rear as far back as the pontoon bridge. 

But now this brilliant general was rudely re- 
minded that there is many a slip betwixt the 
cup and the lip. Up to this moment the crest 
of Missionary Kidge, as viewed from below and 
from a distance, had appeared to be continuous, 
Sherman's SO that Sherman had expected, after 
disappoint- asccnding it, to march without hin- 
drance southward past the tunnel of 
the Cleveland railroad, and tlms to reach a point 
where he could cut off the Confederate army from 
Chickamauga station. Grant had not only looked 
for this, but he had expected Sherman to get into 
position on the ridge at such an early hour on the 
24th that the great battle might take place on that 
day. But now it was near sunset when Sherman, 
looking southward from his new vantage ground, 
saw before him not a continuous crest, but a yawn- 
ing valley, with another frowning crest beyond. 
He had no good topographical map, and hitherto 
his eye had been deceived because of a crest which 
lies just to the east of that depression, and viewed 
from a distance looks continuous with the crests to 
the north and south of it. Sherman, therefore, 
had not reached his goal. Neither had he taken 



Chattanooga 303 

the enemy by surprise. For on that frowning 
crest northward of the tunnel he sees the rebels 
in force. There were two divisions of them, one 
of which Bragg had taken from Lookout Moun- 
tain the night before. They had hastily fortified 
themselves upon the knob north of the tunnel, and 
upon the two tines of the fork to the south of 
it ; and with them were those fine old war-dogs, 
Hardee and Cleburne ! These positions must be 
carried by storm, and the hour of sunset is too 
late for such an experiment. So Sherman forti- 
fies himself on his isolated heights and waits for 
morning. A message from Grant orders him to 
make his attack at daybreak, and tells him that 
Thomas will soon support him by an attack on the 
rebel centre. 

Meanwhile, during all this short winter day, 
most picturesque and stirring events were going 
on at the extreme right of the Union position. 
The rear division of Sherman's army, which 
had been prevented from crossing at An effect of 
Brown's Ferry, remained at Hooker's the breaking 

, . , •111' • , . of a bridge ; 

disposal, considerably increasing his new orders 
strength. This circumstance led Grant *<> Hooker, 
to convert the intended demonstration against 
Lookout Mountain into an assault sufficiently vig- 
orous to detain the rebel force upon the mountain 
and prevent Bragg from withdrawing it in order 



304 TTie Mississi2')pi Valley in the Civil War 

to strengthen his right wing against Sherman. 
Hooker was evidently inspired that morning with 
the ardour of battle that had won for him the so- 
briquet of " Fighting Joe ; " he sought permission 
to interpret his orders with sufficient liberality to 
allow him to storm the summit of the mountain if 
he should find it feasible, and he received from 
Thomas instructions to go ahead and do his best. 
So Hooker began his adventurous movement be- 
fore daybreak of the 24th. He had three divisions, 
one from the Army of the Potomac, one from the 
Army of the Cumberland, one from the Army of 
the Tennessee, in all about 10,000 men. These 
divisions had never fought side by side before. 
The ascent of the mountain was difficult, even if 
there had been no foe there. On the west side 
there was no way of getting up save by narrow 
paths which could be traversed only in single file. 
An ascent here was impracticable, as the men could 
be shot down faster than they could advance. But 
on the other side, near the point of the mountain, 
there was a good wagon-road winding zigzag to the 
very top. This road connected the rebels on the 
mountain with the centre of their army, and to take 
it would turn their position and put them to flight. 
Hooker's troops were in the valley west of 
Lookout creek which was swollen so that it could 
not be forded. With two of his divisions he set 



Chattanooga 305 

about building a rude bridge near the mouth of 
the creek, while the other division, under the 
dauntless John Geary, marched up to Wauhat- 
chie and, crossing there, began to move diagonally 
up the steep side of the mountain, al- 
ways bearing northward so as to reach centofLook- 
and round the point, and ultimate^ o^tMoun- 

tain. 

gam the wagon-road. The movement 
was favoured by the absence of the division which 
Bragg had felt obliged to withdraw in the night ; 
there were still, however, 7000 Confederates in 
position on the mountain, — quite enough to give 
them odds against Hooker with his 10,000 lower 
down. Every available point was entrenched and 
commanded by artillery, but the Confederate force 
was not quite sufficient to enable them to make 
the best use of all these advantages. In many 
places their guns could not be depressed so as to 
bear upon Geary's column, which pertinaciously 
crept along under their muzzles, climbing over 
boulders, bursting through the tangled underbrush, 
keeping up a skirmishing fire, and always mak- 
ing progress, while its route was marked by the 
prostrate bodies of men dying and dead. By noon 
Geary had reached the point of the mountain, and 
come out upon the smoother ascent which was 
traversed by the wagon-road. 

Meanwhile Hooker, with his other two divisions, 



306 Tlie Jlississippi Valley in the Civil War 

had finished their bridge and crossed it ; and then, 
pushing straight up toward the peak, connected 
with Geary's left. As the whole solid force ap- 
proached the wagon-road, the fight became fiercer. 
Up and up they went into the clouds, which were 
The "battle Settling dowu upon the lofty summit, 
above the until they were lost from sight, and 
their comrades anxiously watching in 
Chattanooga valley could hear only the booming 
of cannon and rattle of musketry far overhead, 
and catch glimpses of fire flashing from moment 
to moment through the dark clouds, as if tlie old 
mythmaker's notion of the thunderstorm were 
realized, and elemental spirits were engaged in a 
deadly struggle for the dominion of the upper air. 
At four o'clock a messenger came to Thomas with 
the news that the summit was carried. Well done, 
" Fighting Joe ! " In days to come, whensoever 
Chancellorsville is mentioned, something will also 
have to be said of the " battle above the clouds." 

Next morning, the 25th of November, the air 
was clear and frosty. The clouds had vanished, 
and the sun rose bright and dazzling, while thou- 
sands of eager eyes were turned towards the top 
Presage of of Lookout Mountain. And over its 
victory. sharp outline, visible for miles and 

miles, on the very summit of Pulpit Rock, where 
Jefferson Davis had stood a few weeks ago and 



Chattanooga 307 

uttered his audacious prophecy, there floated on 
the morning breeze the lordly stars and stripes. 
Loud shouts of victory, cheer after cheer, rose 
up melodiously together from the army below,^ in 
earnest of the crowning triumph whereof the air 
was full of presage. 

Victory came, but not in the way that Grant 
had expected. According to his plan, Hooker was 
to keep the enemy occupied on Lookout Mountain, 
while Sherman was to turn his right flank and 
sever his communications with Chickamauga sta- 
tion, and all this was to be accomplished on the 
24th. Now Hooker had done more , 

An unex- 

and Sherman less than was on the pectedsitua- 
programme. Sherman had met with *^^"' 
unforeseen obstacles, while Hooker had captured 
the mountain, so that the Confederates driven 
thence were at liberty to be transferred to Bragg's 
right, there to strengthen the resistance to Sher- 
man. At daybreak the movement of troops north- 
ward along Missionary Ridge could plainly be 
detected from the Union lines. 

I am particular in emphasizing these points, 
because a few years ago there was a visible tend- 
ency toward the growth of a " Grant legend," 
in which that general's reputation was made to 

^ Cist, The Army of the Cumberland, p. 251 ; Hazen, Narrative 
of Military Service, p. 172. 



308 The Mississij^pi Valley in the Civil War 

suffer from misplaced and undiscriminating praise. 
Among other things it was asserted by Grant's 
injudicious admirers that among the world's great 
^, , , , fio^hts, the battle of Chattanooo^a was 

Need for fur- * . . . . * 

ther changes well-nigh unique in having been fought 
of plan. from beginning to end exactly as it 

was first planned in the suj)erb brain of the Union 
commander. Now if anything in this world can 
be said to be clear, it is that the battle of Chatta- 
nooga was not fought as Grant had planned it ; 
while at the same time a correct history of it 
shows us that one mark of a great general is the 
ability to modify his plans on the spur of the 
moment, and to turn the unexpected incidents to 
his own advantage. 

We have seen how the breakino^ of a bridgfe 
turned the demonstration against Lookout Moun- 
tain into a movement which resulted in its capture. 
Since a small garrison would now suffice to hold 
it, Grant ordered Hooker to bring down the bulk 
of his force into Chattanooga valley and connect 
with the right wing of Thomas's army, which oc- 
cupied the low range of hills in front 

Sherman's *. tit- • t-.« t -n« i • 

attack upon of Missionary Kidge. xLarly m the 

Bragg's mornino^ Sherman bes'an his assault 

right. ^ ^ 

upon the north end of the ridge, but 

he encountered desperate resistance and made but 

little progress ; insomuch that as Grant scrutinized 



Chattanooga 309 

the situation from Orchard Knob, the thought 
crossed his mind that if the Confederate right wing 
could maintain its ground against Sherman till 
nightfall, what was to hinder Bragg from evacuat- 
ing his positions during the night and retreating 
upon Cleveland to effect a junction with Long- 
street ? ^ Matters must be pressed more vigor- 
ously, and to this end Grant sent a new order to 
Hooker, telling him to advance to Rossville Gap, 
and then, turning northward along jt ^ 
Missionary Ridge, to assail Bragg's moves against 
left flank. A front attack by Thomas ^^^^^'^l^^*- 
had been in Grant's mind since yesterday, and had 
been mentioned in his evening order to Sherman, 
but the difficulties attending such a movement so 
impressed Grant that he was inclined to withhold 
it until Bragg's line should be more or less shaken 
by one or both of the flank attacks. The crest of 
Missionary Ridge rose 400 feet above its foot-hills, 
and the irregularities in the ground made the as- 
cent so difficult that Bragg declared that a single 
cordon of skirmishers ought to hold it against the 
whole Federal army. Confident in this view of 
the case, Bragg sent brigade after brigade to his 
right to withstand Sherman, until his centre grew 
so thin as to invite attack, even in its strong 
position. From Orchard Knob, where Grant and 

1 Comte de Paris, The Civil War in America, iv. 289. 



310 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Thomas were standing side by side, every feature 
of these movements could be plainly 
ens his centre Seen, and as the day wore on Grant's 
to strengthen anxiety for Sherman increased. Ine- 
qualities of ground prevented his seeing 
what was happening on the extreme Union right, 
and he looked long in vain for the appearance of 
Hooker's men on Missionary Ridge north of Ross- 
ville Gap. The Confederates, in their retreat from 
Lookout Mountain, had destroyed the bridge over 
Chattanooga creek, so that Hooker's progress was 
seriously delayed. 

At last Grant decided to make a demonstration 
with his centre, hoping thus to alarm Bragg into 

recalling some of the troops that were 
Grant decides . oi i i 

to threaten contending against oherman. ohould 

Bragg's cen- Hooker appear at a favourable moment 
above Rossville Gap, this demonstra- 
tion could easily be converted into an assault upon 
the rebel centre. It was for Thomas's army to 
make this important movement. At Stone river 
and at Chickamauga Bragg had tried Thomas as 
anvil ; he was now to feel him as hammer. 

Baird's division occupied the left of Thomas's 
line, as Howard had been sent, with the Eleventh 
corps, to the aid of Sherman. To the right of 
Baird came Wood, then Sheridan, then Johnson ; 
four divisions, numbering 20,000 men. The en- 



Chattanooga 311 

emy's force In front was now much smaller than 
this, probably 13,000 infantry, with 2000 artiller- 
ists ; but it was strongly entrenched near the base 
of the ridge, and again near the summit. The 
instructions to the division-commanders m j 

1 he orders to 

were to carry the first line of works, the storming 
and then halt in the rifle-pits to reform ^®' 
their lines. Further instructions were withheld 
until the effect of this first charge could be seen, 
and also in the hope of Hooker's timely appear- 
ance on the scene. 

At half past three o'clock the signal was given 
by six guns fired in quick succession from Orchard 
Knob, and two strong lines of skir- Amagnifi- 
mishers moved forward, soon followed ^®^* charge. 
by 20,000 men with levelled bayonets, and all on 
the double quick. A heavy fire was opened on 
them from sixty rebel guns, which were vigorously 
answered by the Union batteries. The long lines 
of bayonets gleaming in the wintry sunshine were 
a magnificent and formidable sight. The four 
divisions reached the first line of entrenchments 
almost at the same moment and instantly poured 
over them, scattering their defenders, of whom at 
least 1000 were captured. Then came a marvel- 
lous moment. These brave assailants were thrill- 
ing in every nerve with victory, but the jjosition 
into which they had rushed was scarcely tenable. 



312 The 3fississlppi T^lley in the Civil War 

Swept by a fierce artillery fire, exacerbated by the 
rifles of bidden skirmishers, it was a veritable 
hornet's nest, from which escape must quickly be 
sought in retreat or advance. But the exultant 
mood of these men was not the mood for retreat ; 
an uncontrollable impulse carried them straight 
onward up the slope, without tarrying a moment 
for orders. To adopt a happy phrase of the Count 
of Paris, they "fled forward" in a contagious fury 
of aggressiveness which nothing could quell. 

It was with grave concern that Grant and 
Thomas saw this magnificent charge continue be- 
An anxious yond its prescribed goal. If success- 
moment, f^i^ it meant speedy victory, but if 
repulsed, it would leave the victorious enemy be- 
tween the isolated forces of Sherman on the one 
hand and Hooker on the other ; and the probable 
result would be, — Sherman driven across the Ten- 
nessee, Thomas pushed back into Chattanooga, and 
Hooker badly mauled. Grant exclaimed, " Thomas, 
who ordered those men up the ridge ? " "I don't 
know," replied Thomas, " I did not : Granger, did 
you?" "No," said Gordon Granger, "they are 
going without orders ; when those fellows get 
started, all hell can't stop them! " Grant muttered 
that somebody would suffer if the movement failed.^ 

1 See the account of General Fullerton, Granger's chief of staff, 

in Battles and Leaders, ill. 725. 



Chattanooga 313 

No such calamity, however, was forthcoming. 
The 20,000 bayonets pushed their way up the hill 
under a storm of shells and musketry. Sheridan 
lost 1300 men out of his division of 6000 ; in other 
quarters the loss was not so heavy. In some places, 
to avoid the fire, men went on all fours, Bragg's centre 
but nothing stopped their advance. In crushed, 
less than an hour from the signal to start, the 
crest was carried almost simultaneously at six dif- 
ferent places. Wood's and Sheridan's divisions 
were the first to clear the summit, and among these 
General Hazen contends that his brigade, of 
Wood's division, was foremost.^ The gunners were 
slain at their posts, and the cannon turned upon 
the enemy. The whole Confederate centre was 
routed. Men threw down their arms and fled, or 
were captured in crowds. Bragg himself narrowly 
escaped capture. 

While this was going on. Hooker arrived at 
Eossville Gap, pushed up the ridge, and routing 
the rebel left sent it tumbling in upon the routed 
centre. One division, fleeing before Hooker, was 
thus thrown directly in front of John- r^^^^^j defeat 
son's division, by which it was captured, of the Con- 
The pursuit was kept up, mainly by 
Sheridan, as far as Chickamauga creek, and many 
prisoners were taken. At Baird's end of the as- 

1 See his Narrative, pp. 173-235. 



314 TJie Mississiiypi Vulley in the Civil War 

sailing line, where tlie enemy had been massing to 
move against Sherman, a sturdy resistance was 
encountered. The rebel right wing held its ground 
till toward nightfall, when seeing the rest of the 
army crumbled to fragments it gave way and aban- 
doned the field. The pursuit was continued for 
two days, while Sherman, with 25,000 men, started 
for Knoxville to relieve Burnside ; but the defeat 
of Bragg cut Longstreet's line of supply, and on 
learning of Sherman's approach he got out of the 
way as sj)eedily as possible. Thus the siege of 
Knoxville was raised by the same stroke that freed 
Chattanooga from the presence of the foe. It was 
a double victory. 

The next day after the storming of Missionary 
Ridge was Thanksgiving Day ; the completeness 
of the victory had begun to be realized throughout 
the country by the time people sat down to dinner ; 
and, as Halleck said in his congratulatory tele- 
gram. Grant had made it indeed a day of thanks- 
Greatness of giving. It was in some respects the 
the victory. most brilliant victory of the war. For 
a battle of such dimensions, the losses in killed 
and wounded were remarkably small, — some 6000 
on the Federal side, something less on the side 
of the Confederates, who fought mostly behind 
entrenchments. Grant captured more than 6000 
prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, and 7000 stand of 



Chattanooga 315 

arms. That the destruction of life was so much 
less than at Shiloh, or Stone river, or Chicka- 
mauga, was largely due to the adroit manoeuvring 
which made the enemy's almost impregnable posi- 
tions avail him so little. In this respect the battle 
of Chattanooga is one of the most interesting in 
modern history. 

It is also one of the most picturesque. The im- 
mense length of battle-front, thirteen miles from 
Sherman's left to Hooker's right, the extraordinary 
difficulty of the ground, the dizzy heights scaled, 
the grandeur of the scenery, all com- Grandeur of 
bined to make it a wonderful spectacle, the battle- 
Unlike most of our battles, in which 
the movements were mostly hidden from sight in 
the forest, here the fighting went on to a great ex- 
tent in the full view of both armies. " Many a 
time," General Sherman tells us, " in the midst of 
the carnage and noise," he " could not help stop- 
ping to look across that vast field of battle, to ad- 
mire its sublimity." ^ On that field were arrayed 
portions of our three great armies of the Potomac, 
the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, thus for the 
first time brought together under one leader ; and 
of all the battles of the war, this was the only one 
in which our four most famous Union generals — 
Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan — hap- 

^ Sherman's Memoirs, i. 362. 



316 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

pened all to be engaged. No wonder there was so 
little left of Braxton Bragg ! 

But it was not only for its picturesque features 
or its interesting tactics, but still more for its 
strategic importance, that the battle of Chatta- 
nooga was so brilliant. The victory gave us hence- 
forth undisputed possession of Chattanooga, with 
all that this implied. As the capture of Vicks- 
burg cut the Confederacy in two on the line of the 
Mississippi, so the victory at Chattanooga cut in 
two the remainder of it on the line of the Alle- 
ghanies. The great campaigns of the following 
spring and summer were conducted entirely upon 
soil which formed part of the original thirteen 
The Missis- Atlantic states. The Mississippi val- 
sippi valley ley was now recovered for the Union. 
Once again, indeed, toward the end of 
the following year, the Confederacy ventured to 
invade this region, and threw a great army as far 
north as Nashville, where dire catastrophe awaited 
it. Our next chapter will give some account of 
this important episode in the conclusion of the 
Civil War. 



CHAPTER IX 

NASHVILLE 

It is worth while to note that each of the four 
cardinal victories which restored the supremacy of 
the United States government in the West was won 
under the leadership of Grant. Fort Donelson, 
Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, — these names are 
the landmarks in that mighty story. If we may 
liken the whole war to one stupendous battle of 
four years' duration, it is evident that the United 
States was gradually defeating the Confederacy by 
turning its left flank. At the beginning of the 
year 1864 the Confederate right in Virginia still 
held its ground. There three years of warfare had 
apparently accomplished nothing. Lee was still 
midway between Richmond and Washington, defi- 
ant and apparently unconquerable. It was not 
strange that to the general who had done so much 
this last and most difficult problem should be 
entrusted. It was fitting that to Grant should 
be assigned the task of overthrowing Lee. It was 
also right that in undertaking this task Grant 
should have unlimited control of the whole field of 



318 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

operations. Thus only could unity of purpose in 
Need for ^^ movements of the different armies 

unity of oper- be ensured. For want of such well-de- 
fined unity of purpose the conduct of 
the war had hitherto languished. A good instance 
was furnished by the series of campaigns just 
passed in review for the possession of Chattanooga. 
Immediately after the fall of Vicksburg Grant had 
wished to take his army to Mobile, and in con- 
cert with the fleet under Farragut capture that 
important city. He understood the peril to which 
Rosecrans's army must necessarily be exposed in 
advancing into the difficult mountain region of 
northern Georgia. He knew that Mobile, threat- 
ened at once by land and by sea, must fall unless 
troops should speedily be sent to its defence ; and 
he knew that those troops were most likely to be 
taken from Bragg. His advice was not heeded. 
If it had been followed, the disaster of Chicka- 
mauga might have been averted. The glorious 
victory at Chattanooga, which had ensued upon 
giving him unhampered command in the West, 
pointed clearly to the next step which ought to be 
taken. In March, 1864, a bill was passed through 
Congress reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, 
which heretofore had been held only by Washing- 
ton and Scott.^ Grant was promoted to this rank, 

1 Scott's, which was conferred in 1855, was only a brevet rank. 



Nashville 319 

and made general-in-cliief of all the armies of the 
United States. Thus he was enabled q^.^^^ ^^^^ 
not only to begin operation in Virginia general-in- 
with hands untrammelled, but also to 
control the whole field of war, so that a victory in 
Tennessee or Georgia should exert its full effect 
upon the situation in Virginia. In another twelve- 
month the fruits of this sound policy were gathered, 
and the conqueror of Vicksburg and Chattanooga 
became also the conqueror of Richmond. 

The true character of this final epoch of the 
war, however,* cannot be understood without keep- 
ing clearly before our minds the mutual relations 
between the grand operations in the eastern and 
western theatres of war. The work of overthrow- 
ing Lee called into play other agencies besides the 
campaigns in Virginia which Grant superintended 
in person. Moreover, with regard to that frightful 
tale of bloodshed, from the Wilderness to Peters- 
burg, it may be doubted whether it really added 
anything to Grant's just reputation as a soldier. 

After the end of the war the full grade of General was created by 
Congress, and conferred successively upon Grant, Sherman, and 
Sheridan. At a much later date Schofield, on becoming general- 
in-chief, was made Lieutenant-General. During the Civil War 
the Confederate government usually gave the full rank of Gen- 
eral to the commanders of armies, and that of Lieutenant-General 
to the commanders of corps, which would limit the grade of 
Major-General to the commanders of divisions. 



320 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

To start with an army twice as large as the en- 
emy's, and then to throw away 60,000 men in killed 
and wounded without either inflicting a propor- 
tionate loss or advancing perceptibly 
Virginia cam- toward the goal of the campaign, is 
paign. hardly a record of great generalship, 

and it is not the kind of record which Grant had 
made for himself at Vicksburg and Chattanooga.^ 
When Grant, after three weeks of slaughter, ar- 
rived at the North Anna river, there could be no 
doubt that he had been outgeneralled, or — to use 
Colonel Dodge's happy expression — had received 
a complete stalemate.^ Then came the horror of 
Cold Harbor, which Grant himself, with manly 
candour, afterward deplored ; ^ and then the change 
of base to James river, a point which might have 
been directly reached with small loss ! 

In truth, when Grant first came to Virginia he 
evidently underrated his antagonist, and was pos- 

^ General Sherman once told me that that fearful amount of 
slaughter was after all necessary, because the South would never 
give up so long as it had an army of any size worth mentioning ; 
it was therefore a melancholy necessity to pound the life out of 
Lee's army, even at the cost of half a dozen lives for one, a price 
which the more populous North could afford. But to admit that 
Grant could not avoid paying such a price is to concede the supe- 
rior generalship of Lee. 

2 Dodge, A Bircfs-Eye View of our Civil War, new ed., 1897^ 
p. 214. 

3 Grant's Memoirs, ii. 276. 



Nashville 321 

sessed with the notion that the Army of the Poto- 
mac had never had its full fighting power drawn 
out. Perhaps he may have shared to some extent 
in the feeling to which another western general, 
of much smaller calibre, John Pope, gave such ob- 
jectionable expression two years before, when he 
declared his contempt for " certain expressions he 
found much in vogue, such as bases of ,^ 

Manoeuvring 

supplies and lines of retreat." In some- vs. hammer- 
what similar mood Grant is said to '^^^' 
have spoken slightingly of grand tactics. We are 
told that shortly before the battle of the* Wilder- 
ness, when Meade was saying that he proposed to 
manoeuvre thus and so, Grant interrupted him with 
the exclamation, " Oh, I never manoeuvre ! " ^ This 
anecdote harmonizes with the popular conception 
of Grant as a general who achieved success by 
" continuous hammering " rather than by strategi- 
cal or tactical devices. 

Yet if Grant really said that he never manoeu- 
vred, he must have been speaking very carelessly, 
for he certainly did manoeuvre a great deal, and 
to very good purpose. His campaign in the rear 
of Yicksburg was a series of splendid strategic 
manoeuvres, and it showed how military skill can 
achieve a vast result without great loss of life. So, 
too, with the Chattanooga campaign, it abounded 

1 Swinton's Army of the Potomac^ p. 440. 



322 The Mississippi "Valley in the Civil War 

in beautiful manoeuvres, helped by tlie skill wliicb 
Grant's ma- ^^^ advantage of accidents and thus 
noeuvres. made them " lucky accidents." Smith's 

operation at Brown's Ferry, which Grant adopted, 
was a masterpiece of manoeuvring ; the moving of 
Sherman's forces to the northern end of Mission- 
ary Kidge was another ; the storming of Lookout 
Mountain was developed from a manoeuvre in- 
tended to assist Sherman. The sending of Hooker 
to Kossville Gap, and the order to Thomas's four 
divisions to advance uj)on Missionary Ridge, were 
both manoeuvres designed to make Bragg weaken 
his right wing ; and as for the sublime spontaneous 
rush of Thomas's men, which crushed the enemy's 
centre, its success was prepared by the previous 
manoeuvres. Again, in Virginia, after the experi- 
ments at the Wilderness and Si3ottsylvania had 
shown that " continuous hammering " was exhaust- 
ing our own strength much quicker than the ene- 
my's. Grant's movements b}^ the left flank were 
manoeuvres, and very skilful ones. 

In truth, a thorough trial of the pounding policy 
made it clear that the obstacle to Federal success 
in Virginia did not consist in the fancy that the 
Army of the Potomac had not had its full fighting 
capacity drawn out, but in the fact that its antago- 
nist's movements were guided by superior genius. 
At the west Grant had been opposed by generals 



Nashville 323 

of varying degrees of ability, — Buckner, Sidney 
Johnston, Beauregard, Van Dorn, Pemberton, 
Bragg, — for the most part good soldiers, but none 
of them a demonstrated genius. In The only way 
Virginia he found himself opposed by *<> dispose of 
a general of the calibre of Turenne or 
Marlborough, and his eyes were gradually opened 
to the difference. By the end of July, 1864, after 
three months of alternate manoeuvring and ham- 
mering against an army scarcely half the size of 
his own, his policy was practically reduced to de- 
taining Lee at Petersburg until the whole of the 
Confederacy should be knocked away from behind 
him, leaving him in the air without a prop. 

This business of knocking away the Confederacy 
from Lee was performed by the splendid army 
with which Sherman, in May, 1864, started from 
Chattanooga toward Atlanta. It was work which 
would never have been performed under the old 
regime, with the marplot Halleck at the head of 
things ; for we know that some of Sherman's most 
important movements were strongly disapproved 
by that personage. What was needed . 
was the unity of design secured by operations 
having all great operations controlled ^®^"^^"- 
by a master intelligence, like Grant's, which could 
appreciate and assist the brilliant conceptions of 
Sherman. We must devote a very few words to 



324 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

the operations of the latter, before we go on to the 
decisive part that was finally played within the 
limits of the Mississippi valley. 

When Grant was made general-in-chief of the 
armies of the United States, Sherman succeeded 
him in the chief command at the West, and under 
Sherman were three armies with three superb com- 
manders : the Army of the Tennessee, under Mc- 
Pherson ; the Army of the Cumberland, under 
Thomas ; and the Army of the Ohio, formerly 
under Burnside, but now commanded by Schofield. 
At the beginning of May, 1864, this triple army 
^, . ^ covered a line about twenty miles in 

The armies of 

Sherman and length, a little south of Chattanooga : 
Johnston. McPherson on the right, with 25,000 
men, Thomas in the centre, with 60,000, and 
Schofield on the left, with 15,000 ; in all 100,000 
men, with 260 guns. Opposed to this force was a 
Confederate army of 65,000 men strongly fortified 
at Dalton, under command of Joseph Johnston, 
who among the southern generals ranked next in 
ability to Lee. Johnston had superseded Braxton 
Bragg, whom Mr. Davis had called to Richmond 
to be chief of his general staff. 

It was generally understood by the public that 
Sherman's grand object in this campaign was the 
capture of Atlanta, the principal city of Georgia 



NasJimlle 325 

between the mountains and the sea-coast. But 
Grant and Sherman well knew that a far more 
important object was the destruction or capture 
of Johnston's army,^ and this was likely to be 
no light task. Johnston was a master of Fabian 
strategy, whom it was next to impossible to bring 
to battle unless he saw a good chance of winning. 

At the very outset, indeed, Sherman seems to 
have had an opportunity of forcing Johnston to 
fight at a great disadvantage, or to retreat upon 
dangerous roads. Johnston expected to be attacked 
at Dalton, but Sherman sent McPherson, with his 
25,000 men, through Snake Creek Gap, to seize 
Resaca and there in full force oppose Johnston's 
inevitably consequent retreat from Dalton. If 
this movement succeeded, it was hoped that John- 
ston's southward retreat would be deflected east- 
ward to Spring Place, in which event 

• 1 1 1 1 1 c c 1 • How Sher- 

we might have captured halt oi his man lost a 
arm}^ "Such an opportunity," says goWen 
Sherman, "does not occur twice in a 
single life, but at the critical moment McPherson 
seems to have been a little timid." ^ Sherman 
thought that McPherson ought to have put his 
whole force astride of the railroad at Resaca ; but 

1 " Neither Atlanta, nor Aiagusta, nor Savannah, was the objec- 
tive, but the ' army of Jos. Johnston,' go where it might." Sher- 
man's Memoirs, ii. 26. 

2 Sherman's Memoirs, ii. 34. 



326 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

Johnston asserts that if this had been done, he 
would himself, on letting go his hold upon Dalton, 
have thrown his entire army upon McPherson and 
crushed him.^ This seems probable. For the' 
purpose which Sherman had in view, McPherson's 
force was much too small, and its commander did 
wisely in taking up a strong defensive position 
west of Resaca. Sherman's mistake lay in not 
following Thomas's advice and sending Thomas 
himself, with his 60,000 men, through Snake 
Creek Gap, instead of McPherson. It would then 
have been difficult for Johnston to avoid a fight 
with Thomas, in the course of which McPherson 
and Schofield, with 40,000 men, might have been 
thrown upon his rear, achieving his destruction. 

Such a chance, as Sherman tridy says, does not 
occur twice in a lifetime, and the wily Johnston 
took good care that it should not again be offered 
to Sherman. It remained for the latter to avail 
himself of his numerical superiority to outflank 
his antagonist and push him back by turning his 
strong positions one after another, 
pushed back This work was done in masterly 
upon Atlanta, fashion until by slow stages Johnston 
was driven back upon Atlanta. During all this 
time, from May 5 to July 17, the two armies 
were almost in contact with each other, and there 

1 Battles and Leaders, iv. 266. 




AND THOMAS IN 1864 



Nashville 327 

was frequent skirmishing, but little waste of life, 
except at Kenesaw Mountain, June 27. On 
that occasion, mindful of his primary object, Sher- 
man tried the effect of an assault, but desisted 
when he saw that he was losing faster than the 
enemy. The Union army lost 3000 men, the Con- 
federates scarcely 500. 

In this sort of campaign, despite Sherman's rare 
skill and resourcefulness, the element of time was 
working against him and in favour of Johnston. 
The victorious advance southward was daily length- 
ening Sherman's line of communications and short- 
ening Johnston's ; and as the former was weakened 
by the necessity of detaching men to guard the 
long line, so the latter was more and more relieved 
from such a necessity. Apparently, then, the 
time was approaching when the Confederate gen- 
eral might no longer think it worth while to de- 
cline battle. The experience of Fair Oaks, in 
May, 1862, showed that Johnston could strike 
quickly and heavily when the occasion offered it- 
self. But as the armies drew near to Atlanta, the 
patience of Jefferson Davis was ex- ^ , ^ 

^ Johnston 

hausted. His feelings toward Joseph superseded 
Johnston were unfriendly and unfair, ^ **° * 
and appearances now seemed to justify the blame 
which he was ready to visit upon him. On the 
17th of July he removed Johnston from command, 



328 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

and appointed in his place one of his corps-com- 
manders, John Bell Hood. 

This general, a native of Kentucky, was just en- 
tering upon his thirty-fourth year. He had been 
graduated at West Point in 1853, and had then 
seen some rough service fighting the Comanche 
Indians, after which he was for some time a cav- 
alry instructor at West Point. At the beginning 
of the Civil War he entered the Confederate ser- 
vice, and soon attained the rank of brigadier-gen- 
eral. At Gaines's Mill, where he was severely 
wounded, his brigade lost more than half its num- 
Hood'spre- ^^r, and he was brevetted major-gen- 
vious career, ^pj^j q^ the field. He was in most of 
the Virginia battles of 1862. At Gettysburg he 
lost the use of an arm ; afterward, going west with 
Longstreet, he was in the thick of the fighting at 
Chickamauga, where he lost a leg. Prom Dalton 
to Atlanta he commanded a corps with the rank 
of lieutenant-general, and now, on his promotion 
to the command of an army, he was made a full 
general. 

When the news of Hood's appointment reached 
the Union army, it formed the subject of some 
conversation between Sherman and McPherson, as 
they sat on the steps of the porch of a country 
house. " McPherson had been of the same class 
at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. 



Nashmlle 329 

We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious 
and prepared for hard fighting, because Hood, 
though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great 
mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, deter- 
mined, and rash man." ^ This opinion what the 
is not discordant with that of General Union gen- 

erals thought 

Howard, who writes, "Just at this ofhisap- 
time, much to our comfort and to his pomtment. 
surprise, Johnston was removed and Hood placed 
in command of the Confederate army." ^ In 
truth. Hood's valour outran his discretion, and he 
had one of the gravest faults in a commander, 
impatience. His reputation was that of a hard 
fighter, who was put in command in order to fight, 
and may be said to have held his command on 
condition of plentiful fighting. Mr. Davis was 
tired of Fabius, and preferred to try his luck with 
Terentius Varro. 

On July 20 Hood attacked the Federal army at 
Peach Tree creek, near Atlanta, and a week of 
desultory fighting ensued, in which he lost perhaps 
8000 men without accomplishing anything.^ The 

^ Sherman's Memoirs^ ii. 75. 

2 Battles and Leaders, iv. 313. 

^ In one of these fights, on July 22, the nohle McPherson, 
one of the best generals in the service of the United States, 
was killed. Howard was appointed by Sherman to succeed 
McPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, much to 
the disgust of Hooker, who resigned and went home. Sherman 



330 The Mississij^j^i Valley in the Civil War 

superior skill of Sherman became more and more 
Hoodevacu- apparent, until at the beginning of 
ates Atlanta. September, when Hood was on the 
point of being cooped up in Atlanta, he saved his 
army by evacuating it. 

With this result Sherman had small reason to 
feel pleased. At last Hood had really scored one 
against him. Of course it was desirable that the 
Federals should possess Atlanta. At the North its 
capture was regarded as a great victory, and it 
came at a very opportune moment, just in the heat 
of the presidential canvass. It opened the eyes 
of many people to the silliness of the Democratic 
platform in pronouncing the war a failure. There 
can be no doubt that the acquisition of Atlanta 
was a very useful achievement, which reflected 
great credit upon Sherman. Nevertheless, the 
escape of Hood's army was a serious disappoint- 
ment ; it contained the seeds of possible disaster 
to the Union cause, and it instantly made Sher- 
man's situation more or less awkward. The only 
hope of the Confederates, at this late date, was in 
prolonging the agony until the patience of the 
North should be exhausted. Should General Mc- 
Clellan, the Democratic candidate for the presi- 
dency, be elected over Mr. Lincoln in November, 

was surely right, for Hooker, with all his dash, had abundantly- 
proved himself unfit for any high command involving great re- 
sponsibility. 



Nashville 331 

it would strongly indicate that such a moment was 
approaching. In Virginia Lee's power j^.^ , 
of resistance seemed interminable, and problems for 
more than once the idea of marching ^^"^^^• 
to Grant's assistance, after Atlanta should have 
fallen, had crossed Sherman's mind ; but how could 
such a feat be attempted without first destroying 
Hood's army ? On tlie other hand, it would not 
do to keep the victorious Union army inactive in 
Atlanta ; that would be acknowledging a stalemate. 
While Sherman was considering the situation. 
Hood helped to simplify it by assuming the offen- 
sive and threatening his long line of communica- 
tions. To meet the exigency Sherman sent Thomas 
back to Nashville, and left one corps, ^ , 
under Slocum, to hold Atlanta, while sumesthe 
he moved in pursuit of Hood. On ° «^"sive 
the 5th of October a detachment of Hood's 
army attacked Allatoona, which had been made a 
depot of supplies for the Federals ; but the Union 
commander at that point. General Corse, made a 
superb defence, and the rebels were repulsed with 
heavy loss. A week later Sherman was at Rome, 
while Hood moved from Resaca to Dalton, which 
he captured with its garrison of 1000 men. By 
October 15 Hood was a few miles south of Lafay- 
ette, and Sherman had arrived at Snake Creek 
Gap, where he had been operating five months 



332 The Mississippi Valley hi the Civil War 

before. These retrograde movements caused some 
anxiety at the North, for it looked as if Sherman's 
grip on Georgia might be loosening. But he never 
let go Atlanta, nor did he relinquish his scheme 
for marching to the coast and dealing a blow at 
Virginia. After much discussion he had prevailed 
upon Grant to sanction such a movement, pro- 
vided that Hood's army could first be disposed of. 
There was always a reasonable hope of entrapping 
the fiery Hood into a combat. Indeed, on October 
16 he came very near offering himself as a prey 
to Sherman, but all his officers agreed that it was 
not safe to risk a battle. Against this unanimous 
opposition Hood did not feel like contending, and 
thus the existence of his army was prolonged for 
two months more. 

Still, Hood could accomplish nothing by en- 
trenching himself and waiting upon events. Action 
was as necessary for him as for his adversary. So 
he conceived the plan of striking northward into 
Tennessee, in the hope of drawing Sherman after 
him. In this case the Union general would have to 

let go Atlanta, and virtually surrender 
up his mind ^ ^^^ advantages he had gained by 
to invade j^^g summer's work. But if Sherman 

should not follow him, then Hood felt 
able to demolish any force that might oppose him 
in Tennessee. He believed that he could capture 



Nashville 333 

and hold Nashville, and make it a base from which 
to invade Kentucky. In the latter state he hoped 
to find many recruits and to threaten Cincinnati, 
as Kirby Smith had done two years before. After 
a victorious campaign of this sort, he might take 
his army eastward through some of the gaps in the 
Cumberland Mountains and fall upon Grant at 
Petersburg. Then after defeating Grant, the com- 
bined armies of Lee and Hood might either turn 
and rend Sherman, in case of his being within 
reach, or else might face to the north and march 
with irresistible majesty upon the city of Washing- 
ton. Such were the far-reaching thoughts which 
Hood entertained on two October nights in bivouac 
in a beautiful valley near Lafayette.^ 

From that point Hood moved to Gadsden, in 
Alabama, while Sherman followed as far as Gayles- 
ville. Hood felt it necessary to leave his cavalry, 
commanded by Wheeler, in Georgia, to watch and 
harass Sherman ; and this force he expected to 
replace by the cavalry of Forrest, who was then in 
the western part of Tennessee. On the last day 
of October Hood arrived at Tuscum- jjood's fatal 
bia, where he expected to find abun- delay at Tus- 
dant supplies for his northward march 
upon Nashville. But the supplies had been woe- 
fully delayed, and the railroad from Corinth was 

1 See his own account in Battles and Leaders, iv. 426, 427. 



334 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

broken in places, so that Hood was compelled to 
wait three weeks at Tuscumbia ; and that delay 
worked his ruin. 

By this time Sherman had made up his mind 
what to do. He would reinforce Thomas and leave 
him in Tennessee to deal with Hood, while he him- 
self would return to Atlanta, and thence move in 
force upon Virginia. But as the distance from 
Atlanta to Petersburg is 500 miles as the crow 
flies, and the whole intervening space was a difficult 
country possessed by the enemy, it was desirable 
first to march to the sea-coast, and there establish 
Sherman 3- secure base for the northward march 

leaves Hood to Virginia. On the 2d of November 

and marches • i /->« ? • • 

to the sea- Sherman received (jrant s permission 
coast. tQ undertake this great movement at 

once, on the understanding that Thomas was to 
be left strong enough to keep Hood from doing 
mischief. On the 15th Sherman started, taking 
with him four infantry corps, numbering 63,000 
men, besides Kilpatrick's cavalry, 5000 in number. 
The march through Georgia met with little serious 
opposition. It ended on December 23 with the 
capture of Savannah, including 150 heavy guns 
and 25,000 bales of cotton, as a Christmas present 
for Uncle Sam. From this point the far more 
arduous northward march through the Carolinas 
was to begin. 



NashmlU 335 

We have now to see how Thomas fared during 
the critical weeks after Sherman's departure, and 
the question at once arises, Was he left with suffi- 
cient strength for the task assigned him ? It was 
a task of supreme importance. If Hood should 
defeat Thomas, or elude him and capture Nash- 
ville, the whole country would con- Ouffhtnot 
demn Sherman's movement as fool- Sherman 

I T . T . . . T to have 

nardy, involving an immense immedi- jeftmore 
ate risk for an ultimate gain that was men with 
problematical until the immediate risk 
should be eliminated. Sherman's success was really 
wrapped up in that of Thomas. Considering this 
fact, would it not have been more prudent in Sher- 
man to have taken only three corps, say 50,000 men, 
along with him, and thus have spared an additional 
13,000 for Thomas ? In the light of the ensuing 
events, it certainly seems that it would have been 
wiser.^ 

The force which Sherman left behind for Thomas 
consisted of the Fourth corps, under 
Stanley, 12,000 men, the Twenty-third forces, pre- 
corps of 10,000 men, commanded by sent and 
Schofield, and about 5000 cavalry, now 
to be commanded by General James Harrison Wil- 
son, whom Grant sent from Virginia with the mes- 

^ See Ropes's masterly paper on General Sherman, in Papers 
of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, x. 144. 



336 The Mississipiyi Valley in the Civil War 

sage, " I believe he will add fifty per cent, to the 
effectiveness of your cavalry." Altogether, this 
force of 27,000 was inadequate to cope with Hood's 
40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry led by the re- 
doubtable Forrest. But Sherman sent to Missouri 
for an additional force of 14,000 men, commanded 
by Andrew Jackson Smith, *of the regular army, 
an able general. In September the irrepressible 
Sterling Price had bounced up once more in Mis- 
souri, and Smith had been busy in driving him out 
of the state. So important was it to get Smith 
and his men into Tennessee without delay that 
Grant sent his chief of staff all the way to St. 
Louis to urge the business forward. It was hoped 
that they would be ready to leave St. Louis on 
November 10, but the march across the whole state 
of Missouri consumed many days. Smith did not 
arrive in St. Louis until the 24th, and then it 
was not until the last day of the month that he 
arrived at Nashville and effected a junction with 
Thomas. At the same time a crowd of some 5000 
belated men, returning from various parts of the 
country to their commands, were sent up to Nash- 
ville from Chattanooga and organized into a pro- 
visional division, under General Steedman. Other 
floating molecules, aggregating into a mass of 4000 
or so, and including several regiments of coloured 
troops, came in early in December, and likewise 



Nashville 337 

the cavalry was doubled. So that at last General 
Thomas found himself at the head of a motley- 
host, numbering from 50,000 to 55,000 men. 

Until the end of November, however, he had 
only about 27,000, so that it was necessary to avoid 
a battle. Hood's long delay at Tuscumbia — an 
accident upon which no one could have reckoned 

— allowed the Union army time for concentration ; 
but the incidents of the anxious fortnight after 
Sherman's departure abundantly prove that there 
was an element of rashness in not leaving one 
more army corps behind. Thomas could have 
placed such a force at Eastport on the Tennessee 
river, which would probably have spoiled Hood's 
plans for crossing. 

In the absence of any such obstacle the Con- 
federate general, having obtained his supplies and 
been joined by the larger part of his cavalry, 
crossed the great river at Florence, and began 
his northward march November 19. Hood's north- 
Thomas was at Nashville, intent upon ^^^^ ^^rch. 
gathering troops, and the bulk of his little army 

— the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, with Scho- 
field in command — was at Pulaski. By the 22d 
Hood's advance had reached Lawrenceburg, on 
the Federal flank, so that Schofield was obliged 
to retreat upon Columbia. After brisk marching 
he reached that place on the 24th, barely in time 



338 The Mississij^pi ^Valley in the Civil War 

to anticipate Forrest in securing the bridges and 
fords of Duck river. Had the rebel cavah-y ar- 
rived first upon the scene, they might have cut 
Schofield asunder from Thomas, and thus have 
brought swift ruin upon the Federals. On the 
27th Schofield's army crossed the river and de- 
stroyed the bridges, while Wilson's cavalry under- 
took to hold the fords. 

In spite of Wilson's utmost efforts Forrest got 
his horsemen across the river on the 28th, and 
pushed the Union cavalry northward, leaving the 
way clear for the Confederate infantry to cross. 
This made it necessary for Schofield to retreat 
upon the little town of Franklin, on the Har- 
Schofield's peth river. On the way thither was 
retreat situated the village of Spring Hill, 

Spring Hill ^ Centre of wagon-roads which it was 
to FrankHn. all-important to secure. On the 29th 
Stanley was sent ahead with two divisions, one of 
which he found it necessary to leave on the road 
to guard an exposed point, while with the other 
he pressed on and occupied Spring Hill. The sun 
went down that evening upon a most anxious and 
critical situation. The Union cavalry found its 
energies absorbed in preventing Forrest from clos- 
ing the way to Franklin ; while at various points 
were caught glimpses of Confederate infantry. 
There was even some slight skirmishing with the 



Nashville 339 

division of Patrick Cleburne, one of the ablest 
and boldest officers in the Confederate service. 
By two liours after sunset Hood had at least 
20,000 infantry close by Spring Hill, and why 
Stanley's solitary division was not overwhelmed 
before daybreak is one of the mysteries that may 
perhaps never be explained.^ Had the enemy been 
led by hesitating men of the McClellan type, or 
by puzzle-headed men like Burnside or Pope, the 
loss of such an opportunity would not have been 
strange; but when we consider Hood's well-nigh 
reckless audacity and the rare combination of skill 
and energy in Cleburne afid Forrest, the escape of 
Schofield's little army that night seems marvellous 
indeed. 

Its march next morning, in spite of an occasional 
brush with the enemy's cavalry, was not seriously 
molested. By noon the whole force was in position 
in front of the town of Franklin, excepting Colo- 
nel Opdycke's rear-guard, which was still feeling 

^ Colonel Henry Stone, of Thomas's staff, declares that " a 
single Confederate brigade, like Adams's or Cockrell's or Maney's, 
— veterans since Shiloh, — planted squarely across the pike, either 
south or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented 
Schofield's retreat, and daylight would have found his whole 
force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its 
numbers, to assault whom would have been madness, and to avoid 
whom would have been impossible." Battles and Leaders^ iv. 
446. 



340 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

the enemy. The Federal line, entrenched upon 
rising ground, was convex in shape, 

Position of • i i n i i tt 

the Federal resting Doth flanks upon the Harpeth 
array at river. About half a mile from its 

Franklin. 

extreme left this line of battle crossed 
the turnpike from Columbia. The space between 
river and turnpike was occupied by Jacob Cox's 
division of the Twenty-third corps, while beyond 
the pike for another half mile stretched Ruger's 
division of the same ; the remaining space on the 
right was filled by Kimball's division of the Fourth 
corps, while Wood's division had advanced beyond 
the river with the long wagon-trains. On a bluff 
beyond the river Federal batteries were planted, 
commanding the space in front of the Federal 
line. Wilson's cavalry were also north and east 
of the river, to check any turning movement on 
the part of the rebel cavalry. 

In the Federal line of works, just west of the 
turnpike, were two regiments of Andrew Smith's 
long-wished-for corps from Missouri. These vet- 
erans had just arrived, and with them was a raw 
regiment from Ohio, which had not yet had its 
" baptism of fire." There were about forty pieces 
of artillery in the works. 

While these admirable arrangements had been 
quickly made to receive the enemy's attack, it was 
hoped that he might defer it until the morrow. 










FRANKLIN, NOVEMBER 30, 1864 



r 



Nashville 341 

Early in the afternoon a telegram from Thomas 
asked Schofield if he could detain Hood at Frank- 
lin for three days. Schofield replied that he 
thought not, whereupon Thomas ordered him to 
retreat that night as far as the Brent- j^etreat upon 
wood Hills, in front of Nashville. Nashville or- 
While these messages were going over 
the wires, the impetuous Hood, who had fully 
awakened to the magnitude of the opportunity 
which he had lost the previous night, was prepar- 
ing his charge — the desperate and mighty rush of 
two army corps — against the strong Federal line. 
Excellent as the Federal position was in nearly 
all respects, it had in it one element of weakness 
which came well-nigh proving fatal. Of Wagner's 
division of the Fourth corps, which had been serv- 
ing very efficiently as rear-guard, the first brigade 

— Colonel 0]3dycke's — had taken ^^ alarming 
position within the lines, as a reserve Sunder, 
just west of the turnpike. The other two brigades 

— Lane's and Conrad's — had made a temporary 
halt upon a knoll rather more than a quarter of a 
mile to the front of the lines. They were not en- 
trenched, as it was of course not intended to leave 
them there, but in the hurry of the day's proceed- 
ings they had not yet been withdrawn, when Cle- 
burne and Brown, with 10,000 men on the double- 
quick, came upon them like an avalanche. There 



342 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

was nothing to do but to run for the Federal lines, 
and (as the Koran would say) it was an evil quar- 
ter of a mile thither. The Federal soldiers in line 
for some distance each side of the turnpike were 
obliged to withhold their fire for fear of killing 
their comrades, and so the onward rush of Cle- 
burne's and Brown's divisions was virtually unop- 
A critical posed. In wild enthusiasm, while the 
moment. welkin rang with the " rebel yell," the 

Confederates swarmed into the Union entrench- 
ments along with Lane's and Conrad's fugitives, of 
whom they captured nearly 1000. In a twinkling 
they scattered the raw regiment from Ohio, they 
seized the Union batteries right and left of the 
road, and for just a moment victory seemed within 
their grasp. A fatal rent seemed to have been 
made in the Union line of battle. 

But it was only for a moment. The act of over- 
whelming the Lane and Conrad brigades and the 
capture of so many prisoners had slightly retarded 
the rush of Brown and Cleburne, so that Stewart's 
corps, which was likewise charging on the double- 
quick between turnpike and river, was a few min- 
utes before them in approaching the Federal line. 
The Confed- ^ withering fire from Cox's division 
eratesarere- soon made Stewart recoil. Then as 
Cleburne's division rushed over the 
Union works it received a terrific oblique fire from 



Nashville 343 

Cox's men which shook it from end to end. The 
Lane and Conrad brigades quickly faced about 
and were joined by Opdycke's, and a general rally 
about the turnpike soon expelled the Confederates 
and hermetically closed the temporary gap. 

It was a bitter disappointment for Hood's men. 
Again and again they renewed the attack with 
bravery and pertinacity almost incredi- and de- 
ble. But against the storm of grape Seated, 
and canister and musketry in front, together with 
the enfilading fire of the batteries across the river, 
no human gallantry could stand ; and by nightfall 
the repulse of the Confederates was complete. 

Meanwhile an important cavalry battle was 
fought on the further side of the river. A large 
force of the enemy's cavalry, under Chalmers, 
crossed from the Lewisburg pike with the design 
of operating upon the Federal connections north- 
ward ; but Wilson met them with a superior force, 
and the afternoon was consumed in an obstinate 
battle, which ended in driving^ the whole ^. , 

' ° Chalmers 

rebel cavalry to the south side of the defeated by 
Harpeth. During the night the Union ^^1'^°- 
army continued its retreat to Nashville, taking 
with it all the wagon-train, together with more 
than 1000 prisoners and 33 flags captured from 
the enemy. 

When we bear in mind that the battle of Frank- 



344 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

lin began at four o'clock in the short afternoon of 
the last day of November, the destruction of life 
seems positively awful. More than 8000 men were 
killed and wounded, — nearly 6000 on the Confed- 
erate side, about 2300 on the Union side.^ The 
Awful losses of the Confederates bore melan- 

slaughter. choly testimony to their magnificent 
fighting. Especially noticeable was their loss of 
officers, including eleven generals. Among the 
dead was Patrick Cleburne, the " bravest of the 
brave." 

On the 1st of December, when Schofield's troops 
arrived at Nashville, they were joined by the main 
body of Andrew Smith's veterans from Missouri ; 
and soon afterward by the Steedman 
arrives at division, the negro regiments, and other 
NashviUe; miscellaneous troops already enumer- 
ated, swelling the numbers of the army 
to about 43,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. On 
December 2 Hood's army arrived upon the scene 
and entrenched itself upon a range of low hills 
about a mile distant from the Federal lines. As 

1 I remember reading a newspaper account the day after the 
battle, in which the writer's phraseology unconsciously gave a 
delicious illustration of the purely professional point of view of 
a sensation-monger, e. g., " The carnage compared favourably with 
that of any battle during the war ! " The italicizing is mine, of 
course. 



Nashville 345 

his force did not exceed 38,000 men, the Confed- 
erate general could not now afford to offer battle. 
He hoped for reinforcements from Texas, and 
should Thomas attack him before their arrival, he 
believed that the assault upon entrenchments would 
meet with a bloody repulse, as so often happened. 
So Hood remained in his strong position and 
awaited the course of events. 

The 2d of December was the first day in all 
this campaign when the Union army was strong 
enough to assume the aggressive. The great and 
decisive battle of Nashville, about to be described, 
was fought on the 15th and 16th. Surely the in- 
terval was not a long one when we consider the 
preparations that were necessary to in- 
sure a complete and final success. The ^^s not ready 
material of Thomas's army was mostly *« attack 
excellent, but it had been hastily scraped 
together, and some work of organization and equip- 
ment was required. Especially important were the 
needs of the cavalry. Of this Thomas had a large 
force, with a very able commander, and he intended 
to make it play a great part in the coming battle. 
He did not contemplate a victory like Shiloh or 
Gettysburg, in which the enemy should simply be 
compelled to retire from the field. Such victories 
had been important in their time and place, but 
something more was needed now. Thomas meant 



346 The Mississijoi^i Vdlley in the Civil War 

to make the battle at Nashville a " crowning 
mercy," a Waterloo which should wipe the de- 
feated army out of existence, and for this work he 
counted much upon his cavalry. But Wilson's 
men had been toiling incessantly for six weeks, 
and the loss of horses had been excessive. It had 
been found necessary to send officers through the 
states of Kentucky and Tennessee, impressing 
horses. The barns of farmers, the spacious stables 
of street-car companies, even the circuses, were 
called upon, and handed over their animals with- 
out a murmur. The work went on briskly, and at 
the end of a week, December 9, the 12,000 cavalry- 
men were fairly mounted and equipped for battle.^ 
Meanwhile there was much excitement, not only 
at Washington, but at Grant's headquarters at 
City Point, on James river. That Lincoln and 
Stanton should have remembered Bragg' s aggres- 
sive movements of two years before, that they 
should have felt nervously anxious lest the dash- 
ing Hood should contrive to elude Thomas and 
make a rush into Kentucky, was no more than 
natural. But it does seem strange that Grant, 
usually so imperturbable, should have had his head 
turned ever so little by the feeling of panic. One 
would suppose that his own ample experience of 

^ See General Wilson's interesting paper, in Battles and Lead- 
ers, iv. 467. 



Nashville 347 

the vexations and misunderstandings which beset 
a commander would have kept him Grant's 
patient for at least a week, especially impatience. 
in dealing with a man of the known character and 
calibre of Thomas. But Grant's despatches from 
City Point to Nashville on December 2, 5, 6, 
and 8, show unusual anxiety and some irritation, 
along with an imperfect comprehension of the cir- 
cumstances, as in his second despatch of Decem- 
ber 2, in which he suggested that Thomas ought to 
have advanced to Franklin instead of withdrawing 
Schofield to Nashville.^ On December 9 Grant's 
patience gave way, and an order was written re- 
lieving Thomas and appointing Schofield in his 
place. The order was not sent, but a telegram 
from Halleck informed Thomas that Grant was 
much dissatisfied with his delay. The grand old 
soldier calmly replied, " I feel conscious that I 
have done everything in my power, and that the 
troops could not have been got ready before this. 
If General Grant should order me to be relieved, 
I will submit without a murmur." The same even- 
ing a telegram from Grant informed him that the 

1 Nevertheless the despatch goes on to say, with Grant's cus- 
tomary candour, " At this distance, however, I may err as to the 
best method of dealing with the enemy." Grant's Memoirs, ii. 
382. If he had been on the spot. Grant would have seen that our 
position at Franklin could be much more easily turned by the 
enemy than our position at Nashville. 



348 Tlie Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

order relieving him was revoked, and thus he 
learned of the existence of such an order without 
knowing its exact purport. 

The harrowing ordeal, however, was not yet 
over. That 9th of December was the first of a 
series of days of freezing rain. Roads and fields 
were covered with a glare of ice, making cavalry 
operations impossible. A council of war on the 
10th unanimously declared that a battle could not 
be prudently undertaken until the ice should melt. 
On the 11th the order came from Grant, " Delay 
no longer for weather or reinforcements." But 
Thomas waited for the indispensable thaw, and 
Grant again lost patience. At that moment Gen- 
eral Logan happened to be at City Point, and 
Grant hurried him off to Nashville, 

Logan's 

journey to with an order in his pocket directing 
Louisville Thomas to hand over to him the com- 

and Grant's 

journey to mand of the army ; but Grant enjoined 

Washington. j^ ^^^^^ ^^^^j^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ 

known until he should arrive upon the scene, and 
then, if Thomas had moved, not to deliver it at all. 
After Logan had started. Grant's restlessness rose 
to such a pitch that he decided to go to Nashville 
himself, and went as far as Washington, where he 
found the following telegram from Thomas to Hal- 
leck : " The ice having melted to-day, the enemy 
will be attacked to-morrow morning." Thus was 



Nashville 349 

Grant saved from consummating a colossal piece 
of injustice. As for Logan, when he had gone as 
far as Louisville he heard news which assured him 
that he need go no further.^ 

The morning of December 15 was soft and 
muddy, not the best sort of day for the evolu- 
tions of either infantry or cavalry, but infinitely 

1 Grant's account of this affair in his Memoirs, chap. Ix., shows 
a coldness of appreciation of Thomas which is not creditable to 
the writer. For instance, Grant says he was afraid that Hood 
might make a dash northward, and that " we might have to send 
troops from the East to head him off, . . . General Thomas's 
movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effec- 
tive in defence." Such a statement, made long after the war, 
demands qualification. Effectiveness in defence would hardly 
apply to the handling of the Union army at Nashville ; one might 
as well speak of Napoleon as " effective in defence " at Auster- 
litz. As to " slowness," I have been told that there was a delib- 
erateness about Thomas's personal movements and his manner of 
speech very unlike the electric impulsiveness which was so charm- 
ing in Sherman. But that is a very different thing from lack 
of promptness or celerity in the despatch of business, and Thomas 
was always prompt, while his work in that December fortnight 
while Grant was nagging him was really a marvfel of celerity. 
The fact is, that ever since Shiloh there has been a grain of 
jealousy between the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of 
the Cumberland. They sometimes enjoy girding at each other, 
and one of the stock themes is the alleged " slowness " of the 
latter army and its commanders, which is simply one of the 
numerous commonplaces that are not true. Grant, I think, 
shared in this jealousy, perhaps unconsciously, and this may 
have affected his mental attitude toward Thomas. 



350 The Mississijypi Valley in the Civil War 

better than tlie universal glare of ice that had pre- 
ceded. The j)osition of the Union army was one 
of great excellence, whether for attack or for de- 
fence. The city of Nashville, situated in a pocket 
formed by a great double curve of the Cumberland 
river, was encompassed in front by low hills, upon 
which a strong line of entrenchments 

Position of ., ^ iii 

Thomas's With occasioual redoubts had been 
army, built all the way from the river-bank 

December 15. . i • i i i i 

above the city to the river-bank below. 
This interior defensive line was manned with 
" quartermaster's forces." In front of this line, 
on the extreme Union left, between the Lebanon 
turnpike and the Chattanooga railway, was sta- 
tioned Steedman's division. To the rear and right 
of Steedman, but within the interior line, was 
massed the Twenty-third corps, commanded by 
Schofield, and intended to play the part of a re- 
serve. To the right of Schofield came the Fourth 
corps, now commanded by the veteran Wood, since 
Stanley had been wounded in the battle of Frank- 
lin. A salient in Wood's line, where the Hills- 
boro turnpike crossed Laurens Hill, occupied 
nearly the centre of the Union battle-front. To 
the right of Wood came the Sixteenth corps, 
under Andrew Smith, with its right wing refused 
and extending beyond the Charlotte turnpike. 
Both Wood and Smith were strongly entrenched. 




ENlWOOD ^ / 
HILLS 1 






NASHVILLE, DECEMBER 15, 1864 



Nashville 351 

On tlie extreme right, between the Charlotte road 
and the river, was stationed Wilson's fine corps of 
cavalry. Behind the city the river was patrolled 
by gunboats. Nearly the entire space occupied 
by the Federal army was enclosed by two small 
streams, Richland and Brown's creeks, rising in 
the Brentwood Hills, four miles south of Nash- 
ville, and flowing into the Cumberland river. On 
the high crest of the Brentwood range stood the 
humble abode of a venerable dame, after whom 
the road passing by was known as the Granny 
White pike. About midway between Granny 
White's house and the city the space between the 
forks of Richland and Brown's creeks was occu- 
pied by a low and somewhat broken line of hills, 
which extended northeastward as far Position of 
as the Chattanooga railway. Upon Hood's army, 
this line of hills Hood's army was entrenched. 
Cheatham's corps was on the extreme right, by 
the railway ; the centre, commanded by Stephen 
Decatur Lee, of South Carolina, stretched across 
the Franklin pike ; and on the left Stewart's corps 
reached to the Hillsboro road, where its left wing 
was sharply refused. A stone wall, running along 
the roadside for 1000 yards or so, was utilized as 
a screen for rifle-pits, and at three commanding 
points strong batteries were planted, while about 
a mile to the southwest, beyond a fork of Richland 



352 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

creek, two detached hills were crowned with re- 
doubts. A further attempt was made to strengthen 
the Confederate left by placing a rather solid skir- 
mish line in front of Stewart's corps, terminating 
in an entrenched position on Montgomery Hill, 
close to the Hillsboro pike, and not more than half 
a mile distant from Wood's salient upon Laurens 
Hill. 

The situation boded no good to the Confederate 
army. These defences of its left wing were but 
flimsy as compared with the solid masses of Fed- 
eral infantry and cavalry west of the Hillsboro 

„ pike. It was hardly prudent in Hood, 

Hood's peril. ^ . ^ ^ ' 

under the circumstances, to accept bat- 
tle. If he had been a Stonewall Jackson, he might 
have attempted to withdraw stealthily from his 
position and verify Grant's forebodings by slip- 
ping across the Cumberland river and dashing 
northward. But in presence of the lynx-eyed 
Thomas even Jackson might have proved unequal 
to such an exploit. Perhaps Hood might have 
fared better had he taken position in the first place 
back upon the Brentwood Hills. But in any case, 
with only 38,000 men against Thomas's 55,000, he 
could hardly look for victory. Clearly the worst 
thing Hood could do was to diminish the numbers 
which he could put into the battle, and this mis- 
take he did commit. He kept Forrest, with the 



Nashville 353 

greater part of the cavalry and three brigades of 
infantry, patrolling the country east of Nashville, 
" to drain it of persons liable to military service, 
animals suitable for army purposes, and subsist- 
ence supplies." 1 When the battle was fought, 
Forrest was too far astray to be promptly recalled, 
and Hood's only reliance against the powerful 
Union cavalry was the division of Chalmers, with 
which he watched the Charlotte turnpike. 

Thomas's plan of battle was to make a left wheel 
with his whole right wing, pivoting upon Wood's 
salient at Laurens Hill. At the proper moment 
Wood might threaten the rebel works on Mont- 
gomery Hill, or perhaps attack and Thomas's 
carry them, and press on against Stew- p^^"- 
art's angle. Meanwhile Steedman was to make a 
vigorous demonstration against Cheatham's right 
upon the Chattanooga railway, and Schofield's 
reserve was to play such a part as circumstances 
might determine. 

The early morning of December 15 was foggy, 
but a hot sun had burned off the vapours before 
nine o'clock. The movements began at daybreak. 
Steedman crossed Brown's creek and began a de- 
monstration that was virtually an assault, and kept 
Cheatham's corps busy all day. This attack, more- 
over, neutralized Lee's corps and made it useless ; 

^ Campaigns of Forrest^ p. 634. 



354 The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War 

for when the alarming pressure was felt upon 
Lee and Stewart's left, Lee could not substan- 

Cheathara tially reinforce either Stewart or Cheat- 
ham without leaving either a gap or a 
very thin line at the Franklin pike, and this he 
dared not do lest the garrison of the interior Fed- 
eral line opjDosite should sally from its works and, 
charging straight down the Franklin road, pierce 
the rebel centre. 

Observe, dear reader, the brilliancy of Thomas's 
tactics. Here at the outset, by employing only 
Steedman's division and keeping his " quartermas- 
ter's forces " in their works, he eliminates Lee and 
Cheatham, two thirds of the rebel army, from the 
Superb problem ! The serious work before 

tactics. jjijjj jjQ^ jg ^Q pulverize Stewart, and 

for this purpose he can use Wilson, Smith, Wood, 
and Schofield, nearly his whole force ! This has 
the true Napoleonic flavour; it smacks of Aus- 
terlitz. 

The grand wheel with the Federal right wing 
began early, but an hour or more was lost by some 
of Smith's infantry at first getting in the way of 
Wilson's cavalry. No serious harm was done, how- 
Advance of ever. Wilson was presently in position 
the Federal on Smith's right, driving Chalmers 
wmg. steadily back. By noon the entire Fed- 
eral right wing had wheeled past the Hardin pike 



JVashville 355 

and across Richland creek, and formed a line paral- 
lel to the Hillsboro pike, extending from the pivot 
on Laurens Hill southward to the detached hills thai 
were crowned with rebel redoubts. Thomas wished 
to prolong this line still further, and therefore or- 
dered out Schofield's corps, which marched behind 
Wood and Smith until it took position on Smith's 
right, facing the Hillsboro pike nearly opposite, 
and about a mile and a half west of Granny- 
White's house. The van of Wilson's cavalry then 
pushed forward to the Granny White pike. 

While these things were going on. Wood sent 
forward a single brigade, under Colonel Philip 
Sidney Post, to storm Montgomery Hill. This 
work was done quickly and well; the Outposts 
hill with its guns was soon in our t^^^en. 
hands, along with more prisoners than it was con- 
venient to handle. 

At about two p. M. the detached redoubts were 
stormed by some of Smith's infantry and Hatch's 
division of cavalry dismounted, and their cannon 
were turned upon the enemy. 

Next came Wood's assault in force upon Stew- 
art's angle at the stone wall. By four p. M. all the 
works here had been carried, and the Hood's left 
Confederate left wing was pushed off ^°g broken, 
the ground. Darkness soon stopped the fighting, 
and the men slept wherever they happened to be. 



356 The Mississip'pi Valley in the Civil War 

Stewart's corps had been driven southward two 
miles, and lay across the Granny White pike. At 
nightfall Hood withdrew Cheatham's corps from 
the Nolensville road, and transferred it to his left, 
facing Schofield. Stewart thus became the centre, 
and Lee was placed on his right, with wing refused 
Hood's new on Overton Hill. It was a stronger 
position. position than he had occupied in the 

morning, but his men were dispirited with the day's 
work, while Thomas's men, from the major-gen- 
erals down to the privates, were aglow with the 
instinct of victory, and felt themselves invincible. 

Strong as Hood's position was, its left wing was 
in danger of being turned by reason of Thomas's 
superior numbers, especially in his cavalry. On 
the morning of the 16th Thomas brought his 
forces close up to the enemy : Steedman on the 
left by the railway facing southward. Wood next, 
then Smith standing across the Granny White 
The salient pike, then Schofield parallel to the 
at Shy Hill. Hillsboro pike and facing eastward, 
finally Wilson's cavalry threatening the enemy's 
flank. In order to save this flank, it was necessary 
that it should be sharply refused, and thus a sali- 
ent was created at Shy Hill,^ the steep summit of 

^ So called after the gallant Colonel Shy of the 37th Georgia, 
slain there in the decisive charge which wrecked the Confederate 
left. 




NASHVILLE, DECEMBER i6, 1864 



Nashmlle 357 

whicli was fortified as well as haste would permit. 
Upon this salient Smith and Schofield set up a 
deadly cross-fire, enfilading the Confederate lines 
in two directions. 

So much time had been consumed in moving the 
troops into position over the execrably soft and 
uneven ground that noon was past before heavy 
fighting began. While Schofield and Smith were 
hammering at the salient upon Shy Hill, an at- 
tack was made upon the Confederate right wing at 
Overton Hill. Colonel Post, of Wood's corps, 
who had acquitted himself so nobly the day before, 
undertook to storm the enemy's en- ^, , 

trenchments. He was supported by upon Overton 
Thompson's brigade of coloured troops, ^ * 
from Steedman's division. The utmost bravery 
was shown, by negroes as well as by white men, 
but the assault met with a bloody repulse. Colo- 
nel Post received an ugly wound, and was made 
brigadier-general on the field for his gallantry. 
His unsuccessful assault was not without its effect 
upon the result of the battle. It made Hood 
uneasy about his right wing, so that he took one 
of Cheatham's divisions — the one formerly com- 
manded by Cleburne — and sent it to reinforce 
Lee's troops on Overton Hill. 

At the same time the pressure of the Union 
cavalry upon Chalmers grew so alarming that 



358 The Mississiijpi Valley in the Civil War 

Hood withdrew a brigade of infantry from Cheat- 
Total rout of ham in order to support Chahners. 
Hood's army, ^j these successive depletions Cheat- 
ham's line was weakened, and the angle upon Shy- 
Hill became so thin as to invite assault. There- 
upon one of Smith's brigades scrambled up the 
steep slope and with levelled bayonets drove the 
defenders from their works. At the same time a 
few pieces of Federal artillery, dragged up to an 
eminence that commanded Shy Hill, opened fire ; 
while a brigade of Hatch's cavalry rushed along 
the Granny White road and poured in a quick 
succession of volleys from their repeating rifles. 
Just then Thomas hurled forward the extreme 
right division of Schofield's corps, and in a few 
minutes the whole Confederate left had become a 
disorderly mob running wildly for the Franklin 
turnpike. This was the signal for a grand ad- 
vance along the whole Federal line. Stewart and 
Lee were driven back in utter confusion, and 
Steedman's negroes swept victorious over the hill 
which an hour before had so sternly repulsed them. 
Never was rout more complete and final than that 
of Hood. 

The pursuit was kept up for ten days, ending 
at the Tennessee river below Decatur, on the day 
after Christmas. The Union loss in killed and 
wounded, at the battle of Nashville, was about 



Nashville 359 

3000. The total Union loss in the whole cam- 
paio^n of five weeks was not more than ^, 

•^ ^ The pursuit 

6000. In warfare sound strategy and and the 
sound tactics are the great economizers ^'^^^®^- 
of human life. The Confederate loss in killed and 
wounded cannot be estimated with accuracy ; but 
during the battle and the pursuit Thomas reported 
the capture of at least 13,000 prisoners and 72 
cannon. The Confederate army in the West was 
virtually annihilated. Nashville was the most deci- 
sive victory gained by either side in the Civil War, 
and one of the most brilliant. 

The destruction of Hood's army enabled Sher- 
man to march northward from Savannah through 
the Carolinas, and the western situation was so 
simplified that Schofield's force was transferred 
from Thomas to Sherman. At the eleventh hour 
the Confederate government appointed Robert Lee 
its general-in-chief, and Lee appointed p j. o 
Joseph Johnston to command such Thomas's 
forces as could be scraped together ^^^*<^^y- 
to oppose Sherman. Of these there were about 
15,000 men (one third of them being the remnant 
of the Hood wreckage) to contend against Sher- 
man's 90,000. At Petersburg and Richmond, Lee, 
with about 60,000, was confronted by Grant, with 
125,000. When Sherman arrived at Raleigh, 



360 The Mississipin Valley in the Civil War 

within 120 miles of Lee, while Stoneman, seizing 
the railway between Lynchburg and Knoxville, cut 
off the possibility of retreat from Virginia into the 
Tennessee mountains, the Confederacy had evi- 
dently reached the last ditch. Lee's position, so 
long and so skilfully held, had become untenable. 
The only question was whether he should succumb 
right there, or, letting go Richmond, should unite 
his forces with those of Johnston. In the latter 
case the twain would have been crushed between 
the two great Union armie's as between the upper 
and the nether millstone. Should the Confed- 
eracy's two foremost heroes be vanquished sepa- 
rately or together? Sheridan's victory at Five 
Forks cut away the latter alternative, and virtu- 
ally ended the aggressive proceedings which began 
on the spring day in St. Louis when Grant and 
Sherman congratulated Lyon and Blair upon the 
capture of Camp Jackson. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Alexander, M3Ta, 16, 17. 
Amateur generalship, 204, 207, 208. 
Ammeu's brigade at Shiloh, 87. 
Antietam, battle of, 151. 
Arkansas, the ram, 139, 140. 
Arkansas Post, capture of, 205, 206. 
Athens, Alabama, punishment for the 

sack of, 158. 
Austerlitz, battle of, 98, 354. 

Bailey, Theodorus, 123, 127. 

Ball's Bluff, 50. 

Banks, N. P., in the Port Hudson 
campaign, 223, 226, 231, 234, 247. 

Baton Rouge, surrender of, 137. 

Bayous in the Mississippi valley, 180. 

Beauregard, G. T., 70-72; at Shiloh, 
84-94 ; 134-136, 145. 

Bell, Henry, 126. 

Belmont, battle of, 47-51. 

Big Bethel, 50. 

Big Black river, battle of, 239. 

Big Sunflower experiment at Vicks- 
burg, 218-220. 

Blair, Francis Preston, 1st, 8. 

Blair, Francis Preston, 2d, 8-22, 202. 

Blair, Francis Preston, 3d, 17. 

Blair, James, 8. 

Blair, Montgomery, 8, 116. 

Blockade of Confederacy's coast, 108. 

Bluffs on the Mississippi river, their 
military significance, 181. 

Blunt, J. G., 197. 

Booneville, skirmish at, 24. 

Border states, importance of, 2. 

Bowen, J. S., 229. 

Bowling Green, 52. 

Boyne, battle of, 41. 

Bragg, Braxton, 5, 70, 71 ; at Shiloh, 
79, 81, 88, 94, 96, 97 ; seizes Chat- 
tanooga, 145, 146 ; his invasion of 
Kentucky, 148-153 ; at Stone river, 
161-177 ; sends reinforcements to 
Pemberton, 197, 198 ; loses a golden 
opportunity before Chickamauga, 
265; besieges the Union army in 
Chattanooga, 282-292 ; what was he 
thinking of in sending Burnside into 
eastern Tennessee ? 293-297 ; super- 
seded by Johnston, 324. 



Brannan, J. M., at Chickamauga, 270, 

271. 
Breckinridge, John C, 42 ; at Shiloh, 

79, 94, 97; at Stone river, 162, 163, 

176. 
Brooklyn, the frigate, 117, 124. 
Brown's Ferry, scheme conceived and 

executed by W. F. Smith, 287-292. 
Buchanan, F., 110. 
Buchanan, James, 58. 
Buckner, S. B., 39, 42, 58-63. 
Buell, D. C, 54, 66, 72, 75, 76, 79, 

90-99, 133-147, 149-160 ; his alleged 

slowness, 144, 255, 296 ; punishes 

marauders, 158. 
Burnside, A. E., supersedes McClellan, 

156; 224; at Knoxville, 256, 257, 

284, 293, 295-297, 314. 
Butler, B. F., 115, 129-132. 

Cable, G. W., 128. 

Cairo, Illinois, military importance of, 
41. 

Caldwell, C. H. B., 122. 

Cambronne, 19. 

Camp Jackson, 13-20 ; hospitality at, 
15 ; surrender of, 19. 

Caroudelet, the gunboat, 104, 105, 139. 

Carthage, fight at, 25. 

Cavalry raids in Tennessee, 252, 253. 

Cayuga, the gunboat, 123, 124. 

Chalmers, George, and the rebel cav- 
alry at Nashville, 354, 357, 358. 

Champion's Hill, battle of, 238. 

Chancellorsville, battle of, 95. 

Channel sawed through forest at 
Island No. 10, 103. 

Chattanooga, importance of, 141-145 ; 
military importance of, 248 ; its 
political importance, 249. 

Chattanooga, battle of, 303-315 ; not 
fought as Grant had planned it, 
308 ; its brilliant tactics, 314, 322 ; 
its picturesqueness, 315 ; its great 
results, 316. 

Cheatham, B. F., at battle of Nash- 
ville, 351, 353, 354, 356-358. 

Cherub, the frigate, 115. 

Chickamauga, battle of, 267-280 ; the 
fatal order at, 270 ; rout of the right 



364 



Index 



wing, 272 ; army saved by Thomas, 
273-275; awful slaughter at, 279, 
280. 

Chickamauga valley, 260, 

Cleburne, Patrick, at Stone river, 

167, 168 ; 339 ; his charge at the 
battle of Frauklin, 342 ; killed at 
Franklin, 344. 

Columbus, Tennessee, fortified by 
Polk, 41. 

Confederate defensive line, the Ist, 
38, 52, 65. 

Confederate defensive line, the 2d, 
101 ; broken at Corinth, 136. 

Corinth, Mississippi, its military im- 
portance, 69 ; evacuation of, 134. 

Corse, J. M., his defence of the Alla- 
toona, 331. 

Cowpens, 249. 

Cox, Jacob, at battle of Franklin, 342. 

Crittenden, G. B., 39. 

Crittenden, J. J., 39. 

Crittenden, T. L., 39, 54; at Shiloh, 
93, 94, 96 ; at Stone river, 163, 169, 
173, 176 ; in the Chickamauga cam- 
paign, 265, 268, 272, 277 ; reUeved 
from command, 285 ; his character, 
286. 

Cruisers, Confederate, 111. 

Cumberland river, 45, 52. 

Curtis, S. R., 35-37. 

Davis, Charles, 136-139, 186. 

Davis, Jefferson, 57, 70, 85, 131, 155, 

196, 197, 267, 286, 306, 327. 
Davis, J. C, at Stone river, 162, 167, 

168, 171. 
Dodge, G. M., 187. 
Duncan, J. K., 119, 128. 

Ellet, Charles, 136. 

Ericsson, John, 117, 223. 

Essex, the frigate, at Valparaiso, 115. 

Essex, the ram, 139, 140. 

Fair Oaks, battle of, 327. 

Farragut, D. G., 115, 128, 186, 223, 
224. 

Floyd, John, 58-63. 

Foote, A. H.,56, 102,136. 

Forrest, N. B., 63, 149, 198, 205, 252, 
338 

Fort bonelson, 52, 56-66. 

Fort Henry, 52 ; capture of, 56. 

Fort Jackson, 117-121, 127, 129. 

Fort Pemberton, 217, 218. 

Fort Pillow, 46, 106; evacuation of, 136. 

Fort St. PhiUp, 117-121. 

Fort Sumter, faU of, 2. 

Forts on the Mississippi river, out- 
flanked by Grant's advance up the 
Tennessee, 190; importance of, in 
warfare, 191-194. 



Fox, G. v., 116. 

Frauklin, battle of, position of Scho- 
field's army at, 340 ; charge of Con- 
federates, 341 ; a critical moment, 
342 ; defeat of Confederates, 343 ; 
awful slaughter at, 344. 

Frederick the Great, 97, 163, 286. 

Fremont, J. C, 25, 26, 28-34 ; hia 
edict of emancipation, 29 ; 45, 225. 

Frost, D. M., 13-15, 19. 

Fullerton, J., at Missionary Ridge, 312. 

Gantt, T. T., 18, 19. 

Garfield, J. A.', at Chickamauga, 275- 
278. 

Gates, Horatio, 202. 

Geary, J. W., his part in the storming 
of Lookout Mountain, 305. 

Gettysburg, battle of, 98. 

Grand Gulf, evacuation of, 230. 

Granger, Gordon, 274, 278 ; placed in 
command of the two corps of Mc- 
Cook and Crittenden, 285 ; at Mis- 
sionary Ridge, 312. 

Granny White's house at battle of 
Nashville, 351, 355. 

Grant, U. S., 20 ; his early life, 43 ; 
made brigadier-general of voluneers, 
44 ; seizes Cairo and Paducah, 45; his 
remark on the battle of Belmont, 
51 ; his great victory at Fort Donel- 
son, 58-^5 ; made major-general of 
volunteers, 66 ; ill-treated by Hal- 
leck, 66-69 ; his love of whiskey, 69 ; 
at the battle of Shiloh, 71-100 ; in 
command at Corinth, 154, 155 ; his 
movements at and capture of Vicks- 
burg, 186-247 ; insecurity of his 
position at Oxford, 194 ; his retreat 
to Grand Junction, 200 ; his big 
ditch, 212 ; the critical moment in 
liis career, 230-234; appointed to 
command all the forces west of the 
AUeghanies, 285; his victory at 
Chattanooga, 303-315 ; appointed 
lieutenant-general with chief com- 
mand of the armies of the United 
States, 317-319 ; in his first Virginia 
campaign outgeneralled by Lee, 320; 
as a manoeuvrer, 321, 322; his impa- 
tience at the delay of Thomas in at- 
tacking Hood at Nashville, 346-349. 

Grierson, B. H., 234. 

Haines Bluff, fall of, 240. 

HaUeck, H. W., 34, 54 ; his unfair- 
ness to Grant, 66-69 ; 71, 133-136, 
138, 140-148, 153, 156, 157, 159; 
made general-in-chief,147 ; 186-189, 
195, 200, 203, 204, 206, 234 ; snubbed 
by Rosecrans, 254. 

Hamilton, Schuyler, 106 ; at Corinth, 
187. 



Index 



365 



Hampton Roads, naval battle in, 116. 

Hardee, W. J., at Sliiloh, 79, 94; at 
Stone river, 1G2. 

Harriet Lane, the sloop, 129. 

Hartford, the frigate, 117, 124,224. 

Harvey, W. S., 14, 22. 

Hazeu, William, seizes the heights at 
Brown's Ferry, 290 ; at Missionary 
Ridge, 313. 

Herron, F. J., 197. 

Hildebrand's brigade at Shiloh, 82. 

Hill, D. H., 2G5. 

Holly Springs, capture of, 198, 199. 

Hood, J. B., supersedes Johnston, 328; 
his early career, 328 ; his reputation 
as a fighter, 329 ; evacuates Atlanta, 
330 ; assumes the offensive, 331 ; his 
plan of invading Tennessee, 332, 
333 ; his fatal delay at Tuscumbia, 
333 ; his northward march, 337 ; ar- 
rival before Nashville, 344. 

Hooker, Joseph, sent with two corps 
to the relief of Chattanooga, 284 ; 
takes possession of Lookout valley 
and defeats Longstreet, 291 ; moves 
against Bragg's left at Rossville, 
300 ; storms Lookout Mountain, 
303-306 ; resigns and goes home, 
329. 

Hornet's Xest, the, at Shiloh, 84, 85, 
92. 

Howitzers and siege guns sent from 
Baton Rouge to St. Louis, 15. 

Hull, Isaac, 109. 

Hunter, David, 33, 225. 

Hurlbut, S. A., at battle of Shiloh, 
74, 83, 84, 86, 94 ; at Bolivar, 187 ; 
in the Vicksburg campaign, 208. 

Indianola, the ram, 222. 
Indians, in battle of Pea Ridge, 35. 
Island No. 10, 46, 101-106. 
Itasca, the gunboat, 122. 

Jackson, battle of, 236. 

Jackson, Andrew, 116, 127. 

Jackson, Claiborne, 10-22. 

Jackson, Stonewall, 264, 352. 

Jefferson Barracks, 19. 

Jefferson City, United States flag raised 
at, 23. 

Johnson, Andrew, 157, 158. 

Johnston, A. S., 53, 55, 56, 70, 72, 75, 
76, 81, 84-86; killed at Shiloh, 84; 
his tactical mistake there, 85. 

Johnston, J. E., 196, 197, 232-240, 
242-245, 247; his Atlanta campaign, 
324-327 ; a master of Fabian strat- 
egy, 325. 

Johnston, W. P., 55, 88. 

Katahdin, the gunboat, 123. 
Kenesaw Mountain, battle of, 327. 



Kentucky, importance of, in 1801, 5 ; 
her attempted attitude of neutrality, 
39 ; defect in Bragg's strategy in, 
152. 

Kineo, the gunboat, 123. 

Khig's Mountain, 249. 

Lake Providence experiment at Vicks- 
burg, 213, 214. 

Lee, R. E., small progress made 
against him, 7 ; 43, 148, 151, 264 ; 
the only way to dispose of him, 
323. 

Lee, S. D., at battle of Nashville, 351, 
354, 356-358. 

Lexington, Missouri, siege of, 30-32. 

Lexington, the gunboat, 86. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 8, 10, 12, 22, 29, 
39, 66, 68, 69, 108, 114, 151, 157, 
203-207, 225, 247, 285, 295, 331. 

LindeU's Meadow at St. Louis, 13. 

Logan, J. A., his journey to Louis- 
ville, 348. 

Longstreet, James, at Chickamauga, 

267, 269, 271, 275, 282; sent by 
Bragg into eastern Tennessee, 293- 
297, 314. 

Lookout Mountain, 258, 281 ; stormed 
by Hooker, 303-306. 

Louisiana, the ram, 119, 127, 129. 

Lovell, Mansfield, 119, 127. 

Lusk, W. H., 23. 

Lyon, Nathaniel, 10-28 ; visits Camp 
Jackson in disguise, 16, 17 ; his 
death, 27 ; great qualities, 28. 

McClellan, G. B., 34, 55, 67, 147, 148 ; 
superseded by Burnside, 156 ; 330. 

McClemand, J. A., 73, 77, 82, 83, 94, 
133 ; in the Vicksburg campaign, 
202-208 ; 225 ; dismissed the ser- 
vice, 244. 

McCook, A. McD., 54; at Shiloh, 94. 
96 ; at Stone river, 162, 165-169 ; 
in the Chickamauga campaign, 265- 

268, 272, 277; removed from com- 
mand, 285 ; his character, 286. 

McCuUough, B., 25, 26, 30; death of, 
36. 

McPherson, James, at Shiloh, 80 ; in 
the Vicksburg campaign, 208, 217, 
229, 230, 232, 235, 236, 238, 243 ; in 
the Atlanta campaign, 324-329. 

Madison, George, 17. 

Madison, James, Bishop of Virginia, 
17. 

Magoffin, B., 39, 42. 

Manassas, the ram, 119, 124-127. 

Marlborough's campaigns, 99. 

Maryland, important strategic position 
of, 5. 

Meade, G. G., 98, 284, 321. 

Memphis, capture of, 137 ; as a base 



366 



Index 



from which to advance against 
Vicksburg, 195. 

Merrimac, the ram, 117, 139. 

Miller, John, at Stone river, 176. 

Miller, P. T., 23. 

Mill Spring, battle of, 55, 

Minnesota, the frigate, 109. 

Missionary Ridge, 259. 

Mississippi, the sloop, 123, 124, 

Mississippi river, its physical charac- 
teristics, 179-181. 

Missouri, importance of, in 1861, 5, 6. 

Mitchel, O. M., 54; his raid in Ala- 
bama, 143. 

Mitchell, John, 119. 

Monitor, a dummy at Vicksburg, 222. 

Monitor, the, 139, 

Montgomery, Confederate surrender 
at Memphis, 137. 

Morgan, George, 143. 

Morgan, John H., 42, 149, 

Morton, OUver, 157, 158, 

Mule meat at Vicksburg, 245, 

Mulligan, Colonel, his gallant defence 
of Lexington, 31, 

Mumford, hanged by B. F. Butler for 
hauling down the Union flag, 129, 
130, 

Murfreesboro, situation of, 161. 

Murphy, Colonel, commander at Holly 
Springs, 199. 

Napoleon I,, 81, 97-99, 143, 166, 233, 

242, 247, 349, 
Napoleon III., 132, 
Nashville occupied by Buell's troops, 

64, 
Nashville, battle of, 1, 55; delayed by 

a great storm of snow and ice, 348; 

position of Union army, 350 ; posi- 
tion of the Confederate army, 351 ; 

result of the victory, 359, 360, 
Navigation laws. 111. 
Negley, J. S., at Stone river, 162, 163, 

169-172, 176 ; at Chickamauga, 270. 
Negro troops in battle of Nashville, 

357, 358. 
Nelson, Horatio, 110. 
Nelson, W., 40, 54 ; at Shlloh, 85, 87, 

90-96 ; 149. 
New Madrid, 46 ; surrender of, 102, 
New Orleans, military importance of, 

112. 
Nullification, 116. 

Oglesby, Richard J., 46. 
Oneida, the corvette, 123, 124. 
Opdycke, E., 339, 341. 
Ord, Edward, 154, 244. 

Palmer, J, M,, at Stone river, 162, 

163, 171-173, 175, 176. 
Palmerston, Lord, 111, 



Panic at the North in summer of 

1862, 151, 
Paris, Count of, on the Union position 

at Shiloh, 72 ; on the hanging of 

Mumford, 130 ; on the ettect of 

withdrawing McClellau's army from 

the James river, 148 ; on the charge 

of Thomas's men at Missionary 

Ridge, 312, 
Pea Ridge, battle of, 35-37, 197, 
Pemberton, J. C, supersedes Van 

Dorn, 155 ; 188, 195, 197, 198, 209, 

232, 233, 235-240, 242, 245-247, 
Pensacola, the sloop, 117, 123, 124. 
Perkins, G. H., 128. 
Perry, O. H., 109. 
Perry ville, battle of, 153. 
Petersburg, a point from which to 

operate against Richmond, 148. 
Phoebe, the frigate, 115. 
Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, 98. 
Pike, Albert, 36. 
Pillow, Gideon, 47, 58-63. 
Pinola, the gunboat, 122. 
Pittsburg, the gunboat, 105. 
Pittsburg Landing, 71-100, 133. 
Polk, J. K., 40. 
Polk, Leonidas, bishop and general, 

40 ; 47, 48, 70 ; at Shiloh, 79, 94 ; 

101 ; at Stone river, 162, 164, 173, 

176 ; at Chickamauga, 269. 
Pope, John, 31, 35, 44, 69 ; his capture 

of Island No. 10, 102-106 ; 133, 135, 

136, 147-149, 152, 156, 190, 321. 
Port Gibson, battle of, 229. 
Port Hudson, fortified by Van Dorn, 

140; its military value, 182, 183 ; its 

enormous strength, 184, 185. 
Porter, David, 114. 
Porter, D. D., 114, 116, 120-122, 128, 

129, 196, 219, 221-223, 227, 
Porter, Fitz John, a scapegoat for 

Pope, 156. 
Porter, W. D., 139. 
Post, P. S. , storms Montgomery Hill, 

355; is wounded on Overton HiU, 

357. 
Prairie Grove, battle of, 197. 
Prentiss, Benjamin, 35, 73, 78, 81-86, 

92. 
Price, Sterling, 21-25, 33, 154, 336. 
Pulpit Rock, 286, 306. 

Queen of the West, the ram, 221, 222. 

Rabbit, how to cook a, 246, 
Raccoon Mountain, 258, 261, 281, 
Railroads, inferior to rivers as lines of 
communication, 193 ; without them 
the United States could not have 
suppressed the Southern Confeder- 
acy, 193, 
Rawlins. John, 80. 



Index 



367 



Raymond, battle of, 236. 

Rebel flag hauled down at St. Louis, 
20. 

Renshaw, W. B., 124. 

Replevin, a writ of, 18. 

Reynolds, J. J., at Chickamauga, 270, 
271. 

Richmond, battle of, 149. 

Richmond, the frigate, 117. 

River fleet, importance of, 107, 108. 

Rivers, their importance aa lines of 
communication, 193. 

Roanoke, the frigate, 108. 

Roberts, G. W., at Stone river, 170. 

Ropes, J. C, 93, 97, 148, 152, 159, 335. 

Rosecrans, W. S., succeeds Pope at 
Corinth, 147 ; his battle at luka, 
154 ; his victory over Van Dorn at 
Corinth, 155 ; supersedes Buell, 160; 
his battle at Stone river, 161-177 ; 
manoeuvres Bragg out of Chatta- 
nooga, 226, 227 ; snubs Halleck, 254; 
seeds of disaster in his extension 
of front, 262-264; superseded by 
Thomas, 285. 

Round Forest, the, in the battle of 
Stone river, 173, 174. 

Rousseau, L. H., at Stone river, 162, 
163, 165, 171, 172. 

Rudge, Barnaby, 277. 

St. Louis, a committee of safety ap- 
pointed in, 12 ; Planters' Hotel at, 
22 ; U. S. arsenal at, 10, 13. 

Savannah, Tennessee, 71, 72, 74-77, 
79, 91, 92. 

Scapegoats for the disasters of 1862, 
156. 

Schofield, J. M., in the Atlanta cam- 
paign, 324-329 ; 335; crosses Duck 
river, 338 ; retreats from Franklin, 
338, 339 ; retreats upon Nashville, 
344; at battle of Nashville, 350, 
353-358. 

Scott, Winfield, 12, 34. 

Semmes, Raphael, 109. 

Seven Days' battles, the, 147. 

Seward, W. H., 108. 

Sheridan, Philip, at Stone river, 162, 
166, 168-171 ; at Chickamauga, 278 ; 
at Missionary Ridge, 313. 

Sherman, W. T., 20 ; at the battle of 
Shiloh, 73, 76-78, 82, 83, 92, 94, 99 ; 
on the reason why the Confederates 
were not pursued after Shiloh, 99 ; 
at Memphis, 187 ; his defeat at 
Chickasaw bayou, 200-202 ; in the 
Vicksburg campaign, 208-210, 219, 
226, 229, 232, 234-238, 240-244, 246 ; 
goes from Mississippi to the re- 
lief of Chattanooga, 295-297; his 
stealthy advance toward the north 
end of Missionary Ridge, 298, 299 ; 



reaches the north end of Missionary 
Ridge and finds it occupied by the 
enemy, 301-303 ; assaults the enemy 
before him, 308 ; his defence of 
Grant's hammering policy, 320 ; his 
Atlanta campaign, 323-330 ; leaves 
Hood and marches to the sea-coast, 
330. 

Shiloh, battle of, 71-100 ; terrible 
slaughter at, 99 ; significance of the 
battle, 100. 

Shy Hill, in battle of Nashville, 356- 
358. 

Sigel, Franz, 24-26. 

Sill, Joshua, 166. 

Simmons, Samuel, 14, 16, 17. 

Smith, A. J., moves from Missouri to 
reinforce Thomas, 336 ; his arrival 
at Nashville, 344 ; at battle of 
Nashville, 350, 354-358. 

Smith, C. F., 46, 58, 59, 62, 67, 68, 71, 
74 ; his charge at Fort Donelson, 62, 

Smith, E. K., 143, 146, 149, 150, 152. 

Smith, "W. F., called " Baldy," his 
beautiful scheme for raising the 
siege of Chattanooga, 287-292. 

Snake Creek Gap, where Sherman lost 
a golden opportunity, 325, 326. 

Stanley, David, 335, 338. 

Stanton, E. M., 185, 203. 

Steedman, J. B., 336. 

Stone, Henry, 339. 

Stone river, battle of, 161-177 ; Con- 
federate position at, 161, 162 ; Union 
position at, 162, 163 ; defect in 
the Union position at, 163-167 ; dis- 
astrous beginning, 168 ; the day 
saved by Sheridan, 169-171 ; and by 
Thomas, 172-174; Union victory, 
176 ; terrible slaughter at, 173, 177 ; 
results of, 178. 

Street car, colloquy in, 20. 

Taylor, Richard, 223. 

Tennessee river, 44, 52. 

Thomas, G. H., 54, 55 ; arrival at 
Shiloh, 97 ; refuses to take com- 
mand in place of Buell, 153 ; his 
high opinion of Buell, 159 ; at Chick- 
amauga, 268-270, 272-278; super- 
sedes Rosecrans, 285 ; captures 
Orchard Knob and neighbouring 
bills, 300; the charge of his men 
against Bragg' s centre on Missionary 
Ridge, 310-313 ; in the Atlanta cam- 
paign, 324 ; sent back to Nashville 
to look after Hood, 331 ; his forces, 
335-337 ; cause of his delay in at- 
tacking Hood at Nashville, 345 ; an- 
nihilates Hood's army at Nashville, 
350-359 ; result of the victory, 359, 
360 ; brilliancy of his tactics at 
Nashville, 354. 



368 



Index 



Tilghman, commandant of Port Henry, 

Tiptonville, 102, 105. 
Tyler, the gunboat, 86, 139. 

Ulm, 247. 

*' Unconditional surrender," 63, 65. 

Van Cleve, H. P., at Stone river, 163, 

168, 171, 172, 176. 
Van Dorn, E., 35, 71, 134, 138-140; 

left by Bragg to cover Vicksburg, 

145 ; superseded by Pemberton, 155 :, 

186, 234 ; captures Holly Springs, 

198, 199 ; death of, 253. 
Varuua, the corvette, 123, 124. 
Vicksburg, fortified by Van Dorn, 138; 

its military importance, 182, 183; 

its unapproachableness, 184, 185; 

assaults upon, 243; surrender of, 

246, 247. 
Virginia, importance of, in the Civil 

War, 2-4. 

Walke, Henry, 104. 
Wallace, Lew, 5, 58-62 ; at battle of 
ShUoh, 74, 77, 79-81, 90, 94-97 ; 133. 



Wallace, William, 74, 83 ; kiUed at 

Shiloh, 86. 
Warren, Joseph, 27. 
Webster, Daniel, 68. 
Welles, Gideon, 116. 
Wellington, Duke of, 191. 
Westfield, the gunboat, 124. 
West Virginia, beginning of, 3. 
Wheeler, Joseph, 283. 
WilUch, at Stone river, 167. 
Wilson, J. H., takes command of 

Thomas's cavalry, 336 ; his cavalry 

fight at Franklin, 343. 
Wilson's Creek, battle of, 26-28. 
Wissahickon, the gunboat, 123. 
" Woman order," so called, of B. P. 

Butler, 131. 
Wood, T. J., 54 ; arrival of, at Shiloh, 

97 ; at Stone river, 163, 168, 169, 

171 ; at Chickamauga, 270, 271 ; 

at Missionary Ridge, 313 ; at battle 

of NashviUe, 350, 351, 363-358. 

Tazoo Pass experiment at Vicksburg, 
214-218. 

ZoUicoffer, F. K., 41, 53, 55. 



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